K. Morales v. Co. of Montgomery
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket890 C.D. 2025
JudgeFizzano Cannon
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Klarentyn Morales :
:
v. :
:
County of Montgomery, : No. 890 C.D. 2025
Appellant : Submitted: September 14, 2026
BEFORE: HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: November 16, 2026
The County of Montgomery (County) appeals from a June 20, 2025
Order of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas (Trial Court) denying the
County’s motion for summary judgment on a tort claim arising from a trip and fall.
The Trial Court found issues of fact remained concerning whether Klarentyn
Morales (Morales) may invoke either the real property or sidewalks exception to
governmental immunity in her tort claim against the County. Upon review, we
affirm the Trial Court’s order as to the real property exception, reverse the Trial
Court’s order as to the sidewalks exception, and remand for entry of partial summary
judgment in favor of the County on the sidewalks exception and for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Background
The First Amended Complaint (Complaint) alleged that the incident
giving rise to Morales’s lawsuit occurred on February 22, 2021, adjacent to a
building having an address of 35 East Airy Street in Norristown (Premises).
Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 29a. The Complaint averred that the Premises were
owned by one or more of the following: the County, Montgomery County Prison
(Prison), John/Jane Doe #1-10, and ABC Corporation #1-101 (collectively,
Defendants). Id. The County has admitted its ownership of and maintenance
responsibility for the Premises. Br. of Appellant at 7-8 (citing R.R. at 40a & 94a-
95a). Morales alleges that while walking on a sidewalk at the Premises, “she was
caused to lose her balance, trip, stumble, and fall, thereby sustaining serious and
permanent injuries . . . , due to a defective condition of the sidewalk and/or driveway,
that was concealed by snow and/or ice, causing an uneven walking surface and an
unsuspecting [sic] fall hazard. . . .” R.R. at 30a-31a. In her deposition, Morales
testified that she fell around 10:00 a.m., that it was snowing as she was walking, and
a “thin layer” of snow had accumulated. Id. at 56a-57a.
Morales brought a negligence action against the Defendants, alleging
liability for injuries she suffered when she fell on the sidewalk on the Premises. R.R.
at 29a-38a. Following discovery, the County moved for summary judgment on the
basis of governmental immunity under the statute commonly known as the Political
Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8542. The Trial
Court denied the motion, finding that questions of fact remained concerning whether
immunity applied. This appeal followed.
1
The caption of the complaint described the designations “John/Jane Doe #1-10” and
“ABC Corporation #1-10” as referring to “[a]ny corporation, individual, entity or fictitious name
other than the named Defendants that owned, operated, supervised, leased and/or controlled the
premises and was involved in the snow removal, inspection, repair, and maintenance of the
premises which is subject of this complaint.” R.R. at 29a.
2
II. Issues
On appeal, the County presents two issues for review. First, the County
asserts that the Trial Court’s interlocutory order denying summary judgment was
immediately appealable as a collateral order. Second, the County argues that the
Trial Court committed a reversible error of law by concluding that issues of fact
remain concerning the application of exceptions to the County’s immunity.
III. Discussion
Our scope and standard of review of a trial court order denying
summary judgment are as follows:
We review [a] trial court’s [o]rder denying [a summary
judgment m]otion for an error of law or abuse of
discretion. Balentine v. Chester Water Auth., . . . 191 A.3d
799, 803 n.3 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted). In reviewing a
trial court’s decision regarding a request for summary
judgment, we note summary judgment is appropriate
“only in those cases where the record clearly demonstrates
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Sellers v. Twp. of Abington, . . . 106 A.3d 679, 684 (Pa.
2014) (quoting Summers v. Certainteed Corp., . . . 997
A.2d 1152, 1159 (Pa. 2010)). Whether genuine issues of
material fact exist is a question of law, and “therefore, on
that question our standard of review is de novo. This
means we need not defer to the determinations made by
the lower [court].” Weaver v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc.,
. . . 926 A.2d 899, 902-03 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted).
