Full Opinion

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************ Litsky v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services GAIL S. LITSKY v. DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTION SERVICES (AC 48032) Clark, C. J., and Wilson and Pierson, Js. Syllabus The petitioner, who previously had been found not guilty of several crimes by reason of mental disease or defect and committed to the custody of the Psychiatric Security Review Board, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court’s judgment denying her petition for a writ of habeas corpus. She claimed that her criminal trial counsel, O, rendered ineffective assistance by failing, inter alia, to fully advise her of the available alternatives to the agreement she entered into with the state, under which it agreed not to contest her defense that she was not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect in exchange for her agreement not to challenge the sufficiency of its evidence against her. Held: The habeas court properly rejected the petitioner’s claim that O performed deficiently by failing to adequately advise her about a potentially meritori- ous motion to suppress certain statements she made to the police, as the court credited counsel’s testimony that the petitioner was eager to get out of jail quickly and into a hospital setting, the pursuit of the motion to sup- press would have required her to enter a plea of not guilty and proceed to a contested trial, in which, counsel believed, the state had a provable case, and much of the evidence the petitioner claimed should have been suppressed was available from other sources. The habeas court properly determined that O did not perform deficiently in advising the petitioner about the nature of the mental health treatment she would receive if committed to the board’s custody or her likelihood of suc- cessfully complying with that treatment, as the court found that O counseled her knowing of and considering her past compliance and noncompliance with her medication and therapy regime and went over what she would need to do to be successful under the board’s supervision. The record supported the habeas court’s determination that O did not perform deficiently in failing to advise the petitioner about the possibility of pursu- ing a negotiated guilty plea instead of the mental disease or defect defense, as the court credited counsel’s testimony that the petitioner was informed that she did not need to go forward with the mental disease or defect defense as well as the consequences should she choose a different path, and, because the petitioner elected in the early stages of the proceedings to pursue the mental disease or defect defense, counsel never entered into alternative plea negotiations with the state. Argued September 2—officially released November 17, 2026 Litsky v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services Procedural History Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Shah, J.; thereafter, the court granted the respondent’s motion to preclude certain evidence; judgment denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed. Michael W. Brown, assigned counsel, for the appel- lant (petitioner). Rebecca Z. Oestreicher, deputy assistant state’s attor- ney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael A. Gailor, state’s attorney, and Erin Stack, assistant state’s attor- ney, for the appellee (respondent). Opinion CLARK, C. J. The petitioner, Gail S. Litsky, appeals, following the granting of her petition for certification to appeal, from the judgment of the habeas court denying her second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In her second amended petition, the petitioner alleged that her trial counsel, William O’Connor, rendered inef- fective assistance in her underlying criminal matter. On appeal, the petitioner claims that (1) the court’s analysis and reasoning was flawed in evaluating the prejudice prong of her ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and (2) the court improperly concluded that her trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court. The habeas court found the following facts. On Feb- ruary 8, 2014, officers from the West Hartford Police Department responded to a report of a disturbance at 31 Huron Drive in West Hartford. At the residence, the officers found the petitioner and her injured mother, as well as evidence that the two women had engaged in a violent confrontation. The petitioner was subsequently arrested and gave a videotaped statement to the offi- cers about the attack on her mother. Thereafter, the Litsky v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services petitioner was charged with attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a, assault of an elderly person in the first degree in viola- tion of General Statutes § 53a-59a (a) (1), and cruelty to persons in violation of General Statutes § 53-20 (a) (1). The petitioner and the state subsequently entered into an agreement (agreement) pursuant to which the state agreed not to contest the petitioner’s defense that she was not guilty of the charged offenses by reason of mental disease or defect under General Statutes § 53a-13 (a),1 and the petitioner agreed not to challenge the sufficiency of the state’s evidence in support of the charged offenses. After being canvassed by the court, Alexander, J., the petitioner waived her right to a jury trial on September 16, 2014. Subsequently, on October 21, 2014, a bench trial was held before the court, Suarez, J. The petitioner was represented at trial by O’Connor and Attorney Mer- edith Olan, both of whom were public defenders in the judicial district of Hartford.2 Following the presentation of evidence, the court found the petitioner not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. In reaching its deci- sion, the court found that, by her own admission, the petitioner intended to take the life of her mother during the attack, failed to do so, and gave up when she realized her mother was not going to succumb to the petitioner’s actions. The court also found that the petitioner’s mother was older than age sixty and that the parties had stipu- lated to the seriousness of the injuries suffered by her 1 General Statutes § 53a-13 (a) provides: “In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant, at the time the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts, lacked substantial capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect, either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his conduct within the requirements of the law.” Section 53a-13 (a) has been amended since the events underlying this appeal. See Public Acts 2019, No. 19-27, § 1. The amendment made a technical change to subsection (a) that is not relevant to this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer in this opinion to the current revision of the statute. 