Bradley K. Heppner v. Beneficient Company Holdings, L.P., Beneficient Company Group, L.L.C., and Beneficient f/k/a The Beneficient Company Group, L.P.
CourtCourt of Chancery of Delaware
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketC.A. No. 2026-0749-DH
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
Bradley K. Heppner, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
) C.A. No. 2026-0749-DH
Beneficient Company Holdings, L.P., )
Beneficient Company Group, L.L.C., and )
Beneficient, f/k/a The Beneficient )
Company Group, L.P., )
)
Defendants. )
)
)
REPORT
Report: November 20, 2026
Date Submitted: September 29, 2026.
Michael A. Barlow, Judrick Fletcher, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART AND
SULLIVAN LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Attorneys for Plaintiff Bradley K.
Heppner.
Stephen C. Norman, Ellis H. Huff, POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware; Attorneys for Defendants Beneficient Company Group,
L.L.C., Beneficient Company Holdings, L.P., and Beneficient f/k/a The Beneficient
Company Group, L.P.
HUME, IV, M.
Pot-Limit Omaha, better known as PLO, differs from Texas Hold’em poker
by dealing each player four private cards rather than two, creating nearly three times
as many possible five-card combinations. But, as any seasoned PLO player will tell
you, more cards do not guarantee a winning hand. The same principle applies here,
where a corporate founder, convicted of defrauding others of over a hundred million
dollars, seeks advancement of his legal fees and expenses under multiple contractual
sources. Each source presents a potential path to advancement. But a multitude of
sources does not assure the outcome. Each must independently satisfy its governing
requirements.
Although the relevant governing documents originally selected Delaware as
their forum, two sources now point to Nevada. The parties dispute the proper forum
and whether the requisite causal nexus exists between the founder’s corporate roles
and his criminal conduct. I find that two of the four alleged sources remain subject
to Delaware jurisdiction and that the founder has established the required nexus
under both. But this winning hand comes with a catch: both agreements contain
insolvency provisions that may relieve the obligated entities of their duty to advance
the plaintiff’s legal fees and expenses. Whether those provisions excuse
performance remains to be determined through the Fitracks process.
1
I. BACKGROUND1
A. The Parties
Bradley Heppner (the “Plaintiff”) was the Founder, Chief Executive Officer,
and Chairman of Defendant Beneficient.2 Beneficient consists of three separate
entities: Beneficient Holdings, L.P. (“BCH”), Beneficient Company Group, L.L.C.
(“BCG”), and Beneficient f/k/a Beneficient Company Group, L.P. (“BEN”)
(collectively, “Beneficient” or “Defendants”).3
BEN is a Nevada corporation but was a Delaware limited partnership prior to
its June 2023 conversion.4 BEN is also the managing member of BCG.5 BCH is a
Delaware limited partnership, and served as the primary holding company of
1
I draw the following facts from the pleadings and other documents of record. Unless
otherwise noted, pleadings and their associated declarations and exhibits are cited by
reference to items docketed in C.A. No. 2026-0749-DH. Citations are to Plaintiff’s
Verified Complaint for Advancement (“Compl.”), available at Docket Item (“D.I.”) 1;
Defendants’ Opening Brief in Support of Their Motion to Stay or Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint (“MTD OB”), available at D.I. 11; Plaintiff’s Answering Brief in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion to Stay or Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (“MTD AB”), available at
D.I. 17; Plaintiff’s Opening Brief in Support of His Motion for Summary Judgment for
Advancement (“MSJ POB”), available at D.I. 18; Defendants’ Reply Brief in Support of
Their Motion to Stay or Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (“MTD RB”), available at D.I. 22;
Defendants’ Opening Brief in Support of Their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and
Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“MSJ DOB”), available at D.I. 23;
and the transcript of oral argument on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint in the parallel Nevada Action (“NV Tr.”), available at D.I. 46, Ex. A.
2
Compl. ¶ 11.
3
Id. p. 1.
4
Id. ¶ 7.
5
Id. ¶ 14.
