Heaton v. Islamic Republic of Iran

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MARY B. HEATON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Case No. 19-cv-3003-JMC-MJS THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN Defendant. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION This is a case brought by several hundred plaintiffs—including U.S. servicemembers, military contractors, and the family members of both—based on a series of deadly attacks during the Iraq War. Invoking the terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), Plaintiffs pursue recovery from the Islamic Republic of Iran for the injuries they sustained from the attacks. After Iran failed to appear to defend against this action, two groups of bellwether plaintiffs—forty-nine in total—now move for default judgment against Iran. Following its careful review of Plaintiffs’ submissions and their evidentiary support, this Court finds that most, but not all, of the Group 1 Plaintiffs properly established Iran’s liability and thus a basis to recover damages against Iran in this default posture, and that all the Group 2 Plaintiffs have done the same. In turn, for those Plaintiffs who demonstrated an entitlement to recovery under the FSIA, the Court makes recommendations on damages, sometimes diverging from Plaintiffs’ requested awards. Accordingly, and for the reasons that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART the Group 1 Plaintiffs’ motion (ECF No. 51) and RECOMMENDS that the Court GRANT IN PART the Group 2 Plaintiffs’ motion (ECF No. 62).  * * * In considering these motions, the Court begins with the relevant background and evidence. Next, the Court turns to its recommended findings of fact. As this Court sees it, Iran can be connected to these attacks either by showing that an Iranian-backed proxy group was responsible for the attack, or by showing that a distinctive Iranian weapon was used—typically, an explosively formed penetrator or “EFP.” After examining the details of these groups and weapons, the Court walks through an overview of each attack at issue. Then, with relevant findings of fact in hand, the Court turns to the legal analysis, considering personal and subject-matter jurisdiction, liability, and ultimately damages. As explained, the Court ultimately finds that for each EFP attack, Plaintiffs have shown a sufficient connection with Iran to support a finding of liability and damages. And for the proxy group attacks, Plaintiffs have shown a sufficient connection to Iran for all but one group: the Islamic Army of Iraq or the “IAI.” Where the IAI is alleged to be responsible for a particular attack, the Court is not, given the evidence before it, able to conclude that the FSIA’s terrorism exception supplies a defensible basis to assign liability against Iran for that attack. BACKGROUND I. Procedural Background Plaintiffs filed this action in October 2019 and later filed an amended complaint in 2021, adding new plaintiffs and additional allegations. (See ECF No. 26 (“Am. Compl.”).) By May 2022, Plaintiffs completed service on Iran. (ECF No. 42.) Iran failed to appear in response, so the Clerk entered default against Iran in August 2022. (ECF Nos. 42–44.) Following an order from Judge Jia Cobb (see Min. Order, Oct. 5, 2022), Plaintiffs proposed a schedule for default judgment motions (see ECF Nos. 45, 46). To that end, Plaintiffs identified a group of bellwether plaintiffs whose 2 claims implicated twenty representative attacks (the “Group 1 Plaintiffs”). (See ECF No. 48.) The Group 1 Plaintiffs then moved for default judgment against Iran. (ECF No. 51 (“Mot. I.”).) In July 2024, Plaintiffs filed a notice of supplemental authority, directing the Court’s attention to Borochov v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 94 F.4th 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2024). (See ECF No. 54.) In Borochov, the D.C. Circuit held that a foreign state provides material support for an extrajudicial killing within the meaning of the FSIA’s terrorism exception only if the attack that it supported resulted in at least one victim’s death. See 94 F.4th at 1060–61. Of the twenty representative attacks, Plaintiffs reported that eleven resulted in deaths and nine resulted only in injuries. (See ECF No. 54 at 2–5.) 