2 Although the petitioner was represented by O’Connor and Olan, the petitioner alleges in her operative petition that only O’Connor rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Litsky v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services mother. On the final count, charging the petitioner with cruelty to persons, the court found that the petitioner had intentionally tormented and tortured her mother for three and one-half hours. With respect to the petitioner’s mental disease or defect defense, the trial court found credible the testi- mony of Susan Parke, a psychiatrist, that, at the time of the attack, the petitioner was suffering from, inter alia, bipolar disorder with psychosis type one. The court found that this rendered the petitioner unable to control her behavior or to conform it to the law at the time of the attack. See General Statutes § 53a-13 (a). On January 13, 2015, following the submission of a report prepared by the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services, the court ordered the petitioner committed to the custody of the Psychiatric Security Review Board (board) for a maximum period of forty years. See General Statutes § 17a-582.3 The petitioner did not appeal from the judgment of the trial court. The petitioner commenced the action underlying this appeal by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on 3 General Statutes § 17a-582 provides in relevant part: “(a) When any person charged with an offense is found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to section 53a-13, the court shall order such acquittee committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services who shall cause such acquittee to be confined, pending an order of the court pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, in any of the state hospitals for psychiatric disabilities or to the custody of the Commissioner of Developmental Services, for an examination to determine his mental condition. “(b) Not later than sixty days after the order of commitment pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the superintendent of such hospital or the Commissioner of Developmental Services shall cause the acquittee to be examined and file a report of the examination with the court, and shall send a copy thereof to the state’s attorney and counsel for the acquittee, setting forth the superintendent’s or said commissioner’s findings and conclusions as to whether the acquittee is a person who should be discharged. . . . “(c) Not later than ten days after receipt of such superintendent’s or said commissioner’s report, either the state’s attorney or counsel for the acquittee may file notice of intent to perform a separate examination of the acquittee. An examination conducted on behalf of the acquittee may be performed by a psychiatrist or psychologist chosen by the acquittee Litsky v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services May 24, 2022. On August 22, 2023, the petitioner filed the operative second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus (operative petition). The operative petition alleged that O’Connor had provided ineffective assistance of counsel in various respects. Specifically, and as relevant to this appeal, the operative petition alleged, among other things, that O’Connor had (1) “failed to file a motion to suppress the petitioner’s statements made to the police after her arrest,” (2) “failed to adequately assess the and shall be performed at the acquittee’s expense unless the acquittee is indigent. If the acquittee is indigent, the court shall provide the acquittee with the services of a psychiatrist or psychologist to perform the examination at the expense of the state. The superintendent or said commissioner who conducted the initial examination shall, not later than five days after a request of any party conducting a separate examina- tion pursuant to this subsection, release to such party all records and reports compiled in the initial examination of the acquittee. Any separate examination report shall be filed with the court not later than thirty days after the filing with the court of the initial examination report by the superintendent or said commissioner. “(d) The court shall commence a hearing not later than fifteen days after its receipt of any separate examination report or if no notice of intent to perform a separate examination has been filed under subsec- tion (c) of this section, not later than twenty-five days after the filing of such initial examination report. “(e) At the hearing, the court shall make a finding as to the mental condition of the acquittee and, considering that its primary concerns are the protection of society and the safety and well-being of the acquittee, make one of the following orders: “(1) If the court finds that the acquittee is a person who should be confined or conditionally released, the court shall order the acquittee committed to the jurisdiction of the board and either confined in a hospital for psychiatric disabilities or placed with the Commissioner of Developmental Services, for custody, care and treatment pending a hearing before the board pursuant to section 17a-583; provided (A) the court shall fix a maximum term of commitment, not to exceed the maximum sentence that could have been imposed if the acquittee had been convicted of the offense, and (B) if there is reason to believe that the acquittee is a person who should be conditionally released, the court shall include in the order a recommendation to the board that the acquittee be considered for conditional release pursuant to subdivision (2) of section 17a-584 . . . .” Although § 17a-582 was the subject of technical amendments