360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC 360 M.S.R. ASSOCIATES, LLC, ET AL. v. 350 MAIN STREET MIDDLETOWN, LLC, ET AL. (AC 47817) Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Seeley, Js.* Syllabus The defendants, M Co. and B, appealed from the trial court’s judgment determining, inter alia, that they had interfered with the plaintiff’s use of an easement over an alleyway, a ten foot wide strip of land that runs between the property of M Co. and the property of the plaintiff. The defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court had improperly concluded that the easement was not limited to pedestrian use. Held: The trial court did not err in concluding that the easement, which was created in a 1905 deed between the predecessors in title of the plaintiff and M Co., was not limited to pedestrian use, as the unambiguous language of the deed created an express right-of-way easement without any limitations on how it could be used, and the circumstances surrounding the alleyway that was the subject of the easement, its physical characteristics, and public policy did not warrant a different interpretation of the deed’s language. The trial court did not err in concluding that passage over the alleyway by motor vehicles to access the rear of the plaintiff’s property was a reason- able use of the easement, as there was a lack of evidence to establish that historical use of the servitude by vehicles unreasonably interfered with the servient estate, the easement accommodated vehicle use by the plaintiff and its tenants without issue up until the time that B, M Co.’s tenant, placed obstructions in the alleyway, use of the easement was the only way in which the plaintiff could access the rear of its property, and the 1905 deed did not contain language limiting the scope or use of the easement to pedestrians. The trial court did not err by failing to evaluate and conclude as a matter of law that vehicular use of the alleyway was unlawful and against public policy, as vehicular use of the easement was reasonable, and the court found that the defendants did not establish their claims that vehicular use of the easement violated the Life Safety Code, which ensures fire safety compliance, or public policy governing safe passage by impeding access to the alleyway by pedestrians in the event of a fire or other emergency. The trial court reasonably could have determined, on the basis of the testi- mony before it, that B’s conduct in obstructing vehicular use of the easement was intentional and was designed to block the plaintiff’s use of the easement area, even though B did not testify, and, accordingly, this court could not conclude that the trial court’s decision to award punitive damages constituted an abuse of its discretion. * The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.  360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC This court declined to review the defendants’ claim that the trial court erred in rendering judgment for the plaintiff as to certain counts of the defendants’ counterclaim, as that claim was not adequately briefed. Argued January 22—officially released August 25, 2026 Procedural History Action seeking, inter alia, an injunction prohibiting the defendants from blocking or interfering with the named plaintiff’s use of an easement, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, where the defendants filed a counterclaim; thereafter, the plaintiff Ford News Diner, LLC, withdrew its claims against the defendants, and the defendants withdrew the counts of the counterclaim as against the plaintiff Ford News Diner, LLC; subsequently, the case was tried to the court, Hon. Edward S. Domnarski, judge trial referee; judgment in part for the named plaintiff on the complaint and on the counterclaim, from which the defendants appealed to this court. Affirmed. Jonathan M. Shapiro, with whom was Isabella Tatar, for the appellants (defendants). Mark A. Balaban, for the appellee (named plaintiff). Opinion SEELEY, J. The defendants, 350 Main Street Middle- town, LLC (350 Main), and Susan Bauer, doing business as The Cooking Company, appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff 360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC,1 with respect to counts one and two of the plaintiff’s complaint, which alleged that the defendants had interfered with the plaintiff’s use of an easement over a ten foot wide strip of land that runs between property of the plaintiff and 350 Main, and as to the claims against the plaintiff in a counterclaim filed 1 Ford News Diner, LLC, a tenant of 360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC, originally was a plaintiff in this case. Ford News Diner, LLC, subse- quently withdrew its claims against the defendants and is not a party to this appeal. Accordingly, we refer to 360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC, as the plaintiff in this opinion.  360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC by 350 Main. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly (1) concluded that the easement is not limited to pedestrian use only, (2) found that vehicu- lar use of the easement was reasonable, (3) determined that vehicular use of the easement did not violate public policy and applicable fire code provisions, (4) found that Bauer intentionally obstructed and interfered with the plaintiff’s use of the easement, thereby justifying an award against Bauer of nominal damages in the amount of $10 and punitive damages in the form of attorney’s fees, and (5) rendered judgment in favor of the plain- tiff with respect to counts three, eight and nine of the counterclaim. