Marquez v. State

Luis Ivan Marquez v. State of Maryland, No. 1563, September Term, 2024. Opinion by Getty, Joseph M., J. HEADNOTES: PUBLIC SAFETY — RESTRICTION ON FIREARM POSSESSION BASED ON DISQUALIFYING OFFENSE — JUVENILE ADJUDICATION When a party is charged with unlawful firearm possession based on a disqualifying offense, the disqualifying offense is a juvenile adjudication, and the party declines to stipulate to the offense, the Maryland Public Safety Article creates a limited exception to the prohibition against admission of a juvenile record in a criminal proceeding prior to conviction solely for the purpose of establishing the required disqualified legal status. Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. C-16-CR-23-001823 REPORTED IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND No. 1563 September Term, 2024 ______________________________________ LUIS IVAN MARQUEZ v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ Berger, Leahy, Getty, Joseph M. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Getty, J. ______________________________________ Filed: August 28, 2026 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.08.28 '00'04- 11:25:53 Gregory Hilton, Clerk  When faced with two statutory provisions that appear to conflict, this Court presumes that the legislature “intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law.” Len Stoler, Inc. v. Wisner, 223 Md. App. 218, 234 (2015) (internal quotations omitted). We likewise presume “that the General Assembly had, and acted with respect to, full knowledge and information as to prior and existing law . . . and the policy of the prior law.” Id. We seek to “harmonize these seemingly inconsistent statutory mandates,” or, failing that, to determine which statute controls the facts before us. Aleman v. State, 242 Md. App. 632, 643–44 (2019), aff’d, 469 Md. 397 (2020). Whenever reasonably possible, we interpret statutes to avoid repeal by implication. See Wisner, 223 Md. App. at 234. In the case before us, we consider whether Section 5-133(b)(15) of the Public Safety Article (“PS”) of the Annotated Code of Maryland, which prohibits a person under the age of thirty from possessing a regulated firearm if he was previously adjudicated delinquent for a disqualifying offense, poses a conflict with Section 3-8A-23 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”), which provides that a juvenile adjudication is inadmissible as evidence against the adjudged in a criminal proceeding prior to conviction. We are not aware of any prior case in Maryland that has remarked upon this tension. In the early morning hours of February 20, 2023, Maurice Chase (“Mr. Chase”), an off-duty security guard, got into an altercation with Appellant Luis Ivan Marquez (“Mr. Marquez”), who was smoking in the lobby of the building where Mr. Chase lived and worked. The altercation resulted in Mr. Marquez shooting Mr. Chase. Mr. Marquez argued that he shot Mr. Chase in self-defense.  Mr. Marquez was charged, among other things, with a violation of the unlawful possession of a firearm statute PS § 5-133(b)(15). At trial, Mr. Marquez declined to stipulate to the disqualifying event that supported this charge because it was a juvenile adjudication. As a result, the court exercised its discretion to allow limited evidence of Mr. Marquez’s juvenile record to support the existence of the disqualifying event. Mr. Marquez submits that, under CJP § 3-8A-23, this evidence was not admissible. A jury convicted Mr. Marquez of second-degree murder, use of a firearm in a crime of violence, illegal possession of a regulated firearm by one under the age of thirty, wearing and carrying a handgun, and illegal possession of ammunition. Mr. Marquez submits four questions for our review: 1. Did the trial court err in failing to strike the prosecutor’s improper closing argument? 2. Did the trial court err in restricting Mr. Marquez’s ability to present a defense? 3. Did the trial court err in permitting the State to introduce Mr. Marquez’s juvenile record and in permitting it to be called a conviction? 4. Are Mr. Marquez’s convictions and sentences for one count of possession of a regulated firearm by one under the age of thirty and three counts of wearing and carrying a handgun illegal? We answer questions one through three in the negative and affirm. As to question four, we remand to correct the sentence accordingly. 