Poor Boy v. City of Winnfield
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket25-30624
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
November 16, 2026
No. 25-30624
Thomas B. Plunkett, III
____________
Clerk
Poor Boy Tree Service Incorporated; Mobile Help 4 U
Incorporated,
Plaintiffs—Appellants,
versus
City of Winnfield,
Defendant—Appellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 1:22-CV-2199
______________________________
Before Stewart, Higginson, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Carl E. Stewart, Circuit Judge:
Poor Boy Tree Service, Inc. and Mobile Help 4U, Inc.
(collectively, “Poor Boy”) traveled to the City of Winnfield, Louisiana
(the “City”) to assist with cleanup and recovery efforts following Hurricane
Laura. Poor Boy did not sign a written agreement with the City. However, it
maintains that it entered into an oral contract with the City that the mayor
and the board of aldermen subsequently ratified. Poor Boy was never paid for
the work it completed. As a result, it filed suit alleging breach of an open
account relationship. The City moved for summary judgment on Poor Boy’s
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claim, arguing that there was no contractual relationship under Louisiana
law, and that the parties’ dealings did not constitute an open account
relationship. The district court granted the City’s motion. Poor Boy timely
appealed. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM in part, VACATE in
part, and REMAND.
I.
A. Factual Background
On August 27, 2020, Hurricane Laura made landfall in Louisiana and
caused significant damage to the City. Hurricane Laura entered the City as a
Category Four hurricane and maintained its strength as it progressed through
the City. Following the hurricane, Ty Bewley, owner and operator of Poor
Boy, traveled across Louisiana offering cleanup and recovery services.
Although it is unclear from the record how Bewley and the City began
communicating, it is undisputed that Bewley communicated through text
message with at least one City employee, John Paul, about bringing work
crews to the City to provide cleanup and recovery services. 1.
At some point, both Poor Boy and Mobile Help 4U began performing
cleanup and recovery work in the City. Then, on September 8, 2021, Poor
Boy prepared an invoice totaling $714,369.51 for work performed. That same
day, Mobile Help 4U prepared an invoice totaling $406,468.94 for work
performed. The invoices also included a 2% monthly service charge. At
various points, Poor Boy reached out to the City to obtain payment.
Numerous City officials, including the city clerk and then-mayor George
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1
It also appears that Poor Boy contacted the City’s police chief about bringing a
crew to help.
2
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Moss (“Mayor Moss”) acknowledged Poor Boy’s requests for payment, but
never remitted payment to Poor Boy on behalf of the City.
B. Procedural History
On July 21, 2022, Poor Boy filed an action “to collect on an open
account” pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute section 9:2781 et seq. 2 On
December 23, 2024, the City moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Poor Boy could not show a contractual relationship between itself and the
City. On May 19, 2025, the parties appeared before the district court for a
hearing on the summary judgment motion. At the hearing, the district court
questioned the parties regarding the existence of a potential unjust
enrichment claim. The district court subsequently ordered and received
briefing on the issue of unjust enrichment.
On September 29, 2025, the district court granted the City’s motion
for summary judgment and dismissed Poor Boy’s claim with prejudice. In its
opinion, the district court reasoned that there was a genuine dispute
regarding whether the City consented to a contract with Poor Boy. However,
the district court still determined that judgment as a matter of law was proper
because the Lawrason Act—to which the City is subject—requires the board
of aldermen to vote on a contract before it can be executed by the mayor. The
district court reasoned that summary judgment was proper because Poor Boy
presented no evidence for a reasonable factfinder to determine that the board
of aldermen properly authorized a contract between the City and Poor Boy.
The district court also determined that there was no applicable exception to
that requirement in the instant proceedings. It next considered whether there
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2
Poor Boy’s complaint did not include a standalone claim for breach of contract,
nor did Poor Boy amend its complaint to include that standalone claim. However, the
district court appears to have construed Poor Boy’s complaint as raising claims for (1)
breach of contractual relationship and (2) breach of an open account.
