Salters v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.

25-383-cv Salters v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth. United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit August Term, 2025 (Argued: February 24, 2026 Decided: August 7, 2026) Docket No. 25-383-cv _____________________________________ DERWIN SALTERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, JEAN L. ANDRE, Defendants-Appellees. * _____________________________________ Before: LOHIER, Chief Judge, LYNCH and MENASHI, Circuit Judges. Derwin Salters appeals from the February 18, 2025 judgment entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Orelia E. Merchant, J.) dismissing with prejudice his state law tort claims after a jury returned a verdict in favor of the New York City Transit Authority (“NYCTA”) and Jean L. Andre, a bus driver employed by the NYCTA. Salters commenced this action to recover for injuries he sustained in a car accident with an NYCTA bus operated by Andre. Salters now seeks a new trial for two reasons. First, he * The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above. asserts that the District Judge failed to act impartially and thereby deprived him of his right to a fair trial. Second, he contends that the Magistrate Judge charged with jury selection violated his constitutional rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), by denying his Batson challenge to opposing counsel’s peremptory strikes of three Black prospective jurors without adjudicating the credibility of the race-neutral reasons proffered for the strikes. We reject Salters’s generalized objections to the District Court’s handling of the trial. With respect to Salters’s Batson claim, however, we hold that the Magistrate Judge erred in denying the motion without explicitly adjudicating the credibility of the proffered race- neutral explanations for each peremptory strike. We therefore REMAND the case to the District Court with instructions to conduct a reconstruction hearing, or, if it is no longer possible to do so effectively, to order a new trial. Judge Menashi dissents in a separate opinion. CANER DEMIRAYAK, Law Office of Caner Demirayak, Esq., PC, Bronx, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant. THERESA FRAME, MTA Law Department, Brooklyn, NY (Anna J. Ervolina, MTA Law Department, Brooklyn, NY, Rocco Iervasi, Kritzer Law Group, Smithtown, NY, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees. LOHIER, Chief Judge: Derwin Salters appeals from the February 18, 2025 judgment entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Orelia E. Merchant, J.) dismissing with prejudice his state law tort claims after a jury returned a verdict in favor of the New York City Transit Authority (“NYCTA”) and Jean L. Andre, a bus driver employed by the NYCTA (collectively, “the Defendants”). Salters brought this suit to recover for injuries he sustained in a 2 car accident with a city bus operated by Andre. On appeal we consider Salters’s arguments that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial and that the Magistrate Judge responsible for jury selection failed to comply with step three of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which requires the trial court to decide “whether the [stated] race‐neutral reason for striking a juror is pretextual in light of all evidence with a bearing on it.” Pitchford v. Cain, 146 S. Ct. 1345, 1349 (2026) (citation modified). We reject Salters’s fair-trial challenge but hold that the Magistrate Judge failed to comply with Batson. We therefore REMAND to the District Court with instructions to conduct a Batson reconstruction hearing, or, if it is no longer possible to do so effectively, to order a new trial. BACKGROUND I Salters was seriously injured when his car collided with a municipal bus operated by the NYCTA. He filed this diversity action claiming that the NYCTA and the bus driver acted negligently. Both parties requested a jury trial but consented to Magistrate Judge Lara K. Eshkenazi presiding over jury selection only. Three Black potential jurors—Jurors 8, 16, and 17—are at the heart of this case. 3  During voir dire, Juror 8, who had previously served on a jury in a criminal case, introduced herself as a “health tech,” the mother of two adult children, and married to a security officer. App’x 62. Juror 16, a single mother, worked “as a home attendant” for an “adult care company” and had never been selected for a jury despite appearing once for jury duty. App’x 60. Juror 17 had attended college for graphic design, “liv[ed] off investments in the stock market,” consumed his news from social media, and had never served on a jury. App’x 61. After voir