1 In turn, Plaintiffs asked the Court to hold any ruling in abeyance pending further appellate proceedings in Borochov, which the undersigned granted. (ECF No. 57 at 1–2; Min. Order, Dec. 20, 2024.) In June 2025, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Borochov, see 145 S. Ct. 2847 (2025), leaving the D.C. Circuit’s holding undisturbed. Consequently, Plaintiffs then filed a notice of voluntary dismissal for all the Borochov-impacted plaintiffs—those associated with the nine attacks resulting in injury only. (See ECF Nos. 64, 65.) That left eleven attacks in the original motion, and for these attacks, Plaintiffs have since filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (ECF No. 58 (“FFCL”).) Meanwhile, in February 2025, Plaintiffs sought leave to file another motion for default judgment as to a second group of bellwether plaintiffs (the “Group 2 Plaintiffs”). (See ECF No. 59.) After the Court granted leave, Plaintiffs moved for default judgment as to the Group 2 Plaintiffs, seeking recovery for injuries associated with seven additional attacks. (See ECF No. 62 (“Mot. II.”); id. at 12.) 2 1 Page citations are to those assigned by the Court’s electronic filing system. 2 In seeking leave, Plaintiffs originally indicated that the Group 2 Plaintiffs would include claims stemming from seven different attacks, but they ultimately only filed for default judgment as to six attacks. 3  To resolve these motions—which collectively implicate eighteen total attacks and forty- nine Plaintiffs 3—this Report and Recommendation now follows. II. Evidence Supporting Findings of Fact To secure a default judgment against a foreign sovereign, Plaintiffs must establish their “claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). As the D.C. Circuit has explained, this is a relatively “lenient standard” that can be satisfied with a lesser “quantum and quality of evidence ... than that normally required.” Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citations and quotation marks omitted), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 590 U.S. 418 (2020). Broadly speaking, the standard is met “when the plaintiff shows her claim has some factual basis ... even if she might not have prevailed in a contested proceeding.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted). In that sense, courts retain considerable latitude as to the evidence considered. See id. at 785–86 (“Section 1608(e) does not require a court to step into the shoes of the defaulting party and pursue every possible evidentiary challenge; only where the court relies upon evidence that is both clearly inadmissible and essential to the outcome has it abused its discretion.”); Han Kim v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 774 F.3d 1044, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[W]hen [a] defendant State fails to appear and the plaintiff seeks a default judgment, the FSIA leaves it to the court to determine precisely how much and what kinds of evidence the plaintiff must provide[.]”). In practice, “courts in FSIA cases may look to numerous evidentiary sources” in applying Section 1608(e), including a “plaintiff’s uncontroverted factual allegations” supported by “documentary and affidavit evidence”; “traditional documentary and testimonial evidence”; and 3 Plaintiff Lisa Hundley is counted twice because she is proceeding both individually and as personal representative of the estate of her late husband. (See (ECF No. 58 at 18 (“FFCL”).) 4 “evidence in the form of affidavits.” Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 750 F. Supp. 2d 163, 171 (D.D.C. 2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In addition, “cases in this Circuit and in others have repeatedly sustained jurisdiction or liability or both under the terrorism exception to FSIA based on “expert testimony.” Owens, 864 F.3d at 788. And courts may also properly “take judicial notice of related proceedings and records in cases before the same court.” Rimkus, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 171 (citation modified). Here, Plaintiffs ask the Court to consider three general forms of evidence: factual allegations supported by sworn declarations, several expert reports, and other judicially noticeable facts and evidence. The Court broadly discusses each in turn. A. Plaintiffs’ Uncontroverted Factual Allegations Plaintiffs posit that their Amended Complaint consists of “uncontroverted factual allegations,” which are “supported by” both “documentary and affidavit evidence.” (Mot. I. at 18– 19; Mot. II. at 19.) As noted, in the default FSIA context, “[c]ourts may rely on uncontroverted factual allegations that are supported by affidavits.” See Roth v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 78 F. Supp. 3d 379, 386 (D.D.C. 2015). Plaintiffs’ allegations generally satisfy this test because they are supported by affidavits and documentary evidence. (See ECF Nos. 51-7 to 51-29; 62-3 to 62-9.) While some of the source documents contain hearsay, the Court can generally still rely on that evidence under the hearsay exception applicable to statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or the exception applicable to public records. