Arturo Valenzuela v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-11507
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 1 of 14
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-11507
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
ARTURO VALENZUELA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 9:23-cv-80971-RS
____________________
Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Arturo Valenzuela, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, ap-
peals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas
USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 2 of 14
2 Opinion of the Court 25-11507
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We granted a certificate of appeala-
bility on three issues: (1) whether the state trial court sufficiently
complied with Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), on May 31,
2016, to ensure that Valenzuela knowingly and intelligently waived
his right to counsel; and whether the district court violated Clisby
v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), by failing to address
his claims that (2) the trial court erred by failing to conduct another
Faretta inquiry during jury selection and jury challenges, and (3) the
trial court violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
After careful review, we conclude that the state courts’ re-
jection of Valenzuela’s challenge to the May 31, 2016, waiver was
neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly es-
tablished federal law, and we affirm as to that claim. Because the
district court did not resolve the other two claims, we vacate in part
and remand for the district court to address them in the first in-
stance.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The State charged Valenzuela with ten counts of possessing,
controlling, or intentionally viewing a sexual performance by a
child; it later amended the information to charge fifteen counts.
Before trial, Valenzuela moved three times under Nelson v. State,
274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), to discharge his appointed
counsel. At the first two hearings, the state trial court found that
counsel was performing competently and told Valenzuela that he
could keep his appointed lawyer, hire his own lawyer, or represent
himself.
USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 3 of 14
25-11507 Opinion of the Court 3
The third Nelson hearing took place on May 31, 2016, with
an interpreter present. Valenzuela complained that his lawyer had
told him to plead guilty. The prosecutor confirmed that the State
had offered ten years’ imprisonment to resolve both the Florida
case and similar charges pending in Colorado, noting that Valen-
zuela faced up to 50 years in prison if convicted at trial. The state
trial court found counsel competent and again offered Valenzuela
the same three choices; Valenzuela answered, “I will represent my-
self.” The following colloquy ensued:
THE COURT: Well, we’ll see about that. Okay, how
much education do you have?
MR. VALENZUELA: Up to grade school.
THE COURT: Grade school, as in what grade?
MR. VALENZUELA: Well, it was in Mexico; I don’t
know what it’s like here.
THE COURT: And clearly you do not speak English?
MR. VALENZUELA: No.
THE COURT: And you have no training in law?
MR. VALENZUELA: I have read everything about
my case in this year that I have been in prison; I think
I can represent myself.
THE COURT: You have no training in law, correct?
MR. VALENZUELA: No.
USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 4 of 14
4 Opinion of the Court 25-11507
THE COURT: And no understanding of the English
language?
MR. VALENZUELA: A little.
THE COURT: Well, there’s a saying here that says a
person who represents themselves has a fool for a cli-
ent. I cannot assist you in any way with the presenta-
tion of your case; you will be all on your own figuring
out what objections to make, what questions to ask,
and I would strongly suggest that you reconsider and
move forward with an attorney free of charge. . . .
THE COURT: Sir, I strongly suggest that you don’t
represent yourself; you will be making a very bad de-
cision. If you insist on doing so I will allow it . . . . I’ll
be setting your trial and you’ll be going to trial in the
next several weeks, so you feel that you are prepared
to move forward on a trial in which I can sentence
you to 50 years in the Department of Corrections?
MR. VALENZUELA: Yes, that’s fine.
The court then appointed Valenzuela counsel as standby counsel
and ruled that, “with regard to the Faretta[,] . . . he desires to repre-
sent himself so I will allow it.”
Valenzuela represented himself at trial in October 2016,
with standby counsel available, and the jury found him guilty on
all counts. He is now serving a 195.3-month sentence.
USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 5 of 14
25-11507 Opinion of the Court 5
On direct appeal, Valenzuela argued through counsel that
the state trial court failed to conduct an adequate Faretta inquiry
before allowing him to proceed pro se and failed to renew the in-
quiry at critical stages, including jury selection and the exercise of
jury challenges. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed
without opinion. See Valenzuela v. State, 243 So. 3d 389 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2018) (unpublished table decision). The state postconvic-
tion court later ordered resentencing on one claim but denied relief
on others, including a speedy-trial claim, and the Fourth District
Court of Appeal affirmed.
Valenzuela then filed this § 2254 petition in district court.
Ground One challenged both the adequacy of the May 31 inquiry
and the state trial court’s failure to conduct a Faretta inquiry at crit-
ical stages of trial. Ground Two alleged that counsel was ineffec-
tive for failing to move to suppress his statements to police under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Ground Three challenged
both the trial court’s failure to honor his right to a speedy trial and
his counsel’s failure to advise him of that right. Ground Four al-
leged that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress
videos found on a laptop that Valenzuela said was not his. The
district court denied the petition, holding as relevant here that the
May 31 inquiry satisfied Faretta and that the speedy-trial claim failed
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Valenzuela
USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 6 of 14
6 Opinion of the Court 25-11507
timely appealed, and we granted a certificate of appealability on the
three issues described above. 1
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a § 2254 peti-
tion. See Sims v. Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 1998).