2
Beneficient’s subsidiaries.6 BCG is a Delaware limited liability company, a
subsidiary of BEN, and currently serves as the general partner of BCH.7 BCG held
all of the limited partnership interests in BCH.8
B. Beneficient’s Beginnings and the Need for Funding
Heppner created Beneficient with the purpose of offering liquidity solutions
to people and institutions holding illiquid alternative assets, which at the time, left
investors without any exit opportunities.9 Beneficient’s business model centered on
acquiring and holding illiquid assets and their associated indirect economic rights in
related trust structures.10 In turn, Beneficient sought to generate fees and interest
income from those trusts, a strategy that required substantial capital.11 In 2017,
Beneficient reorganized its capital structure and established a $141 million senior
debt owed to HCLP Nominees, LLC (“HCLP”).12 HCLP is a shell company that
operated through Heppner’s family office for his personal benefit.13
6
Id. ¶ 12.
7
Id. ¶ 13.
8
Id.
9
Id. ¶ 21.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. ¶ 24.
13
MTD OB pp. 4–5.
3
In 2018, GWG Holdings, Inc. (“GWG”) acquired certain Beneficient common
units via private auction.14 GWG agreed to provide debt financing, cash, and stock
to Beneficient throughout 2018.15 Beneficient subsequently disclosed the HCLP
debt to GWG, as well as Heppner’s affiliation with HCLP.16 In April 2019, Heppner
became chairman and a director of GWG’s board of directors.17 Because of the
overlap between GWG’s and Beneficient’s boards, GWG established a Special
Committee composed of independent directors with the purpose of evaluating and
approving transactions between the two companies.18
From May 2019 through May 2021, GWG’s Special Committee approved
numerous investments in Beneficient, including a $65 million capital infusion to
Beneficient structured as an unsecured loan, a $79 million equity investment in
Beneficient with $50 million allocated toward repayment of the HCLP debt, and a
$61 million equity investment with $28 million designated for repayment of the
HCLP debt.19
C. Heppner’s Resignation and the Department of Justice Litigation
14
Compl. ¶ 23.
15
Id.
16
Id. ¶ 24.
17
Id. ¶ 25.
18
Id.
19
Id. ¶ 27.
4
In 2020, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) launched an
investigation into GWG, focusing on its transactions with Beneficient.20 Several
years later, in June 2025, Heppner resigned as Beneficient’s Chief Executive Officer
and Chairman of the Board of Directors.21
On October 8, 2025, the United States Department of Justice (the “DOJ”)
indicted Heppner in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York.22 The indictment charged Heppner with conspiracy to commit wire fraud,
wire fraud, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, making false statements to
auditors, and making false entries in records.23 The DOJ alleged that Heppner
misrepresented material information to GWG’s Special Committee to induce it to
approve investments in Beneficient between May 2019 and March 2021.24 The DOJ
further alleged that, at Heppner’s direction, Beneficient falsified documents naming
Heppner’s friend as HCLP’s manager to conceal Heppner’s actual control over
20
Id. ¶ 28.
21
Id. ¶ 29.
22
Id. ¶ 30.
23
Id.
24
Id. ¶ 32.
5
HCLP.25 The DOJ also alleged that Heppner falsified Beneficient’s October 2019
board meeting minutes, but ultimately dismissed the related charges.26
Heppner’s criminal trial began in April 2026. Following trial, the jury found
Heppner guilty on four of the five counts in the indictment.27 On May 5, 2026,
Heppner sent Beneficient’s counsel a formal written demand seeking advancement
of his legal fees and expenses incurred in defending the DOJ action.28 Under the
Ninth Amended and Restated Limited Partnership Agreement of BCH (the “BCH
LP Agreement”) BCH must promptly pay expenses and attorney fees incurred in
connection with defending any suit within 30 days of the written demand.29 This
meant that Heppner could take no action while he waited for a response. Within this
30-day advancement window, Beneficient instead filed a declaratory judgment
action in Nevada state court, seeking a declaration that Heppner had no right to
advancement in connection with the DOJ action.30
D. The Purported Sources of Advancement
25
Id. ¶¶ 32–33.
26
Id. ¶¶ 34–35.
27
Id. ¶ 35.
28
Id. ¶ 76.
29
Id. Ex. A § 10.02(c).
30
Compl. ¶ 79.
