Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE Bradley K. Heppner, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) C.A. No. 2026-0749-DH Beneficient Company Holdings, L.P., ) Beneficient Company Group, L.L.C., and ) Beneficient, f/k/a The Beneficient ) Company Group, L.P., ) ) Defendants. ) ) ) REPORT Report: November 20, 2026 Date Submitted: September 29, 2026. Michael A. Barlow, Judrick Fletcher, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART AND SULLIVAN LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Attorneys for Plaintiff Bradley K. Heppner. Stephen C. Norman, Ellis H. Huff, POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Attorneys for Defendants Beneficient Company Group, L.L.C., Beneficient Company Holdings, L.P., and Beneficient f/k/a The Beneficient Company Group, L.P. HUME, IV, M. Pot-Limit Omaha, better known as PLO, differs from Texas Hold’em poker by dealing each player four private cards rather than two, creating nearly three times as many possible five-card combinations. But, as any seasoned PLO player will tell you, more cards do not guarantee a winning hand. The same principle applies here, where a corporate founder, convicted of defrauding others of over a hundred million dollars, seeks advancement of his legal fees and expenses under multiple contractual sources. Each source presents a potential path to advancement. But a multitude of sources does not assure the outcome. Each must independently satisfy its governing requirements. Although the relevant governing documents originally selected Delaware as their forum, two sources now point to Nevada. The parties dispute the proper forum and whether the requisite causal nexus exists between the founder’s corporate roles and his criminal conduct. I find that two of the four alleged sources remain subject to Delaware jurisdiction and that the founder has established the required nexus under both. But this winning hand comes with a catch: both agreements contain insolvency provisions that may relieve the obligated entities of their duty to advance the plaintiff’s legal fees and expenses. Whether those provisions excuse performance remains to be determined through the Fitracks process. 1 I. BACKGROUND1 A. The Parties Bradley Heppner (the “Plaintiff”) was the Founder, Chief Executive Officer, and Chairman of Defendant Beneficient.2 Beneficient consists of three separate entities: Beneficient Holdings, L.P. (“BCH”), Beneficient Company Group, L.L.C. (“BCG”), and Beneficient f/k/a Beneficient Company Group, L.P. (“BEN”) (collectively, “Beneficient” or “Defendants”).3 BEN is a Nevada corporation but was a Delaware limited partnership prior to its June 2023 conversion.4 BEN is also the managing member of BCG.5 BCH is a Delaware limited partnership, and served as the primary holding company of 1 I draw the following facts from the pleadings and other documents of record. Unless otherwise noted, pleadings and their associated declarations and exhibits are cited by reference to items docketed in C.A. No. 2026-0749-DH. Citations are to Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint for Advancement (“Compl.”), available at Docket Item (“D.I.”) 1; Defendants’ Opening Brief in Support of Their Motion to Stay or Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (“MTD OB”), available at D.I. 11; Plaintiff’s Answering Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Stay or Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (“MTD AB”), available at D.I. 17; Plaintiff’s Opening Brief in Support of His Motion for Summary Judgment for Advancement (“MSJ POB”), available at D.I. 18; Defendants’ Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion to Stay or Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (“MTD RB”), available at D.I. 22; Defendants’ Opening Brief in Support of Their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“MSJ DOB”), available at D.I. 23; and the transcript of oral argument on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint in the parallel Nevada Action (“NV Tr.”), available at D.I. 46, Ex. A. 2 Compl. ¶ 11. 3 Id. p. 1. 4 Id. ¶ 7. 5 Id. ¶ 14. 