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(4), (8), (9); Karcher v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 396 F. Supp. 3d 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2019). Accordingly, the Court generally considers Plaintiffs’ uncontroverted facts and evidence, noting any issues with specific evidence in the context of the Court’s substantive discussion throughout the rest of this ruling. 5  B. Plaintiffs’ Proffered Expert Testimony Plaintiffs additionally ask that the Court consider and qualify as experts Dr. Michael Knights, Dr. Patrick Clawson, Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Thompson, and Michael Pregent. (Mot. I. at 19; Mot. II. at 20–21.) For the reasons discussed below, pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702, the Court finds each to be qualified on the subject they are proffered to address. Dr. Michael Knights is Plaintiffs’ proposed expert on Iran’s connection to EFPs and on Iran’s “support for terrorist and militia groups in Iraq.” (Mot. I. at 19; see ECF No. 51-3 (“Knights EFP Decl.”).); ECF No. 51-4 (“Knights Militia Decl.”).) Dr. Knights holds a Ph.D. in strategic studies and serves as a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. (Knights Militia Decl. ¶¶ 4, 13.) Dr. Knights has presented and published extensively on “Iran-backed militias in Iraq,” has served as a consultant “on Iran and the Middle East for several U.S. government agencies,” and has researched security issues related to Iraq for over twenty years. (Id. ¶ 6, 10.) Considering his experience, knowledge, and the materials he explains having relied upon to come to his conclusions, the Court concludes that Dr. Knights is qualified as an expert on Iran’s connection to both the use of EFPs in Iraq and on militia groups operating in Iraq. Dr. Patrick Clawson serves as Plaintiffs’ proposed expert “on Iran and its sponsorship of terrorist organizations.” (Mot. I. at 19; see ECF No. 51-5 (“Clawson Decl.”).) For over twenty- five years, Dr. Clawson has served as the Director of Research for the Washington Institute. (Clawson Decl. ¶ 6.) He has served as a consultant for several government agencies and has testified before Congress on numerous occasions regarding Iranian support for militias and proxy groups. (Id. at 2–4, 9.) Dr. Clawson has also been qualified as an expert on Iran and its material support for proxy organizations many times in this District (see id. ¶¶ 7–8 (listing cases)). See, e.g., Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 667 F. Supp. 2d 8, 13 n.3 (D.D.C. 2009). Based on the 6 record before it, this Court likewise deems Dr. Clawson qualified to serve as an expert as to the connections between the insurgent groups in Iraq and Iran’s sponsorship of those organizations. Ryan Thompson is presented as Plaintiffs’ expert for “improvised explosive devices (‘IEDs’) and EFPs.” (Mot. I. at 19.) Thompson is a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve and an engineer specializing in explosive systems like those at issue here. (ECF No. 51-6 (“Thompson Decl.”) ¶¶ 2–3.) During a prior deployment to Iraq, Thompson commanded a Special Weapons Exploitation Team and investigated hundreds of IED and EFP incidents. (Id. ¶ 5.) In another FSIA case in this District, Mr. Thompson previously qualified as an expert on the same topics presented here. See Fissler v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2026 WL 1162455, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2026). Based on Thompson’s declaration and associated materials, this Court similarly finds him qualified as an expert on the use of IEDs and EFPs in Iraq. Michael Pregent is put forward by the Group 2 Plaintiffs as an expert on Iran’s support of terrorist organizations. (Mot. II. at 20.) Pregent is a “former intelligence officer,” a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, and his opinions have been published by leading news organizations in print and on television. (ECF No. 62-10 (“Pregent Decl.”) ¶¶ 4–5.) Pregent served five tours in Iraq and worked as a subject matter expert for coalition forces on various terrorist groups in Iraq. (Id. ¶¶ 5–7.) In at least a dozen cases in this District, Pregent has provided his expert opinion on “Iran’s material support of terrorist activities” (id. ¶ 16). See, e.g., Roth v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 651 F. Supp. 3d 65, 72–73 (D.D.C. 2023) (Roth II). On review of Pregent’s declaration and the other relevant materials in this case, this Court follows suit and qualifies him as an expert on Iran’s material support for various groups in Iraq. 7  C. Plaintiffs’ Requests for Judicial Notice In addition to evidence submitted in this case, Plaintiffs also ask the Court to “take judicial notice of expert evidence and other materials submitted in substantially similar litigation.” (Mot. I. at 20; Mot. II. at 19.) Plaintiffs also request that the Court take judicial notice of a collection of cases