Full Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ____________________________________ ) ELWOOD J. COOPER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 99-2513 (RBW) ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT ) OF JUSTICE, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ____________________________________) MEMORANDUM OPINION The plaintiff, Elwood J. Cooper, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this action against the United States Department of Justice (the “Justice Department”), the United States Marshals Service (the “Marshals Service” or the “USMS”), and the United States Department of the Treasury (the “Treasury Department”) under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, seeking the release of “all records related to his arrest and prosecution.” Cooper v. Dep’t of Just., 890 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57–58 (D.D.C. 2012) (Walton, J.). On March 14, 2016, following multiple decisions by the undersigned and other members of this Court and multiple remands by the District of Columbia Circuit over the twenty-plus-year duration of this case, the Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on what it understood to be “[t]he only remaining issue for the Court to resolve in this case[—]the propriety of the redactions made to the additional documents produced to the plaintiff in September 2005.” Cooper v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 169 F. Supp. 3d 20, 32 (D.D.C. 2016) (Walton, J.) (“Cooper 2016”). However, after the plaintiff appealed the Court’s ruling, see Notice of Appeal at 1, ECF No. 146, the District of Columbia Circuit remanded this case back to the Court in 2018, holding the plaintiff’s appeal in abeyance, in order for this Court to consider “unresolved issues in this case[,]” namely, (1) “the withholdings in records produced to [the plaintiff] prior to [his] second appeal” and (2) “whether the agencies other than the [Marshals Service] conducted adequate searches for responsive records[,]” Order at 1–2, Cooper v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 17-5219 (D.C. Cir. July 11, 2018) (“Cooper III”). In a Memorandum Opinion and Order issued on March 1, 2022, the Court resolved most of the unresolved issues in this case. See generally Cooper v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 99-cv-2513 (RBW), 2022 WL 602532, *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 1, 2022) (Walton, J.) (Cooper 2022); Order (Mar. 1, 2022) (“March 2022 Order”), ECF No. 188. However, there were several issues that the Court could not fully resolve, which were: (1) the adequacy of the searches conducted by [the United States Customs Service (“]Customs[”)] and the [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“]ATF[”)]; (2) the discrepancy between the [Lee H.] Kramer Declaration and Customs’ Vaughn Index in the number of pages located, processed, withheld, released in part, and released in full by Customs; (3) the bases for the withholdings on the pages addressed in rows 5, 9–10, 13–15, 23–28, 31–33, 35, 46, 67, and 68 of the chart in the Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Consolidated Brief, ECF No. 159; (4) whether the [Drug Enforcement Administration (“]DEA[”)] received the February 7, 2000 seven-page referral from the ATF; and (5) the DEA’s, the ATF’s, and the [United States] Marshals Service’s bases for their conclusions regarding segregability. See Mar. 2022 Order at 2. Accordingly, after the defendants apprised the Court of their expected timeline as to when they could provide the Court with this additional information, see generally Defendants’ Status Report, ECF No. 193, Defendants’ Status Report, ECF No. 196, the Court ordered the defendants to file their renewed motion for summary judgment, including supplemental Vaughn information or declarations regarding the outstanding information the Court is required to resolve in this case. See generally Order (July 11, 2022), ECF No. 197. Pending now before the Court are the Defendants’ Renewed Motion For Summary Judgment On Remaining Issues (“Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 211, the Cross Motion for Summary 2 Judgment by Elwood J. Cooper (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 213, and the plaintiff’s Motion To Enforce The D.C. Circuit’s Remand Mandates And Readiness To Proceed With Targeted Resolutions (“Pl.’s Mot. to Enforce”), ECF No. 217. Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions,1 the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant in part and hold in abeyance in part the defendants’ renewed motion for summary judgment on the remaining issues, deny the plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment, and deny as moot the plaintiff’s motion to enforce. 