Leopold v. Federal Housing Finance Agency

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JASON LEOPOLD, et al., Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 23 - 1935 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION In March 2023, three banks regulated by the Federal Home Finance Agency (FHFA) shuttered. In the wake of their collapse, Jason Leopold—a reporter for Bloomberg News— submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to obtain documents about FHFA’s oversight of the banks. When FHFA did not respond, Mr. Leopold and Bloomberg sued. For more than three years, the Parties have worked together to produce and review the requested documents. Now, both sides seek summary judgment with respect to documents that FHFA has withheld in full or in part. For the reasons below, the Court grants in part and denies in part both motions. BACKGROUND A. Statutory Background “FOIA ‘implement[s] a general philosophy of full agency disclosure.’” Informed Consent Action Network v. NIH, No. 23-cv-926, 2026 WL 585104, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 3, 2026) (alteration in original) (quoting DOJ v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 754 (1989)). The statute “requires every federal agency, upon request, to make ‘promptly available to any person’ any ‘records’ so long as the request ‘reasonably describes such records.’” Assassination Archives & Rsch. Ctr. v. CIA, 334 F.3d 55, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)). “Agencies must construe FOIA requests liberally and can only withhold or redact documents if the information requested ‘falls within one of nine statutory exemptions.’” Informed Consent Action Network, 2026 WL 585104, at *1 (quoting People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. NIH, 745 F.3d 535, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2014)); see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9). These exemptions demonstrate that the public’s right to information is “not absolute and that disclosure of certain information may harm legitimate governmental or private interests[.]” Martin v. DOJ, 488 F.3d 446, 453 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). The agency bears the burden of establishing that an exemption applies and ordinarily “must disclose all reasonably segregable, nonexempt portions of the requested record(s).” PETA, 745 F.3d at 540 (cleaned up). And the agency must show that it “reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by” one of FOIA’s nine exemptions or that disclosure is otherwise prohibited by law. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A). B. Factual and Procedural Background The Court draws the facts from the Parties’ Statements of Material Facts and the underlying materials referenced in those statements. See Pls.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (PSOF), ECF No. 37-2; Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (DSOF), ECF No. 40-3. The Court assumes the facts in those statements to be true unless they have been specifically disputed, and it assumes the truth of other undisputed statements in the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see also LCvR 7(h)(1). 1 Mr. Leopold is an investigative reporter at Bloomberg News. Compl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 1. FHFA is a federal agency that regulates eleven banks in the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB) 1 Local Rule 7(h) provides that “the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.” LCvR 7(h)(1). 2 system, as well as the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, the Federal National Mortgage Association, and the Office of Finance. See 12 U.S.C. § 4511(b)(2). In March 2023, three banks in the FHLB system—Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, and Silvergate Bank—collapsed. That same month, Mr. Leopold submitted a FOIA request to FHFA seeking the following records: (1) “FHFA’s internal rating system identifying safety and soundness for each individual FHLB bank” from January 1, 2018, to the date of search; (2) “quarterly supervisory reports” for the same period; and (3) “[e]mails, text messages, memos and letters, referencing [the three banks] . . . includ[ing] any correspondence sent to state officials, such as Governor Gavin Newsom or anyone on his staff.” PSOF ¶ 7; DSOF ¶ 1. FHFA acknowledged receipt of the request on April 3, 2023. PSOF ¶ 8. In July 2023, Mr. Leopold and Bloomberg sued, alleging that FHFA had violated FOIA by failing to respond to the request. Compl. at 3–4. Over three years have passed since then, during which FHFA conducted a search that uncovered responsive records, produced some records, and withheld others in whole or in part under various FOIA exemptions. PSOF ¶¶ 10–15. The Parties now cross-move for summary judgment. See Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. (Mot.), ECF No. 37; Def.’s Opp’n & Cross-Mot. Summ. J. (Cross-Mot.), ECF No. 41; Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n, ECF No. 42; Def.’s Cross-Reply, ECF No. 44; Pls.’ Sur-Reply, ECF No. 47. Those motions are ripe for review. LEGAL STANDARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires a court to “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In a FOIA suit, an agency is entitled to summary judgment if “no material facts are in dispute” and it establishes that all information subject to a request has either “been produced . . . or is wholly exempt from the Act’s inspection 3 requirements.” Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 833 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (cleaned up). Typically, an “agency demonstrates the applicability of a FOIA exemption by providing affidavits regarding the claimed exemptions.” Shapiro v. DOJ, 893 F.3d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2018). “If an agency’s affidavit describes the justifications for withholding the information with specific detail, demonstrates that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and is not contradicted by contrary evidence in the record or by evidence of the agency’s bad faith, then summary judgment is warranted on the basis of the affidavit alone.” ACLU v. DOD, 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011). “[A]n agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears logical or plausible.” Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374–75 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). DISCUSSION The Plaintiffs challenge FHFA’s reliance on FOIA Exemptions 4, 5, 6, and 8 to withhold 2,221 records in whole or in part. They argue that FHFA has failed to carry its burden at the summary judgment stage to furnish adequate factual support for its withholdings. See Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 2–3. And they contend that FHFA did not heed FOIA’s command to “withhold information . . . only if . . . the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by an exemption.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i)(I). For the most part, the Plaintiffs’ arguments come up short. FHFA has met its burden, except for its Exemption 5 withholdings. 2 2 The Plaintiffs raise two procedural arguments, neither of which changes things. First, they ask the Court to disregard a declaration submitted with FHFA’s opposition, see Wright Decl., ECF No. 40-2, because it was “unsworn and unsigned.” Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 2. But FHFA has since submitted a signed copy and explained that it uploaded the unsigned document in error. See Def.’s Cross-Reply 1; Reuploaded Wright Decl. 16, ECF No. 44-1. Second, the Plaintiffs claim that FHFA’s eight-paragraph Statement of Undisputed Facts fails to comply with Local Rule 7(h) because it does not include the requisite facts and record citations. Despite its length, the statement does not violate Local Rule 7(h), particularly when considered alongside FHFA’s Response to the Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, see ECF No. 41-1. See Grimes v. D.C., 794 F.3d 83, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Griffith, J., concurring) (explaining that “all that the [Local Rules] 4  A. Exemption 8 The Court begins with Exemption 8, which covers 2,056 of the 2,221 withholdings reported on the Vaughn index. See Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 16 n.7; Def.’s Cross-Reply 2. It concludes that FHFA properly invoked Exemption 8 to withhold these records. Exemption 8 protects information “contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(8). 3 Notwithstanding the “general rule requiring that [courts] interpret FOIA’s exemptions narrowly,” Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n v. SEC, 771 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2014), the D.C. Circuit has “explained time and again that Exemption 8’s scope is ‘particularly broad,’” id. at 4 (quoting Consumers Union of U. S., Inc. v. Heimann, 589 F.2d 531, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). Congress enacted Exemption 8 to “ensure the security of financial institutions” and “safeguard the relationships between the banks and their supervising agencies.” Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 796 F. Supp. 2d 13, 37 (D.D.C. 2011). It “address[es] the ‘concern[] that release of bank examination and operating reports could endanger the fiscal well-being of [] subject banks.’” Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n, 771 F.3d at 5 (quoting Heimann, 589 F.2d at 537). The text of Exemption 8 reflects that “Congress has intentionally and unambiguously crafted a particularly broad, all-inclusive definition” of records that may be withheld, and “it is not [the] function [of courts], even in the FOIA context, to subvert that effort.” Heimann, 589 F.2d at 533. require” is “submi[ssion] [of] a statement of undisputed material facts and a brief explaining why summary judgment was appropriate”). In any event, a summary-judgment movant may rely on “affidavits or declarations,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), as FHFA has done here. So any purported defect in FHFA’s statement is not dispositive. 3 The Plaintiffs do not dispute that FHFA is an “agenc[y] responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions” under FOIA. See 12 U.S.C. § 4525. 5  Here, the Plaintiffs challenge FHFA’s Exemption 8 withholdings on three related grounds. They argue that FHFA: (1) failed to specify whether the withheld information is either “contained in” or “related to” the relevant report, (2) failed to specify the type of report—i.e., whether it is an examination, operating, or condition report, and (3) failed to demonstrate that certain of the withheld information is “contained in” or “related to” a report at all. See Pls.’ Reply & Cross- Opp’n 17–20. In a nutshell, the Plaintiffs’ view is that FHFA must identify a specific report to which the withheld information pertains to invoke Exemption 8. But Exemption 8 does not require such a showing. The D.C. Circuit has yet to address this question. See Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n, 771 F.3d at 7 (declining to reach “the doctrinal question of whether each withheld document must relate to a specific examination report”). But most courts in this District have rejected the Plaintiffs’ narrow reading of Exemption 8. Those courts reason that Exemption 8 “covers all material that is ‘related to’ [examination, operating, or condition] reports, not just reports themselves. Hence, the ‘related to’ language casts a wide net of non-disclosure over any documents that are logically connected to an ‘examination, operating, or condition report[.]’” Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8)); see also Williams & Connolly LLP v. Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, 39 F. Supp. 3d 82, 91 (D.D.C. 2014). Under the majority view, “Exemption 8 does not require the defendant to identify a specific report to which the information relates.” Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (emphasis added) (cleaned up); see also Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n, 771 F.3d at 7 (noting that courts in this District have concluded that each document withheld under Exemption 8 “need not” “relate to a specific examination report”); McKinley v. FDIC, 744 F. Supp. 2d 128, 143–45 (D.D.C. 2010) (McKinley I), aff’d sub nom. McKinley v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 647 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 6  In support of their reading of Exemption 8, the Plaintiffs rely solely on McKinley v. FDIC, 268 F. Supp. 3d 234 (D.D.C. 2017) (McKinley II). See Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 17–19. There, the court required the agency to specify (1) “whether each of the [withheld] documents consists of information that is directly contained in one of the three enumerated reports, or whether they include information that is simply related to any such report”; and (2) “whether [the agency] characterizes the relevant report as an examination report, an operating report, or a condition report” to invoke Exemption 8. McKinley II, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 245–46. The Plaintiffs posit that “if the agency must specify the kind of report, the information must pertain to a report of some kind.” Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 19. The Court is unpersuaded by McKinley II, which offers little analysis. Instead, it joins the chorus of courts in this District in holding that an agency need not identify a specific report to invoke Exemption 8. Controlling Circuit precedent has repeatedly emphasized that the text of Exemption 8—which includes all documents “contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports”—is “particularly broad [and] all-inclusive.” Heimann, 589 F.2d at 533; see also Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n, 771 F.3d at 4. Notably absent from the statutory text is any requirement that an agency identify a specific report to which withheld records relate, clarify the precise relationship between the withheld information and a particular report, or sort the identified report into one of Exemption 8’s three categories. And the limited legislative history does not support the Plaintiffs’ cramped view. See Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 63–70 (examining the legislative history); see also McCullough v. FDIC, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17685, at *7 (D.D.C. July 28, 1980) (“[T]he legislative history, though limited, strongly implies that all records, regardless of the source, of a bank’s financial condition and operations and in the 7 possession of a federal agency ‘responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions,’ are exempt.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, the Court holds that FHFA need not show that withheld records relate to a specific report. Exemption 8 protects all records “prepared in furtherance of [FHFA’s] responsibility for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions,” Williams & Connolly LLP, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 90 (cleaned up), and it “extends to any documents received by [FHFA] in the course of exercising its regulatory responsibilities in relation to the financial institutions whose information has been withheld,” Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (cleaned up). 4 1. Application of Exemption 8 The Court now turns to the records at issue. FHFA invoked Exemption 8 for 2,056 withholdings that fall into five categories: (1) examination reports (final and draft); (2) other supervision documents (final and draft); (3) materials provided by regulated entities; (4) correspondence and emails between FHFA and regulated entities; and (5) internal FHFA correspondence and emails. Wright Decl. ¶¶ 42–50; accord Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 16 (adopting this five-category framework). The Court considers each category in turn. Exemption 8 undisputedly applies to the first category, which “consists of [draft and final] examination reports prepared by FHFA as part of its supervision of” regulated entities. Wright Decl. ¶ 42. Even the Plaintiffs admit as much, though they stop short of conceding this point. Pls.’ 4 In their motion, the Plaintiffs say in passing that FHFA “does not specify how the withheld material relates to an entity that FHFA is responsible for regulating”—i.e., the three failed banks that FHFA is no longer regulating. Mot. 15. They later appear to abandon this argument by not responding to FHFA’s arguments on this point. See Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 17–20 (making only the three arguments discussed above). Regardless, Exemption 8 applies irrespective of whether a financial institution remains in operation. See Gregory, 631 F.2d at 898–99; see also Pub. Citizen v. Farm Credit Admin., 938 F.2d 290, 293–94 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[F]or purposes of exemption 8 . . . examination reports need not pertain to an institution that is regulated or supervised by the withholding agency.”). So this argument has no force. 