Greenspan v. Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AARON GREENSPAN, Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 23-cv-1816 (BAH) v. Judge Beryl A. Howell EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION Over four years ago, plaintiff Aaron Greenspan began submitting a series of twelve requests, under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, to multiple federal agencies, including defendants Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), for criminal investigative documents generated during a federal investigation of a Chicago-based money-laundering and heroin-trafficking operation in the early 1990s. See Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mem.”) at 1, ECF No. 85-1. Two individuals implicated in this federal investigation were specifically named in plaintiff’s FOIA requests: Bola Ahmed Tinubu, the current president of Nigeria and intervenor-defendant in this lawsuit, and Abiodun Agbele. See id. at 1, 4. When defendants responded to the FOIA requests by issuing Glomar responses, refusing to confirm or deny whether the requested records existed, plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the instant lawsuit and successfully challenged those Glomar responses in a prior round of summary judgment motions. See Greenspan v. Exec. Off. for U.S. Att’ys, No. 23-cv-1816 (BAH), 2025 WL 1040834, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2025). 1 Central 1 The term “Glomar” stems from a case in which the D.C. Circuit upheld the Central Intelligence Agency’s refusal to confirm or deny any relationship to “a ship named the ‘Hughes Glomar Explorer,’” because “doing so would compromise national security or divulge sensitive intelligence sources and methods” and “now Glomar responses are 1 to that prior summary judgment decision rejecting defendants’ reliance on Glomar responses was the fact that public court filings from the early 1990s had already disclosed the fact that both Tinubu and Agbele were criminally investigated in relation to the drug trafficking operation. See id. at *7-9. Defendants have since processed hundreds of pages of records responsive to plaintiff’s requests, withholding, in full or in part, the vast majority. See Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. & Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) at 4-5, ECF 100. Strikingly, none of the records released to plaintiff include the name “Tinubu.” See Pl.’s Mem. at 1. The FBI even produced a redacted version of the federal agent’s affidavit that was referenced in the Court’s prior summary judgment decision—withholding, among other details, intervenor-defendant’s name—despite the fact that the same affidavit had already been filed, with no redactions, on public dockets both when originally submitted to another court in 1993 and again in this Court in 2024. See id. at 6. The parties have now cross-moved for summary judgment once again, with plaintiff challenging the adequacy of the FBI’s search and the propriety of defendants’ assertions of various FOIA exemptions from the disclosure requirements of this law, and defendants insisting they have satisfied their obligations under FOIA. See Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 85; Defs.’ Opp’n. For the reasons that follow, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and defendants’ cross-motion is granted in part and denied in part. Also requiring judicial attention are several motions filed by plaintiff and a non-party regarding discovery, amicus participation, and the review of ex parte, in camera declarations, each of which is denied. proper ‘if the fact of the existence or nonexistence of agency records falls within a FOIA exemption.’” Greenspan, 2025 WL 1040835, at *1 n.1 (first quoting Phillippi v. CIA, 655 F.2d 1325, 1329-31 (D.C. Cir. 1981); then quoting Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 2 I. BACKGROUND Background for this FOIA dispute is described at length in this Court’s prior decision resolving the parties’ first round of summary judgment briefing, which was limited to the propriety of defendants’ asserted Glomar responses, see Greenspan, 2025 WL 1040834 at *1, and that background is incorporated by reference here. Following a brief review of the factual and procedural background, including the conclusions reached in that prior decision, the ensuing proceedings in this case are summarized. A. Plaintiff’s FOIA Requests During 2022 and 2023, plaintiff submitted twelve FOIA requests to six federal government agencies or components thereof—i.e., the FBI, DEA, Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), Executive Office of United States Attorneys (“EOUSA”), and United States Department of State, Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) ¶¶ 21-117, ECF No. 35—seeking “information about a joint investigation conducted by the FBI, IRS, DEA, and the U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the Northern District of Indiana and Northern District of Illinois into the activities, including money laundering, of a Chicago heroin ring that operated in the early 1990s,” Greenspan, 2025 WL 1040834, at *1 (citing SAC ¶¶ 1-2). “Each of plaintiff’s FOIA requests sought criminal investigative records about four named individuals allegedly associated with the drug ring: Bola Ahmed Tinubu, Lee Andrew Edwards, Mueez Abegboyega Akande, and Abiodun Agbele.” Id. at *1; see also SAC ¶¶ 21-117. As the parties recognize, Bola Ahmed Tinubu is the current President of Nigeria. See Pl.’s Mem. at 1; Defs.’ Opp’n at 2; Intervenor-Def.’s Am. Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. (“Intervenor-Def.’s Am. Opp’n”) at 9, ECF No. 115. All but two of the government agencies that received plaintiff’s FOIA requests have been dismissed as defendants in this case, see Stipulation of Dismissal, ECF No. 40; Min. Order (Aug. 13, 2024) (dismissing defendants EOUSA, Department of State, and IRS from this case); 3 Order (Apr. 8, 2025), ECF No. 47 (entering judgment in favor of defendant CIA), and only four of plaintiff’s FOIA requests remain in dispute, see Joint Status Report ¶¶ 5-6 (Aug. 8, 2024), ECF No. 39 (stating that plaintiff “agrees to waive all challenges related to” Counts 2, 7, 10, and the portion of Count 9 pertaining to Lee Andrew Edwards in the second amended complaint and that “[p]laintiff forever waives all additional arguments” beyond the issues listed in paragraph 6). 2 The remaining FOIA requests to the FBI and DEA are described briefly below. 1. FOIA Requests Submitted to the FBI On March 29, 2023, plaintiff submitted to the FBI an electronic FOIA request seeking “[t]he entire FBI file for Bola Ahmed Tinubu, DOB 3/29/1952, President-Elect of Nigeria as of February 2023.” SAC ¶ 54; SAC Ex. 22 at 2, ECF No. 35-22. Less than a week later, the FBI, by letter, acknowledged receipt of the request, notified plaintiff that the request was assigned Request Number 1588244-000, and informed plaintiff that “the FBI will neither confirm nor deny the existence of such records,” invoking FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(6), (7)(C), to justify this response, since “[t]he mere acknowledgement of the existence of FBI records on third party individuals could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” SAC ¶¶ 55-56; SAC Ex. 23 at 1, ECF No. 35-23. Plaintiff challenged the FBI’s response to this FOIA request in Count 5 of his second amended complaint. SAC ¶¶ 54-61, 138-142. In May 2023, plaintiff submitted to the FBI an electronic FOIA request for any “FBI 302 interviews with Bola Tinubu from FBI Case No. 245-IP-71386-UUUUUU during the timeframe 2 Although plaintiff puzzlingly asserts, contrary to his prior narrowing of the issues to resolve this case, that seven FOIA requests “are still at issue,” including those related to Counts 3, 4, and 10 of the Second Amended Complaint, Pl.’s Mem. at 3, requests for records regarding Lee Andrew Edwards and Mueez Adegboyega Akande, see id., are no longer at issue in this case. As previously recognized, plaintiff agreed to “narrow the issues for summary judgment briefing to defendants’ Glomar responses, redactions, and withholdings as to Tinubu and Agbele only,” so FOIA requests that “do not involve Tinubu or Agbele . . . are not at issue,” Greenspan, 2025 WL 1040834, at *2 (citing Joint Status Report ¶¶ 5-6 (Aug. 8, 2024)). 4 1992-1993.” SAC ¶ 62; SAC Ex. 26 at 2, ECF No. 35-26. 3 Roughly a week later, the FBI, by letter, acknowledged receipt of the request, informed plaintiff that the request was assigned Request Number 1593615-000, and, as with plaintiff’s March 29 request, further advised that “the FBI will neither confirm nor deny the existence of such records,” again pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C), since merely acknowledging the existence of any such records “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” SAC ¶¶ 63-64; SAC Ex. 27 at 1, ECF No. 35-27. Plaintiff challenged the FBI’s response to this FOIA request in Count 6 of his second amended complaint. SAC ¶¶ 62-70, 143-147. 