1 In addition to the filings already identified, the Court considered the following submissions in rendering its decision: (1) the Defendants’ Second Renewed Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibit (“Ex.”) 1 (“Sept. 19, 2005 FOIA Release”), ECF No. 120-2; (2) the Defendants’ Second Renewed Motion For Summary Judgment, Ex. 2 (“Supp. Decl. of William E. Bordley”), ECF No. 120-3; (3) the Defendants’ Notice Of Filing, Declaration Of William C. Little, Jr. (“Little Decl.”), ECF No. 153-1; (4) the Plaintiff’s Combined Reply and Ex Parte Status Report and Statement Of Material Facts In Genuine Dispute In Opposition To Defendants’ Notice of Filing And Consolidated Brief (“Pl.’s 2018 Opp’n”), ECF No. 156; (5) the Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Consolidated Brief (“Defs.’ Reply”), ECF No. 159; (6) the Declaration of Leila I. Wassom (the “First Wassom Declaration” or “Wassom Decl.”), ECF No. 175-4; (7) the Declaration of Lee H. Kramer (the “Kramer Declaration” or “Kramer Decl.”), ECF No. 175-5; (8) the Supplemental Declaration of Leila I. Wassom (the “Wassom Supplemental Declaration” or “Supp. Wassom Decl.”), ECF No. 175-8; (9) the Supplemental Declaration [of William E. Bordley] (the “Bordley Supplemental Declaration” or “Supp. Bordley Decl.”), ECF No. 175-9; (10) the Second Supplemental Declaration [of William E. Bordley] (the “Second Supplemental Bordley Declaration” or “2d Supp. Bordley Decl.”), ECF No. 175-11; (11) the Declaration of William C. Little, Jr. (the “Little Declaration” or “Little Decl.”). ECF No. 175-13; (12) the Defendants’ Memora[]ndum Of Points And Authorities In Support Of Renewed Motion For Summary Judgment (“Defs.’ Reply”), ECF No. 211; (13) the Declaration Of Angela D. Hertel (“Hertel Decl.”), ECF No. 211-1; (14) Hertel Decl., Ex. A (“DEA’s Cooper Vaughn #3, Chart 1”), ECF No. 211-1; (15) Hertel Decl., Ex. B (“DEA’s Cooper Vaughn #3, Chart 2”), ECF No. 211-1; (16) the Declaration Of Peter J. Chisholm, Team Lead, Information And Privacy Governance Division, Bureau Of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms And Explosives (“Chisholm Decl.”), ECF No. 211-2; (17) the Declaration Of Charlotte Luckstone (“Luckstone Decl.”), ECF No. 211-3; (18) the U.S. Marshals Service Vaughn Index (“Marshals Service Vaughn Index”), ECF No. 211-3; (19) the Affidavit Of Shari Suzuki (“Suzuki Aff.”), ECF No. 211-4; (20) the Declaration Of Fernando Pinero (“Pinero Decl.”), ECF No. 211-5; (21) the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Vaughn Index (“ICE FOIA Vaughn Index”), ECF No. 211-5; (22) the Plaintiff’s Objection To The Court’s March 1, 2022 Memorandum And Order Granting And Granting Summary Judgment In Part And Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment In Opposition To Defendants’ Fourth Motion For Summary Judgment On The Issues Identified In The D.C. [] Circuit’s July 11, 2018 Remand Order And To Appear At The Scheduled Status Hearing Via Zoom Video (“Pl.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 212; (23) the Pl.’s Mem., Tab F (Criminal Docket in United States v. Ellis, No. 98-cr-141 (S.D. Fl.)) (“Criminal Docket in U.S. v. Ellis, 98-cr-141”), ECF No. 212; (24) the Pl.’s Mem., Tab G (Criminal Docket in United States v. Walker, No. 98- cr-8095 (S.D. Fl.)) (“Criminal Docket in U.S. v. Walker, 98-cr-8095), ECF No. 212; (25) the Pl.’s Mem., Tab H (“Letters from the Bahamian Gov”), ECF No. 212; (26) the Pla[in]tiff’s Statement Of Material Fact Ac[tu]ally And In Good Faith Controverted In Support Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Facts”), ECF No. 212-1; and (27) Pl.’s Facts, Ex. 7 (“DEA Letters from Feb. 4th and Feb. 25th 2000”), ECF No. 212-1. 3 I. BACKGROUND The Court has previously detailed the background of this case in its September 11, 2012, March 14, 2016, and March 1, 2022 Memorandum Opinions. See Cooper v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 890 F. Supp. 2d 55, 58–60 (D.D.C. 2012); Cooper v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 169 F. Supp. 3d at 20, 26–31 (D.D.C. 2016); Cooper v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 99-2513 (RBW), 2022 WL 602532, *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 1, 2022). Therefore, the Court need not repeat the saga of this long-running FOIA case again here. The Court will only detail additional background information necessary to address the outstanding issues yet to be resolved as described in the Court’s March 2022 Memorandum Opinion. On May 3, 1999, the plaintiff submitted FOIA requests to the DEA, Customs, ATF, and the Marshals Service related to the criminal investigation of him and his subsequent conviction for conspiring to import cocaine into the United States. See Cooper 2022 at 3–5; see also id. at 19–26. After years of litigation, and two former members of this court presiding over this case, the District of Columbia Circuit remanded this case to this