dire, defense counsel exercised all of his peremptory strikes against those three prospective jurors. Noting that “the defendant ha[d] chosen to exclude three persons of [B]lack skin color,” Salters’s counsel immediately raised a Batson challenge. App’x 64–65. In response, the Magistrate Judge said that she did not “remember the race of everyone else on the jury.” App’x 65. After Salters’s counsel listed the struck jurors and repeated that all three were Black, the Magistrate Judge counted the empaneled jurors and observed that two other Black jurors remained on the jury. The Magistrate Judge then asked defense counsel to provide “race neutral reasons” for the challenged strikes. App’x 66. Defense counsel responded: 4  Honestly I didn’t even look at the race to know why I was striking them. I have to go back to my notes. [Juror 8], I believe—I’m trying to picture the person in my head. So from my opinion this case involves medical records and things of that nature. She seemed to be very simply educated, not knowing if she would fully be able to comprehend all the expert testimony. App’x 66. Responding “[o]kay,” the Magistrate Judge asked defense counsel to supply race-neutral reasons for striking Jurors 16 and 17. App’x 66. Defense counsel added: [Juror 16], I believe she is a home health aide. So sympathy toward dealing with individuals who may be disabled, elderly, things of that nature. . . . [Juror 17], he, in my opinion, he just seemed a little out of it, not being able to comprehend all the evidence that was going to come in. He said he’s very philosophical. I forgot where he said he gets his news from, but he didn’t seem like he would fully comprehend the evidence. Nothing whatsoever to do with race. App’x 66–67. Salters’s counsel promptly renewed his Batson objection, arguing that defense counsel’s reasons for striking the three Black jurors were pretextual. When Salters’s counsel characterized opposing counsel’s rationale for striking Juror 16 1 as “that she’s a simple-minded person,” the Magistrate Judge 1 While the record reflects that Salters’s counsel referred to Juror 16 by name, App’x 67, it is possible that he intended to refer to Juror 8, whom defense counsel had previously described as “seem[ing] to be very simply educated,” App’x 66. In any event, that ambiguity does not affect our analysis of Salters’s Batson claim. 5 interjected, “I don’t think he used those words. Let’s not characterize it. He didn’t say she’s a simple-minded person. That’s not what he said.” App’x 67. Salters’s counsel continued: And for [Juror 17,] [opposing counsel’s rationale was] that he’s out of it. Are people of [B]lack skin color simpl[y] educated and out of it? I mean, come on. These are not valid reasons. And you know, we had a jury pool of a jury that would more fairly represent the parties in this case. The [D]efendant bus driver is also [B]lack, same color. We have a jury that’s mostly not [B]lack. This is a complete jury that violates the Batson rule, and the challenges on the three that the [D]efendant raised need to be reinstated and need to be put on the jury. Just because you’re [B]lack doesn’t mean you don’t get to be on a jury. This is 2025. App’x 67–68. The Magistrate Judge then denied Salters’s Batson motion, finding that defense counsel’s proffered reasons for excluding the three Black jurors were race-neutral: I don’t think he struck him because he’s [B]lack. He did articulate race neutral reasons. I do think there are still—there are two [B]lack members who will still be on the jury. I’m going to overrule the Batson challenge. Obviously you have it preserved. Anything else? App’x 68. Salters’s counsel persisted that the “jury [was] overwhelmingly not [B]lack and . . . designed by the [D]efendant on purpose”; defense counsel protested that counsel’s description was both “disrespectful” and “harsh”; and 6 the Magistrate Judge ended the colloquy with, “Okay. I think everyone has made their record on this” Batson objection. App’x 68. After an eight-day trial before District Judge Merchant, which Salters now claims was marred by Judge Merchant’s excessive interference with his attorney’s examination of witnesses and abandonment of “the appearance of impartiality and detachment,” United States v. Mazzilli, 848 F.2d 384, 388 (2d Cir. 1988), the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Defendants. DISCUSSION I We start with Salters’s contention that the District Court deprived him of his right to a fair trial by sustaining opposing counsel’s objections and interfering with his attorney’s examination of witnesses. Salters says that the District Court’s constant evidentiary rulings against him left an “indelible impression” on