LSL, LLC v. Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  LSL, LLC v. Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust LSL, LLC, ET AL. v. THE KRISTIN LYONS REVOCABLE TRUST ET AL. (AC 48682) Moll, Suarez and Westbrook, Js. Syllabus The defendants appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the plaintiffs on their counterclaim alleging, in part, that they had an easement by impli- cation over the plaintiffs’ property. The property of both parties had once been owned as a single parcel by the same individual, and the defendants alleged that an implied easement was consistent with the history of the sub- ject properties and the use by their owner and residents. The court initially denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim but, after granting the plaintiffs’ motion for reargument, rendered judg- ment for the plaintiffs. The defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly determined that reasonable necessity is an essential element of an implied easement and improperly granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on that ground. Held: The trial court properly concluded that a showing of reasonable necessity is essential to establish the existence of an implied easement based on a prior use, as, in circumstances like the present case in which a recorded instru- ment does not expressly delineate or support the finding of an easement and there is no absolute necessity, a party must show both that such easement was intended by the grantor at the time of severance and was reasonably necessary to the use and normal enjoyment of the property. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, as the defendants failed to establish that a genu- ine issue of material fact existed as to whether the access to the plaintiffs’ property requested by the defendants was reasonably necessary for the use and normal enjoyment of the defendants’ property. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiffs’ motion for reargument, as, although the plaintiffs raised no additional evidence relevant to their argument on the motion for summary judgment and cited no overlooked case law, the plaintiffs moved for reargument to address a principle of law that had a controlling effect on the outcome of the case. Argued April 28—officially released August 18, 2026 Procedural History Action to recover damages for, inter alia, trespass, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judi- cial district of New Haven, where Catherine M. Carrabba, as trustee of The Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust, was cited in as a defendant; thereafter, the defendants filed  LSL, LLC v. Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust a counterclaim; subsequently, the case was transferred to the judicial district of Hartford, Complex Litigation Docket, where the court, Farley, J., denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim; thereafter, the court, Farley, J., granted the plaintiffs’ motion for reargument, vacated its prior decision, and rendered summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the counterclaim, from which the defendants appealed to this court. Affirmed. Kevin S. Coyne, for the appellants (defendants). Adam M. Swanson, with whom, on the brief, were Alexa Marie J. Derkasch, Charles D. Ray, Jessica D. Bowman, Michael S. Taylor and Thomas E. Crosby, for the appellees (plaintiffs). Opinion WESTBROOK, J. The defendants, Catherine Carrabba (Catherine), both individually and in her capacity as trustee of The Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust (trust), and Stephen Carrabba (Stephen), appeal from the judg- ment of the trial court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the plaintiffs, LSL, LLC, Lili Foggle, and John Foggle. In the underlying action, the plaintiffs sought to preclude the defendants from traversing the plaintiffs’ adjoining property to access a private beach- front located on the southwest portion of the plaintiffs’ property and to gain entry to the defendants’ barn, which is located near the defendants’ northern boundary with the plaintiffs’ property. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly (1) granted the plain- tiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that reasonable necessity is a required element to establish an easement by implication and the defendants failed to present evidence establishing such necessity and (2) granted the plaintiffs’ motion for reargument of its initial denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judg- ment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.  LSL, LLC v. Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust The following undisputed facts, as set forth by the court, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff LSL, LLC, whose members are Lili Foggle, the managing member, and John Foggle (Foggles), owns 22.38 acres of undeveloped land that is located along Longshore Lane in the town of Madison and fronts Long Island Sound (Foggle property). The Foggle property has a large tidal wetland area in its center that bisects it from north to south and drains into Long Island Sound. At the southwest corner of the Foggle property is a pri- vate beach, referred to by the parties as “Mud Beach.” Footbridges and accessways provide pedestrian access to Mud Beach through the Foggle property. The Foggles have resided at 107 Longshore Lane in Madison (Foggle home), which is an adjacent lot located to the southeast of the Foggle property that fronts Long Island Sound, since August 8, 2008. Catherine, as trustee of the trust, owns 78 Longshore Lane (Carrabba property), located east of the Foggle prop- erty and to the north of the Foggle home. Catherine and her husband, Stephen (Carrabbas), reside on the Carrabba property. Catherine, as trustee of the trust, has owned the Carrabba property since July 1, 2019. The Foggle home lies between the Carrabba property and Long Island Sound. On the west side of the Carrabba property, the Carrabbas can access Mud Beach using the footbridges and accessways that traverse the Foggle property. The area adjacent to the northern side of the Carrabba prop- erty contains a barn that is located entirely on the Car- rabba property (barn area). The northern portion of the barn area, however, is very close to the property line shared with the Foggle property. Although the Carrab- bas can access the barn area from the Carrabba property, they allege that, historically, access has also been made by crossing the Foggle property to the northern side of the barn area. The Foggle property, the Foggle home, and the Carrab- ba property were previously held in unity by the Hotch- kiss family. H. Stewart Hotchkiss owned ten parcels of  LSL, LLC v. Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust land (Hotchkiss property), including a farmhouse on what is now the Carrabba property, which were later devised to his wife, Elizabeth Washington Hotchkiss, after his death in 1947. In 2001, the Carrabba property was separated from the remaining Hotchkiss property and conveyed into a separate Hotchkiss family trust for estate planning purposes. The Hotchkiss family contin- ued to live on what is now referred to as the Carrabba property and accessed Mud Beach by crossing what is now the Foggle property until 2006, when the Hotchkiss family conveyed the Foggle property to John V. Greco by way of a warranty deed. The Greco deed contained no references to easements or rights of way over the Foggle property benefiting the Carrabba property. A 2006 sur- vey map filed on the Madison land records shows two parcels: the 22.38 acre Foggle property and the 3.7 acre Carrabba property. The map does not reflect any easement rights appurtenant to the Carrabba property through the Foggle property, nor does it depict any walkways, footpaths, or bridges, although such features were pres- ent on the property at the time. In 2007, Greco conveyed the Foggle property to Shorelands, LLC, by quitclaim deed. This deed also did not contain any references to easements or rights of way over the Foggle property. On May 11, 2021, LSL, LLC, acquired the Foggle property from Shorelands, LLC. After the Hotchkiss family carved out the Carrabba property, the Carrabba property entered into foreclo- sure, at which point Catherine, as trustee of the trust, purchased the property from U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., as trustee for LSF9 Master Participation Trust. The 2019 deed conveying the Carrabba property to Catherine, as trustee, contains no reference to easements or rights of way over the Foggle property. Prior to that conveyance, in 2017, Stephen negotiated an agreement with Shore- lands, LLC, under which Shorelands, LLC, agreed to grant an easement to Stephen or his designee. The ease- ment would provide beach access on the condition that Stephen acquire the Carrabba property at any time prior to May 1, 2038. The agreement was recorded on the land  LSL, LLC v. Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust records in 2020 after Catherine, as trustee, had already purchased the property. An easement was never granted in accordance with that agreement, as the easement was conditioned upon the purchase of the property by Stephen, not the trustee of the trust. Additionally, Ste- phen released any claim under the agreement on May 6, 2021, a few days before LSL, LLC, purchased the Foggle property. LSL, LLC’s deed to the Foggle property did, however, contain references to several encumbrances, including the 2017 letter agreement. The plaintiffs commenced this action on December 8, 2021. On May 24, 2022, the plaintiffs filed their revised operative complaint, which sounded in trespass, nui- sance, and unreasonable interference with property rights and sought to enjoin the defendants from tra- versing the Foggle property and using Mud Beach in any capacity. The defendants filed their amended answer and special defenses on April 4, 2023. The defendants asserted by way of special defense that “[an] implied easement exists and has existed for a long period of time, consistent with the history of the subject properties and use by their owner and residents.” They argued that the claimed easement runs over the pedestrian pathways through the Foggle property leading to Mud Beach, resulting in a benefit to the Carrabba property as the dominant estate. The defendants also argued that the implied easement includes a right to access the north- ern side of the barn area from the Foggle property. On the basis of the foregoing, the defendants also filed a four count counterclaim seeking (1) a declaratory judg- ment decreeing that the defendants have an easement by implication as to both the pedestrian pathways leading to Mud Beach and the northern portion of the barn area located within the Carrabba property (counts one and three) and, (2) pursuant to General Statutes § 47-31, to quiet title and establish the defendants as owners of the easements (counts two and four). On February 15, 2024, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment as to the defendants’ four count  LSL, LLC v. Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust counterclaim. The plaintiffs alleged that “there are no facts that show the [defendants] have even a colorable claim for declaratory judgment and quiet title through easement by implication.” They argued that the defen- dants “have no evidence showing a servitude upon the [plaintiffs’] property to access ‘Mud Beach’ or the alleged ‘barn area’ and . . . cannot prove that accessing these areas is necessary . . . .” On the basis of the foregoing, the plaintiffs alleged that there was no material issue of fact “that the parties’ predecessors in title never intended to create any servitude or easement by implication.” The trial court, Farley, J., in a memorandum of decision dated October 16, 2024, initially denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that necessity was not a required element to establish an easement by implication arising from the division of formerly unified land. The court instead concluded that the principal factor for consideration is the intent of the parties and a genuine issue of material fact remained with regard to intent, despite the plaintiffs’ showing that the defendants failed to refute evidence that access to Mud Beach and the northern portion of the barn area was not necessary for the use and normal enjoyment of the Carrabba property. On November 4, 2024, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reargue, claiming that the parties did not have an oppor- tunity to address a particular case on which the trial court had based its opinion. The court granted the motion and, on April 14, 2025, issued its memorandum of decision following reargument. The court concluded that “a show- ing of reasonable necessity is essential to establish the existence of an implied easement based on a prior use.” The court further concluded that the defendants had failed to establish that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether access to Mud Beach and the barn area was necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of the Carrabba property. The court, however, could not reach the same conclusion with respect to intent. Rather, it stated that, because it is the province of the trier of fact  LSL, LLC v. Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust to discern intent from the use of the easement prior to and after the severance, it “could not [render] summary judgment on the question . . . .”1 Thus, on the basis of reasonable necessity, the court rendered summary judg- ment in favor of the plaintiffs. This appeal followed. I The defendants claim on appeal that the trial court improperly determined that reasonable necessity is an essential element of an implied easement and that the court improperly rendered summary judgment for the plaintiffs because it relied on that determination in con- cluding that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We disagree. Before we address the merits of the defendants’ claim, we begin by setting forth our standard of review and fundamental principles of law governing easements. At the outset, we note that “[t]he standard of review of a trial court’s decision granting summary judgment is well established. Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . Our review of the trial court’s decision to grant [a] motion for summary judgment is plenary. . . . On appeal, we must determine whether the legal conclusions reached by the trial court are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision of the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Francini v. 1 We need not address the issue of intent and instead focus only on the issue of reasonable necessity.  LSL, LLC v. Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 327 Conn. 431, 436–37, 174 A.3d 779 (2018). To assure safe reliance on land records, “implied ease- ments are disfavored in Connecticut and are allowed to a very much more limited extent than in many other states.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kenny v. Dwyer, 16 Conn. App. 58, 65, 546 A.2d 937, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 815, 550 A.2d 1084 (1988). “Where, during the unity of title, an apparently permanent and obvious servitude is imposed on one part of an estate in favor of another, which at the time of the severance is in use, and is reasonably necessary for the fair enjoyment of the other, then, upon a severance of such ownership, whether by voluntary alienation or by judicial proceedings, there arises by implication of law a grant or reservation of the right to continue such use. In such case, the law implies that with the grant of the one an easement is also granted or reserved, as the case may be, in the other, subjecting it to the burden of all such visible uses and incidents as are reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant heritage, in substantially the same condition in which it appeared and was used when the grant was made.” (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Rischall v. Bauchmann, 132 Conn. 637, 642–43, 46 A.2d 898 (1946). More recently, this court explained that “[a]n easement by implication, also referred to as an implied easement, is typically found when land in one ownership is divided into separately owned parts by a conveyance, and at the time of the conveyance a permanent servitude exists as to one part of the property in favor of another which servitude is reasonably necessary for the fair enjoy- ment of the latter property.