Our review is limited to the issues specified in the certificate of ap-
pealability. See Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1250–51 (11th
Cir. 1998). We likewise review de novo whether a district court vi-
olated Clisby, see Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1298–99 (11th
Cir. 2013), and we liberally construe pro se filings, see id. at 1299.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The May 31 Waiver of Counsel
A federal court may not grant habeas relief on a claim adju-
dicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s decision
“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable de-
termination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The petitioner must
show that the state court’s ruling “was so lacking in justification
1 We denied a certificate of appealability as to Ground Two, the ineffective-
assistance portion of Ground Three, and Ground Four.
USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 7 of 14
25-11507 Opinion of the Court 7
that there was an error well understood and comprehended in ex-
isting law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).
In applying this deference, we evaluate the highest state-
court decision that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Mar-
shall v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016).
Because the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed without opin-
ion, we “look through” that unexplained decision “to the last re-
lated state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale,”
and we “presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same
reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018). Thus, we
look here to the state trial court’s ruling, after its colloquy, permit-
ting Valenzuela to represent himself.
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to represent
himself, but because he thereby “relinquishes . . . many of the tra-
ditional benefits associated with the right to counsel,” he must
“knowingly and intelligently” forgo them, and “he should be made
aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so
that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and
his choice is made with eyes open.’” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807, 835
(citation omitted) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann,
317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). The Supreme Court has “not, however,
prescribed any formula or script to be read to a defendant who
states that he elects to proceed without counsel.” Iowa v. Tovar,
541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004). The “ideal method” of assuring a valid
USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 8 of 14
8 Opinion of the Court 25-11507
waiver is a pretrial hearing “at which the defendant would be in-
formed of the charges, basic trial procedures, and the hazards of
self-representation,” but the hearing is only “a means to the end”
of ensuring that the waiver is knowing and voluntary. United States
v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 645 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omit-
ted). In evaluating a waiver, we have considered eight factors: (1)
the defendant’s age, educational background, and physical and
mental health; (2) the extent of the defendant’s contact with law-
yers before trial; (3) the defendant’s knowledge of the nature of the
charges, possible defenses, and penalties; (4) the defendant’s under-
standing of the rules of procedure, evidence, and courtroom deco-
rum; (5) the defendant’s experience in criminal trials; (6) whether
standby counsel was appointed and the extent to which that coun-
sel aided the defendant; (7) any mistreatment or coercion; and (8)
whether the defendant was trying to manipulate the events of the
trial. See id. at 645–46 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 800 F.2d
1057, 1065–67 (11th Cir. 1986)).
Measured against these principles, the state courts’ rejection
of Valenzuela’s claim was not unreasonable. The trial court ad-
dressed many of the relevant factors. It asked about Valenzuela’s
education, his English, and his legal training. Valenzuela faults the
court for not inquiring further into his education, but the court did
ask a follow-up question about how far he had gone in school, and
no Supreme Court decision prescribes a particular line of question-
ing. See Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88. Valenzuela also had an interpreter
at his pretrial hearings, including on May 31, and the court repeat-
USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 9 of 14
25-11507 Opinion of the Court 9
edly found that his appointed counsel was providing effective assis-
tance. His counsel had represented him for six months and had
met with him in jail with an interpreter. Valenzuela also had all his
discovery and listened to and discussed his recorded statements
with counsel. He heard the State’s ten-year offer, which would also
resolve similar charges pending in Colorado, and the court told
him that he faced up to 50 years in prison if convicted. The court
further warned him that it could not “assist [him] in any way,” that
he would be “all on [his] own figuring out what objections to make,
what questions to ask,” and that he would “be making a very bad
decision.” The court then appointed standby counsel. After the
colloquy and having expressly identified Faretta, the court found
that Valenzuela wished to represent himself.
Valenzuela does not show otherwise. He first contends that,
beyond advising him of his sentencing exposure and that he would
be on his own with objections and questions, the court did not ad-
equately explain the dangers of self-representation. He identifies
no Supreme Court decision requiring additional warnings, how-
ever, and Tovar rejects the premise that Faretta prescribes adher-
ence to a script. See 541 U.S. at 88.
Valenzuela next emphasizes his limited education and Eng-
lish, his lack of legal training, and his inexperience with criminal
trials. But the trial court knew of his schooling, his limited English,
and his lack of legal training when it accepted the waiver, and a
defendant’s “technical legal knowledge, as such, [is] not relevant to
USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 10 of 14
10 Opinion of the Court 25-11507
an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend him-
self.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836. Valenzuela also asserts that he could
not read, but he did not say so at the hearing and instead told the
court that he had “read everything about [his] case.”
Valenzuela further suggests that his waiver was coerced be-
cause his appointed lawyers pressed him to accept the plea offer
and he did not trust them. The trial court heard Valenzuela’s com-
plaints at three hearings, however, finding each time that his coun-
sel was performing competently. He identifies no Supreme Court
decision holding a waiver involuntary because the alternative was
competent appointed counsel he did not want. Further, to the ex-
tent he contends that his limited education and the language bar-
rier coerced his choice, he points to nothing at the May 31 hearing
suggesting that anyone pressed him to give up counsel; in fact, the
court urged him to keep it.