2  BACKGROUND A. Legislative History In addressing Mr. Marquez’s contention that CJP § 3-8A-23 conflicts with PS § 5- 133(b)(15), we find a brief overview of the origin of these provisions provides important context. CJP § 3-8A-23 aims to protect juvenile offenders from carrying the same burden, and in particular the same civil disabilities, that a criminal record would impose. The current iteration of the statute took shape in the early 1970s, following a comprehensive restructuring of the law concerning juvenile court proceedings in Maryland in 1969. See Folk v. State, 11 Md. App. 508, 510 (1970). The 1969 Acts were codified into Article 26, § 70-1, et seq., and those provisions were recodified into the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article in 1973. This section of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, often called the Juvenile Causes Act, was recodified in 1975 to make juvenile procedures uniform across the state. Modifications to the law since then have made no substantive changes regarding juvenile delinquency.1 The underlying policy of the juvenile justice system has evolved significantly over the last few decades. Since 1997, the juvenile justice system has incorporated a model of Balanced and Restorative Justice. This approach aims to move away from both the traditional view of juvenile justice as purely rehabilitative and the more punitive view that 1 See Comm’n on Juvenile Justice Jurisdiction, Final Report to the Governor and General Assembly (2001). 3 arose in the 1980s,2 and to balance the objectives of public safety, accountability to victims of juvenile offenders, and promoting “competency and character development to assist children in becoming responsible and productive members of society.” CJP § 3-802. The purpose of the provision that is now PS § 5-133(b)(15) was to extend Maryland’s longstanding prohibition against firearm possession by adults convicted of certain crimes to those adults with certain juvenile offenses. Maryland has prohibited adults convicted of certain crimes from possessing regulated firearms since the early twentieth century, a restriction that predates the federal prohibitions put into place by the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968. Maryland extended this prohibition to those who had committed certain acts as juveniles as part of the Responsible Gun Safety Act of 2000. The language therein stated: A person may not possess a regulated firearm if the person: […] (3) Is less than 30 years of age at the time of possession and has been adjudicated delinquent by a juvenile court for committing: (i) A crime of violence; (ii) Any violation classified as a felony in this State; or (iii) Any violation classified as a misdemeanor in this State that carries a statutory penalty of more than 2 years. S.B. 211, 2000 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Third Reader). The relevant portion of this Act was codified into Article 27 of the Maryland Code, Section 445, under the heading “Regulated Firearms.” Article 27 §§ 441 to 449 were then 2 See Panel on Juvenile Crime: Prevention, Treatment, and Control, Nat’l Rsch. Council & Inst. of Med., Juvenile Crime, Juvenile Justice (Joan McCord, Cathy Spatz Widom & Nancy A. Crowell eds., 2001). 4 recodified in 2003 into Sections 5-128 through 5-144 of the Public Safety Article. The language in PS § 5-133 was “derived without substantive change” from its predecessor. See Melton v. State, 379 Md. 471, 488 (2004) (quoting PS § 5-133 (2003) (Special Revisor’s Note)). PS § 5-133 was again modified by the Firearm Safety Act of 2013. This Act mandated a handgun qualification license, banned certain types of assault weapons, and expanded limits on firearm ownership to include individuals involuntarily committed or voluntarily admitted to a mental health facility for more than 30 days. The current text of PS § 5-133 reads, in relevant part: [A] person may not possess a regulated firearm if the person: […] (15) if under the age of 30 years at the time of possession, has been adjudicated delinquent by a juvenile court for an act that would be a disqualifying crime if committed by an adult. PS § 5-133(b)(15). Thus, although CJP § 3-8A-23 predates PS § 5-133 by several decades, these two provisions have coexisted since 2000. Recent cases before this Court and before our Supreme Court have examined the effect of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) on Maryland’s firearm regulations. In State v. Fields, No. 784, Sept. Term 2022, slip op. at *12 (App. Ct. Md. July 2, 2026), this Court undertook a thorough analysis of whether PS § 5-133(d), which prohibits possession of regulated firearms by those under the age of twenty-one, was consistent with the nation’s history and tradition of firearms regulation as outlined in 5 Bruen. This Court in Fields concluded that PS § 5-133(d) remained constitutional under Bruen.3 In Fooks v. State, 490 Md. 458 (2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1644 (2026), our Supreme Court held that PS § 5-133(b)(2), which prohibits regulated firearm possession by a person who “has been convicted of a violation classified as a common law crime and received a term of imprisonment of more than 2 years[,]” remained constitutional under Bruen. The Court reasoned that this provision is analogous to a felon dispossession statute, which the U.S. Supreme Court has deemed presumptively lawful. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 81; United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 682 (2024). B. Factual Background Around midnight on February 20, 2023, Maurice Chase’s fiancée called him from a McDonald’s where she was experiencing car trouble. Mr. Chase was in his apartment at the Takoma Towers apartment building, which he shared with Brandon White. The two worked as security guards for the building, but they were off duty that night. Mr. White agreed to drive Mr. Chase to pick up his fiancée and her children from the McDonald’s, and the two left the apartment. Mr. Chase remained on a video call with his fiancée as he and Mr. White entered the building’s lobby. In the lobby, they noticed 3 The Court reasoned that those under the age of majority, which was twenty-one in the Founding era, were subject to “pervasive” restrictions on legal rights, including restrictions on purchasing firearms. Fields, slip op. at *26–29. The Court also noted that even though Bruen rendered Maryland’s previous “good and substantial reason” requirement for firearm licensure unconstitutional, the unconstitutional provision was severable from the rest of the applicable statute, which remained valid. Fields, slip op. at *17. 6 Appellant Mr. Marquez, along with four other individuals they did not recognize, smoking near the back exit to the building. Mr. Chase approached Mr. Marquez and told him to leave the building. Mr. Chase asked Mr. Marquez, “Who do you know here?” to which Mr. Marquez responded by knocking on the door of apartment T9. Another building resident, Mary Mboe, testified that shortly after midnight, she heard a knock at the door of apartment T9. She answered, and asked what the visitor wanted, to which he responded that “he wanted to come in.” She denied him entry and closed the door. Mr. Marquez then walked up to Mr. Chase and Mr. White, uttered a colorful array of expletives, and turned to leave through the front door. According to Mr. White, as Mr. Marquez turned away, he spit on Mr. Chase. Mr. Chase then punched Mr. Marquez in the jaw, knocking him to the floor. Mr. White pulled Mr. Chase away from Mr. Marquez, and Mr. Marquez stood up and again headed for the front door. Mr. Marquez stepped outside, and Mr. Chase and Mr. White turned around and headed back into the building. At this point, Mr. White testified that he heard gunshots. Mr. Chase’s fiancée, who was still on the video call, also heard gunshots, and called 911. Mr. White and Mr. Chase then ran toward the rear exit. Mr. Chase grabbed Mr. White and told him that “he was hit[,]” and the two fell to the floor. Mr. White called 911. Corporal Richard Carlson responded to the call and arrived on the scene while Mr. Chase was still alive. Corporal Carlson recognized Mr. Chase as a security guard who worked in the building. While Corporal Carlson was rendering first aid to Mr. Chase, Mr. Chase told him that he was shot by “a Hispanic male, with a black shirt, black jacket or 7 coat and a black ski mask,” and indicated the direction the shooter had fled. Mr. Chase was pronounced dead at 4:40 a.m. at the MedStar Washington Hospital Center. Dr. Kristinza Giese, the medical examiner who performed Mr. Chase’s autopsy, testified that Mr. Chase suffered six gunshot wounds: three to his torso, two to his left leg, and one to his right arm. Around 8:30 a.m. that same morning, officers were alerted to an ongoing incident at a Walgreens near the Takoma Towers building involving an individual believed to be armed. Based on a description from a Walgreens employee, officers put out a bulletin stating that the individual was on foot in the surrounding area. Officers apprehended Mr. Marquez in a nearby parking lot and patted him down. They recovered a loaded firearm and “a box of half-used ammunition.” After Mr. Marquez was arrested, he waived his Miranda rights and spoke with detectives on three occasions. Mr. Marquez initially told Detective Linden Edwards, the lead detective in the case, that he had been at his mother’s house all evening. Later, during interviews conducted on May 16 and May 25, 2023, Mr. Marquez gave detectives his account of the events at Takoma Towers, and asserted that he had acted in self-defense. A jury trial proceeded in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County from March 19–27, 2024. At trial, cell phone forensics examiner Detective Aven Odhner testified that call records from Mr. Marquez’s phone placed the phone near Takoma Towers at midnight on the evening of the incident in question. Firearms examiner Jamie Smith testified that shell casings and bullets recovered from the scene of the shooting were consistent with having been fired from the gun recovered from Mr. Marquez. 8  As we have noted above, Mr. Marquez was charged, among his other offenses, with a violation of PS § 5-133(b)(15), which provides, in relevant part, that “a person may not possess a regulated firearm if the person: […] (15) if under the age of 30 years at the time of possession, has been adjudicated delinquent by a juvenile court for an act that would be a disqualifying crime if committed by an adult.” PS § 5-133(b)(15). This charge rested on Mr. Marquez’s previous juvenile delinquency adjudication for a robbery. Counsel for Mr. Marquez in this case elected not to stipulate to this fact, and simultaneously argued that counsel for the State was precluded from introducing evidence of Mr. Marquez’s juvenile record. The court heard arguments and held its ruling in abeyance. Ultimately, the court permitted the State to introduce a certified copy of Mr. Marquez’s juvenile delinquency adjudication. During testimony from Detective Edwards, the following exchange occurred: [STATE’S COUNSEL]: [W]hat, if any, further investigation did you do to the Defendant regarding his ability to possess a handgun? [DETECTIVE EDWARDS]: The Defendant is -- Luis Ivan Marquez – [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: Overruled. […] [DETECTIVE EDWARDS]: The Defendant, Luis Ivan Marquez, is prohibited from owning a firearm based on a previous conviction for a disqualifying crime. [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. Move to strike. 