Full Opinion

J-S20012-26 2026 PA Super 246 CURTIS LAUBACH AND GENEVIEVE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LAUBACH : PENNSYLVANIA : : v. : : : HOLLY LAUBACH : : No. 322 EDA 2026 Appellant : Appeal from the Order Entered December 24, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Civil Division at No(s): 2022-FC-0683 BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J. OPINION BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 2, 2026 Appellant Holly Laubach (Mother), proceeding pro se, appeals from the orders holding her in contempt for violating the custodial rights of Curtis Laubach and Genevieve Laubach (collectively, Grandparents), the paternal grandparents of Mother’s child, I.L. (Child). Mother claims that the trial court violated her fundamental rights as a fit parent by enforcing a custody order in favor of a third party, violated her due process rights, abused its discretion in its evidentiary rulings, and committed legal error. We affirm in part and vacate in part and remand for further proceedings. The relevant facts and procedural history of this matter are as follows: On June 14, 2022, after Child’s father passed away, Grandparents filed a complaint for partial physical custody of Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5325(1). See Trial Ct. Order, 10/28/25, at 1, n.1. On October 7, 2022, the trial court determined that Grandparents had standing to seek custodial rights J-S20012-26 to Child pursuant to Section 5325(1) of the Child Custody Act. See Trial Ct. Order, 10/7/22.1 A hearing officer then heard Grandparents’ custody petition and filed a proposed custody order, to which both Mother and Grandparents filed exceptions and supporting briefs. See Proposed Order, 11/23/22; Mother’s Exceptions, 12/9/22; Grandparents’ Exceptions, 12/27/22; Grandparents’ Brief, 2/13/23; Mother’s Brief, 2/14/23. The trial court heard the exceptions and entered an order on March 22, 2023 denying all exceptions and adopting the proposed custody order. See Trial Ct. Order, 3/22/23. After the entry of the final custody order on March 22, 2023, Mother, who was represented by counsel at the time, did not appeal or otherwise object to the court’s finding that Grandparents had standing. See Entry of Appearance, 7/1/22; Mother’s Entry of Self-Represented Party, 5/2/23. After a schedule had been established by custody order for Grandparents’ partial physical custody rights to Child, from February of 2024 to September of 2025 Grandparents filed five sets of petitions and/or motions complaining of Mother’s violations of the custody orders in effect at the time of the filing of their respective petitions and/or motions. See Grandparents’ Pets. and Mots., 2/21/24; 9/10/24; 2/18/25; 4/16/25; 9/15/25. On October 14, 2025, the trial court scheduled a hearing on October 17, 2025 to address Grandparents’ petitions and motions filed on September 15, 2025, April 16, 2025, and June 6, 2025. See Trial Ct. Order, 10/14/25. ____________________________________________ 1 See 23 Pa.C.S. §5325(1). -2- J-S20012-26 Specifically, Grandparents’ filings complained of Mother’s failure to reschedule a missed custody visit on February 8, 2025; failure to provide a scheduled Facetime call with Child on May 26, 2025; and failure to cooperate in engaging a clinician to conduct family therapy. See Grandparents’ Pets. and Mots., 2/21/24; 9/10/24; 2/18/25; 4/16/25; 9/15/25. In their emergency petition for special relief filed September 15, 2025, addressing Mother’s failure to cooperate in family therapy, Grandparents stated that they had incurred “significant attorney’s fees, costs and expenses to effectuate the intent of the [custody] order.” See Grandparents’ Emergency Pet. for Special Relief, 9/15/25, at 2. Therein, Grandparents provided the trial court with the custody contempt penalties set forth at 23 Pa.C.S. § 5323(g), as follows: 10. 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 5323(g) provides, in pertinent part: (1) A party who willfully fails to comply with any custody order may, as prescribed by general rule, be adjudged in contempt. Contempt shall be punishable by any one or more of the following: (i) Imprisonment for a period of not more than six months. (ii) A fine of not more than $500. (iii) Probation for a period of not more than six months. (iv) An order for nonrenewal, suspension or denial of operating privilege under section 4355 (relating to denial or suspension of licenses). (v) Counsel fees and costs. (2) An order committing an individual to jail under this section shall specify the condition which, when fulfilled, will result in the release of that individual. -3- J-S20012-26 Id. In response to the hearing notice, Mother moved to “vacate any and all custody orders . . . granting partial physical custody” to Grandparents on the basis that, as a fit parent, Mother held “the exclusive . . . authority to direct [Child’s] upbringing, decision-making, and welfare under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Sections 1 and 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Mother’s Mot., 10/14/25, at 1-2. At the time of the filing of the petitions and motions scheduled to be heard on October 17, 2025, the custody orders in effect provided Grandparents with regular custodial periods with Child every Wednesday evening and one Saturday a month, as well as Facetime calls on Monday evenings. See Trial Ct. Orders, 11/27/24, at 1-2; 3/10/25, at 1-2. The orders further stated that the parties had agreed to family therapy with a specific service provider and directed the parties to comply with the therapist’s recommendations. See Trial Ct. Orders, 11/27/24, at 3; 3/10/25, at 3-4. Additionally, on July 2, 2025, the trial court entered an order solely addressing family therapy, directing the parties to contact a specific service provider and to comply with the therapist’s recommendations. See Trial Ct. Order, 7/2/25. The specified family therapy service provider changed with each subsequent order. See Trial Ct. Orders, 11/27/24, at 3; 3/10/25, at 3-4; 7/2/25. The trial court heard Grandparents’ contempt petitions and Mother’s motion to vacate on October 17, 2025 and issued the following order addressing the petitions and motions on October 28, 2025: -4- J-S20012-26 Upon consideration of [Grandparents’] petition for contempt and modification of the interim order, filed on April 16, 2025, . . . amended petition for contempt and modification, filed on June 6, 2025, . . . petition for contempt, filed on September 15, 2025, . . . [and] emergency petition for special relief, filed on September 15, 2025, and [Mother’s] motion to vacate custody orders as unconstitutional and void, filed on October 14, 2025, . . . the court enters the following: 1. [Grandparents’] petition for contempt and modification is GRANTED. As a sanction, [Grandparents] shall exercise partial physical custody of [] Child during the second and the third Saturday in the month of November, 2025 . . . 2. [Grandparents’] petition for contempt and modification of the interim order filed on November 27, 2024 and March 10, 2025, filed on June 6, 2025, is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. As a sanction, [Grandparents] shall exercise partial physical custody of [] Child during the second and the third Saturday in the month of December, 2025 . . . 3. [Grandparents’] petition for contempt of the order dated July 2, 2025, filed on September 15, 2025, is GRANTED. As a sanction, [Grandparents] shall exercise partial physical custody of [] Child during the second and the third Saturday in the month of January, 2026 . . . 4. [Grandparents’] emergency petition for special relief, filed on September 15, 2025, is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. As a sanction for the violation of the July 2, 2025 custody order which directed the parties to participate in co- parenting counseling . . . [Mother] is directed to pay the sum of $500.00 in counsel fees to [Grandparents’] counsel within 30 days of the date of this order. . . Furthermore, [Mother] is required to complete and submit the criminal history verification form to the family court office within 10 days of this order. 5. [Mother’s] motion to vacate custody orders . . . is DENIED. Trial Ct. Order, 10/28/25 (footnotes omitted and some formatting altered). Both Mother and Grandparents moved for reconsideration and stay of enforcement of the October 28, 2025 order. See Mother’s Mot., 11/7/25; -5- J-S20012-26 Grandparents’ Mot., 11/10/25. On November 17, 2025, the trial court granted reconsideration and vacated the October 28, 2025 order, and scheduled a hearing on the pending motions for December 10, 2025. See Trial Ct. Order, 11/17/2025. On December 8, 2025, Mother filed an emergency motion to “vacate the December 10, 2025 hearing, strike all pending petitions filed by [Grandparents], and require a ruling on [Mother’s] constitutional motion” and Grandparents filed an answer to Mother’s emergency motion. See Mother’s Mot., 12/8/25; Grandparents’ Ans., 12/9/25. On December 24, 2025, the trial court entered an order that denied both Mother’s December 8, 2025 emergency motion and reconsideration of the October 28, 2025 order. See Trial Ct. Order, 12/24/25. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal of the orders of October 28, 2025; November 17, 2025; and December 24, 2025; and upon this Court’s direction filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) statement of errors. The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion that incorporated those same orders and stating that the reasons for the entry of the orders appeared therein. On appeal, Mother raises the following claims: 1. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and violated [Mother’s] constitutional rights by denying [her] motion to vacate custody orders as unconstitutional and void based solely on the governing statue being presumed constitutional, without conducting an independent analysis of whether enforcement in this case is consistent with the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions as applied to a fit parent with full parental rights. 2. Whether the trial court committed an error of law by proceeding with the October 17, 2025 hearing, and continuing the litigation, without first ruling on [Mother’s] pending -6- J-S20012-26 constitutional motion, which raised threshold legal issues concerning the court's authority to proceed. 3. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and violated [Mother’s] due process rights by expanding the scope of the October 17, 2025 hearing to address multiple petitions without adequate notice, thereby depriving [Mother] of a fair opportunity to prepare and respond. 4. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and violated [Mother’s] due process rights by permitting testimony from an undisclosed witness without prior identification or disclosure, and without establishing the witness’s identity or proper evidentiary foundation for the testimony. 5. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and violated [Mother’s] due process rights by conducting the proceedings in a manner that did not afford [Mother] a meaningful opportunity to examine witnesses, present evidence, and fully participate. 6. Whether the trial court committed an error of law by making factual findings not supported by the record, including attributing statements, positions, or conduct, to [Mother] that were not established by the evidence. 7. Whether the trial court committed an error of law by failing to set forth sufficient findings of fact and legal reasoning to permit meaningful appellate review. 8. Whether the trial court committed an error of law by finding [Mother] in contempt where the record did not establish a willful violation of a clear and specific court order or sufficient evidence of intentional noncompliance. 9. Whether the trial court committed an error of law by imposing sanctions that were punitive in nature rather than remedial, exceeding the lawful scope of civil contempt. 10. Whether the trial court committed an[] error of law by imposing sanctions that effectively modified custodial rights by awarding additional custodial time without conducting the required statutory custody analysis. 11. Whether the trial court committed an error of law by declaring the October 28, 2025 order to remain in effect after it had been expressly vacated, without determining whether -7- J-S20012-26 continued enforcement of that order violated [Mother’s] constitutional protected parental rights. 12. Whether the trial court committed an error of law by vacating the October 28, 2025 order and subsequently declaring that same order to remain in full force and effect in its December 24, 2025 order. 13. Whether the trial court committed an error of law by reinstating and relying upon a previously vacated order without new findings supported by the record. 14. Whether the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors resulted in an abuse of discretion and order unsupported by law. Mother’s Brief at 5-9 (some formatting altered). Mother argues that her decisions concerning Child are “entitled to constitutional protection” and that “the enforcement of third-party custody orders violated her constitutional rights” as a fit parent. Id. at 14. Specifically, Mother contends that the trial court, prior to holding her in contempt, failed to determine “whether interference with [her] parental authority could be justified under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.” Id. Mother claims that “the trial court was required to decide the threshold question [of] whether continued enforcement of the [custody] orders against [Mother] was constitutional.” Id. at 15. In terms of due process violations, Mother argues that she did not have “a meaningful opportunity to prepare, respond, or present a defense” to all the issues because the trial court provided only three days’ notice that it would be addressing additional issues. Id. at 17-18. Mother also contends that the trial court “deprived her of a fair opportunity to be heard” because it failed to -8- J-S20012-26 admit her relevant evidence, stating that “there was not sufficient time,” and failed to allow her to “fully