Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON ERIC CHRISTIANSEN, an individual, No. 88874-9-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION LARRY SEARLES and JANE DOE SEARLES, husband and wife and the community composed thereof, and 938 164TH AVENUE, LLC, a Washington limited liability company, Appellants. FELDMAN, J. —Larry Searles and his limited liability company 983 164th Ave LLC (collectively “Appellants”) appeal from judgments in favor of their former tenant, Eric Christiansen, on two claims: (1) negligence predicated on breach of the implied warranty of habitability; and (2) violation of the Residential Landlord Tenant Act (RLTA), ch. 59.18 RCW. Regarding the negligence claim, Appellants argue the trial court erred in awarding emotional distress damages without proof of objective symptomatology. Regarding the RLTA claim, Appellants argue the trial court erred by awarding treble damages under RCW 59.18.085(2) in the absence of prior governmental notice and by failing to enter sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its attorney fee award. We affirm the award of emotional distress damages, reverse the treble damages award, vacate the fee No. 88874-9-I award, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including entry of findings and conclusions that explain the basis for the fee award. I This matter arises out of a landlord-tenant dispute. Because the trial court entered detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law following a bench trial and Appellants do not contest the findings except insofar as they relate to damages, the following statement of facts accepts as true the trial court’s findings, which are verities on appeal. Jubitz Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 31 Wn. App. 2d 898, 907, 553 P.3d 700 (2024) (citing Real Carriage Door Co., Inc. ex rel. Rees v. Rees, 17 Wn. App. 2d 449, 457, 486 P.3d 955 (2021)). Appellants owned a garage facility in Redmond, Washington, with two attached apartments and an auto shop where Searles repaired and painted classic automobiles. Searles admitted he avoided the permitting process when he renovated the building, which included installing a ventilation system. Consequently, a governmental entity did not notify Searles of any violation of an applicable code, statute, ordinance, or regulation before he leased the two apartments. Searles and Christiansen entered into a two-year lease for one of the apartments on June 15, 2020. Searles leased the other apartment to Marshall Johnson, who worked as an automobile painter in the auto shop. Despite the ventilation system and a paint booth, the auto shop would often fill with paint fumes and particulates when Johnson performed his work. Christiansen reported noticing paint fumes in his apartment multiple times. He experienced illness, physical pain, -2- No. 88874-9-I and distress due to these fumes. Christiansen complained about the fumes to Searles on August 14. Three days later, Searles stated he would not hold Christiansen to the lease should he desire to leave. Christiansen also reported these issues to King County. On September 8, Code Enforcement Officer LaDonna Whalen inspected the property. She determined the property was not habitable, noting paint fumes and particulates in the air. She also noted that Searles had not secured proper occupancy permits. Consequently, both tenants were evicted from their respective apartments. Christiansen struggled to find housing, which affected his eating habits and access to his mail. Christiansen filed a complaint against Appellants alleging (1) negligence predicated on breach of the implied warranty of habitability and (2) violations of the RLTA. 1 The claims proceeded to a bench trial, after which the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law determining that Appellants were negligent and violated the RLTA. For the negligence claim, the court awarded Christiansen $25,000 for pain and suffering due to physical illness and $50,000 for emotional distress damages. For the RLTA claim, the court found that Christiansen had proven actual damages totaling $6,967.99, which it trebled under RCW 59.18.085(2) for a total award of $20,903.97. 2 1 Christiansen also alleged negligent infliction of emotional distress and outrage. The trial court dismissed those claims on summary judgment, and Christiansen does not assign error to those rulings. 