We review the record, including “all pleadings, as well as
any depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions,
affidavits, and expert reports, in a light most favorable to
the non-moving party, and we resolve all doubts as to the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the
moving party.” Moon v. Dauphin Cnty., 129 A.3d 16, 19
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (quoting LJL Transp., Inc. v. Pilot Air
Freight Corp., . . . 962 A.2d 639, 647 (Pa. 2009)).
3
N.N. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 349 A.3d 1081, 1087-88 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025). We also
observe:
Rule 1035[.3(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure, Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.3(a)2] does not require that
the moving party introduce evidence on an issue on which
it does not bear the burden of proof in order to have its
motion granted. Additionally, the rule explicitly states
that a non-moving party may not avoid summary judgment
by “resting upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading . . . .” [Id.] Allowing non-moving parties to
avoid summary judgment where they have no evidence to
support an issue on which they bear the burden of proof
runs contrary to the spirit of Rule 1035[.3]. We have
stated that the “mission of the summary judgment
procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof
in order to see whether there is a genuine need for a trial.”
Curran v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., . . . 439 A.2d
652, 658 ([Pa.] 1981) (citations omitted). We have a
summary judgment rule in this Commonwealth in order to
dispense with a trial of a case (or, in some matters, issues
in a case) where a party lacks the beginnings of evidence
to establish or contest a material issue.
Ertel v. Patriot-News Co., 674 A.2d 1038, 1041-42 (Pa. 1996).
A. Appealability of the Trial Court’s Order
The County first contends that its appeal is properly before this Court
as an appeal as of right from an interlocutory order denying a motion for summary
judgment based on governmental immunity.3 We agree.
Rule 313 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure allows an
interlocutory appeal as of right from a collateral order, which is an order “separable
2
Rule 1035.3 replaced the pertinent portion of former Rule 1035, under which the cited
case was decided.
3
Morales does not address this issue in her brief.
4
from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too
important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is
postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.”
Pa.R.A.P. 313. This Court recently concluded that an interlocutory order denying a
summary judgment motion asserting governmental immunity from a tort claim is a
collateral order immediately appealable as of right under Rule 313. See N.N., 349
A.3d at 1087. First, this Court determined that the question of a local agency’s
immunity is separable from the question of its negligence. Id. at 1086-87. Second,
we concluded that the legislature’s “clear intent . . . to insulate local agencies from
exposure to tort liability” and the “implications for . . . individuals’ ability to sue by
invoking an exception to governmental immunity under the Tort Claims Act”
outweigh the efficiency interests of the final judgment rule and are, therefore, too
important to be denied review. Id. at 1087. Finally, because “the entitlement to
immunity ‘is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,’” we
observed that this entitlement will be irreparably lost if a local agency must wait
until the conclusion of a suit to appeal a denial of its assertion of immunity. Id.
(quoting West on behalf of S.W. v. Pittsburgh Pub. Schs., 327 A.3d 340, 343 n.6 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2024)). Accordingly, we held in N.N. that an interlocutory order denying
a summary judgment motion asserting governmental immunity from a tort claim is
a collateral order immediately appealable as of right. Id.
This Court’s analysis and holding in N.N. are applicable and binding
here. Therefore, we agree with the County that its appeal from the Trial Court’s
denial of summary judgment is properly before us.
5
B. Real Property and Sidewalks Exceptions to Governmental Immunity
Section 8541 of the Tort Claims Act provides that “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any
damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the
local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541. The
County is a local agency and is, therefore, within the shield of Section 8541. See 42
Pa.C.S. § 8501; Simko v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 869 A.2d 571, 573 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).
Exceptions to the immunity provided by Section 8541 are set forth in
Section 8542(b), 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b). These exceptions to the absolute rule of
governmental immunity stated in Section 8541 “must be narrowly interpreted given
the expressed legislative intent to insulate political subdivisions from tort liability.”
Buffalini by Buffalini v. Shrader, 535 A.2d 684, 688 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987); see also
Aberant v. Wilkes-Barre Area Sch. Dist., 492 A.2d 1186, 1188 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985)
(observing that “the exceptions enumerated in Section 8542 should be narrowly
construed”). “A claimant seeking to impose liability on a local agency has the
burden of establishing . . . that the negligent act falls within one of the eight
exceptions enumerated in subsection 8542(b) of the Judicial Code.” Santori v.
