Northern Biomedical Research Inc v. Nbr Investment Properties LLC
CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket369662
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
NORTHERN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, INC. UNPUBLISHED
and 1210 PONTALUNA, LLC, November 18, 2026
11:34 AM
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants-
Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
v No. 369662
Muskegon Circuit Court
NBR INVESTMENT PROPERTIES, LLC, LC No. 2021-004490-CB
Defendant/Counterplaintiff-
Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and ACKERMAN and TREBILCOCK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case involves a lease between Northern Biomedical Research, Inc. and NBR
Investment Properties, LLC (the Landlord). The dispute between the parties arose when Northern
Biomedical exercised the option under the lease to buy the property and received an appraisal to
determine the purchase price in accordance with the lease. Once Landlord learned of the appraised
value, it refused to sell the property to Northern Biomedical. Northern Biomedical sued to
complete the purchase, and Landlord countersued. Northern Biomedical moved for summary
disposition on liability, which the trial court granted in Northern Biomedical’s favor. Landlord
now appeals, claiming errors with the trial court’s grant of summary disposition and specific
performance. Northern Biomedical filed a cross-appeal, arguing that the trial court erred when
calculating damages and costs. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
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Founded in 1996, Northern Biomedical is a non-clinical research company for drugs, cell
therapy, and medical devices; Landlord owned the property that Northern Biomedical used
including a laboratory.1 Robert Boyd was the principal owner of both entities.
In 2019, BHJW Biomedical Research Corporation showed interest in purchasing Northern
Biomedical and bought Northern Biomedical’s name and assets, thus becoming Northern
Biomedical. At the time, BHJW could not afford to buy the company and the property, so Landlord
leased 65,000 square feet of the real property to the newly-acquired Northern Biomedical.
In the lease agreement, Northern Biomedical obtained an option to purchase the real
property from Landlord during the lease term:
22.1. Landlord grants to the Tenant an option to purchase the Property, which
shall not be severable from the remaining terms and conditions of this Lease and
shall not survive the expiration or earlier termination of this Lease. The option to
purchase shall be exercisable by written notice from Tenant to Landlord give [sic]
at any time during the Lease term when the Lease is not in default.
22.2. The purchase price shall be determined by appraisal conducted by a
qualified appraiser mutually acceptable to Landlord and Tenant, the cost of which
appraisal shall be born equally by the parties. In the event Landlord and Tenant are
unable to agree upon a qualified appraiser, each party shall select one qualified
appraiser and the 2 qualified appraisers so selected shall choose a third qualified
appraiser who will conduct the appraisal. The purchase price [sic] payable by wire
transfer of collected funds at the closing.
Although the lease did not provide an exhaustive definition of “default,” the lease included
the following provision pertaining to events of default:
18. EVENTS OF DEFAULT. Each of the following will constitute a default
by Tenant under this Lease: (a) if Tenant fails to pay Rent or any other payment
when due hereunder within five (5) days after written notice from Landlord of such
failure to pay on the due date; or (b) if Tenant fails, whether by action or inaction,
to timely comply with, or satisfy, any of the other obligations imposed on Tenant
under this Lease (other than the obligation to pay Rent) for a period of thirty (30)
days after Landlord’s delivery to Tenant of written notice of such default under this
Section 18; provided, however, that if the default cannot, by its nature, be cured
within such thirty (30) day period, but Tenant commences and diligently pursues a
cure of such default promptly within the initial thirty (30) day cure period, then
Landlord will not exercise its remedies for so long as Tenant will have commenced
cure within such thirty (30) days and will be diligently prosecuting the same to
completion.
1
Landlord originally owned real property and operated a biomedical research company on that
property.
