Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 1 of 14 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-11507 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ ARTURO VALENZUELA, Petitioner-Appellant, versus SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondents-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 9:23-cv-80971-RS ____________________ Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Arturo Valenzuela, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, ap- peals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 2 of 14 2 Opinion of the Court 25-11507 corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We granted a certificate of appeala- bility on three issues: (1) whether the state trial court sufficiently complied with Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), on May 31, 2016, to ensure that Valenzuela knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel; and whether the district court violated Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), by failing to address his claims that (2) the trial court erred by failing to conduct another Faretta inquiry during jury selection and jury challenges, and (3) the trial court violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. After careful review, we conclude that the state courts’ re- jection of Valenzuela’s challenge to the May 31, 2016, waiver was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly es- tablished federal law, and we affirm as to that claim. Because the district court did not resolve the other two claims, we vacate in part and remand for the district court to address them in the first in- stance. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The State charged Valenzuela with ten counts of possessing, controlling, or intentionally viewing a sexual performance by a child; it later amended the information to charge fifteen counts. Before trial, Valenzuela moved three times under Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), to discharge his appointed counsel. At the first two hearings, the state trial court found that counsel was performing competently and told Valenzuela that he could keep his appointed lawyer, hire his own lawyer, or represent himself. USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 3 of 14 25-11507 Opinion of the Court 3 The third Nelson hearing took place on May 31, 2016, with an interpreter present. Valenzuela complained that his lawyer had told him to plead guilty. The prosecutor confirmed that the State had offered ten years’ imprisonment to resolve both the Florida case and similar charges pending in Colorado, noting that Valen- zuela faced up to 50 years in prison if convicted at trial. The state trial court found counsel competent and again offered Valenzuela the same three choices; Valenzuela answered, “I will represent my- self.” The following colloquy ensued: THE COURT: Well, we’ll see about that. Okay, how much education do you have? MR. VALENZUELA: Up to grade school. THE COURT: Grade school, as in what grade? MR. VALENZUELA: Well, it was in Mexico; I don’t know what it’s like here. THE COURT: And clearly you do not speak English? MR. VALENZUELA: No. THE COURT: And you have no training in law? MR. VALENZUELA: I have read everything about my case in this year that I have been in prison; I think I can represent myself. THE COURT: You have no training in law, correct? MR. VALENZUELA: No. USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 4 of 14 4 Opinion of the Court 25-11507 THE COURT: And no understanding of the English language? MR. VALENZUELA: A little. THE COURT: Well, there’s a saying here that says a person who represents themselves has a fool for a cli- ent. I cannot assist you in any way with the presenta- tion of your case; you will be all on your own figuring out what objections to make, what questions to ask, and I would strongly suggest that you reconsider and move forward with an attorney free of charge. . . . THE COURT: Sir, I strongly suggest that you don’t represent yourself; you will be making a very bad de- cision. If you insist on doing so I will allow it . . . . I’ll be setting your trial and you’ll be going to trial in the next several weeks, so you feel that you are prepared to move forward on a trial in which I can sentence you to 50 years in the Department of Corrections? MR. VALENZUELA: Yes, that’s fine. The court then appointed Valenzuela counsel as standby counsel and ruled that, “with regard to the Faretta[,] . . . he desires to repre- sent himself so I will allow it.” Valenzuela represented himself at trial in October 2016, with standby counsel available, and the jury found him guilty on all counts. He is now serving a 195.3-month sentence. USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 5 of 14 25-11507 Opinion of the Court 5 On direct appeal, Valenzuela argued through counsel that the state trial court failed to conduct an adequate Faretta inquiry before allowing him to proceed pro se and failed to renew the in- quiry at critical stages, including jury selection and the exercise of jury challenges. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed without opinion. See Valenzuela v. State, 243 So. 3d 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (unpublished table decision). The state postconvic- tion court later ordered resentencing on one claim but denied relief on others, including a speedy-trial claim, and the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed. Valenzuela then filed this § 2254 petition in district court. Ground One challenged both the adequacy of the May 31 inquiry and the state trial court’s failure to conduct a Faretta inquiry at crit- ical stages of trial. Ground Two alleged that counsel was ineffec- tive for failing to move to suppress his statements to police under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Ground Three challenged both the trial court’s failure to honor his right to a speedy trial and his counsel’s failure to advise him of that right. Ground Four al- leged that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress videos found on a laptop that Valenzuela said was not his. The district court denied the petition, holding as relevant here that the May 31 inquiry satisfied Faretta and that the speedy-trial claim failed under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Valenzuela USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 6 of 14 6 Opinion of the Court 25-11507 timely appealed, and we granted a certificate of appealability on the three issues described above. 