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deane v. Kahn, 179 Conn. App. 58, 70, 178 A.3d 403 (2018). In other words, to determine whether an easement by implication has arisen, we examine “(1) the intention of the parties, and (2) if the easement is reasonably necessary for the use and normal enjoyment of the dominant estate.” Utay v. G.C.S. Realty, LLC, 72 Conn. App. 630, 637, 806 A.2d 573 (2002).  LSL, LLC v. Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust Additionally, “[t]he intent of the grantor to create an easement may be inferred from an examination of the deed, maps and recorded instruments introduced as evidence.” Id. “[T]o establish an easement by impli- cation, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating a preexisting use of an apparent servitude at the time the property was severed into separate parcels. . . . Such use may be established by direct evidence of that use by the grantor, but may also be established, more indirectly, by circumstantial evidence of the existence of a use both prior to and after the severance from which it reasonably may be inferred that the same use by the grantor existed at the time of conveyance and was intended to continue.” (Citation omitted.) Deane v. Kahn, supra, 179 Conn. App. 74. Put differently, a party can establish that a grantor intended to convey a servitude by showing use of the servitude at the time of severance or by provid- ing evidence that it can be reasonably inferred that use of the servitude, subsequent to severance, is consistent with its use at the time of severance. “Although the intent to create an easement by deed is . . . a question of law over which our review is plenary . . . if the language of the deed is incomplete or ambiguous regarding the location, scope, or use of the easement, the trial court’s resolution of those issues represents a ques- tion of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.” (Citation omitted.) Deane v. Kahn, 317 Conn. 157, 167 n.6, 116 A.3d 259 (2015). Consistent with the case law previously set forth, we must first consider whether reasonable necessity is a required element for the establishment of an easement by implication. A Our Supreme Court’s decision in Rischall v. Bauch- mann, supra, 132 Conn. 637, provides insight into the elements required to establish an easement by implication on the basis of prior use. In that case, our Supreme Court held that, to establish an easement by implication, the  LSL, LLC v. Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust party must establish that “during the unity of title, an apparently permanent and obvious servitude is imposed on one part of an estate in favor of another, which at the time of the severance is in use, and is reasonably [necessary] for the fair enjoyment of the other . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Id., 642. The court further found that “[t]he principle underlying the creation of an ease- ment by implication is that it is so evidently necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the granted premises, so continuous in its nature, so plain, visible and open, so manifest from the situation and relation of the two tracts that the law will give effect to the grant according to the presumed intent of the parties. . . . Consequently, in determining whether an easement by implication exists, statements by the grantor to the grantee made prior to the consummation of the transaction to the effect that a license and not an easement is to pass by the convey- ance are admissible.” (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 645. The rule set forth in Rischall has since been distilled into a clear two part test. As stated previously in this opinion, to determine whether an easement by implica- tion has arisen, we examine “(1) the intention of the par- ties, and (2) if the easement is reasonably necessary for the use and normal enjoyment of the dominant estate.” (Emphasis added.) Utay v. G.C.S. Realty, LLC, supra, 72 Conn. App. 637. The use of the conjunctive “and” in Utay’s restatement of the test set forth in Rischall conveys that this court intended to impose two require- ments for a finding of an easement by implication. See Ahmadi v. Ahmadi, 294 Conn. 384, 393, 985 A.2d 319 (2009) (“we find significance in the use of the word and between . . . two stated conditions” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The defendants argue that the intent of the grantor is sufficient to establish an easement by implication and point to language in a footnote in Cheshire Land Trust, LLC v. Casey, 156 Conn. App. 833, 115 A.3d 497 (2015), which states that “[n]ecessity is not . . . a basis  LSL, LLC v. Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust independent of the parties’ intent on which to find that an easement by implication exists. . . . Rather, the fact that an easement was reasonably necessary supports the conclusion that the parties intended to create the easement.” Id., 853 n.9; see McBurney v. Cirillo, 276 Conn. 782, 800, 889 A.2d 759 (2006), overruled on other grounds by Batte-Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277, 914 A.2d 996 (2007). The defen- dants’ interpretation of and reliance on this footnote, however, is misguided. In McBurney, our Supreme Court determined that, inter alia, an easement by implication can be inferred from a map. McBurney v. Cirillo, supra, 276 Conn. 806–807. In that case, an 1885 plan clearly defined four beachfront lots separated from Long Island Sound only by a parcel of land that was designated as “lawn.” Id., 787. Owners of lots located further inland, but on the same street, used this “lawn” area to access Long Island Sound. Id., 789–90. The owners of the beachfront lots brought quiet title actions against the owners of the rear lots, aiming to preclude their use of the “lawn” area to access the beach. Id., 791. The Supreme Court found that “it is reasonable to infer that the original intent of the grantor was that the area designated as ‘lawn’ . . . remain open for use by the rear lot owners . . . .” Id., 805. Just as recorded instruments may establish the intent of a grantor, they also may establish the reasonable neces- sity for an easement, thus implicating the original rule from Rischall. The decision in McBurney establishes that an easement by implication may be found with- out an express finding of necessity under two theories: the equitable estoppel theory and the implied covenant theory. Id., 799. Under the equitable estoppel theory, “an implied easement exists in a lot owner when the owner reasonably anticipated the use of the streets disclosed on the map that would prove beneficial to him . . . .” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Under the implied covenant theory, the owner may claim an easement “if the [anticipated] use served as an  LSL, LLC v. Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust inducement to the purchase of the lot.” (Internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Id. Under these two theories, necessity is found through implication on the basis of either an inducement to purchase property or reasonable anticipation of the challenged easement’s use. Id. The court in McBurney concluded that a map that designates an area as a park identifies an area that is such a “promi- nent and attractive . . . feature . . . [that it] was essential to the completeness” of the parcels at issue. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 804. Precluding the use of such a feature restricts the grantee’s right to the use and normal enjoyment of their property, which makes that feature reasonably necessary. In circumstances in which a recorded instrument does not expressly delineate or support the finding of an ease- ment, however, a party must show that such easement was intended by the grantor at the time of severance and is reasonably necessary to the use and normal enjoyment of the property. Both elements are required to establish an easement by implication under such circumstances. As a result, we reject the defendants’ claim that “[t]he intent of the grantor is undoubtedly the basis upon which to find an easement by implication” and uphold the court’s conclusion that “a showing of reasonable necessity is essential to establish the existence of an implied ease- ment based on a prior use.” B Having concluded that reasonable necessity is an essen- tial element of an easement by implication in instances where an easement cannot be inferred from a recorded instrument and there is no absolute necessity, we must now decide whether access to Mud Beach and the northern border of the barn area were reasonably necessary for the use and normal enjoyment of the Carrabba property. In doing so, we must also determine the extent of necessity required by our case law to establish that an easement by implication was reasonably necessary. We first note that “[a]n easement by implication does not arise by mere convenience or economy, but exists because of some significant or unreasonable burden as to  LSL, LLC v. Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust access that demands the easement’s presence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Utay v. G.C.S. Realty, LLC, supra, 72 Conn. App. 638. Still, “[i]n so far as necessity is significant [for an easement by implication] it is sufficient if the easement is highly convenient and beneficial for the enjoyment of the dominant estate.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gemmell v. Lee, 59 Conn. App. 572, 577, 757 A.2d 1171, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 951, 762 A.2d 901 (2000). This is distinguishable from an easement by necessity, in which, typically, the element of necessity is established by the grantee’s inability to use its property beneficially because it lacks physical access to it, “[f]or the law will not presume, that it was the intention of the parties, that one should convey land to the other, in such [a] manner that the grantee could derive no benefit from the conveyance . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Francini v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 164 Conn. App. 279, 285, 134 A.3d 1278 (2016), aff’d, 327 Conn. 431, 174 A.3d 779 (2018). As discussed previously in this opinion, the decision in McBurney clearly states that an easement by implication may be found through recorded instruments. McBurney v. Cirillo, supra, 276 Conn. 802. Parties claiming an ease- ment may rely on a recorded instrument to establish that a common grantor intended that there be an easement. See Gemmell v. Lee, supra, 59 Conn. App. 577 (recorded instruments established intent prong and plaintiffs presented evidence establishing reasonable necessity, resulting in easement by implication). As the trial court found, “[i]n this context, necessity plays a supporting but nonessential role in determining the existence of an implied easement that is rooted in recorded instruments.” When there is no recorded instrument establishing an easement and an easement is not required by necessity, we must determine whether the claimed easement is reasonably necessary. In doing so, we must determine the extent of necessity required to establish an easement by implication. Other jurisdictions have generally concluded that “[t]he test of necessity is whether the party claiming  LSL, LLC v. Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust the right can, at reasonable cost, create a substitute on such party’s own estate. Thus, if the dominant land can be used without an easement by a reasonable expenditure the factor of necessity is lacking.” (Footnote omitted.) 28A C.J.S. 459–60, Easements § 78 (2019); see also Ouellette v. Bolduc, 440 A.2d 1042, 1046 (Me. 1982) (“[m]ere convenience, however great, will not suffice . . . [a]nd the test of necessity is whether the party claiming the easement can at reasonable cost on his own estate create a substitute”); Cheney v. Mueller, 259 Or. 108, 122, 485 P.2d 1218 (1971) (“[o]rdinarily, if the dominant land can be used without an easement by a reasonable expenditure the factor of necessity is lacking” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Berlin v. Robbins, 180 Wn. 176, 189, 38 P.2d 1047 (1934) (“[t]he test of necessity is whether the party claiming the right can, at reason- able cost, on his own estate, and without trespassing on his neighbors, create a substitute”). Thus, in assessing reasonable necessity, we must determine whether the dominant land is capable of use and normal enjoyment without the easement, or whether the party claiming the easement can create a substitute at a reasonable cost. If one of these elements is met, then reasonable necessity is lacking and there is no easement by implication. Our state’s precedent generally falls in line with this rule. In Utay, this court held that an easement to pro- vide additional access to an obstructed driveway was not reasonably necessary. Utay v. G.C.S. Realty, LLC, supra, 72 Conn. App. 638. The plaintiff “ha[d] full and complete access to his property, and continue[d] to access the rear of his property by using the partially obstructed driveway . . . .” Id., 639. Notably, this court held that, “although an easement over the plaintiff’s property would enhance the enjoyment of the defendant’s property, it was not necessary to the fair enjoyment thereof . . . .” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 640. This court has also concluded that the creation of an easement on a private road to access an intersection that is easily accessible through other means was not reasonably necessary. Walters v. Servidio, 227 Conn.  LSL, LLC v. Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust App. 1, 19–20, 320 A.3d 1008 (2024). Additionally, we concluded that, even if renovations to a property could be made in lieu of recognition of an easement, the easement would be deemed reasonably necessary if the renovations were exorbitantly expensive. Sanders v. Dias, 108 Conn. App. 283, 294–95, 947 A.2d 1026 (2008). In Sanders, we held that “the significant cost of relocating a driveway to the defendants’ home, the risks associated with the blasting near the defendants’ home, the limited impact . . . on the plaintiff’s property . . . the grade of the defendants’ property, and safety issues associated with the construction of a steep driveway” made the easement reasonably necessary. (Internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Id. In Deane v. Kahn, supra, 179 Conn. App. 58, we held that an easement that provided the landowner with access to a southern portion of his property by traversing across the southern portion of his neighbors’ property was reasonably necessary. Id., 77. We concluded that the plaintiff established an easement by implication because, “[w]ithout direct vehicular access from the road [the plaintiff would have] been and [would] continue to be unable to conduct ordinary maintenance of the lower portion of his property on a regular basis, to deal with damage to that portion caused by unusual events, such as a severe storm or flooding, to maintain his well or seawall or to construct a beach or boat dock on the river.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Our decision in Schultz v. Barker, 15 Conn. App. 696, 546 A.2d 324 (1988), is most on point with the facts of the present case. In Schultz, the parties’ uncle had devised certain beachfront cottages located on a single parcel of land to the parties, who were siblings and heirs to their uncle’s estate. Id., 698. That land was then divided by the executor of the estate with the consent of the heirs and conveyed so that each beneficiary would own the land underlying his or her respective cottage or cottages. Id. Although the land contained a beachfront, there was no discussion among the heirs regarding their respective rights thereto. Id. The defendant’s sister, who was not a party to the action, granted him permission to use an  LSL, LLC v. Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust area west of her property and also granted him an ease- ment on the eastern side of her property. Id., 699. Despite the easement over this sister’s property, the defendant attempted to pass over the plaintiff’s property to access the beach. Id., 699–700. The trial court, inter alia, con- cluded that the defendant had no right to pass over the plaintiff’s property to access the beach. Id., 700. On appeal we concluded that, “[a]lthough the previ- ous use of the pathways over the plaintiff’s property is an indication that these routes were convenient and beneficial,” the defendant had “convenient access via alternate routes.” Id., 701. The defendant had access to the beach “by a deeded right-of-way” and, like the other heirs, was “able to use the public beach.” Id., 701–702. We concluded that “the trial court’s determination that the defendant did not meet his burden of proving rea- sonable necessity, and therefore was not entitled to an implied easement over the plaintiff’s property, was not clearly erroneous.”2 Id., 702. Each of the aforementioned cases demonstrates that failure to establish reasonable necessity is fatal to a claim of an easement by implication. In Utay, the plaintiff could continue the use and normal enjoyment of his property without the easement, and the plaintiffs in Walters and the defendant in Schultz had access to an alterna- tive route at no cost, or, as in Schultz, had access to an alternative at a reasonable cost, namely, the public beach. In the present case, the defendants presented no evi- dence that use of the established pedestrian pathways on the Foggle property or other portions of the property to access the barn area and Mud Beach was reasonably necessary for the use and normal enjoyment of the Car- rabba property. The defendants failed to present evi- dence tending to prove that access to the barn area is reasonably necessary for the use and normal enjoyment 2 Although the procedural posture of Schultz differs from the present case, we find Schultz persuasive in that it illustrates how reasonable necessity is lacking in circumstances in which there is a reasonable alternative to establishing an easement by implication.  LSL, LLC v. Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust of their property. The barn area is located entirely on the Carrabba property and, although the rear of the barn area appears to be close to the property line of the Foggle property, the defendants can access the barn area from within their own property. As there is an alternative form of access, like in Schultz and Walters, the defendants’ claimed easement to the barn area lacks reasonable necessity. The defendants’ claimed easement over the Foggle property to Mud Beach fails for similar reasons. The defendants have not presented any evidence establishing how access to Mud Beach is reasonably nec- essary to the use and normal enjoyment of the Carrabba property. Additionally, like the defendant in Schultz, the defendants have access to a nearby public beach, which serves as a reasonable alternative to the claimed easement. Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that access to Mud Beach is not reasonably necessary for the use and normal enjoyment of the Carrabba property. The plaintiffs’ well supported motion for summary judgment demonstrated that, as an initial matter, there is no genuine factual dispute as to the issue of reasonable necessity. Because the plaintiffs satisfied their initial burden as the movants, the burden shifted to the defen- dants, and the plaintiffs correctly observed that “[t]he [defendants] have no evidence showing a servitude upon the [plaintiffs’] property to access ‘Mud Beach’ or the alleged ‘barn area’ and the [defendants] cannot prove that accessing these areas is necessary . . . .” The defen- dants submitted evidence only in relation to the intent prong in their response to the plaintiffs’ motion. Because the defendants failed to establish that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to reasonable necessity, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. II The defendants next claim that the trial court improp- erly granted the plaintiffs’ motion to reargue its initial denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The defendants argue that, because the plaintiffs raised  LSL, LLC v. Kristin Lyons Revocable Trust no additional evidence relevant to their argument on the motion for summary judgment and cited no overlooked case law, the trial court lacked a proper basis for grant- ing the plaintiffs’ motion. We disagree. The following additional facts and procedural his- tory are relevant to this claim. The court, in its original memorandum of decision on the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, stated that the court in Cheshire Land Trust, LLC v. Casey, supra, 156 Conn. App. 853 n.9, held that “the consideration of necessity is merely one pathway to address the ‘principal factor’ of intent.” The plaintiffs’ motion for reargument asserted that “[t]he dicta relied on by this court from the Cheshire Land Trust [LLC] case mistakenly applied the necessity test from a map case to a circumstance involving unity of title.” In the defendants’ objection to the motion for reargument, they argued that the plaintiffs “claim