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Pertinent here, the lease also provided the following provisions pertaining to assignment
restrictions, Landlord’s maintenance, option to lease vacant portions of the property, waiver of
consequential damages, and confidentiality:
8. ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLETTING. Tenant will not, without the prior
written consent of Landlord, which consent may not unreasonably be withheld in
Landlord’s sole discretion, (a) assign, pledge or mortgage this Lease or any interest
hereunder; (b) permit any assignment hereof by operation of law; (c) sublet the
Premises or any part thereof; or (d) permit the use of the Premises by any party
other than Tenant and its agents and business visitors.
* * *
12.3. Landlord shall, at its expense, keep and maintain all other portions of the
Property, other than the Premises and the Common Areas, in a good and clean
operating condition and in compliance with all applicable laws, ordinances and
regulations.
* * *
19.3. Waiver of Consequential Punitive, Exemplary Damages. Landlord and
Tenant each hereby waive their right to seek to recover any consequential, punitive,
or exemplary damages.
* * *
23.1. For purposes of this Lease, the term “Vacant Premises” shall mean all
rentable portions of the Property, other than the Premises, that are vacant, and the
term “Other Premises” shall mean all rentable portions of the Property, other than
the Premises. During the Term, Tenant shall have the option to lease the Vacant
Premises or any portion thereof. Tenant shall exercise this option, if at all, by
submitting written notice of Tenant’s exercise of the option (“Option Notice”),
which shall include a description of the Vacant Premises to be leased (“Expansion
Premises”) and the date on which Tenant would like to add such Expansion
Premises to the Premises (“Expansion Date”). If Tenant exercises this option, the
Expansion Premises shall become part of the Premises on the Expansion Date. The
rent per square foot of the Expansion Premises shall be the same as the rent per
square foot of the Premises as of the Expansion Date. Effective as of the Expansion
Date, the Tenant’s Pro Rata Share shall be a fraction in which the numerator is the
number of rentable square feet in the Premises including the Expansion Premises
and the denominator is the total number of rentable square feet in the building on
the Property.
* * *
24.6 Confidential Information. Landlord and Tenant agree to maintain in strict
confidence the economic terms of this Lease.
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On July 1, 2021, Northern Biomedical communicated its exercise of the option to purchase
the property in a written letter: “In accordance with Section 22.1 of the Lease, Tenant hereby
exercises its right to purchase all of Landlord’s right, title, and interest in and to the Property on
the terms and conditions provided in the Lease.” The parties subsequently entered into an
“Agreement Regarding Lease Option to Purchase,” which outlined that Northern Biomedical
“exercised its option to purchase the Property,” established a closing date for sale of the property,
and provided that the agreement was binding on the parties and their “permitted assigns.”
To determine the purchase price, according to the option provision, an appraisal had to be
done. Northern Biomedical picked Stacey Broersma as its appraiser, and Landlord chose Jeff
Genzink. Because the parties could not agree on an appraiser, a third appraiser had to be chosen.
Broersma and Genzink both suggested Doug Adams, and Genzink agreed to the selection.
Broersma sent an e-mail to Adams that the appraisal was for “the Fee Simple Estate Market Value
of the property, excluding the current lease agreements.”
Before the appraisal was conducted, Northern Biomedical’s counsel sent an e-mail to
Landlord’s counsel that it was considering assigning the option to 1210 Pontaluna, LLC (a
company with members who were shareholders of Northern Biomedical) and sent a proposed
assignment document. Landlord’s counsel told Northern Biomedical’s counsel that the
“assignment look[ed] good” and requested an executed copy of the assignment. When Northern
Biomedical’s counsel sent closing documents several days before the target closing date, including
the assignment of the purchase option, Landlord’s counsel stated it was going to “review the
documents and get back to [Northern Biomedical] with any edits.”2
The assignment from Northern Biomedical to 1210 Pontaluna was effective upon execution
by each party; it was not made dependent on the prior consent of Landlord, though there was a
signature page for Landlord to indicate its consent (this went unsigned). The assignment did
include a proviso that Northern Biomedical remained committed to the purchase of the property
“in the event that” 1210 Pontaluna “fails to do so.” The proviso was added at the request of
Landlord: “we would be comfortable with the tenant assigning its right under the agreement
pursuant to a written assignment which specifically states that the tenant is not relieved of its
obligation to purchase the property.”