9  A bench conference followed, wherein the court clarified that the prior incident should not be described with any specificity, and some of the juvenile record might require redaction. Mr. Marquez’s counsel stated: [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: And I would just like the record being corrected. It is not a conviction, so I just want that to be clear for the jury because that is – THE COURT: Okay. And that is why if you were able to do the stipulation, the language the Court was referencing or to reference is an involvement (inaudible) possible conviction. And that is -- I mean, that is just right from the statutes. And so it will be up to the jury to make a determination whether this certified conviction that comes in and whether based on the series of convictions or categories there are, whether he has that conviction. But, again, you know, I agree that the Defendant has various rights, and if you don’t want to stipulate to something, you do not have to stipulate. But, again, we are not going to be disingenuous that an involvement and a conviction is not the same thing. That would be disingenuous, and unless you have a case that states otherwise, the language that needs to be articulated to the jury is such that it is still not -- that is why we do that five, four (inaudible). We are not going to have the pieces or misleading information to a jury. At trial, Mr. Marquez testified in his own defense. The court sustained objections to several portions of Mr. Marquez’s testimony regarding Mr. Chase’s behavior, beginning with the following: [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: So when they approached you, did Mr. Chase speak to you? Did he say something to you? [MR. MARQUEZ]: Yeah. He was just -- he was angry that I was in the building smoking. He was – [STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection. Calls for speculation. THE COURT: Sustained. [MR. MARQUEZ]: He – 10  [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: You can’t say what you think he was feeling, but you can tell us what – [MR. MARQUEZ]: No, I said he was mad. That’s what he said. [STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection. Calls – [MR. MARQUEZ]: He said he was mad. [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay. [STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection. Hearsay. THE COURT: Sustained. Counsel then requested a bench conference, citing to Wallace-Bey v. State, 234 Md. App. 501 (2017), to support the proposition that a murder defendant claiming self-defense may testify to statements made to her by the victim that established her fear of the victim. In Wallace-Bey v. State, this Court held that the circuit court improperly excluded statements made by the victim, the defendant’s boyfriend, that showed the victim had repeatedly abused the defendant prior to the murder. Id. at 546. Next, the court sustained the following objections: [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: After you weren’t allowed into T-9, okay, where did you go next? [MR. MARQUEZ]: I started walking towards the front of the door, like the out -- the entrance. [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL:] Did those two individuals -- Mr. Chase and Mr. White follow you? [MR. MARQUEZ:] Yeah. [STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection. Leading. THE COURT: I am sorry? It is. Sustained as to leading. 11  [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: What were the two individuals that you were talking about doing? [MR. MARQUEZ]: He just kept -- he was angry that they didn’t let me in and – [STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection. Calls for speculation. THE COURT: Sustained. Mr. Marquez testified that Mr. Chase continued to shout at him while he attempted to leave. Defense counsel then asked whether Mr. Marquez knew that Mr. Chase and Mr. White were employed by the building, and whether Mr. Marquez knew Mr. Chase and Mr. White’s intentions in following him, both of which sustained objections as leading and calling for speculation, respectively. After a ten-minute recess, defense counsel’s questioning continued: [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: What did Mr. Chase say to you? [STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: May we approach, Your Honor? THE COURT: No. [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Now, we already talked about how you weren’t allowed into T-9. At that point, did Mr. Chase say other things to you? [MR. MARQUEZ]: Yeah, he was just being really aggressive. [STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. 