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court. The following facts, as set forth by the court in its memorandum of decision or as otherwise undisputed in the record, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendants’ appeal. The plaintiff owns property located at 360 Main Street in Middletown, and 350 Main owns abutting property located at 350 Main Street in Middletown. The plaintiff is the holder of the dominant estate, and 350 Main is the holder of the servient estate. The right-of-way easement at issue in this case “was first created by a deed dated May 1, 1905 [1905 deed], from August Johnson, a predeces- sor in title of [350 Main’s] property, to the plaintiff’s predecessor in title, The Pythian Building Corporation [Pythian].” Pursuant to the 1905 deed, Johnson con- veyed to Pythian the parcel of property now owned by the plaintiff and provided Pythian “with a right of way to the rear of said premises over the passageway on the south side of [Pythian’s property] about ten (10) feet in width” (1905 easement). The easement area referenced in the 1905 deed is situated between the buildings owned by the plaintiff and 350 Main, leads from Main Street to the rear of the buildings, and was referred to at trial as an alleyway (alleyway).2 2 We note that the alleyway between the two buildings also was referred to at trial as an accessway, a passageway and a driveway as well. For  360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC On May 15, 1925, Pythian entered into an agreement (1925 agreement) with 350 Main’s then predecessor in title, Alessandro Saraceno. Under the 1925 agreement, each party granted to the other the right to use a five foot wide strip of land to the rear of each party’s premises, thereby establishing a ten foot wide passageway (pas- sageway) that “shall always remain open on the boundary between the lands of said parties.” The 1925 agreement further stated that Pythian “shall have the right of using the drive-way from Main [Street], so as to be able to enter freely into said passage [1925 easement].” The “drive- way” referenced in the 1925 agreement is the alleyway that leads from Main Street to the rear of the buildings. In 1925, prior to the execution of the 1925 agreement, a historic theater known as the Capitol Theater was built, and it was situated in the rear of the property now owned by 350 Main. The ten foot wide passageway created in the 1925 agreement surrounded the Capitol Theater on the rear and both sides and led to the ten foot wide alleyway that leads out to Main Street. The court specifi- cally found that it was “reasonable to infer that the 1925 agreement, dated around the time the Capitol Theater was built, was entered into in order to create a ten foot wide passageway in the rear of the plaintiff’s property.” The 1905 and 1925 easements “are deed referenced and depicted on a map showing the plaintiff’s property . . . and are also referenced and depicted on maps of [350 Main’s] property.” (Citation omitted.) The plaintiff acquired the property located at 360 Main Street by quitclaim deed in 2008. Its deed specifically provides: “Premises conveyed together with the ten (10) foot right-of-way contained in a Warrantee Deed from . . . Johnson to [Pythian] dated on May 1, 1905, and recorded in Volume 133, at Page 527 of the Middle- town Land Records; and together with right-of-way as contained in a[n] agreement between Pythian . . . and . . . Saraceno dated May 15, 1925 and recorded in Volume 171 at Page 236 of the Middletown Land Records, all ease of reference, we will refer to it as an alleyway or a right-of-way in this opinion.  360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC as shown on the aforesaid map.” “After [the plaintiff] purchased the property [at 360 Main Street], [Alford] Quinland [a principal of the plaintiff] . . . would visit the property three times a week to perform repairs. When he visited the property, Quinland would drive his vehicle over the [alleyway] and park his car in the rear of 360 [Main Street].” Quinland was able to drive a motor vehicle through the alleyway without issue from the time the plaintiff purchased the property located at 360 Main Street until approximately 2017. Michael Stone, the sole member of 350 Main, purchased the property located at 350 Main Street in 2012. Two large doors on the side of the building located at 350 Main Street open into the alleyway between the buildings owned by 350 Main and the plaintiff. As we indicated previously in this opinion, prior to Stone’s purchase, “a portion of the property [at 350 Main Street] was utilized as . . . the Capitol Theater [which] was . . . demolished [in part] in 2011.”3 (Footnote omitted.) Subsequent to Stone’s purchase in 2012, the property remained vacant until sometime in 2017, when Bauer leased the property and began operating The Cooking Company. At all rel- evant times, Bauer was a tenant of 350 Main. Sometime after The Cooking Company began conduct- ing business at 350 Main Street, Bauer, unilaterally and without permission from the plaintiff, placed cement barriers, tables, chairs, and flowerpots in the alleyway to benefit patrons of The Cooking Company. After receiv- ing complaints from tenants, Quinland spoke to Stone, and, subsequently, the items were removed from the alleyway. Stone also instructed Bauer to refrain from blocking the alleyway. In or around 2019, Bauer, again unilaterally and with- out permission from the plaintiff, installed two platforms with stairs that extended approximately four feet into 3 The main theater building was demolished in 2011; however, the lobby building remains on the property. The lobby of the theater building previously operated as a liquor store, and it now comprises the premises leased to Bauer for the operation of The Cooking Company.  