the jury. Appellant’s Br. 48 (quoting Mazzilli, 848 F.2d at 388). We can easily dispense with his argument. Although “a court must strive for that atmosphere of perfect impartiality which is so much to be desired in a judicial proceeding,” Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 169 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation modified), “a trial judge need 7 not sit like a bump on a log throughout the trial,” Mazzilli, 848 F.2d at 388 (citation modified). To the contrary, the district judge is charged with the “active responsibility to [e]nsure that issues are clearly presented to the jury,” which sometimes entails intervening to “clarify[] ambiguities, correct[] misstatements, or obtain[] information needed to make rulings.” United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 403 (2d Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). A jury’s factual findings will stand unless “the judge’s behavior was so prejudicial that it denied a party a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.” Shah v. Pan Am. World Servs., Inc., 148 F.3d 84, 98 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation modified). The trial record is clear. Judge Merchant excluded inadmissible, repetitive, and narrative testimony without injecting her own view of the evidence. Contrast United States v. Victoria, 837 F.2d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1988) (granting a new trial where the judge interrupted to “convey to the jury . . . the judge’s opinion that the witness was not worthy of belief”), with Pisani, 773 F.2d at 403 (declining to grant a new trial based on “interruptions [that] were invited by defense counsel’s often ambiguous or repetitive questions”). So far as we can tell, Judge Merchant did nothing that “exceeded any proper bounds or conveyed to the jury any impression of the judge’s belief” in the probable outcome. Pisani, 773 F.2d at 8 403. And contrary to what Salters tells us, “a simple numerical tally of [objections] sustained and overruled . . . is not enough to establish that the scales of justice were tipped against a [party].” Id. at 402. In light of the entire trial record, “we are convinced beyond peradventure of doubt that [the District Judge’s] conduct was not prejudicial” to Salters and that Salters’s “trial was fair.” United States v. Bejasa, 904 F.2d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1990). II We turn to the more vigorous challenge arising from Magistrate Judge Eshkenazi’s rejection of Salters’s Batson challenge during jury selection. The question is whether the Magistrate Judge complied with Batson’s third step by explicitly determining whether defense counsel’s proffered race-neutral reasons for striking three Black jurors were credible or pretextual. A A district court must apply a three-part test to assess whether a party exercised a peremptory challenge in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of Batson: “[O]nce a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination has been made, the burden shifts to [the non-movant] to proffer a race-neutral explanation for the strike, at which point the court must determine whether the [moving 9 party] has established purposeful discrimination.” Dolphy v. Mantello, 552 F.3d 236, 238–39 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–98). The dispute on appeal concerns Batson’s third step, which “requires a trial judge to make an ultimate determination on the issue of discriminatory intent based on all the facts and circumstances.” Jordan v. Lefevre, 206 F.3d 196, 200 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation modified). “Only at the third step of the analysis does the persuasiveness of the non-movant’s race-neutral explanation become relevant.” Barnes v. Anderson, 202 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 1999). Whether that explanation “should be believed” is “the decisive question” in the Batson analysis. Jordan, 206 F.3d at 201 (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991)). To sum up, a bedrock rule is that “it is error to deny a Batson motion without determining whether the [non-movant’s] race-neutral explanations for the challenged peremptory strikes are credible.” United States v. Thomas, 320 F.3d 315, 320 (2d Cir. 2003); see United States v. Alvarado, 923 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 1991). To be sure, the rule has some flexibility; it permits a trial court to satisfy its obligation at step three without “intricate factual findings.” Messiah v. Duncan, 435 F.3d 186, 198 (2d Cir. 2006). But a “conclusory statement that the . . . explanations were race neutral,” without an additional finding that the 