Snyder, 645 A.2d 443, 446-47 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994); see also Balletta v. Spadoni, 47
A.3d 183, 195 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).
Relevant here, the exceptions allow imposition of liability on a local
agency where an injury allegedly arises from “[t]he care, custody or control of real
property in the possession of the local agency. . . .” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(3)(iv).
However, “[a]s used in this paragraph, ‘real property’ shall not include . . . (iv)
sidewalks.” Id.; see also Reid v. City of Phila., 957 A.2d 232, 235 (Pa. 2008)
6
(observing that “[t]he legislature explicitly distinguished ‘sidewalks’ from ‘real
property’” in specifying exceptions from governmental immunity).
Liability relating to sidewalks is addressed in a separate provision
allowing imposition of liability relating to sidewalks under Section 8542(b)(7), as
follows:
(7) Sidewalks.—A dangerous condition of sidewalks
within the rights-of-way of streets owned by the local
agency, except that the claimant to recover must establish
that the dangerous condition created a reasonably
foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred
and that the local agency had actual notice or could
reasonably be charged with notice under the circumstances
of the dangerous condition at a sufficient time prior to the
event to have taken measures to protect against the
dangerous condition. When a local agency is liable for
damages under this paragraph by reason of its power and
authority to require installation and repair of sidewalks
under the care, custody and control of other persons, the
local agency shall be secondarily liable only and such
other persons shall be primarily liable.
42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(7).
Here, the Trial Court concluded in its opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a)
of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), that either the
real property exception or the sidewalks exception was potentially applicable to
allow Morales’s claim. See generally Morales v. Cnty. of Montgomery (C.P. No.
2023-02618, filed Sept. 11, 2025) (1925(a) Op.). We agree that issues of fact remain
regarding the application of the real property exception but disagree that any issue
of fact remains regarding application of the sidewalks exception.
First, the Trial Court explained that its determination regarding possible
application of the real property exception was based in part on a perceived question
of fact whether the location of Morales’s fall was properly deemed a “driveway,”
7
which would be subject to the real property exception, rather than a “sidewalk,”
which is expressly excluded from the real property exception. 1925(a) Op. at 4.
Although the area in question is a public sidewalk used by pedestrians, it also could
potentially be crossed by vehicles exiting to Marshall Street from the County-owned
building’s garage door next to the location of Morales’s fall. See R.R. at 20a-21a,
31a, 71a, 105a, 107a & 204a-05a (photographs depicting the garage door and
adjacent sidewalk); Br. of Appellant at 6-7 (same).4 The record photographs of the
location of Morales’s fall show that it was in line with the rest of the sidewalk rather
than on the apron of the garage door. See R.R. at 20a-21a, 31a, 71a, 105a, 107a &
204a-05a. However, Morales supported her argument concerning this exception
with an expert report discussing the appearance of the area at issue and opining that
the appearance is consistent with a driveway rather than a sidewalk. See id. at 238a-
40a. That a sidewalk may be crossed by vehicles exiting an adjacent garage or
driveway does not automatically convert the sidewalk to real property for purposes
of an exception to governmental immunity. See Riley v. Cnty. of Del. (Pa. Cmwlth.,
No. 1027 C.D. 2009, filed Feb. 9, 2010), slip op. at 12-135 (rejecting the assertion of
the real property exception to immunity and observing that the plaintiff cited no
authority to support a “dual use” theory, where a municipal driveway crossed the
sidewalk in the location of the plaintiff’s fall). However, this is a fact-sensitive
determination. Here, we conclude that Morales’s expert report was sufficient to
support the Trial Court’s conclusion that an issue of fact remains concerning whether
4
Although attachments to a brief are not part of the record on appeal, the cited photographs
in the County’s brief are merely clearer duplicates of the photographs at pages 70a and 105a of the
reproduced record.