Adams submitted his appraisal. The appraisal outlined that the best use of the property
was a warehouse because the demand for a life-science laboratory in the area was low. Because
of this, the property’s value was reduced by $1.1 million as an estimated cost of removing the
laboratory. With that adjustment, the net appraised value was $8.87 million. Landlord conveyed
its dissatisfaction with the appraisal to Northern Biomedical and requested an extension to the
closing date to obtain a separate appraisal. Northern Biomedical refused to grant the extension,
and Landlord refused to close the sale.
2
Boyd testified that he had concerns that the option paperwork listed Northern Biomedical as a
Michigan corporation when it had reincorporated as a Delaware corporation. Landlord mentions
this in its brief as support that Boyd did not approve of the assignment.
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Because of Landlord’s refusal to close the sale, Northern Biomedical sued Landlord
claiming in part breaches of the lease and option and seeking specific performance as well as
monetary damages. Landlord counterclaimed, requesting declaratory relief regarding the option,
appraisal, and purchase price, as well as breach of lease. Landlord claimed that Northern
Biomedical materially breached the lease by assigning the option without consent, failing to
disclose the appraisers’ conflict of interest, being late in paying rent, using more space in the
property than was leased, and being delinquent in reimbursing property taxes.
As the lawsuit ensued, Northern Biomedical sought to exercise the option to lease the
vacant space. Landlord responded, “Given Tenant’s multiple prior breaches of the lease as
documented in our counterclaim, we cannot agree that the option [to lease vacant space] remains
available to [Tenant]. Instead, Landlord will consider entering into a separate lease with Tenant
related to the additional office space.” The parties negotiated terms to lease the vacant space, but
Northern Biomedical eventually executed a two-year lease at a separate, unrelated location (570
Seminole Road) at a higher rental rate. Northern Biomedical amended its complaint to include a
claim regarding the option to lease and its Seminole Road lease, seeking monetary damages for
breaches of the lease.
For consequential damages, the parties moved for partial summary disposition as to
Northern Biomedical’s claims for damages for lost profits, rent costs, and expansion costs. The
trial court granted partial summary disposition in Landlord’s favor barring Northern Biomedical
from seeking monetary damages for lost profits, expansion costs, and lease costs, finding that such
costs would amount to consequential damages if awarded, and these were precluded by the parties
under the lease.
For liability, Northern Biomedical moved for summary disposition on the three counts in
its complaint, “reserving questions as to damages and relief for trial or later adjudication.” The
trial court granted summary disposition in Northern Biomedical’s favor, concluding that there were
no genuinely disputed material facts. The trial court found that the appraisal was reasonably
conducted, the assignment was not a default under the contract, and Landlord agreed to the
assignment through counsel. The trial court granted Northern Biomedical’s motion and stated that
Landlord must complete the sale of the property at the appraised purchase price and that damages
were still to be determined.
Landlord moved for reconsideration, arguing that specific performance was not raised by
Northern Biomedical in its motion for summary disposition and that the trial court’s grant of
specific performance was a violation of Landlord’s due-process rights; the motion also argued why
specific performance was not appropriate. The trial court denied Landlord’s motion for
reconsideration, finding that specific performance was a cause of action and that Northern
Biomedical styled its complaint and motion to put Landlord “on notice that the question of whether
it must specifically perform the contract provision to sell the property was at issue in the motion.”