10 explanations were in fact the actual reasons for the challenged strikes, is not enough to satisfy step three. Jordan, 206 F.3d at 200. B In rejecting Salters’s challenge, the Magistrate Judge’s findings, such as they were, fell short. As soon as Salters’s counsel objected to defense counsel’s exercise of all three peremptory strikes against Black jurors, the Magistrate Judge counted the number of Black jurors remaining on the jury before asking defense counsel to justify each strike on race-neutral grounds. Defense counsel initially justified his strike of Juror 8—the “health tech” who had “trained as a medical assistant,” App’x 62—by noting that “this case involves medical records” and “[Juror 8] seemed to be very simply educated, [and may not] fully be able to comprehend all the expert testimony,” App’x 66. Defense counsel then proffered that Juror 16’s job as “a home health aide” suggested that she would be “sympath[etic] toward . . . [the] disabled.” App’x 66–67. And Juror 17, defense counsel said, “just seemed a little out of it.” App’x 67. When Salters countered that none of the explanations were credible, the Magistrate Judge replied only with respect to Juror 17: “I don’t think [defense counsel] struck him because he’s [B]lack. He did articulate race neutral reasons.” 11 App’x 68 (emphasis added). The Magistrate Judge then overruled the Batson challenge without first determining that defense counsel’s proffered reasons for striking Jurors 8 and 16 were the actual reasons rather than pretextual. App’x 68. The Magistrate Judge’s failure to resolve the credibility issue at step three is a fatal error. “[T]he Batson analysis recognizes that a race neutral reason may be rational and yet be a pretext for discrimination,” Jordan, 206 F.3d at 200, and that therefore “[t]he credibility of an attorney offering a race-neutral explanation is at the very heart of that analysis,” Barnes, 202 F.3d at 157 (emphasis added). “We cannot square the” Magistrate Judge’s failure to determine the credibility of the attorney’s explanation “with the court’s duty under the third step of Batson.” Id. To be sure, we have not required (and do not now require) “a talismanic recitation of specific words in order to satisfy Batson.” Galarza v. Keane, 252 F.3d 630, 640 n.10 (2d Cir. 2001). “An unambiguous rejection of a Batson challenge will demonstrate with sufficient clarity that a trial court deems the movant to have failed to carry his burden to show that the [non-movant’s] proffered race- neutral explanation is pretextual.” Dolphy, 552 F.3d at 239 (citation modified). But an unambiguous rejection of the challenge at a minimum means that the trial court has made an “explicit adjudication of the credibility of the non-movant’s 12 race-neutral explanations” as to “each challenged strike.” Barnes, 202 F.3d at 156 (emphasis added). In Galarza, for example, we held that a trial “court failed to adjudicate the credibility of the race-neutral explanations offered by the [non-movant] for each of the challenged prospective jurors.” 252 F.3d at 640 (emphasis in original). In other words, as we explained in Dolphy, at step three “a trial court must somehow make clear whether it credits the non-moving party’s race-neutral explanation for striking the relevant panelist.” 552 F.3d at 239 (citation modified). As cases illustrate, “[e]xplicitness” by way of a “clear, individualized rejection” is “required to support the ‘great deference’ we accord ‘the trial judge’s determination of discriminatory intent and credibility.’” Messiah, 435 F.3d at 202–03 (Jacobs, J., concurring) (quoting Jordan, 206 F.3d at 200). The Defendants initially respond that the Magistrate Judge fulfilled her obligation at step three by attempting to develop the record and thereafter asserting, “I don’t think [defense counsel] struck him because he’s [B]lack,” followed by, “I’m going to overrule the Batson challenge.” App’x 68 (emphasis added). But the Defendants do not dispute that “him” referred only to Juror 17, not Jurors 8 and 16. See Barnes, 202 F.3d at 156. And the record does not reflect 13 any “clear credibility finding” as to the veracity of defense counsel’s reasons for striking Jurors 8 and 16. Dolphy, 552 F.3d at 238. Absent any indication that “the trial court credited the[se race-neutral] explanation[s],” id. at 239, the Magistrate Judge’s decision to overrule Salters’s Batson challenge is not a sufficiently “[c]lear acceptance” to satisfy step three, Messiah, 435 F.3d at 199. Taking a different tack, the Defendants suggest that the Magistrate Judge did credit defense counsel’s explanations for all three strikes when she observed that counsel had “waive[d] . . . opportunities to strike other [B]lack jurors” and opted to keep two Black jurors on the empaneled jury. Thomas, 320 F.3d at 319. We disagree that the inclusion of two Black jurors on the jury is a valid reason to excuse the peremptory strikes if defense counsel’s stated reasons for those strikes are pretextual. See id. at 319–20. In any event, the Magistrate Judge’s reliance on the presence of the two Black jurors on the empaneled jury was entirely misplaced. Defense counsel had already exhausted his available peremptory strikes with his third strike (of Juror 16), so the Magistrate Judge could not know whether counsel would have struck the two remaining Black jurors. 