6
Heppner contends that he is entitled to advancement from four sources: (1)
the Second Amended and Restated Limited Partnership Agreement of BEN (the
“BEN LP Agreement”) and BEN Bylaws; (2) the BCH LP Agreement; (3) the
Second Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement of BCG (the
“BCG LLC Agreement”); and (4) the First and Second Amended and Restated
Services Agreements (together, the “Services Agreements”).
1. The BEN LP Agreement and Bylaws
a. The Pre-Conversion BEN LP Agreement
The BEN LP Agreement defines “Indemnitee” to include officers and
directors of the General Partner.31 Section 7.7(a) governs indemnification and
provides coverage for losses, liabilities, and expenses arising from proceedings in
which an Indemnitee is involved, or threatened to be involved, by reason of their
status as Indemnitee.32 This protection extends to civil, criminal, administrative, and
investigative proceedings, regardless of whether the underlying conduct occurred
before or after the agreement’s execution.33 Indemnification is unavailable,
however, if:
(A) there has been a final and non-appealable judgment entered by a
court of competent jurisdiction determining that in respect of the matter
31
Id. Ex. C § 1.1(f).
32
Id. § 7.7(a).
33
Id.
7
for which the Indemnitee is seeking indemnification pursuant to this
Section 7.7, the Indemnitee acted or omitted from acting in bad faith or
engaged in fraud or willful misconduct[.]34
Section 7.7(b) governs the advancement of expenses, and reads
(b) To the fullest extent permitted by law, expenses (including legal
fees and expenses) incurred by an Indemnitee who is indemnified
pursuant to Section 7.7(a) in appearing at, participating in or defending
any claim, demand, action, suit or proceeding shall, from time to time,
be advanced by the Partnership prior to a final and non-appealable
determination that the Indemnitee is not entitled to be indemnified upon
receipt by the Partnership of an undertaking by or on behalf of the
Indemnitee to repay such amount if it ultimately shall be determined
that the Indemnitee is not entitled to be indemnified as authorized in
this Section 7.7. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, except as
otherwise provided in Section 7.7G) [sic], the Partnership shall be
required to indemnify a Person described in such sentence in
connection with any claim, demand, action, suit or proceeding (or part
thereof) commenced by such Person only if (x) the commencement of
such claim, demand, action, suit or proceeding (or part thereof) by such
Person was authorized by the General Partner or (y) there has been a
final and non-appealable judgment entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction determining that such Person was entitled to
indemnification by the Partnership pursuant to Section 7.7(j).35
Section 7.7(c) provides that the indemnification rights established by Section
7.7 are in addition to any other rights available to an Indemnitee under an agreement,
insurance policy, vote of the holders of Outstanding Voting Units, law, equity, or
otherwise.36 These rights extend to actions taken both in the Indemnitee’s official
34
Id.
35
Id. § 7.7(b).
36
Id. § 7.7(c).
8
capacity and in other capacities, and continue after the Indemnitee ceases serving in
that capacity.37
Section 16.9 contains a forum-selection clause providing that:
[A]ny claims, suits, actions or proceedings arising out of or relating in
any way to this Agreement or any partnership interest . . . (regardless
of whether such Disputes . . . are based on common law, statutory,
equitable, legal or other grounds, or . . . are derivative or direct claims)
. . . shall be exclusively brought in the Court of Chancery of the State
of Delaware or, if such court does not have subject matter jurisdiction
thereof, any other court located in the State of Delaware with Subject
matter jurisdiction.38
b. The Post-Conversion BEN Bylaws
On June 6, 2023, BEN converted from a Delaware limited partnership to a
Nevada corporation by filing a Certificate of Conversion with the Delaware
Secretary of State.39 The Certificate of Conversion preserves service of process in
Delaware for proceedings involving obligations BEN incurred as a Delaware limited
partnership and irrevocably appoints the Delaware Secretary of State as BEN’s agent
for service of process in those proceedings.40 Following the conversion, BEN
adopted new bylaws.41
37
Id.
38
Id. § 16.9.
39
Id. Ex. I pp. 1–2.
40
Id. p. 2, ¶ 5.
41
Compl. ¶ 48.