8 Reply & Cross-Opp’n 17 (“Documents in the first category, ‘Examination Reports (final and draft)’ plausibly qualify [for Exemption 8].”). Exemption 8 straightforwardly protects these records. The second category of records also falls within Exemption 8. It encompasses “material . . . contained in supervisory documents prepared by FHFA in its role as the safety and soundness regulator” for the regulated entities that it supervises, and “material that was collected and reviewed by FHFA examiners as part of the agency’s supervisory mission,” Wright Decl. ¶ 45. Because these records were “prepared in furtherance of [FHFA’s] responsibility for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions,” they fall within Exemption 8’s scope. Williams & Connolly LLP, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 90 (cleaned up). The final three categories also qualify for Exemption 8 withholding. The third category consists of “documents prepared by” regulated entities “and later provided to FHFA . . . in its role as the safety and soundness regulator for” those entities. Wright Decl. ¶¶ 46–47. The records “contain material that was collected and reviewed by FHFA examiners as part of the agency’s supervisory mission.” Id. ¶ 47. Similarly, the fourth and fifth sets of withholdings comprise communications between FHFA and regulated entities, covering material “shared with and prepared by FHFA examiners as part of the agency’s supervisory mission,” id. ¶ 49, and “correspondence and emails exchanged within FHFA as part of the agency’s supervisory mission,” id. ¶ 50. Exemption 8 “extends to any documents received by [FHFA] in the course of exercising its regulatory responsibilities in relation to the financial institutions whose information has been withheld.” Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (cleaned up). And it covers all records “prepared in furtherance of [FHFA’s] ‘responsib[ility] for the regulation or supervision of financial 9 institutions[.]’” Williams & Connolly LLP, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 90 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8)). Thus, FHFA’s third, fourth, and fifth categories of withholdings properly invoked Exemption 8. Stepping back, the Court notes that even if the Plaintiffs are correct that Exemption 8 requires that each withheld document relate to a specific report, this record adequately makes that showing for many of the documents responsive to the FOIA request. The Plaintiffs sought the following records from FHFA: the agency’s “internal rating system identifying safety and soundness for each individual FHLB bank,” “quarterly supervisory reports,” and communications about the three failed banks. PSOF ¶ 7; DSOF ¶ 1. On this record, FHFA’s “internal rating system identifying safety and soundness” for each bank is plainly related to FHFA’s obligation to produce annual reports on the “financial safety and soundness of each regulated entity.” 12 U.S.C. § 4521(a)(2). And there can be no genuine dispute that the agency’s “quarterly supervisory reports” qualify for Exemption 8. See Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 17. On any reading of the statutory text, Exemption 8 protects the first two categories of requested documents. 2. Foreseeable Harm Although the agency’s Exemption 8 withholdings fall within the exemption, that does not end the inquiry. An agency may “withhold information . . . only if the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by an exemption.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i)(I). “The foreseeable harm requirement imposes an independent and meaningful burden on agencies” “to foreclose the withholding of material unless the agency can articulate both the nature of the harm from release and the link between the specified harm and specific information contained in the material withheld.” Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. FBI (Reps. Comm.), 3 F.4th 350, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). When an agency satisfies its burden on “a category-by-category basis rather than a document-by-document basis . . . the basis and likelihood of that harm must be 10 independently demonstrated for each category.” Id. Agencies must also conduct a segregability analysis to “consider whether exempt portions of a record could be disclosed without causing foreseeable harm to the interests protected by [the relevant FOIA exemption].” Rudometkin v. United States, 140 F.4th 480, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). Determining foreseeable harm to an “interest protected by an exemption” necessarily entails identifying the interests that the exemption shields. As the D.C. Circuit has recognized, Exemption 8 protects two main interests. See Leopold v. DOJ, No. 19-cv-3192, 2026 WL 113618, at *8 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2026). First, “the primary reason for adoption of [E]xemption 8 was to ensure the security of financial institutions. Specifically, there was concern that disclosure of examination, operation, and condition reports containing frank evaluations of the investigated banks might undermine public confidence and cause unwarranted runs on banks.” Heimann, 589 F.2d at 534 (footnotes omitted). In other words, “Congress enacted Exemption 8 to address the ‘concern[] that release of bank examination and operating reports could endanger the fiscal well- being of [] subject banks.’” Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar. Ass’n., 771 F.3d at 5 (quoting Heimann, 589 F.2d at 533). Second, Congress sought to “safeguard the relationship between the banks and their supervising agencies.” Heimann, 589 F.2d at 534. After all, “[i]f details of the bank examinations were made freely available to the public and to banking competitors . . . banks would cooperate less than fully with federal authorities.” Id. Here, FHFA’s declarants have explained that releasing the “candidly shared” information, analysis, and discussions “of the financial condition of the regulated entities” withheld under Exemption 8 “would cause substantial harm” to those entities. Wright Decl. ¶¶ 43, 45, 47, 49, 51; see also Stallings Decl. ¶ 36, ECF No. 44-2 (“Release of such confidential bank supervisory information to competitors and the public at large, would stifle candid evaluations of financial 11 institutions, and would harm the relationship between such institutions and their supervisory agencies.”). Both justifications—harm to regulated banks and disincentivizing cooperation between banks and regulators—cohere with the interests protected by Exemption 8. The Plaintiffs resist this conclusion on two primary grounds. First, they attack the conclusory nature of FHFA’s declarations. The Court agrees that the relevant statements toe the line of the “boilerplate, unparticularized, and hypothesized assertion[s] of harm” that are insufficient to sustain a FOIA withholding. Reps. Comm., 3 F.4th at 371; see Machado Amadis v. Dep’t of State, 971 F.3d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2020). But the Court is ultimately persuaded that FHFA has met its burden. FHFA’s declarations focus on the “financial condition” and “confidential bank supervisory information” contained in the withheld records. Wright Decl. ¶¶ 43, 45, 47, 49, 51; Stallings Decl. ¶ 36; see Machado Amadis, 971 F.3d at 371 (affirming the sufficiency of declarations that “specifically focused on the information at issue in the [documents] under review” and concluding “that disclosure of that information would” harm protected interests). “In other words, [FHFA has] directly articulated ‘[a] link between the specified harm and the specific information contained in the material withheld.’” Reps. Comm., 3 F.4th at 371 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 114-391, at 9 (2016)). Second, the Plaintiffs assert that no harm can foreseeably befall defunct banks. See Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 13. Perhaps, but FHFA could reasonably foresee that the disclosure of records related to shuttered banks could chill disclosure by operational banks. After all, if banks knew that documents related to FHFA’s supervision could become the object of public scrutiny if they failed, they might be more reluctant to engage in the candid regulatory cooperation that Exemption 8 was designed to protect. Similarly, the Plaintiffs argue that no harm could result from the release of information painting a regulated bank in a positive light. Id. at 21. But FHFA could 12 reasonably foresee that the public disclosure of banks’ closely-held information could provide their competitors with key insights, putting a damper on future cooperation. See McKinley I, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 143 (noting that one of the purposes of Exemption 8 was “to safeguard the relationship between the banks and their supervising agencies because if details of the bank examinations were made freely available to the public and to banking competitors, banks would cooperate less than fully with federal authorities” (emphasis added)). In sum, FHFA has furnished sworn declarations articulating the specific harms that it foresees if the withheld documents are disclosed. And its reasons align with the twin interests shielded by Exemption 8. FHFA thus “correctly understood the governing legal requirement and reasonably explained why it was met here.” Machado Amadis, 971 F.3d at 371. FHFA has also met its burden as to segregability. According to one of FHFA’s declarants, the agency “reviewed all the withheld exempt information and determined that no additional information could be segregated and released without causing foreseeable harm to the agency or the interests protected by the FOIA Exemption being asserted.” Wright Decl. ¶ 53. Sworn agency declarations are afforded “a presumption of good faith” in FOIA litigation. Shapiro v. DOJ, 944 F.3d 940, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). And at the summary judgment stage, “an agency claiming a FOIA exemption may carry [its] burden by the production of affidavits.” Evans v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 951 F.3d 578, 586 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Thus, affording FHFA the presumption of regularity to which it is entitled, the Court is satisfied that it has complied with its segregability obligation. The Court will grant summary judgment in favor of FHFA on Exemption 8. 13  B. Exemption 4 Next up is Exemption 4. FHFA invokes Exemption 4 to withhold 1,292 records. 5 PSOF ¶ 18. The Court concludes that FHFA has met its burden to withhold these records. Exemption 4 “shields from disclosure ‘trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.’” Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 588 U.S. 427, 431 (2019) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)). “When an agency withholds non-trade-secret information under Exemption 4, it must demonstrate that the withheld information is ‘(1) commercial or financial, (2) obtained from a person, and (3) privileged or confidential.’” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. DOJ (CREW), 58 F.4th 1255, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting Pub. Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). FHFA’s Exemption 4 withholdings fall into the same five categories discussed for Exemption 8: (1) examination reports (final and draft); (2) other supervision documents (final and draft); (3) materials provided by the regulated entities; (4) correspondence and emails between FHFA and regulated entities; and (5) internal FHFA correspondence and emails. Wright Decl. ¶¶ 6–20. FHFA does not claim that any of the withheld information constitutes trade secrets, see Wright Decl. ¶ 4; Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 6 n.4, so its withholdings must satisfy the three-part test for non-trade-secret information. The Court addresses each element in turn. 5 FHFA correctly asserts that the “overwhelming majority of documents withheld under Exemption 4 also were withheld under Exemption 8.” Cross-Mot. 11 n.4. It is well-settled that if documents are properly withheld under one exemption, the Court need not determine the applicability of other exemptions. See, e.g., Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862–63 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts may uphold agency action under one exemption without considering the applicability of the other.”). But here, not all documents withheld under Exemption 4 were withheld under Exemption 8. See, e.g., Vaughn Index, ECF No. 41-2 (invoking Exemption 4 alone to withhold documents 2131, 2132, 2133, and 2163). The Court therefore considers the propriety of FHFA’s withholdings under Exemption 4. 14  1. Commercial or Financial First, information withheld under Exemption 4 must be “commercial or financial.” CREW, 58 F.4th at 1262. The “information must be commercial in and of itself; meaning it serves a commercial function or is of a commercial nature.” Id. at 1263 (cleaned up). “Because FOIA does not define the word ‘commercial,’” the term takes on its ordinary meaning, so “information is commercial if it pertains to the exchange of goods or services or the making of a profit.” Id. “Exemption 4 paradigmatically applies to records that a business owner customarily keeps private because they actually reveal basic commercial operations, such as sales statistics, profits and losses, and inventories, or [that] relate to the income-producing aspects of a business.” Id. (cleaned up). And the D.C. Circuit has “defined commercial information to include, for example, a firm’s data or reports on its commercial service or its product’s favorable or unfavorable attributes or information an industry has gathered regarding its competitive strengths and weaknesses.” Id. at 1265 (cleaned up); see also ISC Grp., Inc. v. DOD, 88-cv-0631, 1989 WL 168858, at *2 (D.D.C. May 22, 1989) (concluding that Exemption 4 protected an internal corporate investigative report submitted to an agency that contained “operations statements, financial summaries and forecasts, inventory and labor data, and other financial analyses”). That said, “not every bit of information submitted to the government by a commercial entity qualifies for protection under Exemption 4[.]” Pub. Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1290. Here, FHFA has adequately showed that the withheld information is “commercial or financial” within the meaning of Exemption 4. FHFA’s sworn declarations state that documents withheld in each of the five categories contain “confidential commercial and financial information” provided to the agency by regulated entities that “informed” FHFA’s supervision of those entities. Wright Decl., ¶¶ 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20; see also Stallings Decl. ¶ 7 15 (explaining that the regulated entities “provide FHFA examiners with detailed information about their business processes and activities to facilitate the examiners’ analysis of the[ir] operations”). The first two categories include “Financial Condition and Performance Quarterly Reports, Quarterly Market Risk Monitoring Reports, Quarterly Mark Risk Profiles, Mortgage Program Policy and Analysis reports, Collateral Monitoring Profile reports, Credit and Collateral Risk Modeling Contemporary Unsecured Credit Risk reports and Quarterly Member Credit Profiles.” Wright Decl. ¶ 6; see also id. ¶ 9 (describing the second category of withheld records as “includ[ing] Year-End profiles for the Regulated Entities, Financial Performance Reports for the Federal Home Loan Bank System, Federal Home Loan Bank activity reports, and other supervisory memoranda and presentations prepared by FHFA with confidential information provided to the agency by the Regulated Entities”). The third category includes internal memoranda, presentations, and Board and Committee materials prepared by the regulated entities. Wright Decl. ¶ 12. And the fourth and fifth categories include communications between the regulated entities and FHFA that “contain, discuss and analyze confidential commercial information that FHFA obtained from the regulated entities.” Id. ¶¶ 16, 19. These records contain quintessential commercial or financial information encompassed by Exemption 4. See CREW, 58 F.4th at 1265 (finding that a bank’s internal memoranda, presentations, and Board and Committee materials “demonstrably pertain[] to the exchange of goods or services or the making of a profit”). In arguing otherwise, the Plaintiffs say only that FHFA has not shown that it has withheld exclusively commercial information under Exemption 4. Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 8. But this argument goes to segregability, not exemption from disclosure. At bottom, FHFA has a statutory obligation to “oversee the prudential operations of each regulated entity,” including ensuring that they “maint[ain] [] adequate capital and internal 16 controls” and that their activities “foster liquid, efficient, competitive, and resilient national housing finance markets.” 12 U.S.C. § 4513(a)(1). In other words, FHFA’s core responsibility is to oversee the commercial activities and financial condition of the regulated entities within its reach. It is unsurprising, then, that much (but not necessarily all) of the information provided to FHFA by regulated entities in the course of FHFA’s supervision is commercial or financial in nature. Here, FHFA’s sworn declarations make that clear. 2. Obtained From a Person Second, Exemption 4 applies only to information “obtained from a person.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). For FOIA purposes, the term “‘person’ includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or private organization other than an agency[.]” Id. § 551(2); accord Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. United States Forest Serv., No. 23-cv-00928, 2025 WL 947472, at *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2025). In other words, “[i]nformation is considered ‘obtained from a person’ if the information originated from an individual, corporation, or other entity, and so long as the information did not originate within the federal government.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. DHS, 117 F. Supp. 3d 46, 63 (D.D.C. 2015). Here, the records obtained from regulated entities were “obtained from a person.” Cf. Leopold v. DOJ, No. 19-cv-3192, 2021 WL 124489, at *6 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021) (applying Exemption 4 to a report issued by an independent bank monitor). So too are FHFA’s records incorporating information provided by regulated entities, including FHFA-authored documents and correspondence. Flyers Rts. Educ. Fund, Inc. v. FAA, 71 F.4th 1051, 1056–57 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (noting that Exemption 4 protects information from third parties “even when the government incorporates that information into its own documents” and rejecting the argument that “Exemption 4 protects agency-authored materials only where they contain third-party information repeated 17 verbatim, slightly modified, or summarized”); see also Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. United States, 615 F.2d 527, 529–30 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (upholding the redaction from an agency report of “data supplied to the government from a person outside the government”). 3. Privileged or Confidential Third, the withheld information must be “privileged or confidential.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). As the Supreme Court has explained, information is “confidential” under Exemption 4 only if “it is customarily kept private, or at least closely held, by the person imparting it[.]” Argus Leader, 588 U.S. at 434; see also Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 244 F.3d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[I]n assessing customary disclosure, the court will consider how the particular party customarily treats the information, not how the industry as a whole treats the information.”). In Argus Leader, the Supreme Court also noted that “information might be considered confidential only if the party receiving it provides some assurance that it will remain secret.” 588 U.S. at 434. But the Argus Leader Court did not determine whether such assurances of secrecy are necessary to invoke Exemption 4. See id. at 434–35. Neither has the D.C. Circuit. See CREW, 58 F.4th at 1269. So “the current law of the D.C. Circuit . . . is that information is confidential under Exemption 4 if it is of a kind that would customarily not be released to the public by the person or entity from whom it was obtained.” Gandhi v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 665 F. Supp. 3d 49, 55 (D.D.C. 2023) (cleaned up). Nonetheless, courts in this District have considered assurances of secrecy in evaluating the customs and practice of the submitting party. See, e.g., Humane Soc’y Int’l v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 16-cv- 720, 2021 WL 1197726, at *5 & n.4 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2021) (collecting cases for the proposition that “even after [Argus Leader], courts in this District have continued to recognize that the circumstances under which a company submits information to the government bears on whether 18 that information remains confidential”); WP Co. LLC v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., No. 24-cv-1353, 2026 WL 820742, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 2026) (applying same). Here, FHFA has provided sworn declarations attesting to the confidential character of the withheld information. One declarant states that each document across the five categories withheld under Exemption 4 “is normally kept confidential” by the regulated entities, “is not released to the public,” and “was provided to FHFA with the understanding that the information would remain private.” Wright Decl. ¶¶ 7, 10, 13, 16, 19. Another declarant similarly attests that the regulate