from this District because—for the Group 2 Plaintiffs specifically—many of those prior decisions found Iran responsible for the attacks at issue. (See Mot. II. at 20–21.) More, Plaintiffs ask the Court to take judicial notice of expert reports submitted in other similar cases. (See id. at 19–20; Mot. I. at 20.) In the default FSIA context, courts “in subsequent related cases” may “rely upon the evidence presented in earlier litigation—without necessitating the formality of having that evidence reproduced—to reach their own, independent findings of fact in the cases before them.” Rimkus, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 172. The Court will examine the cases and evidence that Plaintiffs identify, while still independently making its own findings of fact. See id.; see also Roth II, 651 F. Supp. 3d at 73. FINDINGS OF FACT With a general understanding of Plaintiffs’ sources of evidence in mind, the Court turns to its recommended findings of fact. In the discussion that follows, the Court first looks at Iran’s general ties to attacks in Iraq, either through its support of proxy groups or through its provision of EFPs. Then, the Court specifically considers each of the eighteen attacks at issue. I. Iran’s Support of Proxy Groups Since 1984, the United States has designated Iran as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism.” See Determination Pursuant to Section 6(i) of the Export Administration Act of 1979–Iran, 49 Fed. Reg. 2836-02 (Jan. 23, 1984); U.S. Dep’t of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/9RRQ-2QT5] (last visited 8 Sept. 15, 2026). Judges in this District have extensively chronicled Iran’s role in the Iraq War, see, e.g., Roth II, 651 F. Supp. 3d at 73–77; Karcher, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 22–30, so the Court here focuses only on those connections that are relevant to the attacks at issue. One principal area of Iran’s involvement in the war was its support of proxy groups in Iraq. Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Clawson, describes how Iran worked “to reduce U.S. influence in the world and, in particular, to force the United States to leave the Middle East.” (Clawson Decl. ¶ 19.) In pursuit of that goal, Iran often relied on “proxy groups rather than carrying out attacks directly itself,” and it worked with groups from a range of religious and ideological positions, so long as they all “share[d] a common anti-American agenda.” (Id. ¶¶ 22–24.) To facilitate support for these groups, Iran used its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”), the Qods Force (“IRCG-QF”), and the Ministry of Information and Security (“MOIS”). (Id. ¶¶ 26–27, 32, 39, 47; Pregent Decl. ¶¶ 32–36.) Through these organizations, Iran was able to support proxy groups in Iraq by providing travel, funding, training, safe-haven, and weapons. (Clawson Decl. ¶¶ 34, 35, 39, 48, 51, 52.) And during the Iraq War, Iran also leveraged Hezbollah, “an Iranian-funded and IRGC-trained Lebanese terrorist organization,” to “help organize and arm Shia groups” 4 fighting against coalition forces. (Pregent Decl. ¶¶ 49, 53.) Of the various proxy groups that Iran is alleged to have supported in Iraq, Plaintiffs home in on five groups: Al-Qaeda in Iraq (“AQI”), later known as the Islamic State of Iraq (“ISI”), Ansar al-Islam (“AAI”), later known as Ansar al-Sunnah (“AAS”), the Islamic Army of Iraq (“IAI”), Jaish al-Mahdi (“JAM”), and Kataib Hezbollah (“KH”). 4 As another judge previously described, “Islam has two major branches: Shia and Sunni Islam …. Though Iran is mostly Shia and the intelligence community historically thought its goal was to spread[] the Shia revolution, … the Quds force helped Sunni groups so long as they acted against the United States.” Roth II, 651 F. Supp. 3d at 74 n.2 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 9  A. Al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamic State of Iraq Al-Qaeda in Iraq was an arm of the “global Al-Qaeda organization,” and it benefitted from Iran’s support. (Clawson Decl. ¶ 41.) Dr. Clawson characterizes Iran’s support of AQI as “sustained and major,” coming from “top Iranian leadership.” (Id. ¶ 46.) In particular, he describes how Iran’s MOIS sent “money and weapons” to AQI and negotiated for the release “of AQI operatives.” (Id. ¶ 47 (citation omitted).) AQI also used Iranian territory as a base and connection between Iraq and Al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan. (Id. ¶ 48.) Through the IRGC, Iran also funded and armed AQI to specifically “target Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan.” (Pregent Decl. ¶ 82.) The relationship between AQI and Iran was sometimes fraught due to religious differences and Iran’s prolific support of other organizations in Iraq. (Clawson Decl. ¶¶ 46, 49.) At times, Iran