2 Beneficient’s subsidiaries.6 BCG is a Delaware limited liability company, a subsidiary of BEN, and currently serves as the general partner of BCH.7 BCG held all of the limited partnership interests in BCH.8 B. Beneficient’s Beginnings and the Need for Funding Heppner created Beneficient with the purpose of offering liquidity solutions to people and institutions holding illiquid alternative assets, which at the time, left investors without any exit opportunities.9 Beneficient’s business model centered on acquiring and holding illiquid assets and their associated indirect economic rights in related trust structures.10 In turn, Beneficient sought to generate fees and interest income from those trusts, a strategy that required substantial capital.11 In 2017, Beneficient reorganized its capital structure and established a $141 million senior debt owed to HCLP Nominees, LLC (“HCLP”).12 HCLP is a shell company that operated through Heppner’s family office for his personal benefit.13 6 Id. ¶ 12. 7 Id. ¶ 13. 8 Id. 9 Id. ¶ 21. 10 Id. 11 Id. 12 Id. ¶ 24. 13 MTD OB pp. 4–5. 3 In 2018, GWG Holdings, Inc. (“GWG”) acquired certain Beneficient common units via private auction.14 GWG agreed to provide debt financing, cash, and stock to Beneficient throughout 2018.15 Beneficient subsequently disclosed the HCLP debt to GWG, as well as Heppner’s affiliation with HCLP.16 In April 2019, Heppner became chairman and a director of GWG’s board of directors.17 Because of the overlap between GWG’s and Beneficient’s boards, GWG established a Special Committee composed of independent directors with the purpose of evaluating and approving transactions between the two companies.18 From May 2019 through May 2021, GWG’s Special Committee approved numerous investments in Beneficient, including a $65 million capital infusion to Beneficient structured as an unsecured loan, a $79 million equity investment in Beneficient with $50 million allocated toward repayment of the HCLP debt, and a $61 million equity investment with $28 million designated for repayment of the HCLP debt.19 C. Heppner’s Resignation and the Department of Justice Litigation 14 Compl. ¶ 23. 15 Id. 16 Id. ¶ 24. 17 Id. ¶ 25. 18 Id. 19 Id. ¶ 27. 4 In 2020, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) launched an investigation into GWG, focusing on its transactions with Beneficient.20 Several years later, in June 2025, Heppner resigned as Beneficient’s Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors.21 On October 8, 2025, the United States Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) indicted Heppner in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.22 The indictment charged Heppner with conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, making false statements to auditors, and making false entries in records.23 The DOJ alleged that Heppner misrepresented material information to GWG’s Special Committee to induce it to approve investments in Beneficient between May 2019 and March 2021.24 The DOJ further alleged that, at Heppner’s direction, Beneficient falsified documents naming Heppner’s friend as HCLP’s manager to conceal Heppner’s actual control over 20 Id. ¶ 28. 21 Id. ¶ 29. 22 Id. ¶ 30. 23 Id. 24 Id. ¶ 32. 5 HCLP.25 The DOJ also alleged that Heppner falsified Beneficient’s October 2019 board meeting minutes, but ultimately dismissed the related charges.26 Heppner’s criminal trial began in April 2026. Following trial, the jury found Heppner guilty on four of the five counts in the indictment.27 On May 5, 2026, Heppner sent Beneficient’s counsel a formal written demand seeking advancement of his legal fees and expenses incurred in defending the DOJ action.28 Under the Ninth Amended and Restated Limited Partnership Agreement of BCH (the “BCH LP Agreement”) BCH must promptly pay expenses and attorney fees incurred in connection with defending any suit within 30 days of the written demand.29 This meant that Heppner could take no action while he waited for a response. Within this 30-day advancement window, Beneficient instead filed a declaratory judgment action in Nevada state court, seeking a declaration that Heppner had no right to advancement in connection with the DOJ action.30 D. The Purported Sources of Advancement 25 Id. ¶¶ 32–33. 26 Id. ¶¶ 34–35. 27 Id. ¶ 35. 28 Id. ¶ 76. 29 Id. Ex. A § 10.02(c). 30 Compl. ¶ 79. 6 Heppner contends that he is entitled to advancement from four sources: (1) the Second Amended and Restated Limited Partnership Agreement of BEN (the “BEN LP Agreement”) and BEN Bylaws; (2) the BCH LP Agreement; (3) the Second Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement of BCG (the “BCG LLC Agreement”); and (4) the First and Second Amended and Restated Services Agreements (together, the “Services Agreements”). 