The trial court conducted a bench trial on damages and entered judgment in favor of
Northern Biomedical. The trial court referenced its orders in the prior opinions relating to the
parties’ motions for summary disposition, finding that Landlord breached the lease and Northern
Biomedical’s consequential damages were barred by the lease. The trial court ordered that the
property be transferred, and the purchase price was the appraisal as adjusted for setoffs for
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Landlord’s costs of ownership. In its trial brief, Northern Biomedical argued that Landlord had
no right to recoup ownership expenses but did not challenge the amount of the expenses being
claimed.
Landlord moved for relief from judgment, citing newly discovered evidence. Landlord
discovered that a former president of Northern Biomedical shared a copy of the unsigned lease
with a potential investor in February 2021, before Northern Biomedical exercised its option,
thereby breaching the confidentiality provision contained in the lease agreement. The trial court
denied the motion, finding that the breach would not release Landlord from liability.
Landlord now appeals the trial court’s decision on liability and specific performance.
Northern Biomedical appeals the trial court’s decision on damages.
II. ANALYSIS
A. LIABILITY
Beginning with liability, Landlord first argues on appeal that the trial court erred in granting
summary disposition in favor of Northern Biomedical. We review de novo a trial court’s decision
to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition. Sherman v City of St Joseph, 332 Mich App
626, 632; 957 NW2d 838 (2020) (citations omitted). When deciding a motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we consider the evidence submitted in a light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Payne v Payne, 338 Mich App 265, 274; 979 NW2d 706 (2021).
“Summary disposition is appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Sherman, 332 Mich App at 632. The
Court reviews de novo the interpretation of contracts, Klapp v United Ins Group Agency, Inc, 468
Mich 459, 463; 663 NW2d 447 (2003), such as the lease provision in this case, see G & A Inc v
Nahra, 204 Mich App 329, 330; 514 NW2d 255 (1994).
Landlord argues that Northern Biomedical did not properly exercise the option to buy
because Northern Biomedical was in default and the appraisal did not comply with the terms of
the option.
1. DEFAULT
We turn first to whether Northern Biomedical was in default at the time it exercised the
option to purchase the property. An option is an offer that requires certain compliance:
An option is a preliminary contract for the privilege of purchase and not itself a
contract of purchase. An option is basically an agreement by which the owner of
the property agrees with another that he shall have a right to buy the property at a
fixed price within a specified time. An option is, in effect, only an offer which
requires strict compliance with the terms of the option both as to the exact thing
offered and within the time specified. Failure to so comply results in loss of the
rights under the option. [Oshtemo Tp, Kalamazoo Co v City of Kalamazoo, 77 Mich
App 33, 37; 257 NW2d 260 (1977) (cleaned up).]
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Once a party timely exercises an option and complies with its terms, then the option “ripen[s] into
a binding bilateral contract of purchase and sale.” Le Baron Homes v Pontiac Housing Fund, 319
Mich 310, 315; 29 NW2d 704 (1947). “An option becomes vested when the conditions and
procedures specified in the contract are complied with in such a manner as to give the lessee an
immediate right to exercise the option, i.e., . . . the lessee notifies the lessor at least 30 days prior
to the termination of the contract that he intends to purchase the property for the contract price.”
Amoco Oil Co v Kraft, 89 Mich App 270, 275 n 3; 280 NW2d 505 (1979).
There were three requirements for Northern Biomedical to exercise the option: (1) written
notice (2) given during the lease term (3) when the lease was not in default. It is undisputed that
Northern Biomedical met the first two requirements; the focus here is on the third requirement.
For the third requirement, Landlord argues that the lease was in default when Northern
Biomedical exercised the option. The exercise of an option is just an acceptance of an offer
effectuated by meeting certain conditions: “The holder of an option to purchase land does not have
any interest in the premises prior to exercising the option . . . No interest arises until the option has
been accepted.” Oshtemo Tp, 77 Mich App at 38. According to the lease agreement, the option
was “exercisable,” i.e., Northern Biomedical accepted the option offer, by providing Landlord
written notice during the lease term when the lease was not in default.