12  Counsel approached the bench seeking clarification on the court’s ruling. The court explained, “If he is going to say a statement that -- of assaults or threats, then that would be admissible. But if you are seeking to get statements of something other than that, are not [admissible].” Thus advised, defense counsel continued: [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: All right, so, Mr. Marquez, I am not trying to confuse you, but just going back to before you went to [apartment] T-9, did Mr. Chase say anything to you before you went to T-9 that made you do that? [MR. MARQUEZ]: Yes. [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: What did he say? [MR. MARQUEZ]: “What the” -- “What the fuck you doing in my building?” [STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection. THE COURT: Overruled. [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay. And did you know what he meant by “my building”? [STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection. Calls for – THE COURT: Sustained. [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: May we approach, Your Honor? THE COURT: No. Mr. Marquez continued his testimony, relaying without objection that Mr. Chase said to him, “Why the fuck you lying to me? See, you don’t know nobody here[,]” and, “Why the fuck you smoking in my building?” Mr. Marquez alleged that he responded, 13 “Well, I don’t know why you’re so upset, but you can have the building[,]” after which Mr. Chase struck him. Mr. Marquez denied spitting on Mr. Chase. Defense counsel’s questioning continued: [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Okay. When [Mr. Chase] hit you, what happened? [MR. MARQUEZ]: I fell. And there was a girl there with me. She screamed my name. And Mr. White like was holding her back. And he just screaming and screaming. And then I’m trying to leave out the door, but he’s like, “Yeah, I hit you. So what? So what? What are you going to do about it?” [STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection. Hearsay. THE COURT: Sustained. [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: May we approach on that? THE COURT: No. Mr. Marquez then testified without objection that after Mr. Chase struck him, he said some variation of, “What are you going to do about it?” which Mr. Marquez perceived as threatening. Mr. Marquez testified that he “felt like it was a set up” because Mr. Chase did not engage with the others who were with him, and the others left while he was arguing with Mr. Chase. [MR. MARQUEZ:] He just came straight to me and he was just like asking me what I told he asked me. Just kept saying that same thing. Just kept asking me, asking me, and I kept telling him I’m here -- he wanted me to prove it to him. And, I don’t know. I feel like -- I don’t know. Just the -- I didn’t get aggressive with him. I think that made him mad. And when I told him he could have the building – [STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection as to – THE COURT: Sustained. 14  […] [STATE’S COUNSEL]: Request to strike that last portion. THE COURT: Stricken. Please disregard the last part of the statement. The court clarified that “I think that made him mad” should be stricken due to its speculative nature. Near the conclusion of direct examination, defense counsel asked: [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Now, I know you said that you didn’t tell Detective Edwards that, but I just want you to tell the members of the jury, did you shoot Mr. Chase because you felt disrespected in any way? [STATE’S COUNSEL]: Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: May we – THE COURT: Leading. [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: May we approach, Your Honor? THE COURT: It is leading. […] [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Why did you shoot Mr. Chase? [MR. MARQUEZ]: I just wanted him to stop hitting me. I wanted -- I was scared also. I just wanted him to stop hitting me for – [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Were you scared for your life? [MR. MARQUEZ]: Yeah. 15  During closing arguments, counsel for the State said: [STATE’S COUNSEL:] […] You also have second degree specific intent murder. Right? All murder, if it is not first degree murder, is presumed to be second degree murder unless proven otherwise. Right? And now the State – [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: The Court has instructed you as to what the law is and those instructions are binding upon you. Closing arguments are not evidence. Counsel for Mr. Marquez objected on the belief that the State’s words implied a burden of proof on the defendant. The jury convicted Mr. Marquez of second-degree murder, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, illegal possession of a regulated firearm by one under the age of thirty, wearing and carrying a handgun, and illegal possession of ammunition. Mr. Marquez now appeals. DISCUSSION