in 2022; see Public Acts 2022, No. 22-45, § 3; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer in this opinion to the current revision of the statute. Litsky v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services petitioner’s personality disposition and the likelihood that she would meaningfully participate in treatment and comply with institutional rules” when advising her to pursue the mental disease or defect defense, (3) “failed to engage in meaningful plea negotiations other than pursuing the [not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect] disposition,” and (4) “failed to adequately chal- lenge the sufficiency of the evidence” presented by the state at trial.4 The petition further alleged that, but for the deficient performance, “the petitioner would not have [pleaded] guilty by reason of mental disease or defect and would have insisted on going to trial or resolving the charges against her with a custodial plea agreement.” Counsel was appointed for the petitioner, and the habeas trial was held on February 14, 2024, before the court, Shah, J. The petitioner, O’Connor, and Olan each testified at the habeas trial. Several exhibits were also admitted into evidence. O’Connor testified that the decision to pursue a men- tal disease or defect defense was made early in the rep- resentation of the petitioner. He testified that, after discussing the case with the petitioner, reviewing the facts of the case, and learning about the petitioner’s history of mental illness, he determined that a mental disease or defect defense was viable. O’Connor also testi- fied that he explained the defense to the petitioner and advised her about what she could expect if the defense was successful. He testified that he advised the petitioner that she initially would be committed to Whiting Foren- sic Hospital (hospital), a maximum security facility, “[a]nd then, over a period of time, with treatment and good behavior, transferred to . . . . [Dutcher Hall, a less restrictive facility on the hospital campus] and then . . . [u]ltimately begin to transition to the community.” 4 In addition to these alleged errors by O’Connor, the operative petition also included five additional allegations of deficient performance and a freestanding due process claim. Because the petitioner does not pursue those claims on appeal, we deem them abandoned. See, e.g., Alston v. Commissioner of Correction, 236 Conn. App. 568, 572 n.4, 349 A.3d 324 (2025), cert. denied, 354 Conn. 916, 351 A.3d 413 (2026). Litsky v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services O’Connor also testified that he advised the petitioner of her other options, including the maximum potential prison sentence she faced if found guilty of all charges after a trial. He further testified that it was the peti- tioner’s decision to pursue the mental disease or defect defense and that it was his duty as her attorney to pro- vide sufficient advice and information to ensure that she made an informed decision. He testified that he told the petitioner that she needed to decide whether to pursue the defense and that, if she elected not to do so, he would defend the case at trial. O’Connor also testified that, consistent with the peti- tioner’s wishes, he reached the agreement with the state. He further testified that the petitioner “was very eager to get out of jail and to get to the hospital and wanted [the] defense to move along . . . as quickly as it could,” and that, as a result, the goal was “to move [the case] along as efficiently as possible . . . so that [the petitioner could] get from a correctional setting to the hospital.” Olan testified that O’Connor believed that the peti- tioner would be successful in pursuing the mental disease or defect defense and that he spent “a lot of time” speak- ing with the petitioner about the potential risks of the defense. Olan also agreed that the client is the one who decides whether to pursue that defense and that, in this case, the petitioner was “very much on board” with the defense strategy. She testified that it was what the peti- tioner wanted O’Connor and Olan to pursue. Addition- ally, Olan testified that there were discussions between trial counsel and the petitioner concerning potential outcomes if the petitioner elected to pursue a not guilty plea and a contested trial or a negotiated guilty plea. Moreover, Olan corroborated O’Connor’s testimony that the petitioner wanted to proceed with the agreement and felt strongly about it. The petitioner testified that, based on the informa- tion O’Connor and Olan provided to her at the time, she wanted to get out of prison as soon as possible. She also took issue with certain aspects of O’Connor’s testimony. Litsky v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services Specifically, she did not recall being advised about any defenses other than a mental disease or defect defense. According to the petitioner, O’Connor advised her that her only options were to accept the agreement or spend forty-five years in prison. She claimed that she would have been willing to serve a term of imprisonment under certain circumstances. She also stated that, had she been fully advised of the consequences of a mental disease or defect disposition and of her alternative options, she “probably” would not have entered into the agreement. At the close of evidence, both parties filed posttrial briefs in lieu of making closing arguments. On July 25, 2024, the habeas court issued a memorandum of decision in which it denied all counts of the operative petition. With respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel counts of the petition, the court concluded that O’Connor did not render deficient performance as alleged by the petitioner and that the petitioner did not prove prejudice. The petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal, which the court granted on August 6, 2024. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. On appeal, the petitioner claims that “[t]he habeas court’s analysis was flawed because it relied upon seem- ingly circular reasoning” in evaluating whether she was prejudiced by trial counsel’s allegedly deficient perfor- mance. Specifically, she contends that the court improp- erly concluded that she “could not have been prejudiced by any alleged failures of counsel because the result of the proceedings was the ‘successful’ attainment of the [not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect] acquittal” instead of deciding whether she would have “pursue[d] the [agreement] or . . . some other course of action” if she had been properly advised of her options. The peti- tioner also claims that the court improperly concluded that she did not prove that O’Connor rendered deficient performance by failing (1) to adequately advise her about the motion to suppress, (2) to advise her that certain aspects of her “personality disposition” would make Litsky v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services it difficult for her to comply with her treatment while under the supervision of the board, and (3) to advise her that she had the option of pursuing a negotiated guilty plea instead of the mental disease or defect defense.5 For the reasons we will explain, we conclude that the habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner failed to prove that O’Connor’s performance was constitution- ally deficient. Consequently, we need not address the petitioner’s claim that the court’s analysis was flawed in evaluating her prejudice claim. See Dyous v. Com- missioner of Mental Health & Addiction Services, 324 Conn. 163, 186–87, 151 A.3d 1247 (2016) (noting that “court can find against a petitioner, with respect to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, on either the performance prong or the prejudice prong [of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)], whichever is easier” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We begin with the relevant legal principles and stan- dard of review governing the petitioner’s claims. “Our standard of review of a habeas court’s judgment on inef- fective assistance of counsel claims is well settled. In a habeas appeal, this court cannot disturb the underlying facts found by the habeas court unless they are clearly erroneous, but our review of whether the facts as found by the habeas court constituted a violation of the peti- tioner’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Humble v. Commissioner of Correction, 180 Conn. App. 5 Although the petitioner also claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging the state’s evidence at the underlying criminal trial, she does not challenge the habeas court’s finding that the parties had entered into a valid agreement, which precluded the petitioner from challenging the sufficiency of the state’s evidence. See, e.g., Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction, 326 Conn. 772, 785–86, 167 A.3d 952 (2017). Moreover, the record reveals that, notwithstanding the agree- ment, O’Connor did object to certain evidence and moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the state’s case, which the trial court denied. Thus, we conclude that the habeas court did not err in concluding that the petitioner had failed to prove that O’Connor rendered deficient performance in this respect. Litsky v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services 697, 703–704, 184 A.3d 804, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 939, 195 A.3d 692 (2018). “The application of the habeas court’s factual findings to the pertinent legal standard, however, presents a mixed question of law and fact, which is subject to plenary review.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ayuso v. Commissioner of Correction, 215 Conn. App. 322, 343, 282 A.3d 983, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 967, 285 A.3d 736 (2022). Thus, where the claim on appeal is that the trial court’s analysis and reasoning is legally flawed in its application of the correct legal standard, our review is plenary. See id., 344. “A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to adequate and effective assistance of counsel at all criti- cal stages of criminal proceedings.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sastrom v. Mullaney, 286 Conn. 655, 661, 945 A.2d 442 (2008). This right arises under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. Id., 661–62. “A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is gov- erned by the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland [v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 687] . . . . Under Strickland, the petitioner has the burden of demon- strating that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense because there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had it not been for the deficient performance. . . . For claims of ineffective assistance of counsel arising out of the plea process, the United States Supreme Court [in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985)] modified the second prong of the Strick- land test to require that the petitioner produce evidence that there is a reasonable probability that, but for coun- sel’s errors, [the petitioner] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. . . .6 6 We note that, although our Supreme Court has recognized that a defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect “is more like Litsky v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services An ineffective assistance of counsel claim will succeed only if both prongs [of Strickland] are satisfied. . . . Further, [a] court can find against a petitioner, with respect to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, on either the performance prong or the prejudice prong, whichever is easier.” (Citation omitted; footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dyous v. Commis- sioner of Mental Health & Addiction Services, supra, 324 Conn. 186–87. I We first address the petitioner’s claim that the habeas court improperly concluded that O’Connor did not render ineffective assistance by failing to adequately advise the petitioner regarding a potentially meritorious motion to suppress her statement to the police. The petitioner contends that she proved both deficient performance and prejudice, and that the court improperly rejected her claim. We conclude that the court properly deter- mined that the petitioner failed to prove that O’Connor performed deficiently in advising her about the motion to suppress. The following additional facts and procedural his- tory are relevant to this