360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC the ten foot alleyway. The platforms allow access to the alleyway from the doors on the side of the building located at 350 Main Street. The defendants assert that these platforms and stairs are necessary to comply with the Middletown fire marshal’s instructions. As a result of the installation of the platforms and stairs, the plaintiff was unable to drive a motor vehicle over the alleyway. Thereafter, the plaintiff initiated the present action. By way of a four count, second revised verified complaint (operative complaint) dated July 2, 2020, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendants, by installing the platforms and stairs, unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the 1905 easement over the alleyway. In the first and second counts, the plain- tiff alleged that the defendants’ actions constituted a nuisance because they interfered with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the 1905 easement. In the third and fourth counts, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ actions tortiously interfered with business relations between the plaintiff and its tenant, Ford News Diner, LLC, because Quinland could not access the rear of the property with a motor vehicle to perform his duties as a landlord. With respect to relief, the plaintiff sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment, injunctive and equi- table relief, and compensatory and punitive damages. On May 6, 2019, the defendants filed an answer denying the plaintiff’s allegations, five special defenses,4 and a counterclaim. In the ten count counterclaim, 350 Main alleged claims against the plaintiff for trespass, nuisance, quiet title, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and tortious interference with business relations, as well as claims against Ford News Diner, LLC, for trespass and nui- sance.5 It also sought injunctive and declaratory relief. 4 The defendants do not contest the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff as to their special defenses, which alleged unclean hands, estoppel, bad faith, and failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. 5 Counts six and seven of the counterclaim, which were directed at Ford News Diner, LLC, were withdrawn prior to trial.  360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC The case was tried before the court, Hon. Edward S. Domnarski, judge trial referee, on December 19 and 20, 2023. Thereafter, both parties filed posttrial briefs. Prior to trial, the plaintiff and the defendants consented to the court’s visit to the property, without the presence of counsel, to view the property at issue in this case. At trial, the plaintiff presented testimony from Quin- land as its only witness. Quinland testified that, at the time the plaintiff purchased the 360 Main Street prop- erty, Quinland understood that the alleyway was “pro- tected by an easement,” although he did not obtain the details of the 1905 easement until the purchase was completed. Quinland testified that, from the time the plaintiff purchased the property until the time that Bauer obstructed the alleyway, he and his tenants drove over the alleyway without issue. Specifically, Quinland testified that, shortly after The Cooking Company became a tenant of 350 Main, Bauer placed flowerpots, tables and chairs in the alleyway, as well as concrete barriers, all of which obstructed the alleyway. Quinland explained that, as a result, he spoke with Stone, and, subsequently, the concrete barriers, tables and chairs were removed, but that, in 2019, Bauer installed platforms and stairs that protruded approximately four feet into the right- of-way. Further, Quinland testified that, as a result of those actions, he could not park his motor vehicle in the back of his property where there was sufficient space for parking but, instead, had to park in a metered parking space on Main Street, which required frequent atten- tion to ensure that he did not receive a parking ticket. Quinland testified that it was difficult for him to bring equipment from his vehicle parked on Main Street into the basement of the plaintiff’s building, which is accessed through the alleyway. Finally, Quinland testified about his prior complaints regarding the alleyway, including at least two complaints to the Middletown Fire Depart- ment about safety concerns after Bauer installed the platforms and stairs. Following cross-examination of Quinland, the plaintiff rested its case.  360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC Thereafter, the defendants offered testimony from Stone; Ok Yi, the owner of Ford News Diner, LLC; and Al Lespier, a Middletown Deputy Fire Marshal. Stone