2. FOIA Requests Submitted to DEA On July 21, 2022, plaintiff submitted to DEA a FOIA request seeking “[a]ny records from the DEA’s Hammond, Indiana or Washington, D.C. offices concerning the Nigerian heroin distribution organization active from approximately 1988 to 1994 or later involving any of the following third parties Tinubu, Bola Ahmed and Edwards, Lee Andrew.” SAC ¶ 87; SAC Ex. 41 at 1-2, ECF No. 35-41. The request explained that the “organization is described in a civil forfeiture complaint and IRS CI affidavit in ILND Case No. 1:93-cv-04483.” SAC ¶ 87; SAC Ex. 41 at 2. DEA assigned reference number 22-00892-F to the request on the same day. SAC ¶ 88; SAC Ex. 42, ECF No. 35-42. One month later, plaintiff was informed, by letter, that DEA would “neither confirm nor deny the existence of such records pursuant to Exemptions 6 & 7(C) of the FOIA,” since “[e]ven to acknowledge the existence of law enforcement records on another individual could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 3 The parties’ filings are inconsistent as to whether this request was filed on May 23, 2023, see SAC ¶ 62; Pl.’s Mem. at 3, or May 25, 2023, see Defs.’ Opp’n at 3, although the FBI’s affiant notes that the request was dated May 25, 2023, see Defs.’ Opp’n, Decl. of Christina L. Driver, Assistant Section Chief of the Record/Information Dissemination Section, FBI’s Information Management Division (“Driver Decl.”) ¶ 7, ECF No. 100-1. 5 privacy.” SAC ¶ 89; SAC Ex. 43 at 1, ECF No. 35-43. Plaintiff challenged DEA’s response to this FOIA request in Count 9 of his second amended complaint. SAC ¶¶ 87-94, 158-162. 4 On December 5, 2023, plaintiff submitted to DEA another FOIA request seeking “[t]he DEA case file for Abiodun Agbele, located in either the Northern District of Indiana or the Northern District of Illinois, from January 1, 1990 - December 31, 1995.” SAC ¶ 105; SAC Ex. 52 at 3, ECF No. 35-52. DEA assigned the request reference number 24-00201-F the same day. SAC ¶ 106; SAC Ex. 53 at 1, ECF No. 35-53. Approximately three weeks later, DEA informed plaintiff that it would “neither confirm nor deny the existence of such records,” again pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C), due to the “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” that “could reasonably be expected” were such records acknowledged. SAC ¶ 107; SAC Ex. 54 at 1, ECF No. 35-54. Plaintiff challenged DEA’s response to this FOIA request in Count 11 of his second amended complaint. SAC ¶¶ 105-12, 168-72. B. First Round of Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the instant lawsuit on June 12, 2023, initially naming the FBI, DEA, IRS, EOUSA, and Department of State as defendants, and subsequently amended his complaint to add the CIA as an additional defendant. See Greenspan, 2025 WL 1040834, at *4. A few months later, on October 20, 2023, plaintiff filed an emergency motion requesting “a hearing to compel defendants immediately to produce records responsive to his FOIA requests” and “citing the Nigerian Supreme Court’s plan to begin hearing arguments in three days’ time in litigation contesting Bola Tinubu’s election as the President of Nigeria,” which motion was denied “for failure to satisfy any of the requirements for emergency injunctive relief.” Id. (citations omitted) (noting that a subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied). Soon after, Nigerian 4 Plaintiff has waived any claims relating to Lee Andrew Edwards arising from this same count of the second amended complaint and the underlying FOIA request. See Joint Status Report ¶ 5 (Aug. 8, 2024). 6 President Tinubu filed a motion to intervene in the case, citing his privacy interests in his “confidential tax records” and “documents from federal law enforcement agencies that fall within the Privacy Act or exceptions to FOIA and should not be disclosed,” Intervenor-Def.’s Mot. to Intervene at 1, ECF No. 18, which motion was granted over plaintiff’s opposition, see Pl.’s Opp’n to Bola A. Tinubu’s Mot. to Intervene, ECF No. 19; Min. Order (Nov. 27, 2023). Plaintiff filed the operative second amended complaint in March 2024, challenging each agency’s response to his twelve separate FOIA requests. See SAC ¶¶ 118-77. After defendants answered this complaint, the parties jointly informed the Court, in August 2024, that plaintiff had narrowed all FOIA requests at issue in the case “to only those documents . . . already . . . analyzed for processing by the respective agency defendants as of . . . July 11, 2024,” Joint Status Report ¶ 4 (Aug. 8, 2024), and that plaintiff wished to proceed to summary judgment briefing, id. ¶ 5. “To enable this ‘atypical’ step, plaintiff agreed to waive ‘all challenges related to claims where processing’ was not yet complete, resulting in the waiver of any claims relating to Counts 2, 7, and 10 of the second amended complaint, as well as any records related to Lee Edwards in Count 9, and ‘any corresponding allegations related to these requests raised in’ Count 13, which sought declaratory judgment.” Greenspan, 2025 WL 1040834, at *4 (quoting Joint Status Report ¶ 5 (Aug. 8, 2024)). Plaintiff also agreed to “limit summary judgment briefing to challenges to the ‘FBI, DEA, and CIA’s Glomar responses as to Tinubu,’ the DEA’s Glomar response as to Agbele, and any redactions and withholdings as to Tinubu and Agbele.” Id. (quoting Joint Status Report ¶ 6 (Aug. 8, 2024)). Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, defendants EOUSA, IRS, and Department of State were dismissed from this litigation, see Joint Status Report ¶ 7 (Aug. 8, 2024); Min. Order (Aug. 13, 2024), and the parties subsequently completed, in mid-January 2025, summary judgment 7 briefing on the propriety of the FBI, DEA, and CIA’s Glomar responses to the five remaining FOIA requests at issue, concerning Agbele and Tinubu, see Greenspan, 2025 WL 1040834, at *4. In April 2025, summary judgment was granted to plaintiff “as to each of the four Glomar responses asserted by [the] FBI and DEA,” while summary judgment was granted to the CIA, “since its Glomar response was properly asserted.” Id. at *13. Core to the determination that the FBI and DEA’s Glomar responses were improper was the fact that plaintiff identified documents constituting an official acknowledgment by the FBI and DEA that they investigated Agbele and Tinubu and that public acknowledgement precluded those agencies from asserting a Glomar response for investigative records about Agbele and Tinubu. See id. at *7-9 (regarding DEA’s Glomar response as to Agbele); id. at *9 (regarding the FBI and DEA’s Glomar responses as to Tinubu). In particular, plaintiff attached to his first motion for summary judgment “a verified complaint and accompanying affidavit, filed in the Northern District of Illinois by [the United States Department of Justice (‘DOJ’)], on July 26, 1993, seeking the civil forfeiture of funds allegedly connected to the drug trafficking investigation.” Id. (citing Pl.’s First Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A, Verified Compl. for Forfeiture, United States v. Funds in Acct. 263226700 Held by First Heritage Bank in the Name of Bola Tinubu, No. 1:93-cv-04483, ECF No. 41-4 at 2 [hereinafter Forfeiture Compl.]; Pl.’s First Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A, Aff. of IRS Special Agent Kevin Moss, attached to Forfeiture Compl., ECF No. 41-4 at 5 [hereinafter Moss Aff.]). As to Agbele, the Moss Affidavit “explicitly disclose[d], in at least four separate paragraphs, that DEA investigated Agbele,” id. at *7, and “‘specifically’ detail[ed] why ‘there [was] probable cause to believe that funds in certain bank accounts controlled by Bola Tinubu[] were involved in financial transactions in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957 and represent proceeds of drug trafficking,’” id. at *9 (quoting Moss Aff. ¶ 2). 8  Despite defendants’ protestations that “the mere ‘filing of the IRS agent’s affidavit as an exhibit to a complaint does not transform the affidavit into an official disclosure of the Department of Justice and its components,’” id. at *8 (citation omitted), the Court recognized that “public court filings by DOJ constitute official acknowledgment of the filed documents, which acknowledgment binds not only DOJ but also any of its components,” including the FBI and DEA, id.; see also id. at *9-10. In addition, the Moss Affidavit was explicitly incorporated by reference into the federal prosecutor office’s complaint in the forfeiture action, so its contents were “legally considered to be part of the complaint.” Id. at *8. By contrast, summary judgment was granted to the CIA because plaintiff “failed to show that the CIA has ever officially acknowledged the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to his FOIA request.” Id. at *13. The FBI and DEA were also found to have “failed to meet their burden to show that they properly invoked FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), (7)(C), as the rationale for their Glomar responses.” Id. at *11. Although the parties did not dispute that plaintiff’s FOIA requests to the FBI and DEA sought law enforcement investigative records and thus met the threshold requirement for invoking Exemption 7(C), see id. at *11 & n.9, defendants did not “establish[] a cognizable privacy interest to support their Glomar responses,” id. at *12; see also id. at * 11 (noting that “all information that would fall within the scope of Exemption 6 would also be immune from disclosure under Exemption 7(C)” (quoting Roth v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 642 F.3d 1161, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 2011))). As to Agbele, the only explanation DEA gave for issuing its Glomar response was that confirming or denying the existence of responsive documents “would reveal whether a DEA investigation of Agbele existed.” Id. at *9. “[S]ince the existence of a DEA investigation of Agbele has already been publicly acknowledged,” id., DEA’s asserted need to protect the existence of records from public disclosure was “neither logical nor plausible,” id. 9 (quoting ACLU v. CIA (ACLU/CIA), 710 F.3d 422, 430 