claim. During the habeas trial, O’Connor testified that he believed the attempted murder a plea of guilty than it is like a plea of not guilty” because it “lessens [the state’s] burden considerably as a practical matter by barring the defendant from contesting or impeaching the [s]tate’s proof and from presenting other evidence that could counter that proof”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Duperry v. Solnit, 261 Conn. 309, 328, 803 A.2d 287 (2002); neither this court nor our Supreme Court has squarely addressed whether the modified prejudice standard set forth in Hill v. Lockhart, supra, 474 U.S. 52, applies in the context of a defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. See, e.g., Dyous v. Commissioner of Mental Health & Addiction Services, supra, 324 Conn. 187–88 (in habeas appeal arising from criminal matter in which petitioner was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, court set forth Hill prejudice standard but resolved case under deficient performance prong of Strickland). As explained previously, we need not resolve whether the Hill standard applies in the present case because we conclude that the habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to prove deficient performance. Litsky v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services charge was an “overcharge” because “there really wasn’t an intent to kill and . . . it really was more of a disorga- nized attack without . . . that goal in mind.” Among the evidence that was relevant to the petitioner’s intent was a videotaped statement that the petitioner had given to the police after being arrested. The video of the interview, which was admitted into evidence during the habeas trial, shows that the petitioner was questioned by the police after requesting an attorney. O’Connor testified that he considered the possibility of filing a motion to suppress the petitioner’s statement to the police on the ground that continuing to question the petitioner after she requested an attorney violated Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).7 O’Connor further testified that he advised the petitioner about the possibility of filing a motion to sup- press if she pleaded not guilty and went to trial. In fact, he testified that, before he had even seen the video of the interview, the petitioner “pointed . . . out to me . . . that there was some problem that [the police] didn’t read [the petitioner] her rights . . . .” O’Connor further testified that he advised the peti- tioner that, if she decided to proceed with the agreement, she would not be able to contest the state’s evidence. Although O’Connor could not recall the specific con- versation, he testified that, based on his usual practice with other clients, that discussion would have included explaining to the petitioner that she would not be able to 7 In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held “that a suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to consult with an attorney and to have counsel present during questioning, and that the police must explain this right to [her] before questioning begins.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Purcell, 331 Conn. 318, 330, 203 A.3d 542 (2019). Subsequently, in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981), the court held that, when a suspect unambiguously invokes her right to counsel, the police must cease questioning “until counsel has been made available to [her] unless the accused [herself] initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Although the parties and witnesses at the habeas trial referred to the questioning as a Miranda violation, for clarity, we refer in this opinion to the questioning as a potential Edwards violation. Litsky v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services challenge the admission into evidence of her statement to the police if she elected to proceed with the agreement. O’Connor also testified that, notwithstanding his belief that the attempted murder count was an “overcharge,” he and Olan both believed that the petitioner “would lose if she went to trial based on . . . the physical evidence at the scene, the police officers’ observations when they arrived, and potentially the testimony from [the peti- tioner’s] daughter who was present in the next room the entire time,” and that he “would not have recommended that [the petitioner] go to trial on the merits . . . when she . . . had [the uncontested mental disease or defect defense] available if she wanted to pursue it.” When asked whether he considered pursuing a mental disease or defect defense in a contested proceeding so that the petitioner could challenge the state’s evidence, O’Connor testified that the petitioner “was very eager to get out of jail and to get to the hospital,” and that, to accommo- date the petitioner’s goals, “[we] wanted this particular defense to move along as . . . quickly as it could.” The petitioner testified that, after being arrested and taken to the police station, she was questioned by officers from the West Hartford Police Department. She testified that O’Connor did not inform her that the agreement meant that she was forfeiting her right to challenge the admissibility of her statements. The petitioner denied that O’Connor had provided any advice about the signifi- cance of the motion to suppress on the potential outcome of her case. Rather, she testified that O’Connor told her that she “had the right to have an attorney [and] there’s a potential [Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981)] violation, but we’re going to ignore that.” She further testified that O’Connor had told her that her only options were “forty- five years in prison or going to the hospital . . . .” In her posttrial brief in the habeas court, the peti- tioner did not claim that O’Connor did not inform her that there was a potential Edwards issue nor did she state that she was entirely unaware of the possibility Litsky v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services of filing a motion to suppress. Indeed, the petitioner acknowledged that she was aware of the issue when she testified at the habeas trial that O’Connor had told her, “you were right, you had the right to have an attorney [during the interview], there’s a[n] [Edwards] violation, but