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was an open account relationship and held that summary judgment was
proper under Cambridge Toxicology Group, Inc. v. Exnicios, 495 F.3d 169, 174
(5th Cir. 2007). Finally, the district court ruled that unjust enrichment was
not available to Poor Boy because such relief may only be sustained when the
law affords no other potential remedy. Poor Boy timely appealed.
II.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard as the district court and viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Navigators Ins. Co.,
611 F.3d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is
appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when “a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Perry v.
VHS San Antonio Partners, L.L.C., 990 F.3d 918, 926 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Indeed, when a fact
“might affect the outcome” of the case, it is material. Id. In reviewing the
record, we “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party”
and refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.
Vote.Org v. Callanen, 89 F.4th 459, 469 (5th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted).
III.
Poor Boy raises three arguments on appeal. It first argues that the
district court erred in determining that it did not enter into a contractual
relationship with the City. Next, it asserts that the district court erred in
determining that it could not consider the parties’ dealings an open account
under Louisiana law. Finally, it contends that the district court erred in
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declining to grant it leave to amend after sua sponte raising the potential
applicability of unjust enrichment. We address each argument in turn.
A. Oral Contract
1. Contracting on Behalf of Municipalities
Poor Boy argues that the district court erred by granting summary
judgment when there was a genuine dispute regarding contract formation. It
concedes that there was no “formal written, signed agreement.” However,
it maintains that it entered into a binding oral contract with the City. In
support of its argument, it points to emails between representatives of Poor
Boy and Mayor Moss wherein the mayor alluded to an obligation to pay Poor
Boy upon receipt of funds from the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(“FEMA”). In Poor Boy’s view, “the emails and communications in
question would . . . show the existence of the oral contract between the
parties.”
Louisiana law defines a contract as “an agreement by two or more
parties whereby obligations are created, modified, or extinguished.” La.
Civ. Code art. 1906. To form a valid contract, Louisiana requires
“capacity, consent, a lawful cause, and a valid object.” Granger v. Christus
Health Cent. La., 144 So. 3d 736, 760–61 (La. 2013). The party claiming rights
under the contract bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid
contract. Hornbeck Offshore Operators, LLC v. Cross Grp., Inc., 207 So. 3d
1141, 1146 (La. Ct. App. 1 Cir. 2016). Unless the law requires otherwise,
“offer and acceptance may be made orally, in writing, or by action or inaction
that under the circumstances is clearly indicative of consent.” La. Civ.
Code art. 1927.
Poor Boy is correct that the district court recognized a dispute
regarding contract formation. However, the district court determined that
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the dispute was immaterial because Poor Boy had not shown an action by a
City official with capacity to enter into a contract. We agree.
The City was organized under the Lawrason Act. In municipalities
subject to the Lawrason Act “[t]he legislative powers . . . shall be vested in
and exercised by the board of aldermen.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 33:362(A)(1). The mayor, however, “shall be the chief executive officer
of the municipality.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33:362(B). He is
empowered to “sign all contracts on behalf of the municipality.” La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 33:404(4). While the mayor is explicitly authorized to sign
all contracts on behalf of the respective municipality, the Lawrason Act does
not grant him authority to negotiate and enter binding contracts without
board approval.
The Louisiana Supreme Court considered the propriety of a contract
executed by the mayor without board approval in Smith v. Town of Vinton, 25
So. 2d 237 (La. 1946). It held that as a “general rule[,] a [m]ayor acting alone
is without power to execute a contract incurring a debt on the part of his city
or town. He can act only with and under the authority, usually evidenced by
a resolution or ordinance, of the [b]oard of [a]ldermen.” Id. at 241. Louisiana
courts have consistently reaffirmed this principle. Bell v. City of Lake Charles,
218 So. 3d 190, 203 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2017); Sunray Servs., Inc. v. City of
Minden, 690 So. 2d 970, 973 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997); Daspit v. City of
Alexandria, 342 So. 2d 683, 687 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
Here, Poor Boy pointed to no evidence that the board of aldermen
authorized Mayor Moss to enter into a contract. Assuming, arguendo, that
Poor Boy could show consent, a lawful cause, and a valid object, its claim
must still fail because Mayor Moss lacked capacity to enter a contract on
behalf of the City. The district court’s decision properly held that a mayor
may not enter a contract without approval from the board of aldermen. See
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Smith, 25 So. 2d at 241. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on this point.