9
Article VIII of the BEN Bylaws provides indemnification and advancement
rights to covered directors, officers, and employees of the corporation.42 Section
8.1(a)(ii) requires Beneficient to indemnify Indemnitees, to the fullest extent
permitted by Nevada law, against expenses, liabilities, and losses reasonably
incurred in connection with covered proceedings, subject to specified limitations.43
Section 8.1(a)(iv) governs advancement and provides that an Indemnitee’s
expenses “must be paid by the Corporation or through insurance purchased and
maintained by the Corporation . . . as such expenses are incurred and in advance of
the final disposition of the Proceeding,” upon receipt of an undertaking to repay
those amounts if a court ultimately determines that the Indemnitee is not entitled to
indemnification.44 The same provision further requires Beneficient to indemnify an
Indemnitee who is “successful on the merits or otherwise” in defending a
proceeding, or any claim, issue, or matter therein, for attorneys’ fees and expenses
actually and reasonably incurred in that defense.45
Like Section 7.7(b) of the BEN LP Agreement, Section 8.1(a)(iv) of the BEN
Bylaws provides for the advancement of expenses before final disposition of the
42
Id. Ex. D § 8.1(a)(i), (iv).
43
Id. § 8.1(a)(ii).
44
Id. § 8.1(a)(iv).
45
Id.
10
proceeding.46 The BEN Bylaws also specify that expenses must be paid as incurred
and that repayment depends on an ultimate determination by a court of competent
jurisdiction.47 Section 8.1(a)(iii) preserves indemnification rights after an
Indemnitee ceases serving in a covered capacity, while Section 8.1(c) provides that
the indemnification and advancement rights afforded under Article VIII are
nonexclusive of other available rights.48
The conversion also introduced a different forum-selection provision. While
Section 16.9 of the BEN LP Agreement designates the Delaware Court of Chancery,
or another Delaware court where appropriate, as the exclusive forum for covered
disputes, Article XIII of the BEN Charter designates the Eighth Judicial District
Court of Clark County, Nevada as the exclusive forum for derivative actions,
fiduciary duty claims, disputes arising under Nevada law or the corporation’s
governing documents, and claims governed by the internal affairs doctrine, unless
the corporation consents in writing to an alternative forum.49
2. The BCH LP Agreement
46
Compl. Ex. C § 7.7(b); Ex. D § 8.1(a)(iv).
47
Compl. Ex. D § 8.1(a)(iv).
48
Id. § 8.1(a)(iii), (c).
49
MTD OB Ex. 6 Art. XIII.
11
The BCH LP Agreement defines “Indemnitee” broadly to include the
partnership’s general partner, certain current and former officers and directors,
limited partners, persons serving other entities at the General Partner’s request, and
persons designated by the General Partner in its reasonable discretion.50
Section 10.02(a) grants Indemnitees indemnification rights to the fullest
extent permitted by law for proceedings arising “by reason of his or her status as
Indemnitee or by reason of any action alleged to have been taken or omitted to be
taken by [the] Indemnitee in such capacity.”51 The provision excludes
indemnification following a final, nonappealable judgment establishing bad faith,
fraud, willful misconduct, or, in criminal matters, knowing unlawful conduct.52
Section 10.02(e) further provides that “[t]he rights of indemnification in this Section
10.02 shall neither be exclusive of, nor be deemed in limitation of, any rights to
which any person may otherwise be or become entitled or permitted by contract, this
Agreement or as a matter of law[.]”53
Section 10.02(b) governs advancement, and requires BCH to “promptly pay
expenses (including attorneys’ fees)” incurred by an Indemnitee “in appearing at,
50
Compl. Ex. A § 1.01.
51
Id. § 10.02(a).
52
Id.
53
Id. § 10.02(e).
12
participating in or defending any action, suit or proceeding in advance of the final
disposition of such action, suit or proceeding,” including appeals, upon presentation
of an undertaking to repay the amounts advanced if the Indemnitee is ultimately
determined not to be entitled to indemnification.54
Unlike the advancement provisions discussed above, Section 10.02(f)
expressly limits BCH’s indemnification and advancement obligations to the extent
that the Partnership “will remain solvent, as determined by the General Partner in its
reasonable discretion, after payment of such obligations,” and provides that
“thereafter any such obligation shall terminate.”55
Section 11.10 governs dispute resolution. Although Section 11.10(a)
generally requires covered disputes to be resolved through arbitration in
Wilmington, Delaware, Sections 11.10(b) and (c) designate the Delaware Court of
Chancery as the exclusive judicial forum for specified proceedings in aid of
arbitration and for disputes determined not to be subject to arbitration or where the
arbitration provision is not enforced.56
3. The BCG LLC Agreement
54
Id. § 10.02(b).