court for the third time. See id. at 21– 28 (citing Cooper v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 17-5219 (July 11, 2018) (per curiam) (“Cooper III”). In the Circuit’s remand order, it directed this Court to “address[] the withholdings in records produced to Cooper prior to the second appeal . . . [and] whether the agencies other than [the Marshals Service] conducted adequate searches for responsive records.” Cooper III at 1–2. The Circuit held the plaintiff’s appeal “in abeyance pending further order of th[is] court.” Id. at 2. After the parties briefed the outstanding issues that needed to be resolved, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to: (1) the plaintiff’s [FOIA] request to the Executive Office for United States’ Attorneys; (2) the adequacy of the . . . DEA[’s] search for responsive records; (3) 4 the . . . ATF[’s] and the Department of State’s (“State Department”) assertion of Exemption 3; (4) the Marshals Service[’s], the DEA’s, the Customs[’s], and the ATF’s assertion of Exemption 7(C); (5) the DEA’s and Customs’ assertion of Exemption 7(D); (6) Customs’ and the ATF’s assertion of Exemption 7(E); (7) Customs’ assertion of Exemption 7(E) regarding information that was previously withheld pursuant to Exemption 2; (8) the DEA’s assertion of Exemption 7(F); and (9) the segregability of the information withheld by Customs and the State Department. March 2022 Order at 1–2. However, the Court was unable to address several other outstanding issues because of inadequate or a lack of information from the defendants. See generally Cooper 2022. Therefore, the Court ordered the defendants to submit: supplemental Vaughn information or declarations regarding: (1) the adequacy of the searches conducted by Customs and the ATF; (2) the discrepancy between the Kramer Declaration and Customs’ Vaughn Index in the number of pages located, processed, withheld, released in part, and released in full by Customs; (3) the bases for the withholdings on the pages addressed in rows 5, 9–10, 13–15, 23–28, 31–33, 35, 46, 67, and 68 of the chart in the Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Consolidated Brief, ECF No. 159; (4) whether the DEA received the February 7, 2000 seven-page referral from the ATF; and (5) the DEA’s, the ATF’s, and the Marshals Service’s bases for their conclusions regarding segregability. March 2022 Order at 2; see Minute (“Min.”) Order (Sept. 28, 2023). In response to the Court’s Order, on September 29, 2023, the defendants filed their renewed motion for summary judgment, see Defs.’ Mot., and on December 15, 2023, the plaintiff filed his cross-motion for summary judgment, see Pl.’s Mot. On January 10, 2024, the defendants filed their combined reply to the opposition to their motion and their opposition to the plaintiff’s cross-motion. See Defs.’ Reply. And, on February 9, 2026, the plaintiff filed his motion to enforce the District of Columbia Circuit’s mandate. See Pl.’s Mot. to Enforce. The Court will address each outstanding issue listed above in turn. 5 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “FOIA cases typically are resolved on a motion for summary judgment.” Ortiz v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 67 F. Supp. 3d 109, 116 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation omitted). The “FOIA requires federal agencies to disclose, upon request, broad classes of agency records unless the records are covered by the statute’s exemptions.” Students Against Genocide v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 833 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), (b)); see also Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 863 F.2d 96, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) (“[The] FOIA is to be interpreted with a presumption favoring disclosure and exemptions are to be construed narrowly.”). In a FOIA action, the defendant agency has “[the] burden of demonstrating that the withheld documents are exempt from disclosure[,]” Boyd v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 475 F.3d 381, 385 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted), and the district court must “determine the matter de novo,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); see also U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755 (1989) (“[T]he FOIA expressly places the burden ‘on the agency to sustain its action’ and directs the district courts to ‘determine the matter de novo.’”). Moreover, the defendant’s burden “cannot be met by mere conclusory statements.” Wash. Post Co., 863 F.2d at 101 (citation omitted). Instead, “[t]he agency may meet [its] burden by filing affidavits describing the material withheld and the manner in which it falls within the exemption claimed[,]” King v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 830 