2. Ratification of Unauthorized Contract
Poor Boy next argues that the district court erred because the mayor
and the board of aldermen ratified the unauthorized contract. Poor Boy
asserts numerous theories of potential ratification. First, it submits that
Mayor Moss ratified the oral contract through emails alluding to an intention
to pay the invoices upon receipt of FEMA funds. Next, it argues that the
board of aldermen implicitly ratified the oral contract because members of
the board were aware that Poor Boy was working to benefit the City. Finally,
Poor Boy argues that members of the board were aware of the Poor Boy
invoices and never denied the City’s obligation to pay them. These
arguments are unavailing.
It is true that “[a]n unauthorized contract of an agent may be ratified
by the subsequent action or inaction of the principal upon being apprised of
the facts.” Sunray Servs., 690 So. 2d at 973. Indeed, Smith contains an
exception to the general rule that a contract binding a municipality is invalid
unless authorized by the board of aldermen. Specifically, Smith reasons that
a city cannot deny the existence of a contract for “necessary repairs to a
municipally owned and operated utility” entered “with the full knowledge of
all the members of the [board of aldermen], and with no objection or protest
being voiced by any of them.” 25 So. 2d at 241.
But Poor Boy has not presented any evidence that satisfies the Smith
exception. First, Mayor Moss’s email alluding to FEMA funds has no
bearing on the City’s ability to enter a contract because it does not relate to
whether any member of the board of aldermen was aware of the mayor’s
actions. Poor Boy has not named an alderman with knowledge of the
unauthorized contract, nor has it presented evidence that Mayor Moss
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directly informed an alderman of his email response to Poor Boy. 3 Next, Poor
Boy has not cited to an official action by the board of aldermen signaling
approval or lack of protest to an unauthorized contract between the City and
Poor Boy. In fact, Poor Boy expressly argues that testimony from Mayor
Gerald Hamms (“Mayor Hamms”), then a member of the board of
aldermen, should not have been considered because he was not privy to any
details of the arrangement. 4 Turning to the third argument, Poor Boy cannot
now argue that the aldermen implicitly ratified the arrangement simply
because they, as residents of the City, benefited from Poor Boy’s work.
Accordingly, Poor Boy did not provide a sufficient basis for the district court
to conclude that the board ratified an unauthorized contract between the City
and Poor Boy.
3. Exceptions to Lawrason Act’s Requirements
Finally, Poor Boy has not shown that either Former Governor John
Bel Edwards’ (“Governor Edwards”) proclamations or the Louisiana
Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act
(“LHSEADA”) authorized him to bypass the Lawrason Act’s general
requirements. On August 21, 2020, Governor Edwards issued Proclamation
Number 108 JBE 2020, to exercise emergency powers pursuant to Louisiana
Revised Statute section 29:721 et seq. On September 3, 2020, Governor
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3
The relevant email was sent to numerous individuals. Neither party indicates that
any named individual was a member of the board of aldermen.
4
Mayor Hamms’s affidavit does not specifically state that he relied on personal
knowledge during his time as an alderman. However, Poor Boy’s brief concedes that Mayor
Hamms was a member of the board of aldermen during the relevant period.