2 RCW 59.18.085(2) authorizes an award of treble damages if a landlord knowingly violates RCW 59.18.085(1); both provisions are quoted and discussed in section II.B below. -3- No. 88874-9-I In the same decision, the court awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs of suit under the RLTA and directed Christiansen to seek such fees and costs as follows: The Plaintiff is also awarded the costs of the suit and reasonable attorney fees. As to fees, the Court finds as a matter of fact that the claims under the [RLTA] and common Law Negligence are completely intertwined for purposes of fees. Plaintiff’s Counsel shall apply for attorney fees and costs by separate motion. The court then entered a judgment in favor of Christiansen totaling $95,903.97 indicating attorney fees and costs “TBD by separate motion.” In accordance with the trial court’s directive, Christiansen filed a motion for attorney fees totaling $98,464.99. Appellants opposed the motion, contending Christiansen’s request was unreasonable because (1) he requested fees for time spent on issues on which he had not prevailed, (2) he requested fees for his counsel’s travel time to Zoom meetings, and (3) he did not segregate his fees by claim. Christiansen conceded the first two points and reduced his fee request to $76,710.00. The court then entered a second judgment regarding attorney fees awarding that exact amount. Prior to entry of the judgment regarding attorney fees, Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration. Appellants contested Christiansen’s recovery of treble damages under RCW 59.18.085(2) in the absence of prior governmental notice and argued again that Christiansen had failed to segregate his attorney fees by claim. The court denied Appellants’ motion on the same date it issued its judgment regarding attorney fees. Addressing Christiansen’s recovery of treble damages under RCW 59.18.085(2), the court determined that “[n]otice is not required when a landlord deliberately seeks to avoid the statute by avoiding all governmental -4- No. 88874-9-I authorities.” As for attorney fees, the court reiterated, “This court found that the facts among all these claims are so intertwined as to make segregation basically impossible per RCW 59.18 and implied warranty of habitability.” 3 This timely appeal followed. II A. Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages Based on Negligence Appellants argue the trial court erred by awarding Christiansen $50,000 in emotional distress damages based on his negligence claim without proof of objective symptomatology. We disagree. “When the trial court has weighed the evidence in a bench trial, we review whether the court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and, if so, whether the findings support the conclusions of law.” Rufin v. City of Seattle, 199 Wn. App. 348, 354-55, 398 P.3d 1237 (2017). “‘Substantial evidence’ is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, rational person that the finding is true.” Graser v. Olsen, 28 Wn. App. 2d 933, 941, 542 P.3d 1013 (2023) (citing In re Est. of Langeland, 177 Wn. App. 315, 320, 312 P.3d 657 (2013)). We review the record in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed below, which in this case is Christiansen. Skinner v. InCity Props. Holdings, Inc., 35 Wn. App. 2d 436, 450, 580 P.3d 986 (2025) (citing Columbia State Bank v. Invicta Law Grp. PLLC, 199 Wn. App. 306, 319, 402 P.3d 330 (2017)). We review conclusions of 3 In its judgment regarding attorney fees, the court likewise stated: “Defense raised specific objections on pages 4-5 of his opposition. Plaintiff conceded these and the amount of the judgment is the amount after deducting these conceded amounts. Other legal issues are addressed in the motion/order on reconsideration (segregation). There was no objection to the hourly rate.” (Emphasis omitted.) -5- No. 88874-9-I law de novo. Garrand v. Cornett, 31 Wn. App. 2d 428, 439, 550 P.3d 64 (2024) (citing Tedford v. Guy, 13 Wn. App. 2d 1, 12, 462 P.3d 869 (2020)). Emotional distress damages caused by negligent conduct are recoverable under two theories. First, “where a plaintiff has suffered physical injury,” “[d]amages for mental anguish, pain, and suffering are available.” Nunley v. Chelan-Douglas Health Dist., 32 Wn. App. 2d 700, 719, 558 P.3d 513 (2024) (citing Schmidt v. Coogan, 181 Wn.2d 661, 673, 335 P.3d 424 (2014)). “[E]motional damages accompanying a physical injury are recognized as a proper (if ‘parasitic’) element of recovery.” Daley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 86 Wn. App. 346, 351, 936 P.2d 1185 (1997) (reversed on other grounds) (citing Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wn.2d 424, 428, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976)). Second, where a plaintiff has not suffered physical injury, they may recover emotional distress damages through a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. Hunsley, 87 Wn.2d at 436. “[W]e allow claims for emotional distress in the absence of physical injury only where emotional distress is . . . manifest by objective symptomatology.” Bylsma v. Burger King Corp., 176 Wn.2d 555, 560, 293 P.3d 1168 (2013) (citing Hunsley, 87 Wn.2d at 433, 436). “‘[T]o satisfy the objective symptom[at]ology requirement . . . a plaintiff’s emotional distress must be susceptible to medical diagnosis and proved through medical evidence.’” Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wn.2d 91, 113, 26 P.3d 257 (2001) (citing Hegel v. McMahon, 136 Wn.2d 122, 135, 960 P.2d 424 (1998)). Here, Christiansen established that he sustained a physical injury as a result of Appellants’ negligence. Addressing that issue, the trial court’s -6- No. 88874-9-I unchallenged findings (including conclusions of law that are, in effect, findings of fact 4) indicate as follows: • “Plaintiff was spending a good deal of time in his apartment and started noticing symptoms of illness. He was sick to his stomach.” • “The Plaintiff encountered a great deal of paint fumes in his upstairs apartment on or about August 14, 2020 and felt sick.” • “Plaintiff texted Searles complaining about the paint fumes making him sick and said that the apartment had become uninhabitable.” • “Pain and Suffering due to Physical Illness: $25,000.” • “The Plaintiff’s claims for physical pain and suffering as well as emotional distress are proven and sustained by Plaintiff’s credible testimony.” • “The Plaintiff, suffered damages including . . . Physical Pain and Suffering due to the illness the Plaintiff suffered as a result of the exposure to the paint fumes.” Because the trial court repeatedly found that Christiansen suffered physical injuries, including physical pain and illness, he was not required to establish objective symptomatology to recover emotional distress damages. The trial court correctly applied controlling legal principles in so ruling. 5 4 “We treat findings of fact labeled as conclusions of law as findings of fact.” Porter Law Ctr., LLC v. State of Washington Dep't of Fin. Institutions, Div. of Consumer Servs., 196 Wn. App. 1, 13, 385 P.3d 146 (2016). 5 While our Supreme Court did not define the phrase “physical injury” in Bylsma, presumably because the meaning of the phrase is sufficiently clear without further elaboration, the above analysis is consistent with relevant authority defining that phrase. For example, Washington’s legislature defines “physical injury” for purposes of applying criminal law as “physical pain or injury, illness, or an impairment of physical condition.” RCW 9A.04.110(4)(a). This definition is also consistent with the Second and Third Restatement of Torts, both of which have been cited as -7- No. 88874-9-I Appellants urge the court to require objective symptomatology here based on the policy considerations identified in Bylsma, which states that without requiring objective symptomatology “feigned claims of emotional distress would lead to ‘intolerable and interminable litigation.’” 176 Wn.2d at 560-61 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Corcoran v. Postal Tele.-Cable Co., 80 Wash. 570, 579, 142 P. 29 (1914)). But as the court noted in Daley, “[P]hysical injuries alleviate the law’s historical suspicion of emotional injuries generally.” 86 Wn. App. at 351. Requiring objective symptomatology for negligence claims with resulting physical injuries would thus impose an unnecessary barrier to relief that does not comport with the legal principles and policy considerations stated in Bylsma. For these reasons, Appellants’ reliance on the policy discussion in Bylsma is misplaced. Lastly, Appellants contest the trial court’s reliance on Bunch v. Department of Youth Services, 155 Wn.2d 165, 116 P.3d 381 (2005), to justify awarding emotional distress damages based on Christiansen’s testimony alone. There, Bunch sued under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), ch. 49.60 RCW, and was awarded $260,000 in noneconomic damages. 155 Wn.2d at 169- 70. On appeal, the Supreme Court held the award of damages could be supported by Bunch’s testimony without medical consultation. Id. at 180. Appellants argue Bunch is irrelevant because a WLAD claim is akin to an intentional tort rather than authoritative by Washington courts. See Stone v. King County, __ Wn. App. 2d __, 593 P.3d 188, 190-91 (2026). Under the Second Restatement, “bodily harm” includes “physical impairment of the conditions of another’s body, or physical pain or illness.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 15 (A.L.I. 1965). Under the Third Restatement, “illness, disease, [and] impairment of bodily function” likewise constitute physical harm. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 4 (A.L.I. 2010). Accordingly, physical pain and illness, as the trial court repeatedly found, qualify as physical injury. -8- No. 88874-9-I negligence. But even if Bunch were irrelevant as Appellants claim, the physical injuries to which Christiansen testified would still entitle him to emotional distress damages without medical consultation or proof of objective symptomatology. The trial court correctly decided these issues. 6 B. Recovery of Treble Damages under the RLTA The trial court awarded treble damages totaling $20,903.97 under the RLTA. The statutory basis for the award is set forth in RCW 59.18.085(1) and (2), which provide as follows: (1) If a governmental agency responsible for the enforcement of a building, housing, or other appropriate code has notified the landlord that a dwelling is condemned or unlawful to occupy due to the existence of conditions that violate applicable codes, statutes, ordinances, or regulations, a landlord shall not enter into a rental agreement for the dwelling unit until the conditions are corrected. (2) If a landlord knowingly violates subsection (1) of this section, the tenant shall recover either three months’ periodic rent or up to treble the actual damages sustained as a result of the violation, whichever is greater, costs of suit, or arbitration and reasonable attorneys’ fees. Appellants argue the trial court misinterpreted these provisions by awarding treble damages in the absence of prior governmental notice. We agree. “‘Statutory construction begins by reading the text of the statute or statutes involved. If the language is unambiguous, a reviewing court is to rely solely on the statutory language.’” Valve Corp. v. Bucher Law PLLC, 34 Wn. App. 2d 727, 738, 571 P.3d 312 (2025) (quoting State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d 614, 621, 106 6 Because we affirm the trial court’s award of emotional distress damages based on its unchallenged findings of physical injuries, we need not reach Christiansen’s alternative argument, asserted for the first time in a statement of additional authorities, concerning the award of emotional distress damages based on the noneconomic nature of the landlord-tenant relationship, as specified under Price v. State, 114 Wn. App. 65, 71, 55 P.3d 1224 (2002). -9- No. 88874-9-I P.3d 196 (2005)). “‘Rules of statutory construction provide that a statute which is clear on its face is not subject to judicial interpretation.’” Id. (quoting Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wn.2d 97, 107, 922 P.2d 43 (1996)). “Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo.” Novalic v. PeaceHealth, 31 Wn. App. 2d 650, 657, 555 P.3d 445 (2024) (citing Lakeside Indus., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 1 Wn.3d 150, 155, 524 P.3d 639 (2023)). As can be seen above, the plain language of RCW 59.18.085(2) authorizes an award of treble damages where “a landlord knowingly violates subsection (1) of this section.” Subsection (1), in turn, requires a finding that “a governmental agency responsible for the enforcement of a building, housing, or other appropriate code has notified the landlord that a dwelling is condemned or unlawful to occupy due to the existence of conditions that violate applicable codes, statutes, ordinances, or regulations.” RCW 59.18.085(1). If such notice is given, “a landlord shall not enter into a rental agreement for the dwelling unit until the conditions are corrected.” Id. Critical here, the trial court did not find that Searles received governmental notice of noncompliance with any applicable code prior to leasing the apartment to Christiansen. Nor does the record before this court indicate that such notice was given. To the contrary, the trial court ruled “[n]otice is not required when a landlord deliberately seeks to avoid the statute by avoiding all governmental authority.” Without prior governmental notice, Searles could not be in violation of subsection (1) and, consequently, Christiansen cannot recover treble damages under subsection (2). The trial court erred in ruling otherwise. - 10 - No. 88874-9-I Christiansen argues the trial court was correct in determining that a landlord’s intentional avoidance of the permitting process is sufficient to constitute a violation of subsection (1). He claims that, otherwise, the statute would “reward a landlord for intentionally avoiding the very governmental process that would have produced formal pre-lease notice.” Searles indeed admitted to, and the trial court found avoidance of the permitting process. But Christiansen’s argument contradicts the plain language of the statute. Had the legislature intended to permit trial