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted), and by “show[ing] how release of the particular material would have the adverse consequence that the Act seeks to guard against,” Wash. Post Co., 863 F.2d at 101 (citation omitted). “When an agency demonstrates that records contain exempt information . . . it is ‘entitled to a presumption that it complied with the obligation to disclose reasonably segregable material.’” Flyers Rights Education Fund, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Administration, 71 F.4th 1051, 6 1058–59 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Sussman v. United States Marshals Service, 494 F.3d 1106, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). “To rebut this presumption, the requester must offer, at least, evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the agency failed to comply with its obligation.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Courts will grant summary judgment to the government in a FOIA case only if the agency can prove “that it has fully discharged its obligations under the FOIA, after the underlying facts and the inferences to be drawn from them are construed in the light most favorable to the FOIA requester.” Friends of Blackwater v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 391 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Greenberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 10 F. Supp. 2d 3, 11 (D.D.C. 1998)). Thus, in a lawsuit brought to compel the production of documents under the FOIA, “an agency is entitled to summary judgment if no material facts are in dispute and if it demonstrates ‘that each document that falls within the class requested either has been produced . . . or is wholly[, or partially,] exempt [from disclosure].’” Students Against Genocide, 257 F.3d at 833 (omission in original) (quoting Goland v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). However, “[t]he burden upon the requester is merely ‘to establish the absence of material factual issues before a summary disposition of the case could permissibly occur.’” Pub. Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 185 F.3d 898, 904–05 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Campbell, 593 F.2d 1023, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). III. ANALYSIS A. The Adequacy of Searches Conducted by ATF and Customs “An agency responding to a FOIA request is simply required to conduct a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Porup v. Central Intelligence Agency, 7 997 F.3d 1224, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (internal brackets omitted) (citing In re: Clinton, 973 F.3d 106, 116 (D.C. Cir. 2020)). “[T]he adequacy of a FOIA search is generally determined not by the fruits of the search, but by the appropriateness of the methods used to carry out the search.” Iturralde v. Comptroller of the Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Steinberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 23 F.3d 548, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). An agency “need not demonstrate . . . that it located every document that the FOIA requester expected the agency to find.” Pejouhesh v. U.S. Postal Serv., 17-cv-1684 (RDM), 2019 WL 1359292, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2019). Rather, “the proper inquiry is . . . whether the agency conducted a search reasonably calculated to uncover relevant documents.” Bigwood v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 132 F. Supp. 3d 124, 135 (D.D.C. 2015). To demonstrate that it has conducted an adequate search, “an agency may . . . provid[e to the Court] ‘a reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type of search performed, and averring that all files likely to contain responsive materials were searched.’” Id. (second set of ellipses omitted) (quoting Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 313–14 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). “Agency affidavits are accorded a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by ‘purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents.’” Id. (quoting SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 1. The Adequacy of ATF’s Search for Responsive Records In the Court’s March 1, 2022, Memorandum Opinion, it concluded that, based on the declaration submitted by the defendants, it could not find “that the ATF’s search for information responsive to the plaintiff’s original requests was adequate.” Cooper 2022 at 25. Specifically, the Court found that ATF did “not provide any information about which ‘identifiers supplied by the plaintiff’ were used to search[,]” id. (internal brackets omitted), the Treasury Enforcement 8 Communications System (“TECS”), and “[w]ithout a complete list of the search terms used in response to a FOIA request, the Court [wa]s unable to conclude that the agency’s search was adequate,” id. (citation modified) (citing Walston v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 238 F. Supp. 3d 57, 65 (D.D.C. 2017)). Additionally, the Court found that ATF did not “provide the requisite level of detail” “[r]egarding its searches in response to the information provided by the plaintiff during litigation[.]” Id. For example, the Court explained that although ATF “made an inquiry into the individual’s name provided in the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion exhibit, it provide[d] no indication as to either the type of inquiry [ ] made or” which name(s) out of a list of names was searched. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also found that the defendants “fail[ed] to provide any statement that . . . ATF searched all places where responsive records were reasonably likely to be found.” Id. Accordingly, the Court ordered the defendants to submit additional information regarding “the adequacy of the searches conducted by . . . the ATF[.]” March 2022 Order at 2. In ATF’s latest declaration, it “offers [its] sincere apology to [the plaintiff] and the Court,” because “[b]ased on [Chisholm’s] investigation of this matter, [he] believe[s] that a former ATF employee [who was responsible for the processing of the plaintiff’s FOIA request from approximately 2000 until May, 2004] improperly hid, stole, or destroyed ATF’s files related to [the plaintiff].” Chisholm Decl. ¶¶ 3, 16. Chisholm represents that this “anomaly” is an “unprecedented [event] in the 30-plus years in which [he has] been an ATF employee. Id. ¶ 16. Chisholm explains that “[d]ue to the processes in place at the time the records were first assembled and processed [in this case,]” the “records were never scanned for loading into any type of electronic software for FOIA processing or other preservation.” Id. ¶ 4. And, 9 unfortunately in 2007, when ATF was moving its headquarters building, it discovered “several ATF case files and portions of other[ case files that were] wedged between desks and walls, and stuffed into ceiling panels and walls located in and around the former [ATF] employee’s assigned work area.” Id. ¶ 5. “Upon this discovery, ATF conducted a more thorough search of the [former] employee’s work area and recovered all of the materials it could find that were inappropriately stored by the former employee.” Id. After Chisholm learned of the former ATF employee’s negligence, he “attempted to reconcile the FOIA requests assigned to the former employee and to reconstruct ATF records found in inappropriate places.” Id. ¶ 6. However, Chisholm was unable to reconstruct the plaintiff’s FOIA request file, and has “reasonable suspicion” to believe that the “files were removed from ATF’s possession, custody, and control.” Id. Nevertheless, “[i]n response to the [C]ourt’s Orders, [Chisholm] [ ] undertook another comprehensive search of ATF’s legacy, current, and next generation case management systems in an effort to locate records responsive to [the plaintiff]’s FOIA request or ATF’s FOIA litigation files which should contain copies of those records.” Id. ¶ 7. Accordingly, on April 20, 2022, ATF used “[t]he search terms ‘Elwood Cooper,’ ‘Cooper, Elwood’ and ‘Elwood J. Copper’” to search its TECS system for records related to the plaintiff but did not find any “investigations initiated by ATF.” Id. The agency also searched its N-Force 2 and SPARTAN 3 systems “for any records related to [the plaintiff] using the same search terms [used to search the TECS system] as well as [the terms] ‘99-2513,’ which is [this] 2 According to Chisholm, “N-Force is ATF’s [former] official case file of record for documenting investigative activity and information, creating reports, tracking investigative leads, and linking data.” Chisholm Decl. ¶ 7 n.1. 3 Chisholm explains that SPARTAN is ATF’s new record system that will also “provide enhanced communications and data, to assist with the deconfliction of data between the Industry Operations and Criminal Enforcement business areas.” Chisholm Decl. ¶ 7. 10 [c]ivil [a]ction number . . . , and ‘1999-1489,’ which is the tracking number assigned to [the plaintiff]’s FOIA request[,]” but no records were located. Id. Overall, in addition to its N-Force system search and the additional searches identified in the following paragraph, ATF searched the following databases and located no responsive records related to the plaintiff: (1) its “SPARTAN system to determine if [the plaintiff] was mentioned in any Federal Firearms Licensee [ ] or Federal Explosive Licensee [ ] inspections”; (2) its “Firearms Tracing System [ ] database . . . using the term ‘Elwood Cooper’ to determine if any firearms traces or multiple sales mentioned [the plaintiff]”; (3) its “Information and Privacy Governance Division[] ([“]IPG[”]) . . . electronic files using