5
Pursuant to Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, unreported
opinions of this Court filed after January 15, 2008 may be cited for their persuasive value. 210 Pa.
Code § 69.414(a).
8
the area where Morales fell is a driveway such that the real property exception to
immunity applies.
Next, under the sidewalks exception to governmental immunity, a local
agency may be liable in negligence where the injury allegedly resulted from “[a]
dangerous condition of sidewalks within the rights-of-way of streets owned by the
local agency.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(7). We agree with the Trial Court that the
sidewalks provision is inapplicable here. Although the address of the Premises is 35
East Airy Street, it is undisputed that the site of Morales’s fall was the sidewalk at
the rear of the Premises along Marshall Street. R.R. at 94a-95a. The record does
not identify the owner of Marshall Street. However, the record does include a log
of all County-owned roads, on which Marshall Street does not appear.6 Id. at 191a.
Morales does not point to any contradictory evidence in the record. She does not,
for example, cite any real property records such as recorded deeds or rights-of-way
suggesting that the County owns to the center of the street and some other entity
(such as the municipality of Norristown) owns only a right-of-way. Accordingly,
Morales has failed to assert a genuine question that the County is not the owner of
Marshall Street. That being the case, it logically follows that the sidewalk is not
within the right-of-way of a street owned by the County within the meaning of
Section 8542(b)(7). Accordingly, it is immaterial whether the sidewalk at issue is
within the right-of-way of Marshall Street.
As noted above, the County admits that it owns the Premises adjacent
to the sidewalk where Morales fell. R.R. at 40a & 94a-95a. The County further
acknowledges that as the owner of the Premises, it is responsible for maintaining
6
The log in the record appears to have been taken from the County’s website, which
contains the same list: https://assets.montgomerycountypa.gov/files/2026-08/Montco%20Roads-
--75-Miles-%2034291%20seal.pdf (last visited November 12, 2026).
9
and repairing the adjacent sidewalk. Id. at 95a. However, the sidewalks exception
does not apply to a sidewalk merely because it is adjacent to a building owned by a
local agency. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(3) & (7).
We recognize that the result of this conclusion is that a local agency has
no liability under the sidewalks exception for a fall on a sidewalk where, as here, the
local agency owns the real property adjacent to the sidewalk but another entity owns
the adjacent street. As our Supreme Court has explained, however,
[e]ven if the legislature failed to contemplate the situation
where the local agency owns the property adjacent to the
sidewalk, it does not follow that the solution is for this
[C]ourt to engraft language onto the legislature’s
definition of real property where the engrafted language
runs directly contrary to the express words. Rather, the
solution is to give full effect to the clear and unambiguous
language . . . and urge the legislature to resolve the
problem by enacting proper amendments to the statute.
Reid, 957 A.2d at 236 (formatting cleaned up).
Accordingly, the Trial Court erred in determining that there were any
genuine issues of material fact regarding the County’s governmental immunity
regarding the sidewalks exception. The County is entitled to judgment in its favor
on that issue as a matter of law.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing discussion, the Trial Court’s order entering
summary judgment is affirmed as to its conclusion that issues of fact remain as to
whether the real property exception to immunity may apply. The Order is reversed
as to its conclusion that issues of fact remain as to whether the sidewalks exception
to immunity may apply. This matter is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas for
the entry of partial summary judgment in favor of the County on the question of the
10
sidewalks exception to immunity and for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
__________________________________
CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
11
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Klarentyn Morales :
:
v. :
:
County of Montgomery, : No. 890 C.D. 2025
Appellant :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 16th day of November, 2026, the June 20, 2025 Order
of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas is AFFIRMED insofar as it
concludes that issues of fact remain as to whether the real property exception to
immunity may apply. The Order is REVERSED insofar as it concludes that issues
of fact remain as to whether the sidewalks exception to immunity may apply. This
matter is REMANDED to the Court of Common Pleas for the entry of partial
summary judgment in favor of the County of Montgomery on the question of the
sidewalks exception to immunity and for further proceedings consistent with the
foregoing opinion.
Jurisdiction is relinquished.
__________________________________
CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge