Full Opinion

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-1041 KEVIN E. SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRISTOPHER PRICE, et al., Defendants-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. No. 1:21-cv-00373 — Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED SEPTEMBER 18, 2025 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2026 ____________________ Before RIPPLE, LEE, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges. PRYOR, Circuit Judge. On two occasions in June 2019, cor- rectional officers transported Kevin Smith, an Indiana Depart- ment of Correction inmate, between Wabash Valley Correc- tional Facility and an outside hospital. Smith alleges that of- ficers violated his Eighth Amendment rights during each transport. The district court concluded at summary judgment that each officer was entitled to qualified immunity. For the 2 No. 25-1041 reasons below, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background We recite the facts in the light most favorable to Smith as the non-moving party at summary judgment. Taylor v. Schwarzhuber, 132 F.4th 480, 486 (7th Cir. 2025). Kevin Smith was an Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) inmate housed at the Wabash Valley Correctional Fa- cility (Wabash Valley). The facts of this case center on two transports of Smith by IDOC from an outside hospital located in Indianapolis, Indiana back to Wabash Valley. 1. Transport on June 13, 2019 On June 13, 2019, IDOC correctional officers Christopher Price and Jeff Hancock 1 transported Smith to an outside hos- pital for a medical appointment. During the transport, Smith was restrained in “trip gear.” This meant he had his hands handcuffed in front of him, a chain around his waist, and a “black box” plastic cover over the handcuff’s lock apparatus that pulled his hands up against his stomach. While at the hospital, Officers Price and Hancock com- mented to Smith about grievances he had previously filed 1 Officer Hancock, who was the driver during this transport, is not a party in this suit. No. 25-1041 3 against a different IDOC officer. 2 The officers told Smith that he “better watch out” and that he “better be careful.” 3 Following Smith’s medical appointment and in prepara- tion to transport him back to Wabash Valley, the officers placed Smith inside the transport van. Officer Price refused, however, to buckle Smith’s seatbelt. Smith was again in trip gear, so he could not buckle himself. His movement was also limited by an external fixator, or “ex-fix system,” attached to his elbow from a prior reconstructive elbow surgery. Smith questioned the officers’ reasoning for not buckling him in, and one of the officers responded, “you’re not going any- where, don’t worry about it.” Once on the road, Smith could see outside traffic by looking through a two-foot square win- dow in the passenger compartment that faced the front of the van and allowed him to see through the front windshield. The van encountered traffic as it traveled towards Wabash Valley. To Smith, it felt like Officer Hancock, who was driv- ing, kept “hitting the gas, kind of punching it kind of fast and then coming to a stop.” Smith thought it was “not the normal way a person drives.” Suddenly, Officer Hancock applied the brakes, causing Smith to “fly[] forward” and “slam[] on the ground” in the passenger compartment of the transport van. 2 Smith’s claims against this IDOC officer proceeded in Smith v. Foster, No. 1:22-cv-00404-JRS-CSW (S.D. Ind.). 3 While Smith does not specify whether Officer Price personally made ei- ther of these warnings, Officer Price disputes that he was aware of Smith’s grievances at this time and that he discussed them with Smith. We need not resolve that factual dispute because we draw all inferences in Smith’s favor at summary judgment. 4 No. 25-1041 With Smith lying on the van’s floor screaming in pain, Of- ficer Hancock pulled into a nearby parking lot. Officer Price then exited the van to assist Smith in the passenger compart- ment. Officer Price tried to pick Smith up by the shoulder, but Smith told Officer Price not to do that because he thought his shoulder was broken. Officer Price, in response, picked Smith up by the waist and placed him back in the transport van. The officers then took Smith back to the hospital, where he was diagnosed with a broken collarbone. While Smith was being treated for this injury in one of the hospital rooms, he overheard Officers Price and Hancock, sit- ting at the doorway, discussing how they were going to fill out their incident reports. The officers were writing the re- ports on their phones, discussing how to make their reports consistent and laughing with each other. Smith acknowl- edged, however, that he could not “hear everything they were saying.” After Smith was discharged, the officers buckled him in on the return trip to Wabash Valley. Upon their arrival at the prison, both officers refused to give Smith their names and hid their badges and ID cards from Smith. 