develop[] testimony or establish[] foundational facts.” Id. at 18.2 Mother further argues that she had not received advance notice of a witness for Grandparents and therefore was “deprived [] of a fair opportunity to prepare, challenge the witness, or meaningfully respond . . . [or] investigate the witness, a[ss]ess credibility, effectively cross-examine, or obtain rebuttal evidence.” Id. at 19. Mother argues that the trial court erred in finding that she had committed “a willful violation of a clear and specific court order” because “[t]he record does not establish such a violation.” Id. at 20. Instead, she contends that “the record reflects confusion, dispute, and circumstances that do not rise to the level of willful noncompliance.” Id. at 21. Mother further argues that contempt sanctions should be designed to “compel compliance with a court order . . . and may not be punitive,” whereas the sanctions imposed by the trial court “exceeded the permissible scope of civil contempt” and “operated as punishment.” Id. at 22. Furthermore, Mother challenges the “legality of the sanctions imposed,” arguing that the trial court exceeded its authority when it modified Child’s “custody under the guise of contempt sanctions,” as “the award of additional custodial time . . . altered custodial ____________________________________________ 2 Mother does not reference where in the certified record, or in her reproduced record, the trial court stated that there was not sufficient time to hear her evidence. See id. -9- J-S20012-26 rights without [the trial court] conducting the statutory analysis required for custody modification.” Id. at 24. Mother also argues that the trial court impermissibly vacated the October 28, 2025 order – which mandated that certain custodial events were to occur in November and December of 2025 – and then subsequently reinstated it on December 24, 2025 without modifying the dates of required action that had already passed. Id. at 24-25. Grandparents contend that all of Mother’s claims are waived because “Mother’s brief fails to cite [to] legal authority . . . [or] the record to support her position.” Grandparents’ Brief at 23, 25.3 Grandparents argue that Mother also waived the claim “of a violation of her parental rights” because she did not raise it before the trial court until she filed a motion to vacate three days before the hearing on October 14, 2025. Id. at 20-21. Further, to the extent that Mother’s claim stated a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 5325(1) of the Child Custody Act, Grandparents contend it is additionally waived because she failed to serve her motion raising the constitutional claim on the Attorney General. Id. at 21 (citation omitted). ____________________________________________ 3 Grandparents also moved to dismiss Mother’s appeal with prejudice, inter alia, because “there is no citation to the record or to the authorities in the Argument section of [Mother’s] brief.” See Grandparents’ Mot. to Dismiss, 4/10/26, at 3. We denied the motion without prejudice to revisit the request upon consideration of the merits of Mother’s appeal. See Order, 4/17/26. Pursuant to our ultimate disposition of Mother’s appeal, we decline to revisit Grandparents’ motion to dismiss. - 10 - J-S20012-26 Addressing Mother’s due process claims, Grandparents argue that rather than having only three days, i.e., the time between the scheduling order and the hearing date, to prepare to address the issues raised in Grandparents’ latest petitions and motions, Mother in fact had over a month to prepare, as the petitions and motions had been filed on April 16, 2025; June 6, 2025; and September 15, 2025. Id. at 23-24. Grandparents also dispute Mother’s claim that the trial court “limited [] the evidence she could produce” at the October 17, 2025 hearing; rather, they contend that “at no time did the [trial] court indicate that it did not have time to hear evidence” but, rather, “spent a considerable amount of time and gave Mother significant deference in the presentation of her case.” Id. at 25 (some formatting altered). Before reaching the merits of Mother’s claims, we first consider whether Mother has waived them, as this Court will not review a claim unless it is developed in the argument section of an appellant’s brief[] and supported by citations to relevant authority. In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 611 Pa. 643, 24 A.3d 364 (2011) (quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 897 (Pa. Super. 2010)) (“‘where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived’”). In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2017) (some formatting altered); see also Irwin Union Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Famous, 4 A.3d 1099, 1103 (Pa. Super. 