the terms ‘Elwood Cooper’ and ‘Cooper’”; (4) the “hard copy documents still in IPG’s possession”; (5) and “the Department of Justice’s Consolidated Assets Tracking System which contains an inventory of ATF property seized for forfeiture.” Id. ¶¶ 7–10. ATF also searched “the Office of Chief Counsel’s case management system, ProLaw” and located “eight pages of entries relating to the underlying litigation[,]” which ATF represented it was releasing in part to the plaintiff. Id. ¶ 11. Lastly, ATF searched “the MS 365 Compliance Center which encompasses the electronic mailboxes of all current and former ATF employees who had a mailbox system[,]” and found “one document which [ATF believes] may have been previously released to [the plaintiff].” Id. ¶ 13. In sum, ATF represents that it “has searched all locations where information regarding [the plaintiff’s] FOIA requests or litigation files would be reasonably likely to be located” and has not been able to locate any records described in the plaintiff’s FOIA request. Id. ¶ 15. Despite ATF’s representations regarding the scope of its search for responsive documents, the plaintiff contends that the defendant’s declaration was “made in bad faith” 11 because the defendant “claim[s] that they were unable to locate the record[s] previously produced to” the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff himself already has in his possession. See Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 18, 20. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that the defendants have failed to address “the adequacy of the searches conducted by . . . ATF” despite the Court’s previous 2022 Order. Pl.’s Mem. at 6. The plaintiff’s unsupported allegations that the defendants acted in bad faith in conducting their search simply because they did not find documents that the plaintiff was previously provided throughout this litigation, see Pl.’s Facts ¶ 18, does not refute the fact that ATF used all methods it reasonably believed would produce the information the plaintiff requested, see DiBacco v. United States Army, 795 F.3d 178, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“The burden is on the agency to demonstrate that it made a good faith effort to conduct a search * * * using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested”) (internal quotations omitted). The Court can only require that an agency describe the methods it used to search for records and that it searched all places “likely to contain responsive materials.” Porup v. Central Intelligence Agency, 997 F.3d 1224, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2021). Because ATF has done so, and the plaintiff has not shown why the Court should not give ATF the “presumption of good faith” it is entitled to, see id. (“[a]gency affidavits are accorded a presumption of good faith”), the Court finds that the ATF’s search was adequate. 2. The Adequacy of Customs’ Search for Responsive Records In the Court’s 2022 Memorandum Opinion, it found that Customs’s records search in this case was inadequate because Customs did not “definitively state that [it] conducted a search in the TECS in response to the plaintiff’s FOIA request” nor did Customs describe “the method and scope of its search.” 2022 Memo. Op. at 55 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, 12 the Court ordered the defendants to submit “an additional supplemental declaration or Vaughn Index information regarding its search in response to the plaintiff’s FOIA request.” Id. In their renewed motion for summary judgment, the defendants have included affidavits from Shari Suzuki, the Chief of the FOIA Appeals and Policy (“FAP”) Branch, Regulations and Rulings, Office of Trade (“OT”), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), see Suzuki Aff. ¶ 1, and Fernando Pinero, the FOIA Officer of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement FOIA Office (the “ICE FOIA Office”), see Pinero Decl. ¶ 1. In Suzuki’s affidavit, she explains that when the plaintiff filed his FOIA request, “the U.S. Customs Service did not have a centralized FOIA office that handled initial requests[,]” and initial “requests were sent directly to program offices that handled initial FOIA responses.” Suzuki Aff. ¶¶ 4(A)–4(C). In the plaintiff’s case, “his initial request was sent to the U.S. Customs Service Office of Investigations . . . [h]eadquarters office and its Special Agent in Charge Office in Miami, Florida.” Id. ¶ 4(D). However, in 2003, “the U.S. Customs Service Office of Investigations transferred its functions to the newly created . . . ICE[]” and “the U.S. Customs Service also became U.S. Customs and Border Protection” “as part of the overall creation of the” DHS. Id. ¶ 4(E). Additionally, the “U.S. Customs Service Special Agent in Charge office in Miami, Florida ceased to exist” after the creation of DHS. Id. ¶ 