testified that, prior to his purchase of 350 Main Street in 2012, he undertook “[s]tandard due diligence” and com- missioned a survey of the property, which was admitted into evidence. Stone testified that there were no steps attached to the two doors on the side of the building at the time he purchased the property at 350 Main Street. Stone further testified that, to his knowledge, Bauer installed the platforms and stairs to comply with the fire marshal’s instructions. On cross-examination, Stone acknowledged that the platforms and stairs impacted approximately 40 percent of the alleyway but asserted that the platforms and stairs did not block the alleyway and that it was “still passable.” Yi testified that she has owned and operated Ford News Diner, LLC, since 1984 and was familiar with the alleyway between Ford News Diner, LLC, and the building at 350 Main Street, and that she previously had parked her car in the alleyway with permission from the plaintiff’s predecessor in title sometime during the 1990s. Yi also testified that she recalled others, including Quinland, parking in the alleyway. Further, Yi testified that, as a result of Bauer placing objects in the alleyway, it was inconvenient and difficult to receive deliveries. Yi also testified that, prior to the installation of the two stairways in the alleyway, she would drive through the alleyway on a regular basis to unload groceries at the back door of her diner, but that she could no longer do so after the stairways were installed. The defendants’ final witness, Lespier, testified that, in his role as the Deputy Fire Marshal of the Middletown Fire Department, he had visited the property located at 360 Main Street after Quinland submitted complaints about the obstruction of the alleyway. Lespier testified that he had received a complaint from Quinland that set forth safety concerns resulting from the defendants’ conduct in blocking the alleyway. Lespier testified that  360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC he had evaluated the alleyway and platforms and stairs to determine whether there was ample area for a path of travel in the event of an emergency. Lespier testified that he had applied the Life Safety Code,6 which requires a twenty-eight inch wide path of egress that is free from obstructions in the event of an emergency. When ques- tioned by the court, Lespier could not state whether a path that could accommodate a motor vehicle violated the Life Safety Code. On June 27, 2024, the court issued a memorandum of decision finding in favor of the plaintiff with respect to counts one and two of the operative complaint7 and counts one, two, three, four, five, eight and ten of the counterclaim.8 This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. I The defendants first challenge the court’s interpreta- tion of the 1905 easement over the alleyway. Specifically, 6 The Life Safety Code is employed by fire marshals as part of the fire safety compliance assessment required to operate a business in Con- necticut. Notably, the defendants did not plead a violation of the Life Safety Code in their special defenses or the counterclaim. 7 The court found that, with respect to counts three and four of the operative complaint, which alleged tortious interference with business relations, the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to prove the allegations in those counts, and it rendered judgment in favor of the defendants as to counts three and four. 8 As we already have indicated, counts six and seven of the counterclaim were withdrawn prior to trial. See footnote 5 of this opinion. With respect to count nine of the counterclaim, which sought a declaratory judgment determining the rights of the parties with respect to the 1905 easement, the court concluded that the 1905 easement over the alleyway was not limited to pedestrian traffic and that “the passage of motor vehicles over the right-of-way to access the rear of the plaintiff’s property [was] a reasonable use of the right-of-way,” and it rendered a declaratory judgment “in accordance with [those] conclusions.” With respect to the defendants’ special defenses, the court stated in its memorandum of decision: “Although the defendants filed general special defenses as to the plaintiff’s claims, they did not produce evidence at the trial to establish these defenses. Furthermore, they did not address their special defenses in their posttrial brief. Further discussion of the special defenses is not warranted.”  360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC the defendants claim that the court improperly (1) deter- mined that the 1905 easement over the alleyway is not limited to pedestrian use, (2) determined that vehicu- lar use of the 1905 easement is a reasonable use of the right-of-way, and (3) failed to evaluate and conclude as a matter of law that vehicular use of the right-of-way is unlawful and against public policy. We address each claim in turn. Before doing so, however, we set forth general principles governing easements and the appli- cable standard of review. “It is well settled that [a]n easement creates a nonpos- sessory right to enter and use land in the possession of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the rules authorized by the easement. . . . [T]he benefit of an easement . . . is considered a nonpossessory inter- est in land because it generally authorizes limited uses of the burdened property for a particular purpose. . . . [E]asements are not ownership interests but rather privi- leges to use [the] land of another in [a] certain manner for [a] certain purpose . . . . Except as limited by the terms of the servitude . . . the holder of an easement . . . is entitled to use the servient estate in a manner that is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the servitude. . . . Likewise, [e]xcept as limited by the terms of the servitude . . . the holder of the servient estate is entitled to make any use of the servient estate that does not unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of the servitude. . . . 