Full Opinion

FILED OCTOBER 20, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE PALOUSE FAMILY APARTMENTS, ) No. 41223-7-III LLC, a Washington limited liability ) company, a/k/a COPPER HILL ) APARTMENTS, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) HAYDN LIESEKE, and all other ) occupants of 3210 E. 44th Ave., #J206, ) Spokane, WA, ) ) Respondent. ) LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — In this unlawful detainer dispute, Palouse Family Apartments (PFA) appeals the trial court’s reduced attorney fee award to it. Haydn Lieseke cross-appeals and argues the trial court erred in entering a money judgment in favor of PFA because the court never had personal jurisdiction over her. We agree, reverse, and decline to address the other issues raised by the parties. FACTS PFA sought to evict its tenant, Haydn Lieseke, for nonpayment of three months of rent. It elected to post the unlawful detainer summons and complaint on the front door to her rental unit rather than to serve her personally. At the time of the posting, PFA had No. 41223-7-III Palouse Family Apartments v. Lieseke not filed its summons and complaint with the court. The summons provided Lieseke with instructions for how to respond with a notice of appearance. Lieseke mailed her notice of appearance in accordance with the summons’ instructions to PFA’s attorney. Lieseke included a typed note with her notice of appearance, explaining she had attempted to pay, but PFA rejected the payment because it did not include the current month’s rent. She also said she had enough funds to pay the full amount of rent owed. One week later, PFA filed the summons and complaint with the court and applied for and obtained a hearing to show cause (1) why a writ of restitution should not be issued restoring PFA to possession, and (2) why judgment should not be entered for PFA for amounts owing, including its reasonable attorney fees. As part of its filings, PFA filed Lieseke’s notice of appearance and her typed note. Lieseke failed to appear at the show cause hearing, and the trial court ordered that a writ of restitution be issued and a judgment be entered for the relief requested in PFA’s complaint, including its request for attorney fees. Soon after, PSA’s counsel filed an attorney fee declaration, setting forth its fee and cost requests. Around this time, Lieseke was served with the writ of restitution. 2 No. 41223-7-III Palouse Family Apartments v. Lieseke Lieseke then appeared with counsel and sought to stay the writ. In her accompanying declaration, she demonstrated she had tendered to PFA the amount stated in the 30-day notice to pay rent, but PFA rejected payment and demanded that Lieseke also pay the current month’s rent. Lieseke also disputed that she received notice of the show cause hearing and asserted she had certified funds to pay the total amounts requested by PFA, excluding its attorney fees.1 Soon after, Lieseke modified her motion to stay for one to quash the writ and reinstate her tenancy. In her motion, she argued reinstatement was required under RCW 59.18.410(2) and that reinstatement should not be “Held Hostage” because PFA was demanding its attorney fees. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 207 (boldface omitted). Citing RCW 59.18.055(2), she argued PFA was not entitled to a money judgment because she had not been personally served with the unlawful detainer summons and complaint. Also, citing RCW 59.18.290(3), she argued PFA was not entitled to attorney fees because PFA was not entitled to a judgment.2 In response, PFA argued that a money judgment 1 The rent owed was readily determinable, and the allowed costs were known because they were included in opposing counsel’s fee and cost declaration. 2 At the time, the court had issued an order (1) granting PFA a writ of restitution restoring possession to it, and (2) determining that PFA was entitled to the relief requested in its complaint. No judgment had been entered yet. 3 No. 41223-7-III Palouse Family Apartments v. Lieseke could be entered because the court had gained personal jurisdiction over Lieseke by her requesting affirmative relief—that her tenancy be reinstated. It also argued that reinstatement was not permitted before entry of judgment and that entry of judgment would entitle it to attorney fees. The trial court concluded that reinstatement could occur prior to judgment and granted Lieseke’s request for reinstatement conditioned on her paying the amounts owed. However, the court refused to condition reinstatement on Lieseke paying PFA’s attorney fees. Rather, it concluded it could enter judgment for PFA for its reasonable attorney fees in accordance with RCW 59.18.290(3). Later, the parties argued the amount of PFA’s reasonable attorney fees. The court reduced PFA’s requested fees by 90 percent, reasoning that counsel’s briefing would “benefit[ ] other [of his] clients and other cases” and presumably would be recoverable in those cases. CP at 288. PFA appealed, and Lieseke cross-appealed. ANALYSIS Lieseke argues the trial court erred in awarding a money judgment in favor of PFA because the trial court never obtained personal jurisdiction over her. The parties raise 4 No. 41223-7-III Palouse Family Apartments v. Lieseke other issues but because Lieseke’s first argument is dispositive, we do not