4(G). Suzuki explained that, as a result of the creation of DHS, any records related to the plaintiff’s case, to the extent they exist, “should be in the custody and control of ICE.” Id. Nevertheless, when Suzuki “receiv[ed] notice of this [case] in October 2021, [she] searched all of [FAP’s] existing paper files held on site [and offsite] for any historic records pertaining to [the plaintiff] and his FOIA case with the former U.S. Customs Service[,]” but she did not locate any “existing paper records.” Id. ¶ 4(F). Additionally, as to the previous 13 declaration submitted by the U.S. Customs Service in this case, Suzuki explained that based on her review, the U.S. Customs Service searched the TECS system for documents related to the plaintiff by using the plaintiff’s name. See id. ¶¶ 4(J), 4(L). Moreover, “the Special Agent in Charge, Miami, of the U.S. Customs Service Office of Investigations . . . would have been the custodian of the Reports and Investigation [ ] related to [the plaintiff]’s case” and previously “released 182 pages of non-TECS records” to the plaintiff in 2001. Id. ¶ 4(M). Suzuki attested that “[u]pon reasonable belief, there are no other current databases for [her office] to search for the records requested by [the plaintiff] in 2000 that would result in further production.” Id. ¶ 4(O). Regarding the ICE FOIA Office, Pinero declares that in responding to the plaintiff’s FOIA request and the Court’s 2022 Order, the ICE FOIA Office tasked the Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) Records Disclosure Unit (“RDU”) and the Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”) to search for records responsive to the plaintiff’s FOIA request. Pinero Decl. ¶¶ 23, 26. HSI RDU represented to Pinero “that information previously stored in the TECS database was transferred to HSI’s more technologically advanced Investigative Case Management (‘ICM’) database.” 4 Id. ¶ 26. HSI RDU then tasked a special agent from the West Palm Beach [ ] office to conduct searches for responsive records because the subject investigation occurred within the West Palm Beach [ ] [o]ffice area of responsibility.” Id. ¶ 30. The HSI special agent searched “the ICM closed electronic case files, electronic files in Outlook” by “using the plaintiff’s name to locate records” and case file number to search paper 4 According to the defendants, the “ICM database allows HSI to document and manage criminal investigations, serves as a data warehouse for developing statistical reports and satisfying external requests; and allows for data exchange in real-time between ICM and internal/external law enforcement systems.” Pinero Decl. ¶ 26. 14 files. Id. HSI then “sent 240 pages of potentially responsive records extracted from HSI’s ICM database to the ICE FOIA office for processing and release to the [p]laintiff.” Id. Additionally, HSI RDU engaged the HSI Records Liaison Officer which used the plaintiff’s case file number to search for hard copy records and learned that the plaintiff’s records had been transferred to the Atlanta Federal Records Center. Id. ¶ 31. After the plaintiff’s records were transferred back to the HSI RDU office in Washington, D.C., HSI RDU searched a “box of hard copy records which were potentially responsive to [the p]laintiff’s FOIA request” and located “870 pages that were potentially responsive to the [p]laintiff’s FOIA request.” Id. ¶¶ 32–33. Those 870 pages were then processed for potential release to the plaintiff at the rate of 500 pages a month. Id. ¶¶ 33–34. The ICE FOIA office also tasked its Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”) to conduct a search for records responsive to the plaintiff’s FOIA request. Id. ¶ 23. The ERO office used the plaintiff’s “alien number” to search ICE’s Enforce Alien Removal Module (“EARM”) 5 “application for records that are potentially responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA request.” Id. ¶¶ 37–38. The ERO team also used the plaintiff’s “alien number” “to search the Eagle database 6 for draft detainer records in response to the plaintiff’s FOIA request.” Id. ¶ 39 (footnote not in original). The ERO team located a total of 9 pages for processing and release to the plaintiff “subject to partial withholdings.” Id. ¶ 40. In total, the ICE FOIA Office released 1,095 pages of the 1,119 pages to the plaintiff that were responsive to the plaintiff’s FOIA request. Id. ¶ 14. “42 pages were released in full and 5 The defendants represent that EARM is ERO’s case management system that “records custody decisions, detention and removal specifics in an undocumented noncitizen’s record.” Id. ¶ 38. 6 “The Eagle database is ERO’s booking application wherein ICE law enforcement officers process biometric and biographic information of individuals arrested by ICE for criminal violations of law and administrative violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act.” Id. ¶ 39. 