55
Id. § 10.02(f).
56
Id. § 11.10(a)–(c).
13
Under the BCG LLC Agreement, “Indemnitee” is defined to include “any
Person who is or was . . . an officer or director of the Managing Member, any former
Managing Member or any Group Member.”57 Under Section 7.6(a), BCG must
indemnify qualifying Indemnitees for expenses and liabilities arising from
threatened, pending, or completed proceedings, including criminal proceedings, by
reason of their status as Indemnitees.58 Indemnification is unavailable, however, if
a final, nonappealable judgment determines that the Indemnitee acted in bad faith,
engaged in fraud or willful misconduct, or in a criminal matter, acted with
knowledge that the conduct was unlawful.59
Section 7.6(b) governs advancement and provides that
[t]o the fullest extent permitted by law, expenses (including legal fees
and expenses) incurred by an Indemnitee who is indemnified pursuant
to Section 7.6(a) in appearing at, participating in or defending any
claim, demand, action, suit, or proceeding shall, from time to time, be
advanced by the Company prior to a final and non-appealable
determination that the Indemnitee is not entitled to be indemnified upon
receipt by the Company of an undertaking by or on behalf of the
Indemnitee to repay such amount if it ultimately shall be determined
that the Indemnitee is not entitled to be indemnified as authorized in
this Section 7.6.60
57
Id. Ex. B § 1.1.
58
Id. § 7.6(a).
59
Id.
60
Id. § 7.6(b).
14
Thus, advancement requires an undertaking to repay the amounts advanced if the
Indemnitee ultimately is determined not to be entitled to indemnification.61 Section
7.6(c) provides that the indemnification rights are nonexclusive of other rights
available under agreements, insurance, law, equity, or otherwise, and continue after
an Indemnitee ceases to serve in that capacity.62 Further, Section 7.6(j) permits an
Indemnitee to sue for unpaid advancement if a written claim remains unpaid for
thirty days and places the burden of proving nonentitlement on BCG.63
Like the BCH LP Agreement, the BCG LLC Agreement contains a solvency
limitation, which reads:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary set forth in this Section 7.6,
any indemnification or advancement obligation of the Company under
this Agreement shall only be satisfied to the extent that the Company
will remain solvent, as determined by the Managing Member, after
payment of such obligations, and thereafter any such obligation shall
terminate.64
Section 15.9 also contains a forum-selection clause, which provides that covered
disputes, unless the Managing Member agrees otherwise in writing, “shall be
exclusively brought in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware or, if such
61
Id.
62
Id. § 7.6(c).
63
Id. § 7.6(j).
64
Id. § 7.6(l).
15
court does not have subject matter jurisdiction thereof, any other court located in the
State of Delaware with subject matter jurisdiction.”65
4. The Services Agreements
The First Services Agreement, later amended in 2022, became effective June
1, 2017, and identifies four contracting entities: Bradley Capital Company, L.L.C.
(“Bradley Capital”), BCG, BCH, and Beneficient Management Counselors, L.L.C.66
Effective June 6, 2023, the Second Services Agreement replaced the First Services
Agreement and identified BEN in place of BCG.67
Both agreements contain substantially identical advancement provisions
under Section 6.3(b), requiring the Firm under the First Services Agreement, and the
Company under the Second Services Agreement, to pay or cause a Group member
to pay qualifying Indemnitees’ expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees,
incurred in defending and investigating civil or criminal proceedings before their
final disposition.68 Both condition advancement on an undertaking to repay those
amounts if a final adjudication establishes that the Indemnitee is not entitled to
65
Id. § 15.9.
66
Id. Ex. E pmbl. & recitals. Bradley Capital Company received payment for Plaintiff’s
executive duties.
67
Id. Ex. F pmbl. & recitals.
68
Compl. Ex. E § 6.3(b); Ex. F § 6.3(b).