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Edwards issued Proclamation Number 115 JBE 2020, amending 108 JBE
2020, stating:
Pursuant to La. R.S. 29:724(D)(1), the Louisiana Procurement
Code (La. R.S. 39:1551, et seq.) and Louisiana Public Bid Law
(La. R.S. 38:2211, et seq.) and their corresponding rules and
regulations are hereby suspended for the purpose of the
procurement of any good or services necessary to respond to
this emergency, including emergency contracts, cooperative
endeavor agreements, and any other emergency amendments
to existing contracts.
The provisions of this proclamation contained the effective date of August
27, 2020. The Governor continued the suspension of the Louisiana
Procurement Code and Louisiana Public Bid Law through subsequent
proclamations.
Louisiana Revised Statute section 737 provides that:
[W]henever a situation develops within or outside of a
municipality which the chief executive officer of the
municipality determines requires immediate action to preserve
the public peace, property, health, or safety within the
municipality or to provide for continued operation of municipal
government, nothing in this Chapter shall diminish the
authority of the chief executive officer of the municipality to
undertake immediate emergency response measures within the
municipality to preserve the public peace, property, health, or
safety within the municipality or to provide for continued
operation of the municipal government. Whenever the chief
executive officer of the municipality undertakes immediate
emergency response measures because of a disaster or
emergency, he shall immediately notify the parish president
and advise him of the nature of the disaster or emergency and
the emergency response measures being undertaken.
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La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29:737.
The plain language of section 29:737 states that “nothing in this
Chapter shall diminish the authority of the chief executive officer of the
municipality to undertake immediate emergency response measures within
the municipality to preserve the public peace, property, health, or safety
within the municipality or to provide for continued operation of the
municipal government.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29:737. However, the
limit the City points to, the Lawrason Act, is not “in this Chapter.” Thus, it
cannot serve as a limit on Mayor Moss as the City posits.
Still, the City identifies tension between the LHSEADA and the
Lawrason Act. The Lawrason Act generally requires a mayor to obtain
approval before entering into a contract. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 33:362(A)(1); see also Smith, 25 So. 2d at 241. However, the LHSEADA
grants the mayor authority to take certain measures during an emergency.
These measures include:
(1) [s]uspending the provisions of any municipal regulatory
ordinance prescribing the procedures for conduct of local
business, or the orders, rules, or regulations of any municipal
agency, if strict compliance with the provisions of any
ordinance, order, rule, or regulation would in any way prevent,
hinder, or delay necessary action in coping with the emergency
[and] (2) [u]tilizing all available resources of the municipality
as reasonably necessary to cope with the emergency.
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29:737(B)(1)–(2). 5
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5
The remaining authorizations include:
(3) Transferring the direction, personnel, or functions of
municipal departments and agencies or units thereof for the purpose of
performing or facilitating emergency services.
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Assuming that Poor Boy is correct that Mayor Moss intended to enter
into an oral contract with it, Poor Boy has not shown that Mayor Moss was
entitled to do so under the LHSEADA. Indeed, his authority under the
LHSEADA did not allow him to suspend the Lawrason Act—a state law.
Furthermore, Mayor Moss’s decision did not utilize the “available resources
of the municipality” as the arrangement clearly involves a company not
previously affiliated with the municipality. Reading these statutes to give
effect to them both, the LHSEADA authorized Mayor Moss to exercise
emergency authority to the extent his actions did not conflict with other laws.
In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511, 517 (5th Cir. 2004) (“When faced with a
conflict between two statutes, courts must attempt to interpret them so as to
give effect to both statutes.”). The district court’s decision reconciled the
executive authority granted through the LHSEADA with the legislative
requirements imposed through the Lawrason Act. In short, the district court
determined that Mayor Moss could not utilize the LHSEADA to
circumvent the Lawrason Act. Accordingly, the district court correctly
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(4) Directing and compelling the evacuation of all or part of the
population from any stricken or threatened area within the municipality if
he deems this action necessary.
(5) Prescribing routes, modes of transportation, and destinations
in connection with evacuation within the municipality.