2. Transport on June 20, 2019 One week later, Smith had to be transported back to the hospital for another elbow surgery. This time, IDOC correc- tional officers Mark Lamb and Benjamin Rilenge transported him. The officers put Smith in trip gear, placed him on a seat in the transport van, and buckled him in. On this trip, Smith sat in the front of the van in a secure box, which is about four feet by four feet in size and has space for only one person to No. 25-1041 5 sit. Smith arrived at the hospital without incident, and he un- derwent surgery. While still in the hospital, the anesthesiologist explained to Smith that he had given him a “pain ball,” which disburses pain medication over multiple days. Smith became sick and vomited due to the anesthesia. On his way out of the hospital with Officers Lamb and Rilenge escorting him, Smith asked for and received vomit bags from the hospital staff. For the return trip, against Smith’s requests, the officers sat him in the back of the van, not in the secure box in the front like on the trip there. The officers secured Smith’s seatbelt. As Officer Lamb began driving, however, Smith began to feel nauseous. He was still under the effects of anesthesia, and he had not eaten since the night before. Given it was late June in Indiana, the van was very hot inside. By Smith’s account, he asked the officers to turn on the air conditioning or roll down the windows, but they responded no. The van continued down Interstate 70 towards Wabash Valley. According to Smith, I-70’s right lane is bumpy while the left lane is not. The officers drove in the right lane, which left Smith in the back “screaming in pain” because the driving jostled his surgically repaired elbow and his collarbone, which he had broken during the prior week’s hospital transport. He asked them to drive in the left lane, but they refused. Eventually, the officers stopped at a gas station. The offic- ers got out of the van, stood in front of it, and smoked ciga- rettes. The officers left Smith in the van. After about ten or fifteen minutes, the officers got back in the van and continued driving. 6 No. 25-1041 The officers later pulled off the interstate and traveled on street roads to avoid interstate traffic. After doing so, Officer Lamb drove the van over multiple sets of railroad tracks. At first, Officer Lamb slowed down to “bounce the van.” This left Smith screaming in pain while the officers laughed. Smith tes- tified that one of the officers said: “Scream some more. This is funny.” Officer Lamb continued driving, and he asked Officer Rilenge whether he should “speed up or slow down over” the railroad tracks he approached. Smith then saw Officer Rilenge put his hand up and wave his finger, encouraging Officer Lamb to speed up. Officer Lamb then sped up, causing the van to “catch some air” and bounce as they drove over multi- ple sets of tracks. The officers laughed while doing this. B. Procedural Background Smith later filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming eleven defendants in his complaint. The district court screened Smith’s pro se complaint, allowing his Eighth Amendment claims to proceed against Officers Price, Lamb, and Rilenge based on their conduct during the two transports. The court also permitted First Amendment retaliation claims against those same officers based on Smith’s allegations that his previous grievances motivated the officers’ conduct dur- ing the transports. The court severed all of Smith’s remaining claims that were unrelated to the van transports. At the close of discovery, the district court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion for summary judg- ment. First, the court granted qualified immunity to Officer Price on Smith’s Eighth Amendment claim based on the June 13 transport. The court reasoned that because Officer Price was not driving, he could not be held responsible for how Of- ficer Hancock, the non-party officer, drove the van. So, the No. 25-1041 7 court looked only at whether Officer Price violated Smith’s clearly established rights by failing to buckle Smith’s seatbelt, a fact the district court assumed for summary judgment pur- poses because it was otherwise disputed. In concluding Of- ficer Price did not violate Smith’s clearly established rights, the court reasoned that Smith did not offer any binding prec- edent in support. Next, the district court granted qualified immunity to Of- ficers Lamb and Rilenge on Smith’s Eighth Amendment claims based on the June 20 transport. The court first reasoned that Smith did not present binding precedent putting the of- ficers on notice that they were subjecting Smith to a “rough ride.” The court then distinguished an unpublished Sixth Cir- cuit case on its facts. The court further reasoned that the transport van’s hot conditions and the officers’ failures to give Smith food also did not violate his Eighth Amendment rights. Finally, the district court granted summary judgment on Smith’s First Amendment claims as to Officers Lamb and Rilenge, but denied Officer Price summary judgment on Smith’s First Amendment claim against him. Smith lost at trial on his First Amendment claim against Officer Price. Smith does not challenge this verdict on appeal. Smith now appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the officers on his Eighth Amendment claims. II. ANALYSIS Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no gen- uine dispute as to any material fact,” and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). We review the district court’s decision to grant qualified im- munity at summary judgment de novo. Jackson v. City of 8 No. 25-1041 Madison, 176 F.4th 1005, 1015 (7th Cir. 2026). When the facts require us to draw inferences, we draw them in favor of the non-moving party. Doe v. Gray, 75 F.4th 710, 716 (7th Cir. 2023). A. Doctrine of Qualified Immunity Qualified immunity under § 1983 protects state actors from civil damages liability for constitutional violations un- less their conduct violated a “clearly established” statutory or constitutional right. Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012); see also District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018). A plaintiff can overcome a defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity at summary judgment “by showing (1) there is a dispute of material fact as to whether the official violated a ‘statutory or constitutional right,’ and (2) the right was ‘clearly established at the time’” the officer’s alleged mis- conduct occurred. Taylor, 132 F.4th at 486 (quoting Gupta v. Melloh, 19 F.4th 990, 1000 (7th Cir. 2021)). “Our focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that his conduct was un- lawful.” Taylor v. City of Milford, 10 F.4th 800, 806 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation modified). 1. “Constitutional Right” Prong Under the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, Smith must present sufficient evidence from which a reason- able jury could infer that his constitutional rights were in fact violated. The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Pun- ishments Clause proscribes “the unnecessary and wanton in- fliction of pain on prisoners.” Stockton v. Milwaukee County, 44 F.4th 605, 619 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). Accord- ingly, prison officials must “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of … inmates.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. No. 25-1041 9 312, 320 (1986) (citation modified). But the general require- ment that a prisoner must allege and prove the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain is “applied with due regard for differences in the kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment objection is lodged.” Id. Some Eighth Amendment violations constitute “deliber- ate indifference,” while others constitute “excessive force.” Id. at 319–20. The deliberate indifference standard applies where a prison official fails to safeguard an inmate’s “health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The Su- preme Court has found this standard applies in certain con- texts, including the failure to provide medical assistance, maintain humane conditions of confinement, or protect in- mates from attack. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; accord Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (explaining deliberate indifference standard applies to medi- cal care claim “because the State’s responsibility to provide inmates with medical care ordinarily does not conflict with competing administrative concerns”). Demonstrating a con- stitutional violation under this standard requires showing two elements: (1) the prisoner must be exposed to a “substan- tial risk of serious harm,” and (2) the prison official must sub- jectively know of and disregard that substantial risk to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837. In excessive force cases, on the other hand, whether a cor- rectional officer’s alleged use of “excessive physical force” vi- olates the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punish- ments Clause turns on “whether force was applied in a good- faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously 10 No. 25-1041 and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6–7; see also Smith v. Kind, 140 F.4th 359, 366 (7th Cir. 2025). 2. “Clearly Established” Prong Under the second prong of the qualified immunity analy- sis, even if an official violated an inmate’s constitutional right, the official is entitled to qualified immunity unless that right was clearly established at the time of the official’s conduct. E.g., Taylor, 132 F.4th at 486. “To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664 (citation modified). That is why “[t]his step of the analysis requires specificity—for the law to be clearly established, the existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” City of Milford, 10 F.4th at 807 (citation modified). Put another way, “the right must be clearly established to a degree of specificity such that a reasonable government official would be able to identify the violation with a specific set of facts.” Leiser v. Kloth, 933 F.3d 696, 702 (7th Cir. 2019). This means we must consider “whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam). But although “specificity is important, it does not require a case presenting the exact same facts.” City of Milford, 10 F.4th at 807 (citation omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court has stressed that “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). Accordingly, a right is clearly established when: No. 25-1041 11 (1) a closely analogous case finds the alleged viola- tion unlawful; (2) the relevant caselaw shows such a clear trend that we can say with fair assurance that the recognition of the right by a controlling prece- dent was merely a question of time; or (3) in rare cases, the defendant’s conduct was so egregious and unreasonable that no reasonable official could have thought he was acting law- fully. Johnson v. Edwards, 164 F.4th 1074, 1079 (7th Cir. 2026) (citation modified) (quoting Stockton, 44 F.4th at 620–21); see also Kemp v. Liebel, 877 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir. 2017) (“In the absence of controlling or persuasive authority, plaintiffs can demon- strate clearly established law by proving that the defendant’s conduct was so egregious and unreasonable that no reasona- ble official could have thought he was acting lawfully.” (cita- tion modified)). With those principles in mind, we assess whether the of- ficers are entitled to qualified immunity at the summary judg- ment stage for their actions during the two June 2019 trans- ports. B. Transport on June 13, 2019 Smith argues that Officer Price violated his clearly estab- lished Eighth Amendment rights during the transport from the hospital to Wabash Valley on June 13, 2019. Officer Price responds that he is entitled to qualified immunity. 