1. The BEN LP Agreement and Bylaws a. The Pre-Conversion BEN LP Agreement The BEN LP Agreement defines “Indemnitee” to include officers and directors of the General Partner.31 Section 7.7(a) governs indemnification and provides coverage for losses, liabilities, and expenses arising from proceedings in which an Indemnitee is involved, or threatened to be involved, by reason of their status as Indemnitee.32 This protection extends to civil, criminal, administrative, and investigative proceedings, regardless of whether the underlying conduct occurred before or after the agreement’s execution.33 Indemnification is unavailable, however, if: (A) there has been a final and non-appealable judgment entered by a court of competent jurisdiction determining that in respect of the matter 31 Id. Ex. C § 1.1(f). 32 Id. § 7.7(a). 33 Id. 7 for which the Indemnitee is seeking indemnification pursuant to this Section 7.7, the Indemnitee acted or omitted from acting in bad faith or engaged in fraud or willful misconduct[.]34 Section 7.7(b) governs the advancement of expenses, and reads (b) To the fullest extent permitted by law, expenses (including legal fees and expenses) incurred by an Indemnitee who is indemnified pursuant to Section 7.7(a) in appearing at, participating in or defending any claim, demand, action, suit or proceeding shall, from time to time, be advanced by the Partnership prior to a final and non-appealable determination that the Indemnitee is not entitled to be indemnified upon receipt by the Partnership of an undertaking by or on behalf of the Indemnitee to repay such amount if it ultimately shall be determined that the Indemnitee is not entitled to be indemnified as authorized in this Section 7.7. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, except as otherwise provided in Section 7.7G) [sic], the Partnership shall be required to indemnify a Person described in such sentence in connection with any claim, demand, action, suit or proceeding (or part thereof) commenced by such Person only if (x) the commencement of such claim, demand, action, suit or proceeding (or part thereof) by such Person was authorized by the General Partner or (y) there has been a final and non-appealable judgment entered by a court of competent jurisdiction determining that such Person was entitled to indemnification by the Partnership pursuant to Section 7.7(j).35 Section 7.7(c) provides that the indemnification rights established by Section 7.7 are in addition to any other rights available to an Indemnitee under an agreement, insurance policy, vote of the holders of Outstanding Voting Units, law, equity, or otherwise.36 These rights extend to actions taken both in the Indemnitee’s official 34 Id. 35 Id. § 7.7(b). 36 Id. § 7.7(c). 8 capacity and in other capacities, and continue after the Indemnitee ceases serving in that capacity.37 Section 16.9 contains a forum-selection clause providing that: [A]ny claims, suits, actions or proceedings arising out of or relating in any way to this Agreement or any partnership interest . . . (regardless of whether such Disputes . . . are based on common law, statutory, equitable, legal or other grounds, or . . . are derivative or direct claims) . . . shall be exclusively brought in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware or, if such court does not have subject matter jurisdiction thereof, any other court located in the State of Delaware with Subject matter jurisdiction.38 b. The Post-Conversion BEN Bylaws On June 6, 2023, BEN converted from a Delaware limited partnership to a Nevada corporation by filing a Certificate of Conversion with the Delaware Secretary of State.39 The Certificate of Conversion preserves service of process in Delaware for proceedings involving obligations BEN incurred as a Delaware limited partnership and irrevocably appoints the Delaware Secretary of State as BEN’s agent for service of process in those proceedings.40 Following the conversion, BEN adopted new bylaws.41 37 Id. 38 Id. § 16.9. 39 Id. Ex. I pp. 1–2. 40 Id. p. 2, ¶ 5. 41 Compl. ¶ 48. 