simultaneously supported AQI and Shia militias fighting against it. (Id. ¶ 49.) But according to the evidence, Iran kept up its support of AQI because it remained focused on driving coalition forces out of Iraq, regardless of which group ultimately prevailed in that task. (Id.; Pregent Decl. ¶ 48.) And because of Iran’s support (among other factors), many Iraqis criticized AQI’s “foreign components” and “radical” beliefs; so, in an effort to essentially rebrand itself, AQI later merged with a few other groups to become the Islamic State of Iraq. (Clawson Decl. ¶ 43.) As Dr. Clawson describes it, ISI was merely “a continuation of AQI” that received ongoing and material support from Iran. (Id. ¶ 43–44.) In fact, ISI was often still referred to as AQI, and it continued to receive weapons and explosives from Iran. (Id. ¶¶ 44–45.) Based on this evidence, Plaintiffs have satisfactorily shown that Iran provided material support to AQI (and later ISI) to attack U.S. forces during the relevant period. (See id. ¶ 55.) 10  B. Ansar al-Islam and Ansar al-Sunnah Ansar al-Islam, also known as Ansar al-Sunnah, was a Sunni militia with Al-Qaeda affiliations. (Clawson Decl. ¶¶ 50–51.) In 2003, AAS announced their “dedicat[ion] to fighting U.S. and allied forces” in Iraq, and it is reasonably well documented that Iran supported this group to that end. (Id. ¶¶ 50–51.) Iran provided safe-haven and training to AAS fighters—teaching them “how to build and set up [IEDs],” preparing them for sniper attacks, and facilitating movement between Iran and Iraq. (Id. (citation omitted).) Other AAS members were prepped in Iran “for various attack scenarios including suicide bombings, assassinations, and general subversion against U.S. forces in Iraq.” (Id.) Based on this evidence, Plaintiffs have satisfactorily shown that Iran provided material support to AAI (and later AAS) between 2004 and 2008. (See id. ¶ 55.) C. Islamic Army of Iraq According to Dr. Clawson, relevant background about the Islamic Army of Iraq “is more limited.” (Clawson Decl. ¶ 52.) Based on the information available, he explains that IAI “was less motivated” by religion, functioning more as a “nationalist” organization. (Id.) And far from being a constant enemy to coalition forces, “in about 2008–2009, IAI worked in a limited way with the forces the U.S. government supported,” and later in 2014, “some of its fighters” even worked directly “with U.S. forces.” (Id. ¶ 53.) On review of the limited evidence, Dr. Clawson concludes that Iran materially supported IAI. (Id. ¶ 55.) But to reach that conclusion, Dr. Clawson relies in large part on a statement from Colonel Rick Welch, who simply opines that “Iran was funding any group that could keep Iraq chaotic.” (Id. ¶ 52.) Dr. Clawson does not point to any other specific evidence or concrete connections between IAI and Iran. To the contrary, Dr. Clawson 11 acknowledges “there are few accounts of Iranian support for Sunni militants” like those in IAI, and he provides no specific accounts of Iranian support for IAI. (Id. ¶ 52.) The Court is unpersuaded that this evidence establishes the necessary connection between Iran and IAI. While Colonel Welch’s statement may be correct, it does little to show that Iran provided material support to IAI specifically. Instead, it just bears on the notion that Iran’s support was prolific throughout Iraq—a fairly general premise that much of Plaintiffs’ other evidence likewise demonstrates. And aside from Colonel Welch’s statement, Dr. Clawson’s opinion does not point to much else. Without any other evidence to support his conclusion, Dr. Clawson’s attempt to tie Iran’s support to IAI is not something the Court can credit on the present record. See, e.g., Sibley v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2025 WL 1928036, at *7 (D.D.C. July 14, 2025) (“[A]n expert’s unsubstantiated ipse dixit is not ‘satisfactory’ evidence.”). D. Jaish al-Mahdi (“JAM”) Jaish al-Mahdi is an Iraqi Shia militia and one of the main Shia insurgent groups that Iran utilized as a proxy. (Clawson Decl. ¶ 27.) Through IRCG-QF and Hezbollah, Iran trained and armed JAM “to augment their ability to inflict damage against U.S. troops.” (See id. ¶¶ 27, 31–34 (citation omitted).) As Plaintiffs’ expert Pregent describes, JAM’s leader was “eager to accept financial support and weapons from the IRGC and training from Hezbollah,” but he still tried to appear independent from “Iranian influence.” (Pregent Decl. ¶ 65.) Iran insisted that it did not provide weapons to JAM, claiming that any Iranian-made weapons must have been residuals from the Iran-Iraq war in the eighties. (Clawson Decl. ¶¶ 34–35.) Iran’s denial, however, was soon rebutted when coalition forces began recovering weapons from JAM—many of which were made in Iran after 2003. (Id.) Beyond weapons, Iran also offered “basic military training” to many JAM fighters and more advanced training to select JAM leaders. (Id. ¶ 34 (citation omitted).) 