2 2The dissent claims that the Magistrate Judge referenced the racial composition of the empaneled jurors only in response to Salters’s counsel’s objection that the jury was “mostly not Black.” Menashi, J., Dissenting Op., post at 13 (citation modified). That is not a reasonable reading of the record. From the moment Salters’s counsel raised a 14  For the foregoing reasons, we agree with Salters that the Magistrate Judge failed to make the required credibility determination under Batson’s third step. C Relying heavily on our decision in Messiah, 435 F.3d at 198, the dissent insists that the Magistrate Judge must have satisfied step three when it rejected the Batson challenge in general, Menashi, J., Dissenting Op., post at 1–2. As we did in Messiah, we recognize that an “unambiguous rejection” can at times satisfy Batson’s third step. 435 F.3d at 198. But Messiah did not further define an “unambiguous rejection” or purport to overrule our earlier decisions specifying that the trial court should at least “make clear whether [it] credits the non-moving party’s race-neutral explanation for striking the relevant panelist.” Id. Our decisions preceding Messiah are instructive on what the third Batson step requires. In Barnes, we remanded to the trial court to redo its Batson analysis because it was “not clear” whether the court had “found that [the non-movants’] explanation was credible” or “that [the non-movants’] explanation merely sufficed to satisfy their second-step burden of articulating a non-racial explanation.” 202 Batson objection, the Magistrate Judge focused on the race of “everyone else on the jury” and began to count the remaining Black jurors even before Salters’s counsel argued that the jury was “mostly not [B]lack.” App’x 65–67. 15 F.3d at 157. Likewise, in Jordan, which also preceded Messiah, we held that a “conclusory statement that the [non-movant’s] explanations were race neutral did not satisfy Batson’s third step.” 206 F.3d at 200. Both Barnes and Jordan made plain that a trial court violates its obligation to make a credibility finding when it rejects the movant’s Batson challenge merely because the non-movant articulated a non- racial explanation for its jury strikes. 3 Batson itself spells out the nature and source of that obligation at step three: “[T]he trial judge’s findings,” the Court announced, “will turn on evaluation of credibility” of the proffered race-neutral reasons for a strike. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21. Accepting “general assertions” of neutrality at step three, without more, the Court explained, would render “the Equal Protection Clause . . . but a vain and illusory requirement.” Id. at 98 (citation modified). 3 According to the dissent, Jordan was about a trial judge’s failure to afford the parties “a reasonable opportunity to make their respective records,” while Barnes concerned a trial judge whose rejection of a Batson challenge was not “unambiguous.” Menashi, J., Dissenting Op., post at 8–10 (quoting Messiah, 435 F.3d at 198). Neither of these descriptions holds up on a fair and careful reading; in fact, the dissent distorts the actual reasoning in these cases. In saying that Jordan applies only to cases in which a trial judge “short-circuit[ed]” the Batson process, Menashi, J., Dissenting Op., post at 7, for example, the dissent omits that the very reason the trial court erred in that case was because, as here, it never “explicitly adjudicat[ed] the . . . race neutral explanations” and instead ruled “in a summary fashion.” Jordan, 206 F.3d at 200. As for Barnes, the dissent disregards that the trial judge’s rejection of the Batson challenge may have been ambiguous precisely because the judge made no “explicit [credibility] adjudication.” Barnes, 202 F.3d at 156. 16  Decisions postdating Messiah confirm our view of the trial court’s obligations at step three. Dolphy reminded us that Batson’s third step requires an explicit judicial evaluation of the credibility of the proffered neutral explanation for a strike. 