decide those other issues. The dispositive issue requires an examination of RCW 59.18.055, which provides in relevant part: RCW 59.18.055 Notice—Alternative procedure—Court’s jurisdiction limited—Application to chapter 59.20 RCW. (1) When the landlord, after the exercise of due diligence, is unable to personally serve the summons on the tenant, the landlord may use the alternative means of service as follows: (a) The summons and complaint shall be posted in a conspicuous place on the premises unlawfully held, not less than nine days from the return date stated in the summons; and (b) Copies of the summons and complaint shall be deposited in the mail, postage prepaid, by both regular mail and certified mail directed to the tenant’s or tenants’ last known address not less than nine days from the return date stated in the summons. (2) When service on the tenant or tenants is accomplished by this alternative procedure, the court’s jurisdiction is limited to restoring possession of the premises to the landlord and no money judgment may be entered against the tenant or tenants until such time as jurisdiction over the tenant or tenants is obtained. (Emphasis added.) Lieseke contends the court never obtained personal jurisdiction over her and thus it could not enter a money judgment against her. PFA counters that Lieseke consented to the court’s jurisdiction by seeking affirmative relief—reinstatement of her tenancy. Before we address the jurisdiction-by-consent issue, we address PFA’s prefatory 5 No. 41223-7-III Palouse Family Apartments v. Lieseke argument that Lieseke should not be entitled to raise “lack of personal jurisdiction” for the first time on appeal. 1. Lieseke raised the trial court’s lack of personal jurisdiction below Lack of jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a)(1). But lack of personal jurisdiction may be waived as provided in CR 12(h). See Robb v. Kaufman, 81 Wn. App. 182, 188, 913 P.2d 828 (1996) (citing In re Marriage of Parks, 48 Wn. App. 166, 170, 737 P.2d 1316 (1987), discussing CR 12). We need not engage in a CR 12(h) analysis because Lieseke raised the trial court’s lack of personal jurisdiction in her motion to quash the writ and reinstate tenancy, which stated in relevant part: Plaintiff’s refusal to accept the reinstatement amount without the voluntary payment of alleged attorney fees is unsupported by RCW 59.18 et seq. See RCW 59.18.055(2) (“When service on the tenant or tenants is accomplished by this alternative procedure, the court’s jurisdiction is limited to restoring possession of the premises to the landlord and no money judgment may be entered against the [tenant] or tenants until such time as jurisdiction over the tenant or tenants is obtained.”). CP at 207-08. We now address the dispositive issue. 6 No. 41223-7-III Palouse Family Apartments v. Lieseke 2. The trial court never obtained personal jurisdiction over Lieseke PFA argues that Lieseke consented to personal jurisdiction by requesting affirmative relief—asking the trial court to reinstate her tenancy. We disagree that this request caused Lieseke to consent to personal jurisdiction over her. Courts will recognize a waiver of a jurisdictional defense if a defendant acts inconsistently with that defense. Lybbert v. Grant County, 141 Wn.2d 29, 38-39, 1 P.3d 1124 (2000); Castellon v. Rodriguez, 4 Wn. App. 2d 8, 15, 418 P.3d 804 (2018). Sometimes, the inconsistent act is requesting affirmative relief. See, e.g., Parks, 48 Wn. App. at 170 (divorcing husband sought his military pension and original dissolution court awarded entire pension to husband). Here, Lieseke never acted inconsistently with her jurisdictional defense: throughout the proceedings Lieseke consistently argued that a money judgment could not be entered against her because the proceeding was instituted against her by alternative service under RCW 59.18.055, and the court’s lack of personal jurisdiction over her limited PFA’s remedy to restoration of the premises. In addition, the type of “affirmative relief” that would constitute a waiver of a jurisdictional defense has been clarified since Parks. Recently, in In re Recall of Suggs, 4 Wn.3d 511, 517, 565 P.3d 927 (2025), the court reiterated, “[a]ffirmative relief” is relief for which the defendant might maintain an action independent of plaintiff’s claim. 7 No. 41223-7-III Palouse Family Apartments v. Lieseke Here, Lieseke could not have sought reinstatement of her tenancy in an action independent of the unlawful detainer proceeding. We conclude that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Lieseke and that Lieseke did not later consent to the court’s personal jurisdiction over her. Under RCW 59.18.055(2), the trial court lacked authority to enter a money judgment, including a judgment for attorney fees, against Lieseke.3 Reversed. A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040. _________________________________ Lawrence-Berrey, J. WE CONCUR: ______________________________ _________________________________ Murphy, J. Hill, J. 3 PFA argues that former RCW 59.18.230(2)(c) (2022) applies and does not preclude enforcement of a rental agreement clause entitling a prevailing party to attorney fees, even if such fees are not recoverable under chapter 59.18 RCW. We need not address this issue because PFA has not prevailed on appeal. 8