I. The prosecutor did not shift the burden of proof during closing argument, and the circuit court sufficiently cured any error. A. The Parties’ Contentions Mr. Marquez asserts that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof during closing arguments by stating that “[a]ll murder, if it is not first-degree murder, is presumed to be second degree murder unless proven otherwise.” Mr. Marquez interprets this to place a burden of proof on the defendant instead of the State. The State responds that the prosecutor intended the comment to mean that if the State were to prove murder, that murder charge would be presumed second-degree murder 16 unless the State proved a mens rea for first-degree murder. The State asserts that this was an accurate, if ineloquent, statement of the law. B. Standard of Review “Where a party complains that the trial judge’s action abridged a constitutional right, . . . our review is de novo.” Savage v. State, 455 Md. 138, 157 (2017). The prohibition against comments that may shift the burden of proof to the defendant arises from the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. This amounts to a claim that the defendant’s constitutional right was violated, and we therefore review a claim of improper burden shifting de novo. See Molina v. State, 244 Md. App. 67, 174 (2019). C. Analysis It is well-established that “attorneys are afforded great leeway in presenting closing arguments to the jury.” Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 429 (1999). However, “counsel may argue law to the jury only where a dispute . . . exists as to the law of the crime.” Tetso v. State, 205 Md. App. 334, 410 (2012) (quoting White v. State, 66 Md. App. 100, 118 (1986)). “Arguing law includes stating, quoting, discussing or commenting upon a legal proposition, principle, rule or statute.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The prohibition against comments that may shift the burden of proof to the defendant in a criminal trial arises from the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which protect a criminal defendant’s right not to testify at trial. Although indirect comments regarding a “defendant’s failure to produce evidence to refute the State’s evidence” may constitute 17 improper burden shifting even if not “tantamount to [a comment that] the defendant failed to take the stand[,]” not every such comment will necessarily amount to shifting the burden of proof. See Molina, 244 Md. App. at 174. “Not every improper comment by the prosecutor requires reversal, as error in closing argument is subject to harmless error review.” Fuentes v. State, 454 Md. 296, 321 (2017). An error is harmless if “a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict[.]” Id. (quoting Simpson v. State, 442 Md. 446, 457 (2015)). The State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Here, the prosecutor stated during closing argument: “You also have second degree specific intent murder. Right? All murder, if it is not first-degree murder, is presumed to be second degree murder unless proven otherwise.” The applicable law for murder and its degrees was not in question in this case. Thus, it was improper for the prosecutor to comment upon the law. Mr. Marquez interprets the prosecutor’s comment to place a burden on the defendant to “prove[] otherwise” with regard to second-degree murder. Mr. Marquez also asserts that even if the State did not intend the comment to shift the burden of proof, the jury could have interpreted it that way. Section 2-204(a) of the Maryland Criminal Law Code provides: “A murder that is not in the first degree under § 2–201 of this subtitle is in the second degree.” Phrased differently, any murder that is not proven to be in the first degree is a second-degree murder. This is not a misstatement of the law, and Mr. Marquez’s interpretation relies 18 heavily on the addition of the phrase “unless proven otherwise” to support a considerable leap in logic. We therefore conclude that although the prosecutor improperly commented upon the law during closing argument, the comment did not shift the burden of proof. We turn now to whether the prosecutor’s comment constitutes harmless error. “In determining whether the error was harmless, we ask the following: absent the prosecutor’s improper reading of the law to the jury, is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty?” White, 66 Md. App. at 120. Similar to Tetso, where the prosecutor during closing argument improperly remarked on the weight the jury could give to circumstantial evidence, in this case, the prosecutor “did not go beyond the law of the case by presenting argument which substantively altered the binding instructions[.]” 