57 Broad Street Stamford, LLC v. Summer House Owners, LLC, 184 Conn. App. 834, 841, 195 A.3d 1143 (2018). “The use of an easement must be reasonable and as little burdensome to the servient estate as the nature of the easement and the purpose will permit. . . . Ordi- narily when [judicial] opinions speak of the use of an easement, it arises in right-of-way cases. Thus use fre- quently involves the amount of traffic over the easement or alterations to the land to make it passable. . . . This is not to overlook, however, that [t]he owner of an ease- ment has all rights incident or necessary to its proper  360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC enjoyment, [although] nothing more. . . . Kuras v. Kope, 205 Conn. 332, 341, 533 A.2d 1202 (1987). “Significantly, the full scope of the use to be made of [an easement] requires evaluation of the purpose it was to serve. . . . [A]ppellate case law . . . [has] used the terms location, scope, and use somewhat interchange- ably. . . . [Our Supreme Court has] read scope and use as having similar meanings insofar as they involve what [the] holder [of the easement] may do with it, [and] the purposes for which it may be used.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, 221 Conn. App. 657, 669–71, 303 A.3d 13 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 938, 307 A.3d 273 (2024). In the present case, the parties do not dispute the exis- tence of the 1905 easement over the alleyway between the two properties. At issue in this case is the permissible scope of the 1905 easement and whether the plaintiff’s utilization of the easement for vehicular access to the area located in the rear of its building constitutes a rea- sonable use of the easement. “Both this court and our Supreme Court have noted that Connecticut case law regarding the standard of review in easement cases is somewhat confusing . . . . Deane v. Kahn, [317 Conn. 157, 167 n.6, 116 A.3d 259 (2015)], quoting Sanders v. Dias, 108 Conn. App. 283, 290, 947 A.2d 1026 (2008). In an attempt to provide some clarity, our Supreme Court, in Deane v. Kahn, supra, 167 n.6, stated: Our scope of review as to the intent behind language in a deed is plenary. . . . Although the intent to create an easement by deed is therefore a question of law over which our review is plenary . . . if the language of the deed is incomplete or ambiguous regarding the location, scope, or use of the easement, the trial court’s resolution of those issues represents a question of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. . . . In the absence of unambiguous or complete language in the deed, therefore, determining the location, scope, and use of an express easement is a fact-intensive inquiry  360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC properly subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. . . . “Nevertheless, when faced with a question regarding the construction of language in deeds, the reviewing court does not give the customary deference to the trial court’s factual inferences. . . . The meaning and effect of the [language in the deed] are to be determined, not by the actual intent of the parties, but by the intent expressed in the deed, considering all its relevant pro- visions and reading it in the light of the surrounding circumstances. . . . “Our basic rule of construction is that recognition will be given to the expressed intention of the parties to a deed . . . and that it shall, if possible, be so construed as to effectuate the intent of the parties. . . . In arriving at the intent expressed . . . in the language used, however, it is always admissible to consider the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction, and every part of the writing should be considered with the help of that evidence. . . . “In the construction of a deed or grant, the language is to be construed in connection with, and in reference to, the nature and condition of the subject matter of the grant at the time the instrument is executed, and the obvious purpose the parties had in view. . . . [I]f the meaning of the language contained in a deed or convey- ance is not clear, the trial court is bound to consider any relevant extrinsic evidence presented by the parties for the purpose of clarifying the ambiguity. . . . “Finally, we note that [t]he fact that servitudes are intended to bind successors to interests in the land, as well as the contracting parties, and are generally intended to last for an indefinite period of time, lends increased importance to the writing because it is often the primary source of information available to a prospective pur- chaser of the land. The language should be interpreted to accord with the meaning an ordinary purchaser would ascribe to it in the context of the parcels of land involved.  