12  On this record, Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that during the relevant period, Iran provided material support to JAM to drive coalition forces out of Iraq. (See id. ¶ 55.) E. Kataib Hezbollah (“KH”) Finally, Kataib Hezbollah was “Iran’s premiere special operations unit in Iraq.” (Pregent Decl. ¶ 66.) Through the IRGC-QF, Iran “manned, equipped, trained, and funded Kataib Hezbollah.” (Id.) Specifically, IRGC-QF trained KH fighters on “[s]urveillance tactics, [s]niper and kidnapping operations, room clearing, complex ambush tactics,” and various explosive attacks. (Id. ¶ 68.) During the Iraq War, the group’s “signature weapon” was an improvised rocket assisted mortar (“IRAM”). (Id. ¶¶ 69, 73.) The weapon worked by using a dump truck, or other large truck, as “a crude launching platform for shrapnel-filled barrel sized explosives,” which KH would launch over U.S. compounds to devastating effect. (Id. ¶ 69.) Here, too, Plaintiffs have satisfactorily shown that Iran provided material support to KH to harm U.S. troops in Iraq during the period relevant to their claims. II. Iran’s Provision of EFPs Along with proxy-group support, one of Iran’s most notorious contributions to the war in Iraq was the EFP—a weapon designed to penetrate armored vehicles. (Knights EFP Decl. ¶¶ 19, 22.) By initiating an explosion behind “a concave copper plate,” an EFP creates “a molten [copper] slug.” (Id. ¶ 19 (citation omitted).) The molten slug can penetrate a vehicle’s armor, after which it “shatters into deadly fragments” and causes a “wide spray of semi-molten metal,” which can maim and kill a vehicle’s occupants. (Id. ¶ 22.) Unlike many other IEDs, EFPs require “complex metallurgy” and other complicated design elements, making it difficult for “non-state actor[s]” to manufacture these weapons. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 49.) EFPs made their first recorded appearance in Iraq around August 2004. (Id. ¶ 30.) They were devastatingly effective at piercing coalition forces’ 13 armored vehicles, and between November 2005 and December 2011, more than 1,500 EFPs were detonated in Iraq, “killing at least 196 U.S. troops” and injuring many more. (Id. at ¶¶ 22, 29.) Iran supplied almost all the EFPs used during the Iraq War, and those ties are well documented. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 38–39, 41.) Evidence of Iran’s EFP-related involvement started to mount around 2005, when U.S. special forces “intercepted EFPs entering Iraq from Iran, over the marshes connecting the two countries.” (Id. ¶ 34; see also id. ¶¶ 38–43 (discussing smuggling routes).) As information about Iran’s involvement grew, coalition forces were sometimes able to use clues left by an EFP’s manufacture (such as a unique chemical signature) to identify the exact mill or designer in Iran who was responsible for making the weapon. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 25, 32.) Further, EFPs “never proliferated into the hands of Sunni militants, indicating” Iran’s distinct control over these weapons, which it only supplied to Shia groups. 5 (Id. ¶ 43.) And Iran did not just supply these weapons; IRGC-QF also sponsored training on how to deploy EFPs. (Id. ¶ 33.) Based on this evidence, U.S. military officials concluded that Iran was responsible for the provision of EFPs in Iraq (id. ¶ 41), and United Kingdom military officials made similar findings (id. ¶ 45). In recent years, several other judges in this District have found Iran responsible for the provision of EFPs. See, e.g., Lee v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 518 F. Supp. 3d 475, 484–85 (D.D.C. 2021); Karcher, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 30; Roth II, 651 F. Supp. 3d at 89. In keeping with those rulings, and based on the additional evidence here (see Knights EFP Decl. ¶ 51 (“[T]o a reasonable degree of certainty … the Iranian government, including the IRGC and its Qods Force, was the principal supplier of almost all, if not all, EFP warheads used in Iraq prior to U.S. military withdrawal in late 2011.”)), this Court has no trouble reaching the same conclusion. 5 Though, as noted above, Iran did still provide support to some Sunni groups, just not in the form of EFPs. 14 III. Attacks Against the Group 1 Plaintiffs Having traced Iran’s connections to various proxy groups and to EFPs, the Court now turns to the specific attacks at issue in this case. The Court will first address the eleven Group 1 attacks, broken out based on whether an EFP was involved or not. (See Mot. I. at 20, 26.) 6 A. EFP Attacks There are six Group 1 attacks where Plaintiffs have offered evidence of EFP usage. 