The issue then becomes whether the lease was in default when Northern Biomedical gave
written notice to Landlord. When Northern Biomedical sent written notice, there were only two
alleged breaches of the lease agreement that had already occurred or were occurring: (1) the over-
occupation of the property, and (2) the disclosure of the lease to a third party in violation of the
confidentiality provision. The late rent payments, the late property tax payment, the appraisal, and
the assignment all occurred after Northern Biomedical gave written notice. Although these may
be breaches that constitute events of default, they are irrelevant to whether the lease was in default
at the time of the option’s exercise and do not affect the subsequent purchase agreement that
ripened after the exercise. See Le Baron Homes, 319 Mich at 315.
Although the lease did not define “in default,” it did have a section pertaining to events of
default. For the defaults outlined in that section, a breach or failure of contractual obligations
required written notice from Landlord to constitute a default, which indicates that Landlord must
have been aware of a breach or failure for it to be a default. The provision also included an
opportunity for Northern Biomedical to cure a default.
With regard to Landlord’s claim of over-occupation, Landlord would have either known
of any over-occupation or, at least, been on notice of such because Landlord had the duty to keep
and maintain all portions of the property not leased by Northern Biomedical under § 12.3 of the
lease. Put another way, Landlord should have known if Northern Biomedical was using unleased
parts of the property because Landlord was supposed to maintain those unleased parts. Given that
Landlord did not provide a written notice of default to Northern Biomedical related to any over-
occupation, let alone give the tenant 30 days to cure, Northern Biomedical was not in default based
on any purported over-occupation when it gave written notice of the option.
As to the disclosure of the lease to a third party, there seems little doubt that such disclosure
did violate the lease’s confidentiality provision. This provision did not cover each and every aspect
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of the lease, but rather just “the economic terms” of it. By giving an unsigned copy of the entire
lease to a third party, the economic terms were certainly disclosed to such party without Landlord’s
knowledge or consent. This seems a clear-cut breach of § 24.6 of the lease.
Whether this breach means that Northern Biomedical was “in default” when it exercised
its option to buy is not as clear cut. On the one hand, there was a breach, and there is nothing in
the record to suggest that Landlord knew or should have known about the breach so as to put
Landlord on notice to provide written notice of default. On the other hand, there is no general
definition of default in the lease, and the provision setting forth what can constitute a default does
not plainly envision a “hidden” breach. Moreover, although it does not bear directly on whether a
breach of the confidentiality provision amounts to a default, the sharing of the lease’s economic
terms would seem to have little-to-no relevance to the purchase price of the property, which was
determined by appraisal of the property as a fee simple without the lease. The main driver of this
dispute has been the purchase price, and the breach of confidentiality had no impact on the
appraisal and purchase price.
Because the confidentiality breach is of a kind not clearly covered by the “Events of
Default” provision, we conclude that Northern Biomedical was not materially “in default” by
reason of its earlier sharing an unsigned copy of the lease with a third party. Had the parties wanted
a more expansive understanding of “in default,” they could have included a broader catchall
provision in the “Events of Default” section. Instead, the parties tied “default” not just to the
performance of contractual obligation but also to notice from Landlord. Understandably, such
notice did not occur here, but that does not change the fact that Landlord must give notice and a
chance to cure before the tenant could be deemed to be “in default.” Thus, although Landlord
might have had a claim for breach of contract based on the confidentiality provision, Northern
Biomedical was not barred from exercising its option as a result of that breach.
2. APPRAISAL
Landlord next argues that the option did not convert into a contract when Northern
Biomedical gave notice of its intent to exercise the option because there was no purchase price and
the appraisal was a condition that was not properly satisfied. Landlord’s argument fails to consider
that there are different types of conditions under an option:
Where the terms of the option require that payment of the purchase money, or a
part thereof, accompany the election to exercise the option, such provision must
ordinarily be complied with; on the other hand, its terms may merely require that
notice be given of the exercise of the option and leave the matter of the payment of
the purchase money to be thereafter settled as in the case of the ordinary executory
contract of sale. In the first instance payment is a condition precedent to the
creation of a contract. In the second, it is a condition subsequent to creation.