9 Article VIII of the BEN Bylaws provides indemnification and advancement rights to covered directors, officers, and employees of the corporation.42 Section 8.1(a)(ii) requires Beneficient to indemnify Indemnitees, to the fullest extent permitted by Nevada law, against expenses, liabilities, and losses reasonably incurred in connection with covered proceedings, subject to specified limitations.43 Section 8.1(a)(iv) governs advancement and provides that an Indemnitee’s expenses “must be paid by the Corporation or through insurance purchased and maintained by the Corporation . . . as such expenses are incurred and in advance of the final disposition of the Proceeding,” upon receipt of an undertaking to repay those amounts if a court ultimately determines that the Indemnitee is not entitled to indemnification.44 The same provision further requires Beneficient to indemnify an Indemnitee who is “successful on the merits or otherwise” in defending a proceeding, or any claim, issue, or matter therein, for attorneys’ fees and expenses actually and reasonably incurred in that defense.45 Like Section 7.7(b) of the BEN LP Agreement, Section 8.1(a)(iv) of the BEN Bylaws provides for the advancement of expenses before final disposition of the 42 Id. Ex. D § 8.1(a)(i), (iv). 43 Id. § 8.1(a)(ii). 44 Id. § 8.1(a)(iv). 45 Id. 10 proceeding.46 The BEN Bylaws also specify that expenses must be paid as incurred and that repayment depends on an ultimate determination by a court of competent jurisdiction.47 Section 8.1(a)(iii) preserves indemnification rights after an Indemnitee ceases serving in a covered capacity, while Section 8.1(c) provides that the indemnification and advancement rights afforded under Article VIII are nonexclusive of other available rights.48 The conversion also introduced a different forum-selection provision. While Section 16.9 of the BEN LP Agreement designates the Delaware Court of Chancery, or another Delaware court where appropriate, as the exclusive forum for covered disputes, Article XIII of the BEN Charter designates the Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County, Nevada as the exclusive forum for derivative actions, fiduciary duty claims, disputes arising under Nevada law or the corporation’s governing documents, and claims governed by the internal affairs doctrine, unless the corporation consents in writing to an alternative forum.49 2. The BCH LP Agreement 46 Compl. Ex. C § 7.7(b); Ex. D § 8.1(a)(iv). 47 Compl. Ex. D § 8.1(a)(iv). 48 Id. § 8.1(a)(iii), (c). 49 MTD OB Ex. 6 Art. XIII. 11 The BCH LP Agreement defines “Indemnitee” broadly to include the partnership’s general partner, certain current and former officers and directors, limited partners, persons serving other entities at the General Partner’s request, and persons designated by the General Partner in its reasonable discretion.50 Section 10.02(a) grants Indemnitees indemnification rights to the fullest extent permitted by law for proceedings arising “by reason of his or her status as Indemnitee or by reason of any action alleged to have been taken or omitted to be taken by [the] Indemnitee in such capacity.”51 The provision excludes indemnification following a final, nonappealable judgment establishing bad faith, fraud, willful misconduct, or, in criminal matters, knowing unlawful conduct.52 Section 10.02(e) further provides that “[t]he rights of indemnification in this Section 10.02 shall neither be exclusive of, nor be deemed in limitation of, any rights to which any person may otherwise be or become entitled or permitted by contract, this Agreement or as a matter of law[.]”53 Section 10.02(b) governs advancement, and requires BCH to “promptly pay expenses (including attorneys’ fees)” incurred by an Indemnitee “in appearing at, 50 Compl. Ex. A § 1.01. 51 Id. § 10.02(a). 52 Id. 53 Id. § 10.02(e). 12 participating in or defending any action, suit or proceeding in advance of the final disposition of such action, suit or proceeding,” including appeals, upon presentation of an undertaking to repay the amounts advanced if the Indemnitee is ultimately determined not to be entitled to indemnification.54 Unlike the advancement provisions discussed above, Section 10.02(f) expressly limits BCH’s indemnification and advancement obligations to the extent that the Partnership “will remain solvent, as determined by the General Partner in its reasonable discretion, after payment of such obligations,” and provides that “thereafter any such obligation shall terminate.”55 Section 11.10 governs dispute resolution. Although Section 11.10(a) generally requires covered disputes to be resolved through arbitration in Wilmington, Delaware, Sections 11.10(b) and (c) designate the Delaware Court of Chancery as the exclusive judicial forum for specified proceedings in aid of arbitration and for disputes determined not to be subject to arbitration or where the arbitration provision is not enforced.56 3. The BCG LLC Agreement 54 Id. § 10.02(b). 55 Id. § 10.02(f). 56 Id. § 11.10(a)–(c). 