1. Attack 1 – May 14, 2006 – Baghdad, Iraq Because this attack was squarely addressed in Karcher, the Court relies on evidence from that case while making its own findings of fact. See Karcher v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2021 WL 133507, at *20–21 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2021). On May 14, 2006, Army Sergeant First Class (“SFC”) Robert West was driving the lead vehicle as part of a convey heading along Route Pluto in Baghdad, Iraq. (ECF No. 51-7 at 10; Karcher, 16-cv-232, Lutz Rep., ECF No. 109-1 at 71.) At approximately 6:10 PM local time, an explosion ignited West’s up-armored M1114 HMMWV, causing the vehicle to careen and flip. (Karcher, 16-cv-232, Lutz Rep., ECF No. 109-1 at 71.) SFC West and the front-seat passenger, Chief Warrant Officer John Engeman, were both killed in the incident. (See ECF No. 51-7 at 10.) Later investigation revealed evidence “consistent with a multiple EFP array,” including copper residue left on one of the penetrated doors. (See Karcher, 16-cv-232, Lutz Rep. ECF No. 109-1 at 72, 75.) Plaintiffs’ expert, Thompson, also concluded that the explosive used was an EFP. (Thompson Decl. ¶ 11.a & accompanying report.) 6 Given the myriad Plaintiffs and attacks at issue, the Court’s summary of each attack is relatively brief. But this should not be construed as an effort to minimize the lasting effects of these attacks on the lives of these Plaintiffs. The supporting declarations paint a more fulsome picture of Plaintiffs’ pain and grief stemming from the attacks. So, even though the Court’s legal summary will not—and frankly, cannot—fully encapsulate the associated details, these declarations were fully considered in the Court’s analysis. 15  2. Attack 2 – January 5, 2010 – Balad, Iraq On January 5, 2010, Army Sergeant David Croft was conducting a patrol near Balad, Iraq. His convoy of up-armored M1151 HMMWVs was on Route Ninja when it hit a choke point. (ECF No. 51-8 at 23–25.) After some reconnaissance, the convoy opted to proceed and was soon attacked by two EFPs that pierced the lead vehicle with Sgt. Croft inside. (ECF No. 51-8 at 23–25, 40; Thompson Decl. ¶ 11.b & accompanying report.) The blast severely wounded Sgt. Croft, and the convoy was then attacked with small arms fire. (ECF No. 51-8 at 25.) Sgt. Croft was medevacked to Balad, but he ultimately succumbed to the blast wounds and died. (Id. at 25, 27, 98, 99, 104.) 3. Attack 3 – March 11, 2008 – Kishkishkia, Iraq In March 2008, Army Staff Sergeant (“SSG”) Laurent West and Army SSG Albert Dyk went to meet a local leader in Kishkishkia, Iraq about a potential weapons cache. (ECF No. 51-9 at 17; ECF No. 51-10 at 4.) On their return trip, their convoy of up-armored M1151 HMMWVs was attacked with a multi-array EFP. (ECF No. 51-9 at 15; Thompson Decl. ¶ 11.c & accompanying report.) The blast struck SSG West in the lead vehicle and killed him. (ECF No. 51- 10 at 4.) SSG Dyk was in the second vehicle; he watched as the first one exploded, and he later had to wash the carnage from the attack out of that vehicle. (Id.) 4. Attack 4 – September 8, 2009 – Baghdad, Iraq The evidence related to this attack has been reviewed in Lee v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 656 F. Supp. 3d 11, 48–49 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2023). On September 8, 2009, Air Force Sergeant Jon Kone participated in a “meet and greet” at an Iraqi Police Station in southern Baghdad. (ECF No. 51-14 at 3–4.) His convoy was travelling through a traffic circle when his up-armored M1151 HMMWV was struck by an EFP (see Thompson Decl. ¶ 11.g & accompanying report) that “had been placed between a brick wall and the road” (Lee, 19-cv-830, Lutz Rep., ECF No. 53-2 at 187– 16 88). The blast penetrated the armor of the HMMWV, killing the vehicle commander and injuring Sgt. Kone. (Id.; see also ECF No. 51-14 at 8–16, 30–31.) 5. Attack 5 – April 21, 2005 – Ramadi, Iraq Curtis Hundley and Robert Sabado both worked for Blackwater Security Consulting, LLC (“Blackwater”). (ECF No. 51-15 at 6; ECF No. 51-16 at 3.) On April 21, 2005, they were part of a convoy of armored Mamba vehicles traveling from Baghdad to Ramadi when their vehicle was hit by an EFP. (Thompson Decl. ¶ 11.h & accompanying report; ECF No. 51-16 at 4; ECF No. 51- 17 at 6, 9–10.) Shrapnel from the blast killed Hundley, and Sabado sustained serious injuries and was medevacked to Landstuhl, Germany. (ECF No. 51-15 at 13; ECF No. 51-16 at 6–8.) 