[Catsman v Eister, 8 Mich App 563, 567; 155 NW2d 203 (1967).]
In support of its argument, Landlord cites Holly Road Medical Associates v Ucer,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 13, 2006 (Docket
No. 259173). We note first that Holly Road is unpublished, and therefore the only value it has
here is its persuasiveness. Cox v Hartman, 322 Mich App 292, 307; 911 NW2d 219 (2017). As
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can be seen by a review of that opinion, however, the circumstances there were materially different
than those here. In Holly Road, the appraisal appeared to be a condition precedent to the exercise
of the option. The entire lease agreement was not cited in the Court’s opinion, but in its reasoning,
the Court stated that “the lease agreement specifies that plaintiff, at its option, could purchase the
property for the average of the two appraisals by notifying defendants of its intent to purchase
within fifteen days after receiving defendants’ appraisal.” Id. at 3. Therefore, the plaintiff in that
case had to obtain an appraisal before exercising the option, and the plaintiff was not bound to
complete the purchase at the appraisal price. The plaintiff could choose not to purchase the
property after the appraisal by failing to notify of its intent to purchase, which indicates that the
option was not exercised before the appraisal was obtained.
Here, the appraisal was a condition subsequent to the option’s exercise. Once Northern
Biomedical gave its written notice to exercise the option, both parties were bound to the purchase
agreement with the price to be determined by appraisal. The option gave Northern Biomedical the
right to purchase the property at a fixed price determined by appraisal as long as Northern
Biomedical’s acceptance met the option’s terms. See Le Baron Homes, 319 Mich at 313. Thus,
although the purchase price had not yet been determined, the parties were bound to complete the
purchase given that Northern Biomedical met all the conditions precedent to create the contract in
accordance with the option. See id. at 315.
Because Northern Biomedical met the conditions to exercise the option, the parties were
bound to complete the purchase. The trial court therefore did not err in granting summary
disposition in relation to Landlord’s claims that the option was not properly exercised.
B. SUBSTANTIAL BREACH
Landlord further argues that there was a genuine issue of material fact on whether Northern
Biomedical committed the first substantial breach of the lease by breaching the anti-assignment,
confidentiality, payment, and appraisal provisions in the lease. “One who first breaches a contract
cannot maintain an action against the other contracting party for [its] subsequent breach or failure
to perform,” if the “initial breach was substantial.” Able Demolition v Pontiac, 275 Mich App
577, 585; 739 NW2d 696 (2007) (cleaned up). To be substantial, the breach must “effect[] such a
change in essential operative elements of the contract that further performance by the other party
is thereby rendered ineffective or impossible.” McCarty v Mercury Metalcraft Co, 372 Mich 567,
574; 127 NW2d 340 (1964).
1. THE ANTI-ASSIGNMENT PROVISION
Here, the anti-assignment provision is not specific to any particular provision in the lease,
but rather applies to the lease in its entirety, including “any interest hereunder.” This language is
broad enough to prohibit assignment (without prior written consent of Landlord) of the option-to-
purchase provision, and the parties appeared to have understood as such when they were preparing
the closing documents.
Northern Biomedical may very well have breached the non-assignment provision. The
assignment was made without the express prior written approval of Landlord. There is nothing in
the record suggesting that counsel for Landlord had the authority to execute a written consent
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under the lease on Landlord’s behalf, and the proposed written consent attached to the executed
assignment was never signed by Landlord.