552 F.3d at 239. A “conclusory statement” that accepts the race- neutral explanations as “decisive and sufficient,” we asserted, “does not necessarily indicate—even by inference,” and even when accompanied by a ruling that “the strike stands”—“that the trial court credited [counsel’s race- neutral] explanation” at Batson’s third step. Id. (citation modified). Dolphy’s formulation of the third step reflects the logic and language of Batson and its progeny, which “virtually compels the conclusion that the trial court has an independent obligation to ‘eliminate the taint of racial discrimination’ in the jury selection process” with an explicit determination of credibility at step three. Carew v. Morton, 150 F.4th 150, 171 (2d Cir. 2025) (Lohier, J., concurring) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991)). Finally, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Pitchford v. Cain, 146 S. Ct. 1345 (2026), supports our conclusion. In Pitchford, the Court determined in the context of a capital habeas petition that a state trial court had failed to conduct 17 “the essential third step of the Batson inquiry.” Id. at 1349. The Court helpfully restated the well-established requirements of step three as follows: After [the non-movant] asserts race-neutral reasons for a peremptory strike, the defense counsel must at least have an opportunity to argue that the asserted race-neutral reasons were not the actual reasons—that is, the reasons were pretextual. Then, the trial court can determine whether those asserted reasons were the actual reasons or instead were pretextual. Id. at 1353. Step three thus requires a separate “determin[ation that the] asserted reasons were the actual reasons” and not “pretextual.” Id. For whatever reason in Salters’s case, however, “things broke down, and the ordinary trial-court procedure for resolving Batson claims at step three never occurred.” Id. Without an explicit judicial determination that defense counsel’s stated reasons for striking Jurors 8 and 16 “were the actual reasons or instead were pretextual,” id., we are unable to tell whether the trial court has fully discharged its constitutional responsibilities under Batson. D Salters argues that the Magistrate Judge’s error requires not only vacatur but an entirely new trial. We decline to go that far. Where a district court has failed to make the findings required at Batson’s third step, “the appropriate course usually will be to remand for” the district court to conduct a 18 reconstruction hearing after which it can make “findings . . . as to the challenged strikes and an ultimate determination on the issue of discriminatory intent based on all the facts and circumstances.” Barnes, 202 F.3d at 156 (citation modified). In its discretion, the district court may otherwise decide that “the passage of time has made such a determination impossible or unsatisfactory” and that a new trial is warranted. Dolphy, 552 F.3d at 240. We therefore remand to the District Court to make the credibility determination under Batson after a reconstruction hearing, or to order a new trial if it determines that the passage of time or some other impediment renders it “impossible or unsatisfactory” to decide credibility at this time. Id. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we REMAND the case to the District Court with instructions to conduct a reconstruction hearing, or, if it is no longer possible to do so effectively, to order a new trial. 19 25-383 Salters v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth. MENASHI, Circuit Judge, dissenting: When a litigant believes that the opposing counsel struck a juror for an impermissible discriminatory reason, the three-step Batson framework follows. First, the litigant must establish “a prima facie case” that the “facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference” that the opposing counsel struck the juror “on account of” a protected characteristic. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986). Second, “[o]nce the [litigant] makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the [opposing counsel] to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging [the] juror[].” Id. at 97. Third, the litigant “has an opportunity to rebut the [opposing counsel’s] race- neutral reason as pretextual, and the trial court in turn decides whether the [stated] race-neutral reason for striking a juror is pretextual ‘in light of all evidence with a bearing on it.’” Pitchford v. Cain, 146 S. Ct. 1345, 1349 (2026) (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 252 (2005)). This appeal focuses on what the trial judge must do at step three. The trial judge must “determine whether [the] asserted reasons” for