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). As to Tinubu, two distinct privacy interests were identified to be possibly at play in responding to plaintiff’s FOIA request “(1) Tinubu’s interest in keeping secret the fact that he was under investigation, and (2) Tinubu’s privacy interest in the contents of [any] investigative files,” id. at *12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), but only the former interest was at issue in determining the validity of defendants’ Glomar responses. Since the affidavits provided by the FBI and DEA “[did] not even acknowledge that the existence of the criminal investigation of Tinubu has already been made public, much less explain why, in light of that reality, a cognizable privacy interest still exists to support the asserted Glomar responses,” those defendants “failed to meet their burden to sustain their Glomar responses.” Id. C. Subsequent Releases of Records Following plaintiff’s successful challenge to the FBI and DEA’s Glomar responses to his FOIA requests in the first round of summary judgment briefing, see Greenspan, 2025 WL 1040834, at *9-12, the FBI and DEA were ordered to “search for and produce non-exempt records responsive to plaintiff’s FOIA requests (FBI Requests Nos. 1588244-000 and 1593615-000, and DEA Request Nos. 22-00892-F and 24-00201-F),” Order (Apr. 8, 2025), at 2. Defendants’ compliance with that order required substantial supervision by the Court. See, e.g., Min. Order (Feb. 3, 2026) (directing defendants to make timely releases of processed records to plaintiff and to submit affidavits to explain extensive processing delays and requiring the parties to submit joint status reports on a biweekly basis). The FBI eventually made six interim releases of records to plaintiff responsive to his FOIA requests, between February 13, 2026, and June 1, 2026. Defs.’ Opp’n at 4 (citing Defs.’ Opp’n, Decl. of Christina L. Driver, Assistant Section Chief of the Record/Information Dissemination Section, FBI’s Information Management Division (“Driver Decl.”) ¶¶ 5-13, ECF No. 100-1). The 10 FBI processed a total of 399 pages of responsive records, releasing 30 pages in full, withholding 59 pages in full as duplicative of other processed pages, and withholding 247 pages in part and 63 pages in full “pursuant to one or more of the following applicable FOIA exemptions: 3, 5, 6, 7(C), 7(D), 7(E), and 7(F).” Driver Decl. ¶ 5. 5 As part of this processing, the FBI completed consultations with DEA, EOUSA, IRS, and ICE, each of which recommended withholding certain information pursuant to FOIA exemptions. Id. ¶¶ 10-13; see also Driver Decl., Ex. H, Decl. of Natasha Hudgins, Attorney-Advisor, EOUSA (“Hudgins Decl.”), Ex. I, Decl. of Anamaria Bianca Mircan, Tax Law Specialist, IRS Privacy, Governmental Liaison and Disclosure Division (“Mircan Decl.”), Ex. J, Decl. of Kenneth N. Clark, Ph.D., Assistant Director, ICE Office of Information Governance and Privacy (“Clark Decl.”), ECF No. 100-2. DEA likewise completed its searches for responsive records and provided further releases to plaintiff in response to the Court’s order. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 5. DEA processed a total of 240 pages, none of which were released in full. Id.; see also Defs.’ Opp’n, Decl. of Angela C. Davis, Unit Chief, Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Unit of the DOJ, DEA (“Davis Decl.”) ¶¶ 24-25, ECF No. 100-4. Instead, 4 pages were determined to be nonresponsive, 172 pages were withheld in full and 50 pages were withheld in part based on DEA’s review alone, and 2 pages were withheld in full and 12 pages were withheld in part after consultation with the FBI. See Davis Decl. ¶¶ 24-25 (explaining that the withholdings were pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 3, 6, 7(C), 7(D), 7(E), and 7(F)). Two aspects of defendants’ productions of responsive records are notable. First, the term “Tinubu” does not appear in any of the records released to plaintiff by either the FBI or DEA. See 5 After consultation with the IRS, the FBI initially withheld certain information pursuant to FOIA Exemption 7(A), but “[t]he IRS no longer asserts 7(A)” as a basis for withholding records and that information has been withheld pursuant to other exemptions. Driver Decl. ¶ 12 & n.5. 11 Defs.’ Cross-Mot., Ex. 6, Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s SUMF”) at 9, ECF No. 100-6. Second, indicative of the questionable withholdings in this case, the FBI released to plaintiff a redacted version of the Moss Affidavit, see Pl.’s Mem. at 6; Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 3, Decl. of Plaintiff Aaron Greenspan in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. (“Pl.’s Decl.”), Ex. F, May 28, 2026, FBI Production Cover Letter & Redacted Moss Aff. (“FBI’s Redacted Moss Aff.”), ECF No. 85-4, which had been publicly posted in full, without redactions, on this case’s docket for several years and was central to the resolution of the first round of summary judgment briefing, see Greenspan, 2025 WL 1040834, at *7-9 (citing Moss Aff.). D. Continued Litigation and the Instant Cross Motions for Summary Judgment While defendants were processing and releasing records, plaintiff and defendant-intervenor Bola Ahmed Tinubu continued unabated to engage in motion practice. 