13 Under the BCG LLC Agreement, “Indemnitee” is defined to include “any Person who is or was . . . an officer or director of the Managing Member, any former Managing Member or any Group Member.”57 Under Section 7.6(a), BCG must indemnify qualifying Indemnitees for expenses and liabilities arising from threatened, pending, or completed proceedings, including criminal proceedings, by reason of their status as Indemnitees.58 Indemnification is unavailable, however, if a final, nonappealable judgment determines that the Indemnitee acted in bad faith, engaged in fraud or willful misconduct, or in a criminal matter, acted with knowledge that the conduct was unlawful.59 Section 7.6(b) governs advancement and provides that [t]o the fullest extent permitted by law, expenses (including legal fees and expenses) incurred by an Indemnitee who is indemnified pursuant to Section 7.6(a) in appearing at, participating in or defending any claim, demand, action, suit, or proceeding shall, from time to time, be advanced by the Company prior to a final and non-appealable determination that the Indemnitee is not entitled to be indemnified upon receipt by the Company of an undertaking by or on behalf of the Indemnitee to repay such amount if it ultimately shall be determined that the Indemnitee is not entitled to be indemnified as authorized in this Section 7.6.60 57 Id. Ex. B § 1.1. 58 Id. § 7.6(a). 59 Id. 60 Id. § 7.6(b). 14 Thus, advancement requires an undertaking to repay the amounts advanced if the Indemnitee ultimately is determined not to be entitled to indemnification.61 Section 7.6(c) provides that the indemnification rights are nonexclusive of other rights available under agreements, insurance, law, equity, or otherwise, and continue after an Indemnitee ceases to serve in that capacity.62 Further, Section 7.6(j) permits an Indemnitee to sue for unpaid advancement if a written claim remains unpaid for thirty days and places the burden of proving nonentitlement on BCG.63 Like the BCH LP Agreement, the BCG LLC Agreement contains a solvency limitation, which reads: Notwithstanding anything to the contrary set forth in this Section 7.6, any indemnification or advancement obligation of the Company under this Agreement shall only be satisfied to the extent that the Company will remain solvent, as determined by the Managing Member, after payment of such obligations, and thereafter any such obligation shall terminate.64 Section 15.9 also contains a forum-selection clause, which provides that covered disputes, unless the Managing Member agrees otherwise in writing, “shall be exclusively brought in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware or, if such 61 Id. 62 Id. § 7.6(c). 63 Id. § 7.6(j). 64 Id. § 7.6(l). 15 court does not have subject matter jurisdiction thereof, any other court located in the State of Delaware with subject matter jurisdiction.”65 4. The Services Agreements The First Services Agreement, later amended in 2022, became effective June 1, 2017, and identifies four contracting entities: Bradley Capital Company, L.L.C. (“Bradley Capital”), BCG, BCH, and Beneficient Management Counselors, L.L.C.66 Effective June 6, 2023, the Second Services Agreement replaced the First Services Agreement and identified BEN in place of BCG.67 Both agreements contain substantially identical advancement provisions under Section 6.3(b), requiring the Firm under the First Services Agreement, and the Company under the Second Services Agreement, to pay or cause a Group member to pay qualifying Indemnitees’ expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, incurred in defending and investigating civil or criminal proceedings before their final disposition.68 Both condition advancement on an undertaking to repay those amounts if a final adjudication establishes that the Indemnitee is not entitled to 65 Id. § 15.9. 66 Id. Ex. E pmbl. & recitals. Bradley Capital Company received payment for Plaintiff’s executive duties. 67 Id. Ex. F pmbl. & recitals. 68 Compl. Ex. E § 6.3(b); Ex. F § 6.3(b). 16 indemnification.69 Similarly, Section 6.3(c) of both agreements establishes an order of priority for potentially duplicative indemnification payments, placing primary liability on the Firm or Company, respectively, and secondary liability on applicable Group members.70 The agreements differ, however, in their governing-law and forum-selection provisions.71 Section 7.3(a) of the First Services Agreement selects Delaware law, while Section 7.3(b) requires covered proceedings to be brought in the state or federal courts located in New Castle County, Delaware.72 By contrast, Section 7.3(a) of the Second Services Agreement selects Nevada law, while Section 7.3(b) provides that the parties “submit and consent to the exclusive jurisdiction, including removal jurisdiction, of the state and federal courts located in Clark County, Nevada for any action or proceeding relating to this Agreement or the provision of the Services.”73 E. Procedural Posture Heppner filed a Verified Complaint for Advancement on June 5, 2026. 