striking the juror “were the actual reasons or instead were pretextual.” Id. at 1353. But how does the judge discharge that obligation? Our court has provided an answer: “As long as a trial judge affords the parties a reasonable opportunity to make their respective records, he may express his Batson ruling on the credibility of a proffered race-neutral explanation in the form of a clear rejection or acceptance of a Batson challenge.” Messiah v. Duncan, 435 F.3d 186, 198 (2d Cir. 2006). The trial judge must allow the parties to offer their objections and responses, and then the trial judge must clearly reject or accept the Batson challenge. The trial judge “need not recite a particular formula of words, or mantra,” but must provide only “[a]n ‘unambiguous rejection of a Batson challenge.’” Dolphy v. Mantello, 552 F.3d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Messiah, 435 F.3d at 198). In this case, the magistrate judge did everything that our precedents require, so I would affirm the judgment of the district court. Because the majority declines to do so, I dissent. I Salters’s attorney challenged the defense counsel’s use of three peremptory strikes against African American jurors. The defense counsel responded by offering race-neutral explanations. He said that he struck Juror 8 because “this case involves medical records” and Juror 8 “seemed to be very simply educated [and may not] fully be able to comprehend all the expert testimony.” App’x 66. He struck Juror 16 because her job as “a home health aide” suggested that she might have “sympathy toward dealing with individuals who may be disabled.” Id. at 66-67. And he struck Juror 17 because that juror “seemed a little out of it” and “didn’t seem like he would fully comprehend the evidence.” Id. at 67. The magistrate judge allowed Salters’s attorney to argue in response that “[t]hose explanations are a pretext for racial bias” and “are not valid reasons.” Id. After Salters’s attorney argued that the race-neutral reasons were pretextual, the magistrate judge rejected Salters’s Batson challenge by stating: “I don’t think he struck him because he’s black. He did articulate race neutral reasons. I do think there are still—there are two black members who will still be on the jury. I’m going to overrule the Batson challenge.” Id. at 68. The magistrate judge complied with our precedents. “We have repeatedly emphasized that a trial court may not deny a Batson motion without determining whether it credits the race-neutral 2 explanations for the challenged peremptory strikes.” Galarza v. Keane, 252 F.3d 630, 636 (2d Cir. 2001). But to make that determination, the trial court “need not recite a particular formula of words,” Dolphy, 552 F.3d at 239, or engage in a “talismanic recitation of specific words in order to satisfy Batson,” Galarza, 252 F.3d at 640 n.10. The trial court must provide only “[a]n ‘unambiguous rejection of a Batson challenge’” because such a rejection “will demonstrate with sufficient clarity that a trial court deems the movant to have failed to carry his burden to show that the [opposing counsel’s] proffered race-neutral explanation is pretextual.” Dolphy, 552 F.3d at 239 (quoting Messiah, 435 F.3d at 198). In other words, “[w]hile there must be an ‘explicit adjudication of the credibility of the non-movant’s race-neutral explanations,’” United States v. Altareb, 758 F. App’x 116, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Barnes v. Anderson, 202 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 1999)), “‘no clearly established federal law requires’ the district court ‘to provide express reasons for each credibility determination,’” id. at 120 (alteration omitted) (quoting McKinney v. Artuz, 326 F.3d 87, 100 (2d Cir. 2003)). “As long as a trial judge affords the parties a reasonable opportunity to make their respective records, he may express his Batson ruling on the credibility of a proffered race-neutral explanation in the form of a clear rejection or acceptance of a Batson challenge.” Messiah, 435 F.3d at 198. 1 1 See also Messiah, 435 F.3d at 203 (Jacobs, J., concurring) (“I agree with the majority that explicitness requires no more than that the trial judge ‘make clear whether he credits the non-moving party’s race-neutral explanation for striking the relevant panelist,’ for example through ‘unambiguous rejection of a Batson challenge,’ and that no ‘talismanic recitation of specific words’ is needed.”) (quoting Galarza, 252 F.3d at 640 n.10). 