courts to award treble damages based on a landlord’s deliberate evasion of the permitting process, it would have so stated. And while Christiansen’s policy argument is compelling, as the trial court’s corresponding ruling confirms, “we do not add words to a statute that the legislature did not intend to include.” Jespersen v. Clark County, 199 Wn. App. 568, 580, 399 P.3d 1209 (2017). We therefore reverse the trial court’s award of treble damages under the RLTA and remand the matter to the trial court to strike that award. C. The Trial Court’s Attorney Fee Award Lastly, Appellants argue the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Christiansen attorney fees under the RLTA because it did not enter adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its fee award, including its determination that the negligence and RLTA claims were intertwined for purposes of awarding such fees. Because the record does not show that the court took an active role in assessing the reasonableness of Christiansen’s fee request, we vacate the fee award and remand the matter to the trial court for entry of proper findings and conclusions that explain the basis for the award. - 11 - No. 88874-9-I We apply a two-step review to attorney fee awards. In the first step, “we review de novo whether there is a legal basis for awarding attorney fees by statute, under contract, or in equity.” Gander v. Yeager, 167 Wn. App. 638, 647, 282 P.3d 1100 (2012). Appellants do not dispute on appeal, nor did they dispute in the trial court, that Christiansen is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs of suit under the RLTA. Accordingly, the first step of the two-step analysis is uncontested. The second step is to review the trial court’s award, including its determination as to whether segregation is possible, for abuse of discretion. Gander, 167 Wn. App. at 647; Mayer v. City of Seattle, 102 Wn. App. 66, 79, 10 P.3d 408 (2000); King County v. Vinci Constr. Grands Projets/Parsons RCI/Frontier-Kemper, JV, 188 Wn.2d 618, 632, 398 P.3d 1093 (2017). We will reverse an attorney fee award on this basis only if the trial court exercised its discretion on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. Fiore v. PPG Indus., Inc., 169 Wn. App. 325, 351, 279 P.3d 972 (2012). The trial court determined the amount of its fee award based on the lodestar method, which multiplies the hours reasonably expended in litigation by the reasonable hourly rate of compensation. Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wn.2d 581, 597, 675 P.2d 193 (1983). The fee applicant has the burden to prove that a fee request is reasonable, and the fee applicant’s documentation is the starting point, but it is not dispositive. Fetzer Co. v. Weeks, 122 Wn.2d 141, 151, 859 P.2d 1210 (1993). The trial court must make an independent determination as to whether a fee is reasonable. Absher Const. Co. v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 79 Wn. App. 841, 847, 917 P.2d 1086 (1995). The court must - 12 - No. 88874-9-I determine whether “counsel expended a reasonable number of hours in securing a successful recovery for the client” and whether counsel’s hourly rate was reasonable. Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wn.2d 398, 434, 957 P.2d 632 (1998). The court considers factors such as “the [attorney’s] usual billing rate, . . . the level of skill required by the litigation, time limitations imposed on the litigation, the amount of potential recovery, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case.” Bowers, 100 Wn.2d at 597. Additionally, “[i]f attorney fees are recoverable for only some of a party’s claims, the award must properly reflect a segregation of the time spent on issues for which fees are authorized from time spent on other issues.” Mayer, 102 Wn. App. at 79-80 (citing Dash Point Village Assocs. v. Exxon Corp., 86 Wn. App. 596, 611, 937 P.2d 1148 (1997)). But the trial court need not segregate time if it determines that the various claims in the litigation are “so related that no reasonable segregation of . . . claims can be made.” Hume v. Am. Disposal Co., 124 Wn.2d 656, 673, 880 P.2d 988 (1994)). “The party claiming an award of attorney fees has the burden of segregating its lawyer’s time.” Manna Funding, LLC v. Kittitas County, 173 Wn. App. 879, 901, 295 P.3d 1197 (2013). In this case, the parties agree that fees were authorized for the RLTA claim but not for the negligence claim. Lastly, in determining the fee award, “‘[c]ourts must take an active role in assessing [its] reasonableness’” and “‘should not simply accept unquestioningly attorney fee affidavits from counsel.’” Berryman v. Metcalf, 177 Wn. App. 644, 657, 312 P.3d 