16
indemnification.69 Similarly, Section 6.3(c) of both agreements establishes an order
of priority for potentially duplicative indemnification payments, placing primary
liability on the Firm or Company, respectively, and secondary liability on applicable
Group members.70
The agreements differ, however, in their governing-law and forum-selection
provisions.71 Section 7.3(a) of the First Services Agreement selects Delaware law,
while Section 7.3(b) requires covered proceedings to be brought in the state or
federal courts located in New Castle County, Delaware.72 By contrast, Section 7.3(a)
of the Second Services Agreement selects Nevada law, while Section 7.3(b) provides
that the parties “submit and consent to the exclusive jurisdiction, including removal
jurisdiction, of the state and federal courts located in Clark County, Nevada for any
action or proceeding relating to this Agreement or the provision of the Services.”73
E. Procedural Posture
Heppner filed a Verified Complaint for Advancement on June 5, 2026. 74
Beneficient moved for dismissal on June 19, to which Heppner responded by moving
69
Compl. Ex. E § 6.3(b); Ex. F § 6.3(b).
70
Compl. Ex. E § 6.3(c); Ex. F § 6.3(c).
71
Compl. Ex. E § 7.3(a)–(b); Ex. F § 7.3(a)–(b).
72
Compl. Ex. E § 7.3(a)–(b).
73
Id. Ex. F § 7.3(a)–(b).
74
Compl.
17
for summary judgment.75 Beneficient then cross-moved for summary judgment.76 I
held oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss and Cross Motions for Summary
Judgment on September 29.77 During oral argument, Plaintiff presented information
challenging Defendants’ insolvency claim. Defendants objected to this information.
On October 16, Plaintiff’s counsel wrote to the Court with an update.78 There,
Plaintiff responds to Beneficient’s claims that paying advancement would render
BCH and BCG insolvent.
Beneficient also informed the court that Quinn Emanuel sought and ultimately
obtained permission to withdraw as Heppner’s counsel in the DOJ litigation
following a “fundamental disagreement” and an “irreconcilable conflict” concerning
Heppner’s sentencing.79 Beneficient argues that this development moots the present
advancement action.80 Beneficient further contends that Heppner’s request for
coverage under its 2019 directors’ and officers’ liability insurance tower could also
moot this action if the insurers provide coverage.81 Alternatively, Beneficient
75
D.I. 11, 18.
76
D.I. 23.
77
See D.I. 38.
78
D.I. 39.
79
D.I. 40 p. 2.
80
Id. p. 3.
81
D.I. 40 p. 3.
18
requests that the Court stay this action pending the insurers’ coverage
determination.82
On October 20, 2026, the Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County,
Nevada heard oral argument on Heppner’s and Bradley Capital Company, LLC’s
motion to dismiss Beneficient’s First Amended Complaint.83 Heppner argued that
the claims concerning BCG and BCH belonged in Delaware because separate
agreements containing Delaware forum-selection clauses governed those entities.84
He maintained that the Second Services Agreement neither superseded those
agreements nor extinguished the subsidiaries’ independent advancement
obligations.85 As to the claims concerning Beneficient, Heppner argued that his
advancement rights accrued when the underlying conduct occurred, before
Beneficient converted to a Nevada corporation, and that the conversion did not
eliminate his right to pursue those claims in Delaware.86
Beneficient contended that its current governing documents designate Nevada
as the proper forum and that the Second Services Agreement required Heppner to
82
Id.
83
D.I. 41.
84
NV Tr. 7:18–8:16.
85
Id. 9:16–11:20.
86
Id. 14:10–17:13.
19
pursue advancement from the parent company before seeking payment from its
subsidiaries.87 The court largely denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the
Nevada forum-selection provisions supported jurisdiction over the claims
concerning Beneficient and BCH.88 At the same time, the court granted the motion
to dismiss Count III, concerning BCG, in light of BCG’s forum-selection
provision.89
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Motion to Dismiss
There are four potential sources of advancement: the BEN LP Agreement90
and BEN Bylaws91; the BCH LP Agreement92; the BCG LLC Agreement93; and the
Services Agreements.94 The parties disagree about the applicable forum provisions
between the BEN LP Agreement and the BEN Bylaws, and the First and Second
Services Agreements. I first address Defendants’ Motion to Stay or Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint. Defendants contend that forum-selection provisions in the
87
Id. 20:20–21:16, 20:20–26:19.
88
Id. 33:19–35:10.
89
Id. 35:11–22.