Valenzuela’s remaining arguments concern events beyond
the May 31 hearing, including standby counsel’s role at trial and the
trial court’s failure to renew the offer of counsel before his original
sentencing—an omission the court ultimately corrected by vacat-
ing the sentence and appointing counsel. Those arguments,
though, fall outside the first certified issue, which is limited to the
May 31 hearing. See Murray, 145 F.3d at 1250–51. For the same
reason, we express no view on whether the trial court was required
to renew its Faretta inquiry during jury selection and jury chal-
lenges, which is part of the claim we remand.
USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 11 of 14
25-11507 Opinion of the Court 11
The state trial court invoked Faretta and applied no rule con-
tradicting it, and Valenzuela identifies no Supreme Court decision
reaching a different result on materially indistinguishable facts, so
the state courts’ decision was not contrary to clearly established
federal law. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000). It
was also not an unreasonable application of Faretta. Although
Valenzuela had repeatedly complained about his appointed coun-
sel, had limited education and English ability, and lacked any legal
training, those facts at most make the validity of his waiver debat-
able, and a “state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit pre-
cludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disa-
gree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Richter, 562
U.S. at 101 (quotation marks omitted). We thus conclude that the
district court correctly denied relief on this claim. We now turn to
address the Clisby claims.
B. The Clisby Claims
In Clisby, we instructed district courts “to resolve all claims
for relief raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988), regardless whether habeas relief is granted
or denied.” 960 F.2d at 936. A claim for relief is “any allegation of
a constitutional violation,” id., and when a district court fails to re-
solve such a claim, we vacate without prejudice and remand, see id.
at 938. However, a “habeas petitioner must present a claim in clear
and simple language such that the district court may not misunder-
stand it,” Dupree, 715 F.3d at 1299, and there is no Clisby error when
the petitioner did not present the claim as an independent ground
USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 12 of 14
12 Opinion of the Court 25-11507
for relief, see Barritt v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 1246, 1251–
52 (11th Cir. 2020).
The State concedes that the district court violated Clisby as
to both claims, and our review of the record confirms it.2
Ground One. In addition to challenging the May 31 inquiry,
Ground One alleged that “the trial court was required to conduct
a Faretta inquiry” at jury selection and jury challenges and that the
trial court had not done so. Valenzuela separately explained that
“[a]dditional error occurred in the trial court’s pretrial Faretta in-
quiry on May 31, 2016.” The district court’s own summary de-
scribed Ground One as challenging the inquiry “prior to permitting
Petitioner to proceed pro se and at critical stages of the proceed-
ings,” but its analysis addressed only the inquiry “prior to permit-
ting him to proceed pro se” and stated that the “sufficiency of the
inquiry is the only question at issue.” The district court’s observa-
tion that the trial court “provided Petitioner opportunities to end
his self-representation throughout the trial” supported its conclu-
sion about the initial waiver, but the court did not resolve whether
Faretta required a renewed inquiry at later stages.
Ground Three. Valenzuela described Ground Three as “two
fold” because “the trial court failed to honor Petitioner’s right to
2 Although Valenzuela’s brief focuses on the merits of the unresolved claims,
he cites Clisby and asks us to reverse and remand or order an evidentiary hear-
ing, and the State does not argue abandonment but instead concedes error.
Liberally construing Valenzuela’s brief, we conclude that these issues are
properly before us. See Dupree, 715 F.3d at 1299.
USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 13 of 14
25-11507 Opinion of the Court 13
speedy trial,” and counsel was ineffective for failing to advise
Valenzuela of the speedy-trial right and for waiving the right with-
out his consent. Valenzuela invoked Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972), and Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992). The district
court, however, described Ground Three solely as a claim that
Valenzuela was “deprived of his right to a speedy trial based on
counsel’s ineffective assistance” and resolved it under Strickland. It
never addressed the freestanding claim that the trial court violated
Valenzuela’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Unlike the passing reference in Barritt, each of these claims
was presented in Valenzuela’s petition as a distinct ground for relief
with its own supporting allegations. See 968 F.3d at 1251–52. The
district court therefore violated Clisby by failing to resolve them.
We express no view on the merits of either claim, see Dupree, 715
F.3d at 1299, or on any procedural defense the State may raise on
remand. Further, because the district court fully resolved the claim
certified in the first issue, which Valenzuela asks us to decide, we
affirm as to that claim and vacate only as to the unresolved claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the denial of Valenzuela’s
claim that the May 31, 2016, Faretta inquiry was inadequate. We
vacate the judgment in part and remand for the district court to
address Valenzuela’s claims that the trial court erred by failing to
conduct a renewed Faretta inquiry during jury selection and jury
challenges and that the trial court violated his constitutional right
to a speedy trial.
USCA11 Case: 25-11507 Document: 37-1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 Page: 14 of 14
14 Opinion of the Court 25-11507
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND
REMANDED.