360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC Searching for a particular meaning adopted by the creat- ing parties is generally inappropriate because the creat- ing parties intended to bind and benefit successors for whom the written record will provide the primary evi- dence of the servitude’s meaning. . . . Simone v. Miller, 91 Conn. App. 98, 108–10, 881 A.2d 397 (2005); see also Rocamora v. Heaney, 144 Conn. App. 658, 665–66, 74 A.3d 457 (2013). For this reason, [i]n determining the scope of an express easement, the language of the grant is paramount in discerning the parties’ intent. Leposky v. Fenton, 100 Conn. App. 774, 778, 919 A.2d 533 (2007). In addition, [a]ny ambiguity in the instrument creating an easement, in a case of reasonable doubt, will be construed in favor of the grantee. Mackin v. Mackin, [186 Conn. 185, 189, 439 A.2d 1086 (1982)].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 221 Conn. App. 673–75. In sum, “[i]n determining the character and extent of an easement created by deed, the ordinary import of the language will be accepted as indicative of the intention of the parties, unless there is something in the situation of the property or the surrounding circumstances that calls for a different interpretation.” Oak Leaf Marina, Inc. v. Ertel, 23 Conn. App. 91, 96, 579 A.2d 568, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 827, 582 A.2d 206 (1990). A The defendants first claim that the trial court erred in concluding that the 1905 easement over the alleyway between the two properties is not limited to pedestrian use. In support of this claim, the defendants contend that the court failed to consider the 1905 easement “in light of all [of] the surrounding circumstances at the time it was created,” namely, that it provided a means of egress from the fire escape at the rear of the building on the plaintiff’s property to the alleyway and then to Main Street and that it served the purpose of providing safe passage for pedestrians to exit from the Capitol Theater. The defendants further assert that the characteristics of the alleyway, namely, its “ ‘narrow’ ” size and the fact  360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC that doors in the buildings abutting the alleyway open directly into the alleyway, “overwhelmingly” support a conclusion that the 1905 easement over the alleyway was intended for pedestrian use only. Finally, the defendants contend that the court improperly failed to address their claim that public policies governing safe passage sup- ported a conclusion that the 1905 easement was intended to be limited to pedestrian traffic. We are not persuaded by these contentions. The following additional facts are relevant to our reso- lution of this claim. In its memorandum of decision, the court found that “the [1905] easement is not restricted to pedestrian use,” and its finding was predicated on “the words ‘right-of-way’ used in the 1905 easement.” Specifically, the court found that “[t]he right-of-way granted in the [1905] easement is a general right-of- way to the rear of the plaintiff’s property; there is no limiting language in the grant; the language used in the [1905] easement is clear.” The court found “further support for its conclusion that the [1905] right-of-way is not limited to pedestrian use in the clear language used by the previous owners of the dominant and servient estates in their 1925 agreement. Although that agree- ment created a new right-of-way that was separate from the one created in 1905, the two rights-of-way were con- nected. Significantly, the parties to the 1925 agreement expressly stated that the plaintiff’s property ‘shall have the right of using the drive-way from Main [Street], so as to be able to enter freely into said passage.’ The use of the term ‘drive-way’ implies use by vehicles that have a driver. Significantly, the parties did not use the term ‘walkway.’ It is reasonable to infer that in 1925 motor vehicles used the right-of-way.” (Emphasis in original.) Moreover, the court was unpersuaded by the defen- dants’ claims that the purposes of the 1925 agreement were to “provide a path of safety from the fire escape at the rear of the plaintiff’s building to Main Street,” and “to provide a ten foot passageway around the perimeter of the former Capitol Theater building to allow for safe  360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC passage for the building’s occupants to Main Street.” With respect to the claim regarding the fire escape, the court concluded that that “interpretation conveniently ignore[d] the fact that the right-of-way grant is in gen- eral terms and is not limited in any manner.” Moreover, although the court agreed that, given the seating capacity of the Capitol Theater of 1100 people, “it [was] reasonable to infer that the 1925 agreement related to the creation of a ten foot wide pedestrian passageway to serve the the- ater building,” the court determined that that inference was not sufficient to establish that the 1905 easement was limited to pedestrian use. As the court explained: “It is undisputed that the passageway established by the 1925 agreement connected with the plaintiff’s right- of-way [that] was created under the 1905 easement. . . . [T]he 1925 agreement referred to the plaintiff’s 1905 right-of-way as a driveway. The