2010) (noting that “[w]hen deficiencies in a brief hinder our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the - 11 - J-S20012-26 appeal entirely or find certain issues to be waived” (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (c) (providing that the argument section of an appellate brief shall contain discussion of issues raised therein and citation to pertinent legal authorities and references to the record). Similarly, we may find claims waived where a pro se appellant fails “to develop cognizable arguments with discussion and citation to relevant authority.” Saber v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 350 A.3d 965, 970 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citations omitted); cf. Thomas v. Thomas, 194 A.3d 220, 229 (Pa. Super. 2018) (noting that, while “pro se status confers no special benefit,” this Court may “construe materials of a pro se litigant liberally” (citation omitted)). Here, the argument section of Mother’s brief cites two authorities for the general propositions that a fit parent has the constitutional right to exercise “authority over the care, custody, and control of their child” and that courts must “apply third-party custody statutes in a manner that does not infringe upon a fit parent’s rights.” See Mother’s Brief at 13-14 (citations omitted). Mother’s brief contains no other citation to authority. Additionally, while contending that “[t]he record does not establish [her willful] violation” of the custody order and that “the record reflects confusion, dispute, and circumstances that do not rise to the level of willful noncompliance,” Mother fails to reference the relevant places in the certified record that support her claims. Id. at 20-21. Rather, Mother references her own reproduced record and, in doing so, only identifies trial court orders and one item of evidence, namely, her email message to the third therapist wherein Mother objected to - 12 - J-S20012-26 a scheduled family therapy session. See id. at 17, 21, 22, 25. After a careful review of Mother’s brief we conclude that, while she has cited to authority to establish a constitutionally protected right, Mother has failed to cite authority to support her claims that an impermissible infringement of that right occurred or for any of her other claims and, further, failed to reference items in the certified record to support her claims. While mindful of Mother’s pro se status, we find the majority of Mother’s claims waived on appeal because she has not supported her arguments with discussion and citation to relevant authority and reference to relevant portions of the record. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (c); M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d at 465; Saber, 350 A.3d at 970; see also B.L.F. v. D.J.F., 2401 EDA 2019, 2020 WL 974915, * 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 28, 2020) (unpublished mem.) (stating that, while this Court “liberally construe[s] materials filed by a pro se litigant, [ ] pro se status confers no special benefit,” citing Wilkins v. Marsico, 903 A.2d 1281, 1284-85 (Pa. Super. 2006)).4 We are also mindful that our role here is not to act as Mother’s counsel by identifying relevant authority and evidence in the record to support her claims to avoid waiver. See B.L.F., 2020 WL 974915, at *2 (stating that “[t]his Court will not act as counsel” for the pro se appellant (citation omitted)); see also Feldman v. CP Acquisitions 25, L.P., 325 A.3d 691, 702 (Pa. Super. 2024) (stating that it is not the role of this Court “to scour ____________________________________________ 4 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (noting that unpublished memorandum decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value). - 13 - J-S20012-26 the record to find support for the claims raised” (citation omitted)). Before we conclude that all of Mother’s claims are waived, however, we note that Mother has raised and argued the claim that the trial court committed legal error in the types of custody contempt sanctions it imposed. See Mother’s Brief at 22, 24 (wherein Mother challenged the “legality of the sanctions imposed”). Here, we are presented with an order that is, on its face, in conflict with the custody contempt statute, which was provided to the trial court by Grandparents in their emergency petition of September 15, 2025. Under these circumstances, we decline to find Mother’s claims addressing the contempt sanctions waived – despite the shortcomings in her brief on appeal – and, accordingly, proceed to consider these claims. See Irwin Union Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 4 A.3d at 1103; see also Thomas, 194 A.3d at 229. We review custody contempt orders to determine if the trial court abused its discretion. See K.M.G. v. H.M.W., 171 A .3D 839, 844 (Pa. Super. 