we’re going to ignore that.” Nevertheless, the peti- tioner argued that O’Connor performed deficiently by failing to advise her that it was not in her best interest to pursue the uncontested mental disease or defect defense given that doing so required her to forgo her right to file a motion to suppress. Specifically, she argued that the motion to suppress was likely to be successful and would have undermined the state’s ability to prove that she had the intent to kill her mother. She further noted that “the maximum exposure on the other charges would still be significantly less than under the avenue taken that surrendered the suppression issue.” She argued that, “[g]iven that O’Connor stated that the attempted murder was an overcharge . . . it becomes clear that it was deficient for [O’Connor] to advise the petitioner to pursue the [mental disease or defect defense] to the exclusion of a motion to suppress her interview.” In its memorandum of decision, the habeas court made the following findings in rejecting the petitioner’s claim that O’Connor performed deficiently in connection with the advice he gave to the petitioner about the motion to suppress.8 The court found that the petitioner had told 8 The habeas court’s findings with respect to the motion to suppress, which we discuss in this part of the opinion, are set forth in two separate sections of the memorandum of decision. In the first section, the court addressed whether “trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investi- gate the facts of the petitioner’s case and to explore potential legal and factual defenses to some or all of the charges against the petitioner.” In the second section, the court addressed whether “trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the statement,” rather than whether counsel was ineffective for improperly advising the petitioner concerning that motion. (Emphasis added.) We observe that the habeas court likely structured the decision in this manner because, in portions of the petitioner’s posttrial brief, she appears to have argued that O’Connor was ineffective not only in failing to provide adequate advice regarding the motion to suppress, but also in failing to actually file that motion. Nevertheless, for the Litsky v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services O’Connor that “[she] want[ed] to be released from jail as soon as she could,” which O’Connor took into account in his handling of the case. The court further found that “trial counsel discussed the [mental disease or defect] defense with the [petitioner] and allowed her to decide whether to pursue it or not.” The court also found that O’Connor had “provided advice to the [petitioner] about the possible jail term if she was found guilty . . . and the possible term of commitment if she [pursued the mental disease or defect defense],” and “discussed the various scenarios with the [petitioner].” The court additionally found that, “had it been a typical jury trial, [O’Connor] would have moved to suppress, but because both sides agreed to the [mental disease or defect disposition] there was no need to attempt to exclude such evidence.” The habeas court also considered the evidence pre- sented against the petitioner in the underlying criminal trial and found that “the evidence and statements the petitioner provided in her police interview were available through other sources, including the victim’s statement and her testimony at trial.” Specifically, the court noted that, although the petitioner had admitted in her state- ment to the police “that she pinched, grabbed, punched, kicked, burned, and attempted to electrocute her mother and push her down stairs, as well as hit her on the head with a table leaf,” the victim’s trial testimony disclosed the same or similar information concerning the nature of the assault, i.e., “that the petitioner grabbed her and dragged her to the kitchen and then attempted to push her down stairs . . . burned her, hit her with a table leaf, tossed water on her, tried to electrocute her, cut her with a kitchen knife, threatened to blind her with the knife, and kept asking her, ‘why won’t you die.’ ” The court further noted that there was “photographic evidence of the house in which the victim was attacked, showing the knife, other instruments used to harm the victim, and reasons explained herein, the totality of the court’s findings, all of which are supported by the record, support the ultimate conclusion that the petitioner failed to prove that O’Connor performed deficiently in con- nection with his advice regarding the motion to suppress. Litsky v. Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Services the blood spatter.” The court found that, “[d]ue to the petitioner’s eagerness to leave jail, trial counsel tried to get her into treatment at the hospital and out of jail in a timely fashion, which included not wasting time making frivolous motions that would not impact the outcome of the [mental disease or defect defense].”9 On the basis of those findings, the court concluded that “[t]he petitioner has not shown any deficient performance or prejudice in trial counsel’s decision not to file a motion to suppress.” On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly concluded that O’Connor did not perform deficiently in connection with the advice he provided to her regarding the motion to suppress. The petitioner reit- erates her contention that “a motion to suppress would have almost certainly . . . been successful if pursued” and that “it was deficient for [O’Connor] to advise the petitioner to pursue the [mental disease or defect defense] to the exclusion of a motion to suppress her interview.” On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude that the habeas court properly determined that O’Connor did not perform deficiently in advising the petitioner about the motion to suppress. As explained previously, the court credited the testimony of O’Connor and Olan that the petitioner was eager to get out of jail quickly and into the hospital. O’Connor testified that he discussed the potential Edwards violation with the petitioner and 9 Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, we do not construe the habeas court’s reference to the motion to suppress as “frivolous” to mean that there wa