90
Compl. Ex. C.
91
Id. Ex. D.
92
Id. Ex. A.
93
Id. Ex. B.
94
Id. Exs. E, F.
20
BEN Charter95 and the Second Services Agreement96 apply and make Nevada the
appropriate forum. Plaintiff argues that Delaware was preserved as the forum in the
BEN LP Agreement97 and First Services Agreement.98
“The proper procedural rubric for addressing a motion to dismiss based on a
forum-selection clause is found under Rule 12(b)(3), improper venue. Although
Delaware courts have, in the past, framed a forum-selection clause analysis as
jurisdictional in some sense, recent cases have all proceeded under Rule 12(b)(3).”
In re Bay Hills Emerging P'rs I, L.P., 2018 WL 3217650, at *4 (Del. Ch. July 2,
2018) (quoting Bonanno v. VTB Hldgs., Inc., 2016 WL 614412, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb.
8, 2016)). The Court applies an approach similar to Rule 12(b)(6) when considering
a motion to dismiss for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3). Simon v. Navellier
Series Fund, 2000 WL 1597890, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 2000). However, “the court
is not shackled to the plaintiff's complaint and is permitted to consider extrinsic
evidence from the outset.” Bay Hills, 2018 WL 3217650, at *2 (quoting Troy Corp.
v. Schoon, 2007 WL 949441, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 26, 2007)). The standard for a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion is familiar to the parties:
95
MTD OB Ex. 6.
96
Compl. Ex. F.
97
Id. Ex. C.
98
Id. Ex. E.
21
(i) all well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true; (ii) even
vague allegations are ‘well-pleaded’ if they give the opposing party
notice of the claim; (iii) the Court must draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the non-moving party; and [(iv)] dismissal is inappropriate
unless the “plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any
reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.”
Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896–97 (Del. 2002) (citation modified).
The reasonable conceivability standard grants a plaintiff all “reasonable
inferences that logically flow from the face of the complaint” but does not obligate
the Court “to accept every strained interpretation of [plaintiff’s allegations].” In re
Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig., 897 A.2d 162, 168 (Del. 2006) (quoting
Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1083 (Del. 2001)). The Court will “ignore
conclusory allegations that lack specific supporting factual allegations.” Ramunno
v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 1034 (Del. 1998).
B. Nevada Is the Proper Forum Under the BEN Bylaws, BEN
Charter, and BEN LP Agreement.
The BEN LP Agreement’s forum-selection provision required that
proceedings arising out of the Agreement be brought in the Delaware Court of
Chancery, or if the Court of Chancery lacked subject matter jurisdiction, another
Delaware court having subject matter jurisdiction.99 When BEN converted from a
Delaware limited partnership to a Nevada corporation, it filed a Certificate of
99
Compl. Ex. C § 16.9.
22
Conversion.100 This provision permitted service of process in Delaware for suits
arising from obligations BEN LP incurred while organized as a Delaware limited
partnership.101 As a Nevada corporation, BEN has a charter that provides forum
selection in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County, Nevada, for actions,
suits, or proceedings brought to interpret, apply, enforce, or determine the validity
of the charter’s articles or BEN Bylaws.102 BEN’s Bylaws provided for
indemnification and advancement.103
Plaintiff contends that since the underlying conduct arose pre-conversion, the
BEN LP Agreement forum-selection provisions apply. In support, he points to 6
Del. C. § 17-219(g):
The conversion of a limited partnership out of the State of Delaware in
accordance with this section and the resulting cessation of its existence
as a limited partnership of the State of Delaware pursuant to a certificate
of conversion to non-Delaware entity shall not be deemed to affect any
obligations or liabilities of the limited partnership incurred prior to such
conversion or the personal liability of any person incurred prior to such
conversion, nor shall it be deemed to affect the choice of law applicable
to the limited partnership with respect to matters arising prior to such
conversion.
100
Id. Ex. I.
101
Id.
102
MTD OB Ex. 6.
103
Compl. Ex. D § 8.1(a)(i)–(iv).