2017). Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law on facts and circumstances before the trial court after hearing and consideration. Consequently, the court abuses its discretion if, in resolving the issue for decision, it misapplies the law or exercises its discretion in a manner lacking reason. Similarly, the trial court abuses its discretion if it does not follow legal procedure. Id. at 844-45 (citation omitted). Here, the trial court’s October 28, 2025 order provides the reasons why it found Mother in contempt for violations of the relevant custody orders. See Trial Ct. Order, 10/28/25, at n.1-4. We are unable to glean, however, the - 14 - J-S20012-26 reasons why the trial court awarded Grandparents with six custody visits with Child – in addition to the visits set forth in the custody order in effect at the time – as sanctions for Mother’s acts of contempt, aside from its statement that, “even though [Grandparents’] petition is labeled as seeking modification of the custody orders, [Grandparents] are not seeking any modification of the other terms of the orders.” Trial Ct. Order, 10/28/25, at 2, n.2; 3, n.3. In custody proceedings, the penalties for contempt are set forth at Section 5323(g) of the Child Custody Act as follows: (g) Contempt for noncompliance with any custody order.-- (1) A party who willfully fails to comply with any custody order may, as prescribed by general rule, be adjudged in contempt. Contempt shall be punishable by any one or more of the following: (i) Imprisonment for a period of not more than six months. (ii) A fine of not more than $500. (iii) Probation for a period of not more than six months. (iv) An order for nonrenewal, suspension or denial of operating privilege under section 4355 (relating to denial or suspension of licenses). (v) Counsel fees and costs. (2) An order committing an individual to jail under this section shall specify the condition which, when fulfilled, will result in the release of that individual. 23 Pa.C.S. § 5323(g). Section 5323(a) also provides that a court may make an “award . . . [of partial physical] custody if it is in the best interest of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 5323(a). - 15 - J-S20012-26 Here, the trial court awarded Grandparents with additional custodial visits with Child as a contempt sanction for Mother’s violations of various custody orders. See Trial Ct. Order, 10/28/25, at 1-3 (stating, “as a sanction, [Grandparents] shall exercise partial physical custody of Child” for six specified dates, in addition to the custodial periods set forth in the parties’ current custody order). The penalties permitted upon a finding of contempt in a custody proceeding, however, are expressly enumerated in Section 5323(g). See Rogowski v. Kirven, 291 A.3d 50, 60 (Pa. Super. 2023) (holding that “[a]ttendance at counseling sessions . . . is not an enumerated sanction under Section 5323(g) that may be imposed as punishment for an act of contempt in a custody matter” (citation omitted)). Because the award of custodial rights to a child is not an enumerated contempt penalty, we hold that the award of additional custodial time with Child – or any custodial rights to Child – as a sanction for Mother’s contemptuous conduct violates Section 5323(g). See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5323(g); see also Rogowski, 291 A.3d at 60. Furthermore, the record fails to reflect that the trial court considered Child’s best interest in awarding the custodial visits to Grandparents, as required by Section 5323(a). See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5323(a). A “custody award should not be used to reward or punish a parent for good or bad behavior” and a “change of custody is just as important to the child . . . as an original award of custody.” Puthuff v. Ramsey, 668 WDA 2025, 2026 WL 161551, *2 (Pa. Super filed Jan 21. 2026) (unpublished mem.) (citation omitted). Because the heart of any child custody matter is the best interest of the child, it is imperative that - 16 - J-S20012-26 Child not be treated as a pawn or a tool to punish Mother for her conduct. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5323(a); see also Puthuff, 2026 WL 161551 at *2. For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the contempt sanctions awarding Grandparents with additional custodial time with Child and remand for the trial court to consider and impose sanctions as permitted by Section 5323(g). We affirm the remainder of the orders appealed. Orders affirmed in part and vacated in part. Remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished. Date: 11/2/2026 - 17 -