1 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review de novo the district court’s denial of a § 2254 peti- tion. See Sims v. Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 1998). Our review is limited to the issues specified in the certificate of ap- pealability. See Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1250–51 (11th Cir. 1998). We likewise review de novo whether a district court vi- olated Clisby, see Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1298–99 (11th Cir. 2013), and we liberally construe pro se filings, see id. at 1299. III. ANALYSIS A. The May 31 Waiver of Counsel A federal court may not grant habeas relief on a claim adju- dicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable de- termination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The petitioner must show that the state court’s ruling “was so lacking in justification 1 We denied a certificate of appealability as to Ground Two, the ineffective- assistance portion of Ground Three, and Ground Four. USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 7 of 14 25-11507 Opinion of the Court 7 that there was an error well understood and comprehended in ex- isting law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). In applying this deference, we evaluate the highest state- court decision that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Mar- shall v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). Because the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed without opin- ion, we “look through” that unexplained decision “to the last re- lated state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale,” and we “presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018). Thus, we look here to the state trial court’s ruling, after its colloquy, permit- ting Valenzuela to represent himself. A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself, but because he thereby “relinquishes . . . many of the tra- ditional benefits associated with the right to counsel,” he must “knowingly and intelligently” forgo them, and “he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807, 835 (citation omitted) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). The Supreme Court has “not, however, prescribed any formula or script to be read to a defendant who states that he elects to proceed without counsel.” Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004). The “ideal method” of assuring a valid USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 8 of 14 8 Opinion of the Court 25-11507 waiver is a pretrial hearing “at which the defendant would be in- formed of the charges, basic trial procedures, and the hazards of self-representation,” but the hearing is only “a means to the end” of ensuring that the waiver is knowing and voluntary. United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 645 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omit- ted). In evaluating a waiver, we have considered eight factors: (1) the defendant’s age, educational background, and physical and mental health; (2) the extent of the defendant’s contact with law- yers before trial; (3) the defendant’s knowledge of the nature of the charges, possible defenses, and penalties; (4) the defendant’s under- standing of the rules of procedure, evidence, and courtroom deco- rum; (5) the defendant’s experience in criminal trials; (6) whether standby counsel was appointed and the extent to which that coun- sel aided the defendant; (7) any mistreatment or coercion; and (8) whether the defendant was trying to manipulate the events of the trial. See id. at 645–46 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 800 F.2d 1057, 1065–67 (11th Cir. 1986)). Measured against these principles, the state courts’ rejection of Valenzuela’s claim was not unreasonable. The trial court ad- dressed many of the relevant factors. It asked about Valenzuela’s education, his English, and his legal training. Valenzuela faults the court for not inquiring further into his education, but the court did ask a follow-up question about how far he had gone in school, and no Supreme Court decision prescribes a particular line of question- ing. See Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88. Valenzuela also had an interpreter at his pretrial hearings, including on May 31, and the court repeat- USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 9 of 14 25-11507 Opinion of the Court 9 edly found that his appointed counsel was providing effective assis- tance. His counsel had represented him for six months and had met with him in jail with an interpreter. Valenzuela also had all his discovery and listened to and discussed his recorded statements with counsel. He heard the State’s ten-year offer, which would also resolve similar charges pending in Colorado, and the court told him that he faced up to 50 years in prison if convicted. The court further warned him that it could not “assist [him] in any way,” that he would be “all on [his] own figuring out what objections to make, what questions to ask,” and that he would “be making a very bad decision.” The court then appointed standby counsel. After the colloquy and having expressly identified Faretta, the court found that Valenzuela wished to represent himself. Valenzuela does not show otherwise. He first contends that, beyond advising him of his sentencing exposure and that he would be on his own with objections and questions, the court did not ad- equately explain the dangers of self-representation. He identifies no Supreme Court decision requiring additional warnings, how- ever, and Tovar rejects the premise that Faretta prescribes adher- ence to a script. See 541 U.S. at 88. Valenzuela next emphasizes his limited education and Eng- lish, his lack of legal training, and his inexperience with criminal trials. But the trial court knew of his schooling, his limited English, and his lack of legal training when it accepted the waiver, and a defendant’s “technical legal knowledge, as such, [is] not relevant to USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 10 of 14 10 Opinion of the Court 25-11507 an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend him- self.