745 (2013) (quoting Mahler, 135 Wn.2d at 434-35). The court must - 13 - No. 88874-9-I provide findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to allow the appellate court to understand why it awarded the amount in question. SentinelC3, Inc. v. Hunt, 181 Wn.2d 127, 144, 331 P.3d 40 (2014). In the absence of an adequate record, including sufficient findings and conclusions, a fee award must be remanded “‘for the entry of proper findings of fact and conclusions of law that explain the basis of the award.’” View Ridge Ests. Homeowners Ass’n v. Guetter, 30 Wn. App. 2d 612, 648, 546 P.3d 463 (2024) (quoting Mahler, 135 Wn.2d at 435). Applying these principles here, the record does not show that the trial court took an active role in assessing the reasonableness of the fee award. While the court noted that “[t]here was no objection to the hourly rate,” it provided no independent analysis as to whether Christiansen’s counsel expended a reasonable number of hours securing his client’s recovery. And while the court found “that the claims under the [RLTA] and common Law Negligence are completely intertwined for purposes of fees,” it entered that finding before reviewing Christiansen’s fee request and did not explain why that is so. The court entered no other findings or conclusions to enable this court to determine why it found the fee award reasonable. Christiansen’s contrary argument lacks merit. Christiansen claims “[t]he trial court did not award fees without findings.” That is so, he argues, because the court “expressly awarded Christiansen costs and reasonable attorney fees, found ‘as a matter of fact’ that the RLTA and common-law negligence claims were ‘completely intertwined for purposes of fees,’ and directed counsel to apply for fees and costs by separate motion.” This argument fails on several grounds. First, as - 14 - No. 88874-9-I discussed above, the trial court’s non-segregability finding alone is insufficient to satisfy the “active role” requirement. Second, as also noted above, the trial court entered the above finding without first reviewing Christiansen’s fee request, which improperly circumvented Christiansen’s burden of proof and denied Appellants the opportunity to refute a showing of non-segregability before the court issued its ruling. 7 As with the trial court’s analysis generally, this premature ruling does not demonstrate an active role in assessing the reasonableness of the requested fees. We therefore vacate the award of attorney fees under the RLTA and remand the matter to the trial court for entry of proper findings and conclusions that explain the basis for the award. III Christiansen also requests attorney fees and costs on appeal under RAP 18.1 and RCW 59.18.085(2). We deny the request for two reasons. First, while Christiansen prevailed with regard to emotional distress damages, Appellants prevailed with regard to treble damages. Consequently, Christiansen did not substantially prevail on appeal. See Peterson v. Koester, 122 Wn. App. 351, 364, 92 P.3d 780 (2004) (“Although the respondents prevail in terms of the mechanical room, [appellants] have prevailed with regard to the order forcing them to reduce the elevation of the improvements. Neither party has substantially prevailed on appeal. Therefore, we do not award attorney fees and costs for the appeal.”). 7 Although Washington courts have not addressed a similar issue in a published opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals found an abuse of discretion in Midland Funding LLC v. Sotolongo where the trial court awarded attorney fees to Midland under the parties’ contract “without allowing Sotolongo an opportunity to challenge the authenticity of the contract or the scope of the attorney-fees award authorized by the contract.” 325 P.3d 871, 882 (Utah Ct. App. 2014), abrogated on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Cullimore, 417 P.3d 129 (Utah 2018). - 15 - No. 88874-9-I Second, Christiansen did not properly request fees on appeal. Christiansen requests appellate fees twice in his brief: in the section regarding whether the trial court properly awarded attorney fees and costs under the RLTA and in the conclusion. Neither request complies with the separate section requirement in RAP 18.1(b). See Wilson Court Ltd. P’ship v. Tony Maroni’s, Inc., 134 Wn.2d 692, 710 n.4, 952 P.2d 590 (1998) (“Wilson includes a request for attorney fees and costs in the last line of the conclusion of its Supplemental Brief, but does not include a separate section in its brief devoted to the fees issue as required by RAP 18.1(b). This requirement is mandatory.“). IV We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. WE CONCUR: - 16 -