23
Plaintiff also points to this Court’s ruling in Bernstein v. TractManager, where the
Court held that “the right to indemnification or advancement for claims that arose
during the life of the LLC continues to be governed by the terms of the old operating
agreement.” 953 A.2d 1003, 1005 (Del. Ch. 2007).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has no vested forum right and that the BEN
Charter and Bylaws governing at the time his advancement rights arose determine
the appropriate forum. See Sylebra Cap. P’rs Master Fund, Ltd. v. Perelman, 2020
WL 5989473, at *10 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2020) (stating that forum-selection bylaws,
like other forum-selection clauses, are presumed valid and enforceable); City of
Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 241 (Del. Ch. 2014)
(providing that forum-selection bylaws regulate where a suit may be filed, not
whether a party may file suit or what type of remedy the party may receive).
Plaintiff’s cited authority is inapposite. Under 6 Del. C. § 17-219, conversion
does not affect the obligations or liabilities of the transitioning limited partnership.
So too here. Indemnification and advancement obligations found under the BEN LP
Agreement are preserved. The company still has an obligation to provide
indemnification and advancement as before. But forum selection is not an
obligation. As this Court held in City of Providence, forum-selection clauses
regulate the location of the action, not viability or remedies. City of Providence, 99
A.3d at 241. And the Plaintiff has no vested right to a particular forum. The
24
conversion from Delaware LP to Nevada corporation also brought with it an
amendment to the forum-selection clause. “[T]his Court has held that where a
corporation's by-laws put all on notice that the by-laws may be amended at any time,
no vested rights can arise that would contractually prohibit an amendment.” Kidsco
v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995) (citing Roven v. Cotter, 547 A.2d
603, 608 (Del. Ch. 1988)). Plaintiff knew that the forum could change. Indeed, not
only was Plaintiff aware, but he signed the Certificate of Conversion and is listed on
BEN’s charter.104
Plaintiff argues that the Certificate of Conversion makes Delaware the forum
for suits against the former BEN because, in compliance with 6 Del. C. § 17-
219(e)(6), it allows service of process on the former BEN in Delaware and names
the Secretary of State as its agent to accept service. The Plaintiff conflates service
of process with forum selection and offers no authority to suggest that service of
process affects forum selection. The service of process requirement does not
mandate that Delaware is the required forum for litigation. The certificate of
conversion’s service of process requirement ensures that the LP remains amenable
to suit in Delaware for pre-conversion acts. While this presumes that Delaware is
the forum, it does not guarantee that it will remain so. Parties may choose a different
104
Compl. Ex. I; MTD OB Ex. 6.
25
forum. “Delaware courts afford a great deal of respect to a plaintiff's choice of
forum, and this respect should be even more stalwart where both parties have agreed
in advance to a forum by contractual provision.” Aveta v. Colon, 942 A.2d 603, 607
(Del. Ch. 2008) (footnote and citations omitted). “To escape the reach of a forum
selection clause on grounds that it is unreasonable or unjust, the avoiding party
‘bears a heavy burden to demonstrate that enforcement here would place it at an
unfair disadvantage or otherwise deny it its day in court.’” Mack v. Rev. Worldwide,
Inc., 2020 WL 7774604, at *6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 2020) (quoting Sylebra Cap. P’rs
Master Fund Ltd. v. Perelman, 2020 WL 5989473, at *11 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2020)).
Plaintiff has made no argument that it is unreasonable or unjust here. The forum-
selection clause is valid, and Nevada is the chosen forum.
C. Nevada Is the Proper Forum Under the First and Second Services
Agreements.
BEN executed the First Services Agreement with Bradley Capital on June 1,
2017.105 The First Services Agreement provides indemnification and advancement
rights for Plaintiff.106 It also contains choice of law and forum-selection
105
Compl. Ex. E.
106
Id. § 6.3.
26
provisions.107 The First Services Agreement selected Delaware law and designated
Delaware as the forum.108
BEN executed the Second Services Agreement with Bradley Capital on June
6, 2023, in conjunction with BEN’s conversion to a Nevada corporation.109 The
indemnification and advancement provisions of the Second Services Agreement are
substantially similar to the First Services Agreement. The Second Services
Agreement also contained choice of law and forum-selection clauses in section
7.3.110 The Second Services Agreement selects Nevada law to govern within the
forum of Clark County, Nevada.111
As with the Bylaws argument, Defendants contend that the Court should
dismiss the advancement request under the Second Services Agreement because it
designates Nevada as the forum for an action, no