74 Beneficient moved for dismissal on June 19, to which Heppner responded by moving 69 Compl. Ex. E § 6.3(b); Ex. F § 6.3(b). 70 Compl. Ex. E § 6.3(c); Ex. F § 6.3(c). 71 Compl. Ex. E § 7.3(a)–(b); Ex. F § 7.3(a)–(b). 72 Compl. Ex. E § 7.3(a)–(b). 73 Id. Ex. F § 7.3(a)–(b). 74 Compl. 17 for summary judgment.75 Beneficient then cross-moved for summary judgment.76 I held oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss and Cross Motions for Summary Judgment on September 29.77 During oral argument, Plaintiff presented information challenging Defendants’ insolvency claim. Defendants objected to this information. On October 16, Plaintiff’s counsel wrote to the Court with an update.78 There, Plaintiff responds to Beneficient’s claims that paying advancement would render BCH and BCG insolvent. Beneficient also informed the court that Quinn Emanuel sought and ultimately obtained permission to withdraw as Heppner’s counsel in the DOJ litigation following a “fundamental disagreement” and an “irreconcilable conflict” concerning Heppner’s sentencing.79 Beneficient argues that this development moots the present advancement action.80 Beneficient further contends that Heppner’s request for coverage under its 2019 directors’ and officers’ liability insurance tower could also moot this action if the insurers provide coverage.81 Alternatively, Beneficient 75 D.I. 11, 18. 76 D.I. 23. 77 See D.I. 38. 78 D.I. 39. 79 D.I. 40 p. 2. 80 Id. p. 3. 81 D.I. 40 p. 3. 18 requests that the Court stay this action pending the insurers’ coverage determination.82 On October 20, 2026, the Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County, Nevada heard oral argument on Heppner’s and Bradley Capital Company, LLC’s motion to dismiss Beneficient’s First Amended Complaint.83 Heppner argued that the claims concerning BCG and BCH belonged in Delaware because separate agreements containing Delaware forum-selection clauses governed those entities.84 He maintained that the Second Services Agreement neither superseded those agreements nor extinguished the subsidiaries’ independent advancement obligations.85 As to the claims concerning Beneficient, Heppner argued that his advancement rights accrued when the underlying conduct occurred, before Beneficient converted to a Nevada corporation, and that the conversion did not eliminate his right to pursue those claims in Delaware.86 Beneficient contended that its current governing documents designate Nevada as the proper forum and that the Second Services Agreement required Heppner to 82 Id. 83 D.I. 41. 84 NV Tr. 7:18–8:16. 85 Id. 9:16–11:20. 86 Id. 14:10–17:13. 19 pursue advancement from the parent company before seeking payment from its subsidiaries.87 The court largely denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the Nevada forum-selection provisions supported jurisdiction over the claims concerning Beneficient and BCH.88 At the same time, the court granted the motion to dismiss Count III, concerning BCG, in light of BCG’s forum-selection provision.89 II. ANALYSIS A. The Motion to Dismiss There are four potential sources of advancement: the BEN LP Agreement90 and BEN Bylaws91; the BCH LP Agreement92; the BCG LLC Agreement93; and the Services Agreements.94 The parties disagree about the applicable forum provisions between the BEN LP Agreement and the BEN Bylaws, and the First and Second Services Agreements. I first address Defendants’ Motion to Stay or Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. Defendants contend that forum-selection provisions in the 87 Id. 20:20–21:16, 20:20–26:19. 88 Id. 33:19–35:10. 89 Id. 35:11–22. 