205 Md. App. at 412–13 (quoting White, 66 Md. App. at 123). “The prosecutor’s argument as to the law was neither incorrect nor materially inconsistent with the circuit court’s instructions.” Id. Moreover, unlike in Tetso, where the circuit court overruled defense counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s comment on the weight of circumstantial evidence, here, the circuit court issued a curative instruction to the jury. The instruction was sufficient to draw attention to the State’s ineloquent comment and redirect the jury to the correct statement of the law. Accordingly, we hold that although the State improperly commented upon the law where the law was not in question, the State’s comments during closing argument did not shift the burden of proof, and the court’s instruction to the jury sufficiently cured any error. 19 II. The court did not deprive Mr. Marquez of an opportunity to present a defense. A. The Parties’ Contentions Mr. Marquez argued that he shot Mr. Chase in self-defense. Accordingly, Mr. Marquez testified at trial that Mr. Chase made threatening statements to him such that he feared for his life. The court sustained objections to portions of Mr. Marquez’s testimony on the grounds that they were hearsay, or else speculative as to Mr. Chase’s internal thought process. Mr. Marquez argues that these objections should not have been sustained, because preventing Mr. Marquez from testifying to exactly what Mr. Chase said deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to present his defense. The State responds that the court properly exercised its discretion to limit Mr. Marquez’s testimony, and, perhaps more importantly, that the limits on Mr. Marquez’s testimony did not in fact prevent him from supporting his defense, because Mr. Marquez was able to testify to similar or even more detailed actions and statements at other points during his testimony. B. Standard of Review Ordinarily, a trial judge is afforded broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb such determinations absent an abuse of that discretion. See Kelly v. State, 392 Md. 511, 530 (2006) (citing Hopkins v. State, 352 Md. 146, 158 (1998)). The admissibility of hearsay evidence, however, is a legal question we review de novo. See Dulyx v. State, 425 Md. 273, 285 (2012). 20  C. Analysis A defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 495 (1984)). This right, “albeit fundamental, is nonetheless subject to two paramount rules of evidence, embodied both in case law and in Maryland Rules 5-402 and 5-403. The first is that evidence that is not relevant to a material issue is inadmissible. The second is that, even if relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” Taneja v. State, 231 Md. App. 1, 11 (2016) (internal quotations omitted). Hearsay is an out-of-court statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying, admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. See Md. R. Evid. 5- 801. A circuit court has no discretion to admit hearsay unless it meets an exception. Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 8 (2005); Md. R. Evid. 5-802. Also relevant here is Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-701, which limits lay witness testimony to “opinions or inferences which are: (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” A lay witness’s observations must be “rationally based and premised on the personal knowledge of the witness,” which generally precludes speculation as to another person’s internal and unobservable thought process or motivation. See State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 699 (2014). 21  Here, Mr. Marquez takes issue with the circuit court’s ruling on several portions of his testimony as we have outlined supra. These rulings fall into a few distinct categories, hearsay and speculation chief among them. Before we reach the meat of these issues, we first briefly address Mr. Marquez’s frustration with the circuit court’s rulings where “[t]he prosecutor did not have to give a basis for her objection before the court sustained it[,]” or the court did not give an explanation for sustained objections or allow counsel to approach for a bench conference. Although it is “the better practice for trial courts […] to articulate on the record the reasons for the decision to exclude evidence[,]” neither the Maryland Rules nor our case law bears such a requirement. See Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 100 (2004) (citing Streater v. State, 352 Md. 800, 810 (1999)). In this case, instances where the court gave a limited explanation for sustaining the State’s objections appear to retread the same ground as objections already made earlier in the same testimony. While defense counsel understandably asked for clarification on the court’s rulings as to specific statements to be excluded, the record does not indicate any baseless rulings that would suggest an abuse of discretion. We turn now to the crux of Mr. Marquez’s claim: the court’s rulings as to hearsay and speculation. On the matter of hearsay, Mr. Marquez draws a parallel to Wallace-Bey, 234 Md. App. at 546, where this Court held that the circuit court improperly excluded statements made by the victim, the defendant’s boyfriend, that showed the victim had repeatedly abused the defendant prior to the murder. In that case, this Court determined 22 that the victim’s statements were not hearsay because they were largely commands or threats, which could not be offered to prove the matter asserted therein