3  That is what happened here. The parties completed the three Batson steps, and the magistrate judge expressly stated that she was “going to overrule the Batson challenge.” App’x 68. That was a “clear rejection” of the challenge. Messiah, 435 F.3d at 198. II The majority decides that the record reflects a “failure” of the magistrate judge “to resolve the credibility issue at step three.” Ante at 12. The majority offers two points in support of that conclusion. First, the majority argues that “[w]hen Salters countered that none of the explanations were credible, the Magistrate Judge replied only with respect to Juror 17.” Id. According to the majority, the statement of the magistrate judge that “I don’t think he struck him because he’s black,” App’x 68, was not a credibility determination sufficient to justify all three strikes. As a result, the majority believes that the magistrate judge “overruled the Batson challenge without first determining that defense counsel’s proffered reasons for striking Jurors 8 and 16 were the actual reasons rather than pretextual.” Ante at 12. In other words, the magistrate judge evaluated the reason for striking Juror 17, but she purportedly ignored Juror 8 and Juror 16. Second, the majority appears to argue that the magistrate judge rejected the Batson challenge—here, presumably with respect to all three jurors—because of “the presence of the two Black jurors on the empaneled jury.” Id. at 15. Both points are belied by the record. A First, the magistrate judge did not need “to provide express reasons for each credibility determination.” McKinney, 326 F.3d at 100. She needed to provide an unequivocal rejection of the Batson challenge to the three strikes. And she did exactly that. The magistrate judge clearly rejected the challenge after hearing a lengthy argument 4 from Salters’s attorney that the proffered reasons for all three jurors were pretextual. See App’x 67 (“If I could respond. Those explanations are a pretext for racial bias.”); id. (“The description of the analysis as to why it was okay to remove [Juror 8] is that she’s a simple-minded person.”); id. (“And for [Juror 17] that he’s out of it. Are people of black skin color simple educated and out of it? I mean, come on. These are not valid reasons.”). Salters’s attorney emphasized that he was challenging all three struck jurors. He argued that “[t]his is a complete jury that violates the Batson rule, and the [peremptory] challenges on the three that the defendant raised need to be reinstated and need to be put on the jury.” Id. at 67-68 (emphasis added). After hearing these arguments, the magistrate judge reacted to the attorney’s specific argument about Juror 17 by stating that “I don’t think he struck him because he’s black.” Id. at 68. The magistrate judge then responded to the attorney’s more general argument about the three struck jurors: “He did articulate race neutral reasons. I do think there are still—there are two black members who will still be on the jury. I’m going to overrule the Batson challenge.” Id. The magistrate judge said that the defense counsel had articulated race-neutral “reasons” in the plural, making clear that she credited the proffered reasons for the three jurors—not only the one reason given for striking Juror 17. Id. That is especially clear in context because the statement of the magistrate judge followed the argument of Salters’s attorney regarding the “challenges on the three.” Id. at 67 (emphasis added). The majority offers two somewhat contradictory critiques of the magistrate judge’s decision. On the one hand, the majority claims that the magistrate judge focused too specifically on Juror 17 and 5 overlooked Jurors 8 and 16. 2 On the other hand, the majority claims that the magistrate judge erred “when [she] rejected the Batson challenge in general,” ante at 15 (emphasis added), instead of offering “an explicit determination of credibility” for each explanation for each strike, id. at 18. The first claim is about the record. The second claim is about our precedent: the majority insists that even if the record is best understood to reflect a rejection of the Batson challenge as to all three strikes, our precedents require the magistrate judge to do more than she did to effectuate that rejection. Both claims are wrong. The record shows that the magistrate judge invited and heard argument with respect to all three strikes, and she rejected the Batson challenge as to all three. There is no reasonable way to read the record without concluding that the magistrate judge decided that the defense counsel’s “asserted reasons were the actual reasons” rather than “pretextual.” Pitchford, 146 S. Ct. at 1353. If our precedents require only “a clear rejection or acceptance of a Batson challenge” after hearing arguments from the parties, Messiah, 435 F.3d at 198, then the magistrate judge satisfied that requirement. The majorit