90 Compl. Ex. C. 91 Id. Ex. D. 92 Id. Ex. A. 93 Id. Ex. B. 94 Id. Exs. E, F. 20 BEN Charter95 and the Second Services Agreement96 apply and make Nevada the appropriate forum. Plaintiff argues that Delaware was preserved as the forum in the BEN LP Agreement97 and First Services Agreement.98 “The proper procedural rubric for addressing a motion to dismiss based on a forum-selection clause is found under Rule 12(b)(3), improper venue. Although Delaware courts have, in the past, framed a forum-selection clause analysis as jurisdictional in some sense, recent cases have all proceeded under Rule 12(b)(3).” In re Bay Hills Emerging P'rs I, L.P., 2018 WL 3217650, at *4 (Del. Ch. July 2, 2018) (quoting Bonanno v. VTB Hldgs., Inc., 2016 WL 614412, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 2016)). The Court applies an approach similar to Rule 12(b)(6) when considering a motion to dismiss for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3). Simon v. Navellier Series Fund, 2000 WL 1597890, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 2000). However, “the court is not shackled to the plaintiff's complaint and is permitted to consider extrinsic evidence from the outset.” Bay Hills, 2018 WL 3217650, at *2 (quoting Troy Corp. v. Schoon, 2007 WL 949441, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 26, 2007)). The standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is familiar to the parties: 95 MTD OB Ex. 6. 96 Compl. Ex. F. 97 Id. Ex. C. 98 Id. Ex. E. 21 (i) all well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true; (ii) even vague allegations are ‘well-pleaded’ if they give the opposing party notice of the claim; (iii) the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party; and [(iv)] dismissal is inappropriate unless the “plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.” Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896–97 (Del. 2002) (citation modified). The reasonable conceivability standard grants a plaintiff all “reasonable inferences that logically flow from the face of the complaint” but does not obligate the Court “to accept every strained interpretation of [plaintiff’s allegations].” In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig., 897 A.2d 162, 168 (Del. 2006) (quoting Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1083 (Del. 2001)). The Court will “ignore conclusory allegations that lack specific supporting factual allegations.” Ramunno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 1034 (Del. 1998). B. Nevada Is the Proper Forum Under the BEN Bylaws, BEN Charter, and BEN LP Agreement. The BEN LP Agreement’s forum-selection provision required that proceedings arising out of the Agreement be brought in the Delaware Court of Chancery, or if the Court of Chancery lacked subject matter jurisdiction, another Delaware court having subject matter jurisdiction.99 When BEN converted from a Delaware limited partnership to a Nevada corporation, it filed a Certificate of 99 Compl. Ex. C § 16.9. 22 Conversion.100 This provision permitted service of process in Delaware for suits arising from obligations BEN LP incurred while organized as a Delaware limited partnership.101 As a Nevada corporation, BEN has a charter that provides forum selection in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County, Nevada, for actions, suits, or proceedings brought to interpret, apply, enforce, or determine the validity of the charter’s articles or BEN Bylaws.102 BEN’s Bylaws provided for indemnification and advancement.103 Plaintiff contends that since the underlying conduct arose pre-conversion, the BEN LP Agreement forum-selection provisions apply. In support, he points to 6 Del. C. § 17-219(g): The conversion of a limited partnership out of the State of Delaware in accordance with this section and the resulting cessation of its existence as a limited partnership of the State of Delaware pursuant to a certificate of conversion to non-Delaware entity shall not be deemed to affect any obligations or liabilities of the limited partnership incurred prior to such conversion or the personal liability of any person incurred prior to such conversion, nor shall it be deemed to affect the choice of law applicable to the limited partnership with respect to matters arising prior to such conversion. 100 Id. Ex. I. 101 Id. 102 MTD OB Ex. 6. 103 Compl. Ex. D § 8.1(a)(i)–(iv). 23 Plaintiff also points to this Court’s ruling in Bernstein v. TractManager, where the Court held that “the right to indemnification or advancement for claims that arose during the life of the LLC continues to be governed by the terms of the old operating agreement.” 953 A.2d 1003, 1005 (Del. Ch. 2007). Defendants argue that Plaintiff has no vested forum right and that the BEN Charter and Bylaws governing at the time his advancement rights arose determine the appropriate forum. See Sylebra Cap. P’rs Master Fund, Ltd. v. Perelman, 2020 WL 5989473, at *10 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2020) (stating that forum-selection bylaws, like other forum-selection clauses, are presumed valid and enforceable); City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 241 (Del. Ch. 2014) (providing that forum-selection bylaws regulate where a suit may be filed, not whether a party may file suit or what type of remedy the party may receive). Plaintiff’s cited authority is inapposite. Under 6 Del. C. § 17-219, conversion does not affect the obligations or liabilities of the transitioning limited partnership. So too here. Indemnification and advancement obligations found under the BEN LP Agreement are preserved. The company still has an obligation to provide indemnification and advancement as before. But forum selection is not an obligation. As this Court held in City of Providence, forum-selection clauses regulate the location of the action, not viability or remedies. City of Providence, 99 A.3d at 241. And the Plaintiff has no vested right to a particular forum. The 24 conversion from Delaware LP to Nevada corporation also brought with it an amendment to the forum-selection clause. “[T]his Court has held that where a corporation's by-laws put all on notice that the by-laws may be amended at any time, no vested rights can arise that would contractually prohibit an amendment.” Kidsco v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995) (citing Roven v. Cotter, 547 A.2d 603, 608 (Del. Ch. 1988)). Plaintiff knew that the forum could change. Indeed, not only was Plaintiff aware, but he signed the Certificate of Conversion and is listed on BEN’s charter.104 Plaintiff argues that the Certificate of Conversion makes Delaware the forum for suits against the former BEN because, in compliance with 6 Del. C. § 17- 219(e)(6), it allows service of process on the former BEN in Delaware and names the Secretary of State as its agent to accept service. The Plaintiff conflates service of process with forum selection and offers no authority to suggest that service of process affects forum selection. The service of process requirement does not mandate that Delaware is the required forum for litigation. The certificate of conversion’s service of process requirement ensures that the LP remains amenable to suit in Delaware for pre-conversion acts. While this presumes that Delaware is the forum, it does not guarantee that it will remain so. Parties may choose a different 104 Compl. Ex. I; MTD OB Ex. 6. 25 forum. “Delaware courts afford a great deal of respect to a plaintiff's choice of forum, and this respect should be even more stalwart where both parties have agreed in advance to a forum by contractual provision.” Aveta v. Colon, 942 A.2d 603, 607 (Del. Ch. 2008) (footnote and citations omitted). “To escape the reach of a forum selection clause on grounds that it is unreasonable or unjust, the avoiding party ‘bears a heavy burden to demonstrate that enforcement here would place it at an unfair disadvantage or otherwise deny it its day in court.’” Mack v. Rev. Worldwide, Inc., 2020 WL 7774604, at *6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 2020) (quoting Sylebra Cap. P’rs Master Fund Ltd. v. Perelman, 2020 WL 5989473, at *11 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2020)). Plaintiff has made no argument that it is unreasonable or unjust here. The forum- selection clause is valid, and Nevada is the chosen forum. C. Nevada Is the Proper Forum Under the First and Second Services Agreements. BEN executed the First Services Agreement with Bradley Capital on June 1, 2017.105 The First Services Agreement provides indemnification and advancement rights for Plaintiff.106 It also contains choice of law and forum-selection 105 Compl. Ex. E. 106 Id. § 6.3. 26 provisions.107 The First Services Agreement selected Delaware law and designated Delaware as the forum.108 BEN executed the Second Services Agreement with Bradley Capital on June 6, 2023, in conjunction with BEN’s conversion to a Nevada corporation.109 The indemnification and advancement provisions of the Second Services Agreement are substantially similar to the First Services Agreement. The Second Services Agreement also contained choice of law and forum-selection clauses in section 7.3.110 The Second Services Agreement selects Nevada law to govern within the forum of Clark County, Nevada.111 As with the Bylaws argument, Defendants contend that the Court should dismiss the advancement request under the Second Services Agreement because it designates Nevada as the forum for an action, no