15 1,070 pages were released subject to partial withholdings pursuant to FOIA . . . exemptions 6, 7(C) and 7(E).” Id. Similar to the arguments the plaintiff made regarding ATF’s search of documents in this case, the plaintiff argues that the defendants’ declarations were presented in bad faith and “do not address any of the issues” previously ordered by the Court. See Pl.’s Mem. at 1, 6; Pl.’s Facts ¶ 18. The plaintiff argues that the “newly release[d records] by ICE are irrelevant and non- responsive to [his] FOIA” request and instead are related to the criminal cases of two other individuals. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 17 (citing Criminal Docket in U.S. v. Ellis, 98-cr-141, and Criminal Docket in U.S. v. Walker, 98-cr-8095). 7 But, the plaintiff has not argued or suggested that the search conducted by Customs or the ICE FOIA office was inadequate or that they improperly withheld or redacted records. Instead, the plaintiff essentially argues that the agencies’ search was more expansive than required since the agencies provided him with documents that he argues are unrelated to his case. The Court agrees and therefore finds that Customs’ and the ICE FOIA offices’ searches were adequate. Cf. SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C.Cir.1991) (explaining that the adequacy of the search is determined by whether it was “reasonably calculated to discover the requested documents, not whether it actually uncovered every document extant”). Accordingly, the Court grants the defendant’s renewed motion for summary judgment as to the searches conducted by Customs and ATF. 8 7 The plaintiff also argues that ICE did not file a Vaughn Index on the Court’s public docket for the newly released documents that it released to the plaintiff. See Pl.’s Facts ¶ 17. The Court finds this argument to be without merit since ICE’s detailed Vaughn Index is submitted with Pinero’s declaration. See generally ICE Vaughn Index, ECF No. 211-5. 8 The plaintiff also argues that “Customs has not address[ed] the discrepancy between the Kramer declaration and [the] C[]ustom Vaugh[n] Index in [t]he number of pages located, processed, withheld, released in part and released in full[] by Customs.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 21 (capitalization modified). However, the Court already addressed this (continued . . .) 16 B. Inconsistencies Between DEA Records Produced to The Plaintiff and the DEA Vaughn Index or Declarations In the Court’s March 2022 Memorandum Opinion, it identified several entries on the DEA’s Vaughn Index that appeared to be inconsistent with the documents produced to the plaintiff as part of the DEA’s January 3, 2000 and August 21, 2001 productions, and therefore required the defendants to supplement its declaration or Vaughn Index regarding these specific records. See Cooper 2022 at 42–45, 46. Additionally, after the plaintiff challenged eight pages of records that appeared to be missing from the ATF’s and DEA’s Vaughn indices, the Court required the defendants to provide “supplemental Vaughn Index information or a supplemental declaration addressing whether the DEA received” a referral regarding those eight pages from ATF on January 20, 2000 and February 7, 2000. See id. at 49. In a declaration from Angela D. Hertel, who serves as the Unit Chief of the Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Legal and External Affairs Sub-Unit (“CCARL”) of the DEA, she explains that her office is “responsible for the receiving, processing, and disclosing of the DEA information requested pursuant to the FOIA.” Hertel Decl. ¶¶ 1–2. Hertel details the extensive efforts that the DEA has made in this litigation to provide records to the plaintiff as well as comply with the Court’s orders. In the following subsections, the Court will analyze the DEA’s compliance with the FOIA as related to the prior issues identified by the Court in 2022. 1. ECF No. 156-1, page 10 of 84 The first seeming discrepancy that the Court identified in its March 2022 Memorandum Opinion, concerned ECF 156-1, page 10 of 84, of the plaintiff’s combined opposition. See (. . . continued) argument in its March 2022 Memorandum Opinion and found that the “Customs’ Vaughn Index and the Kramer Declaration provide an adequate basis for the Court to review whether the 154 pages were properly withheld pursuant to the FOIA[,]” Cooper 2022 at 47, and that Customs’s Vaughn Index was adequate, see id. at 48. 17 Cooper 2022 at 43; Pl.’s 2018 Opp’n at ECF No. 156-1 at 10 of 83. 9 The Court could not reconcile the DEA’s redactions on ECF 156-1, page 10 of 84 with page 58 of the DEA’s Vaughn Index, ECF No. 175-4 at 153, because on page 58 of the DEA’s Vaughn Index, it noted that the document referenced on that page was withheld in full, but document ECF 156-1