With that said, this breach was not substantial in that it did not make Landlord’s further
performance ineffective or impossible. Landlord’s required performance was clear: to complete
the purchase of the property. The assignment was made to an entity that shared ownership with
Northern Biomedical, and the assignment clearly kept the latter liable for closing the deal in the
event the assignee entity could not. Even though Landlord did not provide prior written consent,
Landlord was on notice of the assignment, as evidenced by the provision keeping Northern
Biomedical on the hook, added at Landlord’s insistence, as well as the sharing of documents right
before the expected closing date. Landlord has not pointed to anything in the record to show that
this assignment somehow made it impossible for Landlord to close the purchase or otherwise made
Landlord’s further performance ineffective.
2. PAYMENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS
As for the late payments and the breach of the confidentiality provisions, Landlord has
failed to show how either of these breaches was a substantial breach. There has been no
explanation, for example, how several late rent payments near to the time of the expected closing
somehow made the sale impossible. In the normal course, such relatively incidental sums would
be accounted for in the closing documents. As for the confidentiality agreement, as already
explained, the economic terms of the lease had little-to-no relevance to the purchase of the property
as a fee-simple without consideration of the lease. Neither of these breaches was substantial so as
to excuse Landlord’s performance.
3. APPRAISAL PROVISION
Finally, with respect to the appraisal: Had Northern Biomedical breached the lease when it
sought an appraisal to set the purchase price, this breach could very well have been a substantial
one. For a breach to be substantial, it must affect an essential part of the contract and must be
material, which includes a consideration of whether the “nonbreaching party obtained the benefit
it reasonably expected to receive.” Omnicom of Michigan v Giannetti Inv Co, 221 Mich App 341,
348; 561 NW2d 138 (1997). The appraisal went to one of the main aspects of the purchase—the
price. See Zurcher v Herveat, 238 Mich App 267, 282; 605 NW2d 329 (1999) (“It is essential that
an enforceable, real estate sales contract either set forth the price to be paid by the purchaser or
furnish a basis from which the price may be ascertained.”). A breach dealing with the price and
appraisal could certainly be material, given that Landlord likely linked the price to an appraisal in
order to receive the value of the property in the sale. See MCL 339.2601 (“ ‘Appraisal’ means an
opinion, conclusion, or analysis relating to the value of real property.”); see also Black’s Law
Dictionary (12th ed) (“[Appraisal is] [t]he determination of what constitutes a fair price for
something or how its condition can be fairly stated; the act of assessing the worth, value, or
condition of something.”).
Landlord has not, however, raised a genuine issue of material fact on whether Northern
Biomedical actually breached the appraisal requirement. For its part, Northern Biomedical had to
select a qualified appraiser, and this qualified appraiser would, with the agreement of Landlord’s
qualified appraiser, select “a third qualified appraiser who will conduct the appraisal.”
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Landlord has failed to show that any of the three appraisers were not qualified. A person
is “qualified” if he possesses the necessary qualities or properties to be eligible for a position or to
perform a function. Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed) (defining qualified as “[p]ossessing the
necessary qualifications; capable or competent”) (defining qualification as “possession of qualities
or properties (such as fitness or capacity) inherently or legally necessary to make one eligible for
a position or office, or to perform a public duty or function”). Although the Occupational Code
does not define “qualified,” a “certified” appraiser is an individual licensed under MCL 339.2610.
MCL 339.2601(d), (e). To be licensed, a person must be at least 18 years old, of good moral
character, and have provided proof of completion of the appropriate education, examination, and
experience requirements. MCL 339.2610. MCL 339.2633 provides the duties of a licensed
appraiser, including maintenance of an actual place of business and a system of books and records.
Landlord has failed to show that “qualified” means anything other than licensed and in
good standing under the Occupational Code. Although there are certain prohibited acts that may
result in suspension or revocation of a license, see MCL 339.2635, there was no evidence that
Broersma or Adams participated in such conduct to have resulted in a license suspension or
revocation. Even if they had, such disciplinary action would not have had a retroactive effect to
somehow make them unqualified pre-appraisal.