fact that [350 Main’s] predecessor in title may have sought to create a pedes- trian passageway over other property of [350 Main’s] predecessor in title does not alter or diminish the general right-of-way in favor of the plaintiff created in the 1905 deed.” (Emphasis in original.) We agree with the court’s analysis in this respect. The fact that the parties to the 1925 agreement sought to and did create an easement in the rear of their properties likely intended for pedestrian use in connection with the theater, does not change the express right-of-way easement created in the 1905 deed, which contains no limitations or specifications on the means by which it may be used. The 1905 deed creates an express right-of-way ease- ment over the alleyway “to the rear” of the plaintiff’s property. The 1905 easement contains no language limiting how the right-of-way may be used, it does not include the term “walkway,” and it does not include any language limiting its use to foot traffic or pedestrian use. Moreover, pursuant to the clear language of the 1925 agreement, the plaintiff’s predecessor in title was provided with “the right of using the drive-way from Main [Street], so as to be able to enter freely into [the 1925 easement or passageway that was created in the  360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC rear of the two properties].” We conclude that, when “construed in connection with, and in reference to, the nature and condition of the subject matter of the grant at the time the instrument [was] executed, and the obvi- ous purpose the parties had in view”; Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 221 Conn. App. 674; the unambiguous language of the 1905 deed conveys a gen- eral right-of-way easement to the plaintiff that is not limited to pedestrian use.9 Our conclusion is supported by this court’s decision in Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 221 Conn. App. 676, in which this court stated: “[T]he . . . deed designates a ‘right of way’ without limitation or reservation. The language, ‘open as a right of way for the use and benefit of the grantee,’ clearly reflects the grantor’s intent to create a general right-of-way ease- ment. The . . . deed contains no specifications of any particular manner in which [the lot at issue] should be used and imposes no limitation on the scope of the ease- ment. More particularly, the language does not limit the right-of-way to foot passage or to ingress and egress. Con- sequently, we conclude that the . . . deed and the . . . map expressly grant a general right-of-way in terms that are clear and unambiguous.” Thus, in Williams, this court similarly held that a deed that did not include restrictions 9 Relatedly, the defendants claim that the trial court placed “undue reliance” on the term “drive-way” as used in the 1925 agreement to reference the 1905 easement established in the earlier 1905 deed. The defendants argue that the court erroneously inferred that the use of the term “drive-way” suggested that motor vehicles used the alleyway in 1925. The defendants claim that “[t]here is no evidence in the record to support the trial court’s conclusion that motor vehicles used the right-of-way in the [alleyway] in 1925. In fact, in doing so, the trial court ignored all other evidence before it to reach its conclusion.” A review of the record, however, reveals that this inference is reason- able based on the evidence before the court. We construe the term “drive-way” according to its ordinary meaning at the time of the 1925 agreement, which implies use by motor vehicles. See, e.g., Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (3rd Ed. 1916) pp. 310, 836 (defining “driveway” as “[a] passage, or way, along which vehicles or animals are driven” and defining “road,” in part, as “an open way or public passage for vehicles, persons, and animals”).  360 M.S.R. Associates, LLC v. 350 Main Street Middletown, LLC “clearly and unambiguously created a general right-of- way . . . . See, e.g., Heuer v. Webster, 187 Ill. App. 273, 274–76 (1914) (language of grant, shall be and remain an open court for light, air, access and right of way, for the common benefit of the parties hereto, was plain and unambiguous); Cox v. Glenbrook Co., 78 Nev. 254, 261–62, 371 P.2d 647 (1962) (Here the grantor conveyed an easement [and right-of-way] with full right of use. To our mind, that phrase is clear and without ambiguity. It may not, under the veil of interpretation, be considered to mean a restricted right of use.).” (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 680. The defendants claim that the circumstances surround- ing the alleyway—its narrow width, the two doors of the defendants’ building that open into the alleyway, the plaintiff’s fire escape that requires use of the alleyway, the use of the parties’ respective properties at the time of the 1925 agreement, the fact that motor vehicles did not use the right-of-way over the alleyway in 1905 when it was created, and public policy considerations—warrant a different interpretation of the language of the 1905 easement. We do not agree. In support of these contentions, the defendants first argue that the alleyway was a necessity for pedestrians in 1905 after the plaintiff’s predecessor in title converted the building at 360 Main Street from single-use to mul- tiuse. The defendants, however, provided no evidence to the court t