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836. Valenzuela also asserts that he could not read, but he did not say so at the hearing and instead told the court that he had “read everything about [his] case.” Valenzuela further suggests that his waiver was coerced be- cause his appointed lawyers pressed him to accept the plea offer and he did not trust them. The trial court heard Valenzuela’s com- plaints at three hearings, however, finding each time that his coun- sel was performing competently. He identifies no Supreme Court decision holding a waiver involuntary because the alternative was competent appointed counsel he did not want. Further, to the ex- tent he contends that his limited education and the language bar- rier coerced his choice, he points to nothing at the May 31 hearing suggesting that anyone pressed him to give up counsel; in fact, the court urged him to keep it. Valenzuela’s remaining arguments concern events beyond the May 31 hearing, including standby counsel’s role at trial and the trial court’s failure to renew the offer of counsel before his original sentencing—an omission the court ultimately corrected by vacat- ing the sentence and appointing counsel. Those arguments, though, fall outside the first certified issue, which is limited to the May 31 hearing. See Murray, 145 F.3d at 1250–51. For the same reason, we express no view on whether the trial court was required to renew its Faretta inquiry during jury selection and jury chal- lenges, which is part of the claim we remand. USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 11 of 14 25-11507 Opinion of the Court 11 The state trial court invoked Faretta and applied no rule con- tradicting it, and Valenzuela identifies no Supreme Court decision reaching a different result on materially indistinguishable facts, so the state courts’ decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000). It was also not an unreasonable application of Faretta. Although Valenzuela had repeatedly complained about his appointed coun- sel, had limited education and English ability, and lacked any legal training, those facts at most make the validity of his waiver debat- able, and a “state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit pre- cludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disa- gree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (quotation marks omitted). We thus conclude that the district court correctly denied relief on this claim. We now turn to address the Clisby claims. B. The Clisby Claims In Clisby, we instructed district courts “to resolve all claims for relief raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988), regardless whether habeas relief is granted or denied.” 960 F.2d at 936. A claim for relief is “any allegation of a constitutional violation,” id., and when a district court fails to re- solve such a claim, we vacate without prejudice and remand, see id. at 938. However, a “habeas petitioner must present a claim in clear and simple language such that the district court may not misunder- stand it,” Dupree, 715 F.3d at 1299, and there is no Clisby error when the petitioner did not present the claim as an independent ground USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 12 of 14 12 Opinion of the Court 25-11507 for relief, see Barritt v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 1246, 1251– 52 (11th Cir. 2020). The State concedes that the district court violated Clisby as to both claims, and our review of the record confirms it.2 Ground One. In addition to challenging the May 31 inquiry, Ground One alleged that “the trial court was required to conduct a Faretta inquiry” at jury selection and jury challenges and that the trial court had not done so. Valenzuela separately explained that “[a]dditional error occurred in the trial court’s pretrial Faretta in- quiry on May 31, 2016.” The district court’s own summary de- scribed Ground One as challenging the inquiry “prior to permitting Petitioner to proceed pro se and at critical stages of the proceed- ings,” but its analysis addressed only the inquiry “prior to permit- ting him to proceed pro se” and stated that the “sufficiency of the inquiry is the only question at issue.” The district court’s observa- tion that the trial court “provided Petitioner opportunities to end his self-representation throughout the trial” supported its conclu- sion about the initial waiver, but the court did not resolve whether Faretta required a renewed inquiry at later stages. Ground Three. Valenzuela described Ground Three as “two fold” because “the trial court failed to honor Petitioner’s right to 2 Although Valenzuela’s brief focuses on the merits of the unresolved claims, he cites Clisby and asks us to reverse and remand or order an evidentiary hear- ing, and the State does not argue abandonment but instead concedes error. Liberally construing Valenzuela’s brief, we conclude that these issues are properly before us. See Dupree, 715 F.3d at 1299. USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 13 of 14 25-11507 Opinion of the Court 13 speedy trial,” and counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Valenzuela of the speedy-trial right and for waiving the right with- out his consent. Valenzuela invoked Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), and Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992). The district court, however, described Ground Three solely as a claim that Valenzuela was “deprived of his right to a speedy trial based on counsel’s ineffective assistance” and resolved it under Strickland. It never addressed the freestanding claim that the trial court violated Valenzuela’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. Unlike the passing reference in Barritt, each of these claims was presented in Valenzuela’s petition as a distinct ground for relief with its own supporting allegations. See 968 F.3d at 1251–52. The district court therefore violated Clisby by failing to resolve them. We express no view on the merits of either claim, see Dupree, 715 F.3d at 1299, or on any procedural defense the State may raise on remand. Further, because the district court fully resolved the claim certified in the first issue, which Valenzuela asks us to decide, we affirm as to that claim and vacate only as to the unresolved claims. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, we affirm the denial of Valenzuela’s claim that the May 31, 2016, Faretta inquiry was inadequate. We vacate the judgment in part and remand for the district court to address Valenzuela’s claims that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a renewed Faretta inquiry during jury selection and jury challenges and that the trial court violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 14 of 14 14 Opinion of the Court 25-11507 AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.