(6) Controlling ingress and egress to and from the affected area,
the movement of persons within the area, and the occupancy of premises
therein.
(7) Suspending or limiting the sale, dispensing, or transportation
of alcoholic beverages, explosives, and combustibles, excluding those
components of firearm ammunition.
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29:737(3)–(7).
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determined that Poor Boy was not exempt from obtaining board of aldermen
approval before entering a contract with the City.
Having considered each of Poor Boy’s arguments regarding a
potential oral contract, we agree with the district court that Poor Boy’s oral
contract claim failed as a matter of law.
B. Open Account
Poor Boy also argues that the district court erred by determining that
the parties’ arrangement could not be considered an open account as a matter
of law. Section 9:2781 of the Louisiana Code specifies that an open account
includes “any account for which a part or all of the balance is past due,
whether or not the account reflects one or more transactions and whether or
not at the time of contracting the parties expected future transactions.” La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2781(D).
The district court’s holding relied heavily on the fact that the parties
had no prior dealings before Hurricane Laura. Thus, the district court
contextualized all the services provided in light of the disaster recovery
efforts. In the district court’s view, Poor Boy and the City could not have an
open account relationship because each individual service that Poor Boy
performed was meant to assist the City in the immediate aftermath of
Hurricane Laura, and the parties had no expectation of a continued
relationship once the recovery efforts were completed.
The district court’s decision applies the factors from Cambridge
Toxicology Group, wherein we held that the parties’ dealings did not
constitute an open account relationship—in part—because the parties did
not have a history of working together. 495 F.3d at 174. We noted that
“[a]lthough the statute permits recovery based on a single transaction, this
feature alone does not subject [the challenged agreement] to the open
account statute.” Id.
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Six months after our decision in Cambridge Toxicology Group, the
Louisiana Supreme Court considered the open account statute and held that:
[La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2781 (D)] must be applied as
written. Under a plain reading of that statute, there is no
requirement that there must be one or more transactions
between the parties, nor is there any requirement that the
parties must anticipate future transactions. To the extent the
prior case law has imposed any requirements which are
inconsistent with the clear language of [La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 9:2781 (D)], those cases are overruled.
Frey Plumbing Co. v. Foster, 996 So. 2d 969, 972 (La. 2008).
Frey Plumbing expressly overruled all Louisiana cases requiring an
open account relationship to be premised on multiple transactions, which
includes the line of cases we relied on in Cambridge Toxicology Group.
Accordingly, the district court erred in holding that the parties’ relationship
could not constitute an open account because they had no prior dealings and
had not expressly contemplated future dealings. However, the parties did not
raise Frey Plumbing before the district court. Thus, the district court was
without the benefit of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s guidance in rendering
its decision on this issue. Because section 9:2781 “must be applied as
written” we VACATE the grant of summary judgment on this claim and
REMAND it to the district court for further consideration under Frey
Plumbing and its progeny. 6
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6
In supplemental briefing before this court, the City also cites Uniti Fiber, LLC v.
Miller Pipeline, LLC, 407 So. 3d 893, 897 (La. Ct. App. 5 Cir. 2025) as support for its
argument that there can be no open account without an underlying contractual agreement.
Because we remand the open account claim to the district court, we decline to consider the
merits of this argument.
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C. Unjust Enrichment
Finally, Poor Boy argues that the district court erred by declining to
grant it leave to amend its complaint to include a claim for unjust enrichment.
Under Louisiana law, one “who has been enriched without cause at
the expense of another person is bound to compensate that person.” La.
Civ. Code art. 2298. The remedy provided by the unjust enrichment
statute “is subsidiary and shall not be available if the law provides another
remedy for the impoverishment or declares a contrary rule.” La. Civ.
Code art. 2298. In line with article 2298, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
held that unjust enrichment is “only applicable to fill a gap where no express
remedy is provided.” Walters v. MedSouth Record Mgmt., LLC, 38 So. 3d 241,
242 (La. 2010) (quoting Mouton v. State, 525 So. 2d 1136, 1142 (La. Ct. App.