6 For example, in September 2025, plaintiff moved to compel production and to impose contempt sanctions, asserting that defendants were “actively engaged in a deliberate effort to defy this Court’s Order due to what they perceive as a politically-sensitive topic,” protesting defendants’ continued assertions of FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C), and requesting immediate disclosure of responsive records. See Pl.’s Mot. to Compel and for Contempt Sanctions at 1-2, ECF No 55. The same day, intervenor-defendant Tinubu moved to have “the Court confirm that [the FBI and DEA] can and should withhold or redact records that identify Intervenor, pursuant to Exemption 7(c) and the Privacy Act.” See Intervenor-Def.’s Mot. to Confirm Exemptions at 1, ECF No. 56. Both motions were denied as meritless, premature, and “predicated on a misapprehension of the prior [summary 6 This motion practice unnecessarily consumed judicial resources and those of the parties. For example, plaintiff filed a motion to strike a joint status report filed by defendants, alleging the omission of two pictures that he intended to include in his section of the report. See Pl.’s Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 80. The parties fully briefed this motion, with subsequent briefs clarifying that plaintiff’s inability to view the pictures was the result of a mere “technical difficulty,” and the motion was denied. Min. Order (June 8, 2026). 12 judgment] decision issued in this matter,” which “was limited to the appropriateness of the agencies’ blanket Glomar responses” and did not evaluate “the applicability of Exemptions 6 and 7(C) to specific records.” Min. Order (Oct. 15, 2025) (citing Greenspan, 2025 WL 1040834, at *6, 9, 13). Plaintiff then moved a second time, in February 2026, to compel production and impose contempt sanctions, which motion was again denied as premature and unnecessary in light of defendants’ declarations submitted to the Court explaining the reasons for delays in the processing of records. See Min. Order (Apr. 8, 2026). Plaintiff filed his second motion for summary judgment on June 25, 2026. See Pl.’s Mot. Following three requests by defendants to extend the applicable deadline, which were “reluctantly” granted, Min. Order (Aug. 20, 2026), defendants, on August 28, 2026, filed a combined cross-motion for summary judgment and opposition to plaintiff’s motion, as well as ex parte, in camera declarations in support of that cross-motion. See Defs.’ Opp’n; Defs.’ Notice of Compliance, ECF No. 101. Those cross-motions became ripe for resolution in September 2026. See Intervenor-Def.’s Am. Opp’n; Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Cross-Mot. & Reply in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 104; Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Defs.’ Cross-Mot. (“Defs.’ Reply”), ECF No. 110; Pl.’s Surreply in Opp’n to Defs.’ Cross-Mot. (“Pl.’s Surreply”), ECF No. 113. Meanwhile, during the briefing of the pending cross-motions for summary judgment, plaintiff has continued to file multiple additional motions. See Pl.’s Mot. for Entry of Procedural Safeguards Governing Def. FBI’s Ex Parte, In Camera Submissions (“Pl.’s Mot. for Entry of Procedural Safeguards”), ECF No. 97; Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to Serve Limited Discovery on Bola A. Tinubu and DCI Group (“Pl.’s Discovery Mot.”), ECF No. 105; Pl.’s Mot. for Judicial Notice in Supp. of Pl.’s Discovery Mot. (“Pl.’s Mot. for Judicial Notice”), ECF No. 116. In addition, a non-party has sought leave to file a brief as amicus curiae, in support of plaintiff’s summary 13 judgment motion, but plaintiff opposes. See Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief by Karl Von Batten (“Non-Party Mot. for Leave to File Amicus Br.”), ECF No. 102. These motions will be addressed, and denied, in the discussion below. See discussion infra notes 17 & 22 and Part III.C. II. LEGAL STANDARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 entitles a party to summary judgment “only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment in the movant’s favor is proper as a matter of law.” Soundboard Ass’n v. FTC, 888 F.3d 1261, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (citation omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Most FOIA cases “can be resolved on summary judgment.” Evans v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 951 F.3d 578, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Brayton v. Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). “Agencies may withhold from disclosure information that falls within one of [FOIA’s] nine enumerated exemptions,” but “[t]hose ‘limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act.’” Hum. Rts. Def. Ctr. v. U.S. Park Police, 126 F.4th 708, 712-13 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (quoting Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)); see also Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 913 F.3d 1106, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (explaining that Congress “provided nine specific exemptions” from disclosure because “legitimate governmental and private interests could be harmed by release of certain types of information” (quoting FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 621 (1982))). Even when a record falls within a FOIA exemption, except Exemption 3, “[a]n agency shall withhold information” only if it “reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by [the] exemption.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i)(I). This foreseeable harm requirement “impose[s] an independent and meaningful burden on agencies,” and requires agencies to “independently demonstrate[]” the “basis and likelihood” of harm that would result from release of each record or group of similar 14 records. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. FBI, 3 F.4th 350, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Ctr. for Investigative Reporting v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 436 F. Supp. 3d 90, 106 (D.D.C. 2019)). Moreover, FOIA’s segregability requirement “extends to both steps of FOIA’s sequential inquiry: Even if an exemption covers an entire agency record, the agency still must release any reasonably segregable information within the record that could be disclosed without causing reasonably foreseeable harm to an interest that the exemption protects.” Leopold v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 94 F.4th 33, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), (a)(8)(A)(ii)(I)-(II)). FOIA’s “strong presumption in favor of disclosure places the burden on the agency to justify the withholding of any requested documents.” Hum. Rts. Def. Ctr., 126 F.4th at 713 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991)). “The agencies may carry that burden by submitting declarations attesting to the basis for the agency’s decision.” Am. First Legal Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 126 F.4th 691, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 58 F.4th 1255, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2023)). “In a FOIA action, ‘[s]ummary judgment may be granted on the basis of agency affidavits if they contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.’” Eddington v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 35 F.4th 833, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting Evans, 951 F.3d at 584). In other words, “agency affidavits that are relatively detailed and non-conclusory, and . . . submitted in good faith . . . are accorded a presumption of good faith.” Evans, 951 F. 3d at 584 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 15 III. DISCUSSION Plaintiff challenges the adequacy of the FBI’s search for responsive records, as well as the propriety of the FBI and DEA’s withholdings, which he asserts are not justified with sufficient specificity and improperly withhold information that has already entered the public domain. See Pl.’s Mem. at 1-2; Pl.’s Opp’n at 1-2. Defendants counter that the FBI conducted an adequate search and that they properly withheld records pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 3, 5, 6, 7(C), 7(D), 7(E), and 7(F). See Defs.’ Opp’n at 2. The adequacy of the FBI’s search is considered before addressing each asserted exemption in turn and disposing of plaintiff’s separate requests for limited discovery and for the Court to take judicial notice. A. FBI’s Search Was Adequate The adequacy of an agency’s search for documents responsive to a FOIA request is “determined not by the fruits of the search, but by the appropriateness of the methods used to carry out the search.” Kowal v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 107 F.4th 1018, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 641 F.3d 504, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). Indeed, only the search process, not the results, must be adequate. See id. “An agency fulfills its obligations under FOIA . . . if it can demonstrate beyond material doubt that its search was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Canning v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 346 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Valencia-Lucena v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); see also Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“The court applies a ‘reasonableness’ test to determine the ‘adequacy’ of a search methodology” (internal citation omitted)). To obtain summary judgment as to search adequacy, an agency may submit a “reasonably detailed affidavit” that “set[s] forth the search terms and the type of search performed, and aver[s] that all files likely to contain responsive materials . . . were searched.” Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. FBI, 877 F.3d 399, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 16 (quoting Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). The agency affidavits “are accorded a presumption of good faith,” and a court “will not credit ‘[m]ere speculation that . . . uncovered documents may exist’ as a basis for finding an agency’s search inadequate.” Kowal, 107 F.4th at 1027 (quoting SafeCard Servs., Inc., 926 F.2d at 1200). “In the absence of contrary evidence, such affidavits or declarations are sufficient to demonstrate an agency’s compliance with FOIA.” North v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 774 F. Supp. 2d 217, 222 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). The FBI’s search satisfies this reasonableness standard. See Morley, 508 F.3d at 1114. In a 46-page declaration, the FBI’s Assistant Section Chief of the Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS), Information Management Division, described in detail (a) her familiarity with the procedures followed by the FBI in responding to FOIA requests, Driver Decl. ¶ 3; (b) her specific knowledge of how the FBI handled plaintiff’s FOIA request, id.; (c) how the FBI’s Central Records System (“CRS”) is organized and the comprehensive set of records, information, and data it contains, id. ¶¶ 15-20; (d) the FBI’s basis for believing that a search of the CRS automated indices, accessed via a search in Sentinel, combined with a manual indices search would be the most reasonable means to locate responsive records, some of which may predate the implementation of Sentinel, see id. ¶ 21; (e) that, since plaintiff’s FOIA requests 1588244-000 and 1593615-000 sought a specific file, i.e., “FBI File Number 245-IP-71386-UUUUUU,” a search of the CRS was unnecessary and the agency processed the records contained in that previously identified file, id. ¶ 23; (f) that, following this Court’s first summary judgment decision, the FBI searched that “previously identified multi-subject file using the terms: ‘Bola’ and ‘Tinubu,’” and located 399 pages of responsive documents, id.; and (g) that “there is no basis for the FBI to conclude that a search elsewhere would reasonably be expected to locate responsive records subject to the FOIA,” 17 id. ¶ 24. Responding to plaintiff’s further challenges in his reply brief, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 11-12, the FBI submitted a second declaration from an Assistant Section Chief of the RIDS, Information Management Division, clarifying that (a) the term search for “Bola” and “Tinubu” was conducted “along with a manual page-by-page review within th[e] multi-subject file”; (b) the search term “Bola” and the search term “Tinubu” were utilized separately; (c) the entire subfile number 245- IP-71386-UUUUUU was reviewed; and (d) all segregable, non-exempt information was provided to plaintiff. Defs.’ Reply, Second Decl. of Shannon R. Hammer, Assistant Section Chief of the Record/Information Dissemination Section, FBI’s Information Management Division (“Second Hammer Decl.”) ¶¶ 3-4, ECF No. 110-1 (emphasis in original). 7 These declarations are sufficiently detailed as to the “the search terms and the type of search performed” to satisfy the FBI’s burden as to search adequacy. Reps. Comm., 877 F.3d at 402. Indeed, plaintiff’s challenges to the adequacy of the FBI’s search has already narrowed significantly in recent months as the agency explained its search methodology through these declarations. Compare Pl.’s Mem. at 9-11 (objecting to the FBI’s nondisclosure of search terms, term search of the case file, and failure to explain whether it located the specific investigative file mentioned in plaintiff’s FOIA request), with Pl.’s Surreply at 4-5 (conceding that the FBI’s declarations resolved certain search questions and left only one question open). Plaintiff’s sole remaining question as to the adequacy of the FBI’s search is whether the FBI conducted a manual page-by-page review of the entire multi-subject file identified in his FOIA request, i.e., FBI Case No. 245-IP-71386-UUUUUU, or of only those pages identified through th