6. Attack 6 – January 18, 2007 – Baghdad, Iraq This attack was previously addressed by the Karcher court, and the Court here looks to that same evidence. See, 2021 WL 133507, at *30–31. On January 18, 2007, Army Sergeant Bradley Salisbury was escorting a counterintelligence operator to a meeting in Dawr, Iraq. (ECF No. 51- 21 at 4, 8.) Sgt. Salisbury and Specialist (“SPC”) William Rechenmacher were in the last vehicle of their convoy of up-armored M1114 HMMWVs when they were struck by an EFP. (Id. at 4–6; Thompson Decl. ¶ 11.l & accompanying report.) A molten slug pierced the passenger door, decapitating SPC Rechenmacher and injuring Sgt. Salisbury. (ECF No. 51-21 at 4–6.) The area of the attack was the site of many EFP attacks at the time (id.), and the expert in Karcher also found that this was an EFP attack (see Karcher, 16-cv-232, Lutz Report, ECF 109-1 at 162). B. Proxy Group Attacks For these next five attacks, Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Knights, proffered evidence that attempts to link responsibility to various proxy groups. The Court discusses each in turn. 17  7. Attack 7 – May 21, 2004 – Baghdad, Iraq On May 21, 2004, Army SSG Jeremy Horton was on patrol near Iskandariyah, Iraq, when he was attacked by an IED that caused “[p]enetrating shrapnel injuries to” his head, killing him. (ECF No. 51-25 at 9, 10; Knights Militia Decl. ¶ 17.a & accompanying report.) Based on the location and other details from the attack, Dr. Knights concluded that this IED attack was carried out by one of the following insurgent groups: AQI, AAS, IAI, or JAM. (See Knights Militia Decl. ¶ 17.a & accompanying report.) 7 In recognition of his service, SSG Horton was posthumously awarded a Bronze Star and a Purple Heart. (ECF No. 51-25 at 11.) 8. Attack 8 – September 19, 2007 – Baghdad, Iraq On September 19, 2007, Army SPC 8 Christopher Neff was in one of two M1A1 Abrams tanks on a counter-IED mission. (ECF No. 51-26 at 11, 19.) SPC Neff’s tank was following some tire tracks in the Khadra neighborhood of Baghdad, Iraq when a large surface-laid IED detonated. (Id. at 55, 59.) The explosion disabled the tank and severely injured Neff, who later died in route to the hospital. (Id. at 17, 71, 106–07.) Dr. Knights concludes that AQI, AAS, or IAI was 7 Plaintiffs submit that this attack was carried out with a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (“VBIED”) (see FFCL at 22), but their only support for that theory seems to be a hearsay statement from an Army chaplain to Horton’s mother (see ECF No. 51-25 at 4). Ultimately, the Court cannot credit that inadmissible evidence and so cannot conclude that a VBIED was used. See Fed. R. Evid. 802; Flanagan v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 190 F. Supp. 3d 138, 178 n. 26 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[A] court considering a motion for default judgment under section 1608(e) must draw its findings of fact and conclusions of law from admissible testimony in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence[.]”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs suggest that the use of a VBIED indicates that only AQI can be connected to this attack. (See FFCL at 20–21.) They point to testimony from Michael Pregent in other cases, explaining that VBIEDs are a part of complex attack methods used by AQI. (See Roth, 19-cv-2179, Tr., ECF No. 102 at 30–31, 66, 76; Brown v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 21-cv-1308, ECF No. 34-3 ¶¶ 122, 132.) This Court is not persuaded. For one thing, Pregent’s opinions in those cases were focused on his specific reviews of other specific attacks, not necessarily VBIED usage writ large. For another, and more strikingly, Plaintiffs’ theory conflicts with their expert here, Dr. Knights—who specifically reviewed this attack and this location and believed that there were multiple groups that could be responsible, not just AQI. (See Knights Militia Decl. ¶ 17.a & accompanying report.) The Court looks to Dr. Knights’ specific assessment of this specific attack over Plaintiffs’ alternative connect-the-dots approach from other sources opining about other attacks. 8 Christopher Neff was posthumously promoted to Specialist. (ECF No. 51-26 at 107.) 18 responsible for the attack, in part, because these “were the only groups” in the area “taking on heavily-armored” U.S. tanks. (Knights Militia Decl. ¶ 17.b & accompanying report.) 9. Attack 9 – June 20, 2007 – Baghdad, Iraq On June 20, 2007, while in the Al Jamma area of Baghdad, SSG Darren Hubbell and three other servicemembers were killed by an IED lodged in a doorframe. (Knights Militia Decl. ¶ 17.c & accompanying report.) Because this was an area where AQI, AAS, and the IAI all operated, and considering other facts, Dr. Knights concludes that one of these groups was responsible. (See id.) 10. Attack 10 – March 22, 2008 – Husseiniyah, Iraq Army Sergeant David Stelmat was part of a patrol mission near Husseiniyah, Iraq on March 22, 2008. (ECF No. 51-28 at 37, 188.) While driving along an eastern route, Stelmat’s up-armored M114 HMMWV went over an IED that was buried under the road. (Id. at 37–38.) The IED was triggered by a command-wire, and the explosi