For Broersma, Landlord argued that her prior work with Northern Biomedical created a
conflict of interest which made her unqualified. Whether Broersma was required to disclose prior
work is beside the point. Such disclosure would have related to whether the services she provided
met a certain level of professionalism and had nothing to do with her then-status under the state’s
licensing regime.
Similarly for Adams, there is no question in this record that he was appropriately licensed
to do the work and in good standing, and therefore he was qualified. Had Adams provided
deficient services, Landlord might well have had a claim against him for professional malpractice.
But whether, in this instance, Adams performed deficiently has no bearing on whether he had the
appropriate qualifications to be a state-licensed appraiser. Qualifications relate to the person and
are viewed prospectively, not in terms of the person’s eventual work. See Surman v Surman, 277
Mich App 287, 308-309; 745 NW2d 802 (2007) (finding that an opposing party’s disagreement
with an expert’s opinion does not present an issue of whether the expert is qualified).
Furthermore, even if Adams had performed deficiently, Landlord failed to show that this
resulted from a breach on Northern Biomedical’s part. “A party asserting a breach of contract
must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) there was a contract (2) which the other
party breached (3) thereby resulting in damages to the party claiming breach.” Miller-Davis Co v
Ahrens Const, Inc, 495 Mich 161, 178; 848 NW2d 95 (2014) (emphasis added). Landlord needed
to show that Northern Biomedical—not Broersma or Adams—breached the lease. Northern
Biomedical and Landlord both selected their appraisers in accordance with the lease, and these
appraisers selected Adams. If Adams’s appraisal was in breach of the contract, then the breach
was caused by both parties equally.
In conclusion, the trial court did not err when it rejected Landlord’s substantial breach
argument and granted summary disposition.
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C. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Landlord’s final argument in its appeal is that the trial court deprived it of due process
when it granted specific performance sua sponte and denied Landlord’s motion for reconsideration.
The Court reviews de novo the trial court’s grant of specific performance. Samuel D Begola Servs,
Inc v Wild Bros, 210 Mich App 636, 639; 534 NW2d 217 (1995). The Court reviews for an abuse
of discretion a trial court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration. Redding v Redding, 214 Mich
App 639, 642; 543 NW2d 75 (1995). “The trial court abuses its discretion when it makes an error
of law or when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” People
v Owens, 338 Mich App 101, 113; 979 NW2d 345 (2021).
A trial court can grant specific performance “where enforcement of [a] promise is
necessary to avoid injustice,” there is no adequate remedy at law, and monetary damages are
insufficient to place the nonbreaching party “in as good a position as if the contract had not been
breached.” Hai v CIG Capital Advisors, Inc, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026)
(Docket No. 370517); slip op at 3. “Land is presumed to have a unique and peculiar value, and
contracts involving the sale of land are generally subject to specific performance.” In re Smith
Trust, 480 Mich 19, 26; 745 NW2d 754 (2008). Specifically, where a party properly and timely
exercises an option to purchase real property, “specific performance is the proper remedy.” Id.
Further, when the trial court grants summary disposition, it must “render judgment without delay.”
MCR 2.116(I)(1).
In connection with its claim of breach of contract, Northern Biomedical requested specific
performance as the remedy in its complaint. Thus, when Northern Biomedical moved for summary
disposition on its breach-of-contract claim, the natural result if such motion was granted was to
grant the requested relief that corresponded to the claim. By Northern Biomedical moving for
summary disposition on that claim, Landlord was on notice that if the summary disposition motion
was granted, the trial court may order specific performance as a result.
Regardless, Landlord was able to argue against specific performance in its motion for
reconsideration. The trial court considered the merits of Landlord’s argument and rejected them.
Although the series of events was not the most ideal, it did not demonstrate that Landlord’s due-
process rights were violated. See MCR 2.613(A); see also Boulton v Fenton Twp, 272 Mich App
456, 463-464; 726 NW2d 733 (2006). Thus, the tria