12 No. 25-1041 1. Constitutional Violation At the outset, we must determine which Eighth Amend- ment standard to apply when assessing Officer Price’s con- duct. Smith contends Officer Price, the passenger officer dur- ing the June 13 transport, refused to buckle his seatbelt and then failed to intervene while Officer Hancock drove the transport van recklessly. This claim, in substance, “is func- tionally the same as claims in failure-to-protect or conditions- of-confinement cases, which are evaluated under the deliber- ate indifference standard.” Thompson v. Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 107 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, and Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303). So, we assess Officer Price’s conduct under the deliberate indifference standard. To survive summary judgment under that standard, Smith must designate evi- dence sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that (1) he was exposed to a “substantial risk of serious harm,” and that (2) Officer Price subjectively knew of and disregarded that risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837. Starting with the objective element, Smith argues he was exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm because Officer Hancock drove recklessly while his seatbelt was not fastened. This resulted in Smith getting thrown to the floor, causing him to break his collarbone. So, on this prong, the question is whether these conditions add up to a substantial risk of seri- ous harm. The parties agree that the mere failure to fasten Smith’s seatbelt, at least on its own, did not expose him to a substan- tial risk of serious harm. We concur. See Proffitt v. Ridgway, 279 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding failure to fasten de- tainee’s seatbelt was at most negligence when the inmate es- caped from back seat and caused crash). No. 25-1041 13 But an inmate is exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm when he has a limited ability to protect himself during a transport because he is not restrained by a seatbelt and is then subjected to reckless driving. Brown v. Fortner, 518 F.3d 552, 559–60 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding substantial risk of serious harm when officer refused to fasten inmate’s seatbelt, drove recklessly, and ignored inmate’s pleas to slow down); Thomp- son, 878 F.3d at 107 (same for passenger officer). We hold that these conditions, taken together, expose inmates to an objec- tively “excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; cf. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment protects against future harm.”). Here, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Smith, a reasonable jury could find Smith was exposed to a substan- tial risk of serious harm during the June 13 transport. First, a reasonable jury could find Officer Hancock drove the transport van recklessly. To Smith, Officer Hancock was driv- ing erratically—he kept “hitting the gas, kind of punching it kind of fast then coming to a stop” in a way that struck Smith as unusual. Then, Officer Hancock applied the brakes sud- denly, causing Smith to fly forward and land on the van’s floor. Smith did not see any traffic warranting that behavior. Officer Price disputes this fact, arguing Officer Hancock was required to slam on his brakes because a car had pulled out in front of the transport van. Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Smith, however, a reasonable factfinder could conclude Officer Hancock drove the van recklessly. And Smith had limited ability to protect himself from that reckless driving. Smith was not restrained by a seatbelt. Smith also had additional limitations further impairing his ability to defend himself. Smith remained restrained in trip gear, 14 No. 25-1041 meaning his hands were handcuffed in front of him, a chain was cinched around his waist, and a “black box” pulled his hands up against his stomach. These restraints also prevented Smith from buckling his seatbelt on his own and limited his ability to brace for impact during the ride. And the ex-fix sys- tem attached to Smith’s elbow further limited his ability to brace for impact. From Smith’s account of the facts, a reasonable jury could conclude Smith was exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm when he was recklessly driven in a transport van and had a limited ability to protect himself because his seatbelt was not fastened combined with the other restraints prevent- ing him from bracing for impact. Moving to the subjective element of Smith’s claim, we must next determine whether Officer Price was deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of harm Smith faced because of Officer Hancock’s reckless driving and Smith’s inability to protect himself from that driving. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837. It is important to note, here, that Officer Price cannot be held vicariously liable for Officer Hancock’s actions. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (“Respondeat supe- rior or vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983.”). Of- ficer Price is only liable for his conduct. Accordingly, Officer Price cannot be held liable under § 1983 if he took “measures reasonably calculated to address the risk” Smith faced. Hunter v. Mueske, 73 F.4th 561, 566 (7th Cir. 2023). “Deliberate indifference is more than mere negligence or carelessness: it is ‘something approaching a total unconcern’ for inmate safety.” Id. (quoting Rosario v. Brawn, 670 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2012)). Smith advances the following facts to show Officer Price was deliberately indifferent to the No. 25-1041 15 substantial risk of harm he faced. While still at the hospital, both officers warned Smith to watch out because they had learned that Smith had filed grievances against another IDOC officer. Then, as the officers loaded Smith into the transport van, Officer Price did not buckle Smith’s seatbelt. Smith re- sponded and asked the officers why he was not being buckled in, to which one of the officers responded, “you’re not going anywhere, don’t worry about it.” The record does not show which officer made this statement, but a reasonable juror could infer Officer Price at least heard this statement. And once they got on the road, as discussed above, Smith contends Officer Hancock drove the transport van recklessly. In partic- ular, the designated evidence suggests Officer Hancock hit the brakes hard multiple times before Smith was eventually thrown to the transport van’s floor. Officer Price did not in- tervene—either by telling Officer Hancock to drive less errat- ically or by fastening Smith’s seatbelt—in response to Officer Hancock’s driving that was, as Smith put it, not normal. Taking these facts together, a reasonable jury could infer that Officer Price conspired with Officer Hancock to teach Smith a lesson for filing grievances against officers, antici- pated that Officer Hancock would drive recklessly and errat- ically, and refused to fasten Smith’s seatbelt to protect him from that driving. A reasonable jury could also conclude that Officer Price could have—but did not—intervene once Officer Hancock began driving recklessly, letting Smith get thrown around the van and ultimately break his collarbone. 4 Relying 4 “An official satisfies the personal responsibility requirement of section 1983 if she acts or fails to act with a deliberate or reckless disregard of plaintiff’s constitutional rights[.]” Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996, 1005 (7th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). Thus, an official can be held liable under 16 No. 25-1041 on Smith’s telling, Officer Price callously disregarded the sub- stantial risk of harm Smith faced during the transport. See Hunter, 73 F.4th at 566; accord Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994). These disputed facts—around whether Officer Price admonished Smith for filing grievances, whether Offic- ers Price and Hancock conspired to subject Smith to a mali- cious rough ride, and whether Officer Price was subjectively aware of the risk to Smith’s safety and disregarded that risk by failing to intervene even though he had a realistic oppor- tunity to—all affect the qualified immunity analysis. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Smith, we conclude he has presented sufficient evidence to support both elements of the deliberate indifference test of his Eighth Amendment claim against Officer Price at summary judg- ment. Smith adequately asserts that he was exposed to the substantial risk of serious harm posed by being recklessly and erratically driven in a prison transport van without his seat- belt fastened and that Officer Price was aware of that risk but disregarded it by failing to intervene. § 1983 for failing to intervene to prevent other officials’ harm when: (1) a constitutional violation occurred, (2) the official observed that violation or had reason to know that violation occurred, and (3) the official “had a re- alistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring.” See Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 556 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting longstanding recognition of “‘failure to intervene’ basis for a constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment”). In other words, there can be no constitutionally impermissible failure to in- tervene when there is no violation that compelled intervention. Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 505–06 (7th Cir. 2004). No. 25-1041 17 2. Clearly Established Law Having concluded a reasonable jury could find Officer Price violated Smith’s constitutional rights, we now consider the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis: whether that right was clearly established. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). To make this determination, “[w]e first look to whether the Supreme Court or this circuit has pre- viously held that conduct analogous to the present case vio- lates the right at issue.” Leiser, 933 F.3d at 702. “If no control- ling precedent exists, we broaden our survey to include all relevant caselaw in order to determine whether there was such a clear trend in the caselaw that we can say with fair as- surance that the recognition of the right by a controlling prec- edent was merely a question of time.” Kemp, 877 F.3d at 351 (citation modified). “The dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Id. (citation modified) (quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12). 5 Here, determining whether Officer Price’s violation of Smith’s rights was clearly established in June 2019 requires findings of fact, which we cannot make at this stage of the lit- igation. See City of Milford, 10 F.4th at 808. Taking the facts most favorable to Smith, a jury could conclude that Officer Price was deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of 5 The officers contend Smith waived reliance on the third path to defeating qualified immunity—that this is one of the rare cases where no reasonable official would have thought he was acting lawfully. But that contention misses the thrust of Smith’s argument. Smith has consistently argued— both on appeal and in the district court—that a clear trend in the relevant case law would have put the officers during both June 2019 transports on notice that they were violating his clearly established constitutional rights. 18 No. 25-1041 harm Smith faced, in violation of Smith’s clearly established rights. Starting with the deliberate indifference standard’s objec- tive element, we have no trouble concluding it was clearly es- tablished by June 2019 that recklessly driving an inmate who is not secured by a seatbelt exposes that inmate to a substan- tial risk of serious harm. A consensus of appellate case law bears this out, as multi- ple other circuits have reached the same conclusion. For ex- ample, the Fourth Circuit in Thompson v. Virginia held that the plaintiff there was exposed to substantial risk of harm when “he was fully shackled, unable to brace himself for impact, and sitting without a seatbelt, in a vehicle that was speeding and being driven in a way intended to scare and injure him, by a driver who refused both his requests to be seatbelted and to slow down.” 878 F.3d at 107. Likewise, the Eighth Circuit in Brown v. Fortner affirmed the denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment when the plaintiff alleged he was in- jured by the driver operating the prison van recklessly after refusing to buckle plaintiff’s seatbelt. 518 F.3d at 559–60. Fur- thermore, the Fifth Circuit in Rogers v. Boatright reversed in part a dismissal at the screening stage where the plaintiff al- leged he suffered injuries while being transported without a seatbelt when an officer drove a prison transport van reck- lessly. 709 F.3d 403, 408–09 (5th Cir. 2013). 6 6 The principles from these cases are consistent with a Second Circuit case involving officers’ mere negligence, where the court explained that prison officials’ failure “to provide inmates with seatbelts does not, without more, violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.” Jabbar v. Fischer, 683 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (emphasis added). No. 25-1041 19 These cases were sufficient to put reasonable officers on notice that, by June 13, 2019, recklessly driving an inmate who is not secured by a seatbelt exposes that inmate to a substan- tial risk of serious harm. Now we turn to the deliberate indifference standard’s sub- jective element. On that element too, after taking the facts in the light most favorable to Smith, we conclude his rights were clearly established as of June 13, 2019. First, it is well-settled as a general matter that prison offi- cials cannot stand back and allow the violent assault of an in- mate in his care. “Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). As we observed in the context of an officer’s failure to protect an inmate from another inmate’s attack, “[o]bviously, doing absolutely noth- ing about a known serious risk constitutes deliberate indiffer- ence.” Hunter, 73 F.4th at 566; cf. Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 185, 190 (2011) (observing law “not in controversy” in 1996 that prison official would be liable for failing to protect inmate from subsequent sexual assault if he knew about prior inci- dent). The obligation on prison officials to protect inmates’ safety accords with the related failure-to-intervene doctrine, under which we have held “police officers who have a realis- tic opportunity to step forward and prevent a fellow officer from violating a plaintiff’s rights through the use of excessive force but fail to do so could be held liable under § 1983.” Fill- more v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 505–06 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation mod- ified); see also Yang, 37 F.3d at 285; Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2005) (observing we have “long 20 No. 25-1041 recognized” the “‘failure to intervene’ basis for a constitu- tional violation under the Eighth Amendment”). Second, any reasonable officer would understand these principles to apply with obvious clarity to circumstances where a fellow officer, not another inmate, perpetrates the as- sault. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 739 (“[C]ontours [of the right] must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would under- stand that what he is doing violates that right.”). As the Fourth Circuit explained in Thompson, reasonable officials would understand these well-established failure-to-protect principles “to mean that inmates have an Eighth Amendment right to be protected from malicious attacks, not just by other inmates, but also from the very officials tasked with ensuring their security.” 878 F.3d at 109. Third, the Fourth Circuit has applied these principles in a context factually analogous to the circumstances Officer Price faced. In Thompson, the court concluded a passenger officer was deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of harm posed to an inmate when driven recklessly without a seatbelt. Id. at 108–09. In that case, the passenger officer refused to buckle the plaintiff’s seatbelt. Id. at 108. The passenger officer was aware of the driving officer’s erratic driving and plain- tiff’s corresponding concern for his safety during the trip, as the passenger officer had mocked the plaintiff for being scared during the drive. Id. And the passenger officer had at least heard a threat that the “rough ride” was intended to teach the plaintiff a lesson. Id. at 108. Based on those facts, the court concluded the passenger officer “was aware of the risk” to the plaintiff created by the driving officer. Id. at 108–09. The court then concluded that the passenger officer consciously disregarded that risk by failing to intervene. Id. at 109. No. 25-1041 21 Summed up, by June 2019, inmates had a clearly estab- lished right to reasonable protection from malicious assaults by a prison official. And Thompson demonstrated how this principle applies to a passenger officer in a prison transport van—a passenger officer, aware of the risk, may not sit by idly while the driving officer uses the manner of his driving to physically assault an inmate in his care. 7 Applied here, if we accept Smith’s account of the June 13 transport, Officer Price violated Smith’s clearly established Eighth Amendment rights. Under that account, Officer Price was not a passive bystander. As explained above, a reasona- ble jury could infer that Officer Price conspired with Officer Hancock to teach Smith a lesson for filing grievances against officers, anticipated that Officer Hancock would drive reck- lessly, and thus refused to fasten Smith’s seatbelt to protect him. In keeping with the plan, once Officer Hancock began recklessly and erratically driving, Officer Price failed to inter- vene when given a realistic opportunity. Given those circum- stances, in June 2019, any reasonable officer in Officer Price’s position would have known he was constitutionally obligated to intervene to protect Smith from Officer Hancock’s reckless driving. 7 In reaching this conclusion, we do not rely on the unpublished circuit court cases and district court cases Smith offers. See Johnson, 164 F.4th at 1084 n.1 (explaining Scott v. Becher, 736 F. App’x 130, 134 (6th Cir. 2018), a case relying on Thompson, “is an unpublished, nonprecedential opinion from a sister circuit, so we do not consider it further”); Day v. Wooten, 947 F.3d 453, 462 (7th Cir. 2020) (“We have conclusively stated that district court opinions cannot clearly establish a constitutional right because they are not binding authority.”). 22 No. 25-1041 We acknowledge, of course, that Officer Price’s account of the June 13 transport “diverge[s] with respect to the facts sur- rounding the incident.” City of Milford, 10 F.4th at 810. As we explained above, the parties’ divergent accounts create dis- putes of material fact. “Each of these material disputes of fact must be determined by the jury, so that the court can properly assess [Officer Price’s] entitlement to qualified immunity.” Id. at 811. But taking the facts in the light most favorable to Smith at this stage, we disagree with the district court’s conclusion that Officer Price did not violate Smith’s clearly established constitutional rights. Thus, the district court erred in award- ing Officer Price qualified immunity at summary judgment. C. Transport on June 20, 2019 We now consider Smith’s claim that Officers Lamb and Rilenge violated his Eighth Amendment rights during the June 20 transport from the hospital to Wabash Valley. Both officers claim entitlement to qualified immunity at summary judgment. Recall that, in Smith’s telling, he endured the following conditions during the June 20 transport. Earlier in the day, Of- ficers Lamb and Rilenge transported Smith to the hospital. They put him in trip gear, placed him on a seat in a secure box located in the front of the van, and buckled him in. They ar- rived at the hospital without incident. Then, after Smith un- derwent significant orthopedic surgery on his elbow, the of- ficers transported him back to Wabash Valley. For the return trip, the officers—over Smith’s protests—sat him in the back of the van and not in the secure box in the front like on the trip there, and they fastened his seatbelt. The drive back took about two hours, and the transport van was hot inside. Smith was also nauseated from the anesthesia he received earlier No. 25-1041 23 that morning, had vomited while still at the hospital, and had not eaten since the night before. The officers, according to