1 Cir. 1988)).
Here, the district court determined that unjust enrichment was
unavailable to Poor Boy because the law provided a potential remedy through
its claim for breach of an open account, despite its holding that there was no
contract or open account arrangement between Poor Boy and the City. But,
nullity or absence of a contract, or absence of an open account are situations
where Louisiana courts have allowed an unjust enrichment claim. 7 “[I]t is not
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7
Gilstrap v. Cross Realty, Inc., 428 So. 3d 997, 1003 (La. Ct. App. 5 Cir. 2025)
(“[o]nce the district court determined that no contract existed and granted summary
judgment on that issue, the unjust enrichment claim became Gilstrap's only recourse”);
Carr & Assocs., Inc. v. Jones, 368 So. 3d 593, 605, (La. Ct. App. 1 Cir. 2023), writ denied,
370 So. 3d 1075 (La. 2023) (“regardless of whether the parties orally contracted for [the]
services, we readily apply the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment to support recovery
[] for [the] services” which the evidence showed was provided); Gulfstream Servs., Inc. v.
Hot Energy Servs., Inc., 907 So. 2d 96, 100 (La. Ct. App. 1 Cir. 2005), writ denied, 904 So.
2d 706 (La. 2005) (in suit on open account, where trial court found the parties had not
agreed to an open account, “[i]n the absence of a contract or agreement, the only legal
remedy available in this case arises under La. C.C. art. 2298”).
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the success or failure of other causes of action, but rather the existence of other
causes of action, that determine whether unjust enrichment can be applied.”
Garber v. Badon & Ranier, 981 So. 2d 92, 100 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2008).
Here, the district court did not state that the open account claim failed, for
example, because it had been brought untimely, or because it lacked
evidentiary support; it held there was no open account relationship as a
matter of law because the parties did not engage in the type of transactions
that qualified as an open account.
This is not a situation where the plaintiff has another claim available
but cannot prevail on that claim because of prescription, failure to plead the
claim, or some other defect. Of course, Louisiana courts have consistently
held that a plaintiff cannot seek to recover for unjust enrichment when
another remedy exists at law. 8
As stated above, we vacate the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on the open account claim and remand for consideration of Frey
Plumbing and its progeny. Until the district court decides whether there is, or
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8 Walters, 38 So. 3d at 242 (plaintiff’s delictual action had prescribed and so unjust
enrichment was not available as an alternative remedy); 5301 Jefferson Hwy, LLC v. A.
Maloney Moving & Storage, Inc., 392 So. 3d 337, 353 (La. Ct. App. 5 Cir. 2024) (sustaining
the trial court’s determination that several tort claims that plaintiff plead or could have
pursued were prescribed); Russo v. OnPath Fed. Credit Union, 388 So. 3d 1274, 1281 (La.
Ct. App. 5 Cir. 2024) (defendant showed additional amounts would have been due under
an incentive plan and so plaintiffs had no unjust enrichment claim); Pinegrove Elec. Supply
Co., Inc. v. Cat Key Constr., Inc., 88 So. 3d 1097, 1101–02 (La. Ct. App. 5 Cir. 2012)
(plaintiff’s open account claim had prescribed, and it also had available a remedy under the
Private Works Act, so there was no cause of action in unjust enrichment). Garber, 981 So.
2d at 100 (denying unjust enrichment claim because supplemental petition did not
sufficiently allege facts to support the claim).
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is not, a claim on an open account, there cannot be a determination of
whether Poor Boy is foreclosed from amending its complaint to assert an
unjust enrichment claim. Fluid Disposal Specialties, Inc. v. UniFirst Corp., 316
So. 3d 1222, 1228-29 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2019), aff’d on rehearing, 316 So.
3d 1252 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2020), writ denied, 302 So. 3d 1116 (La. 2020)
(noting that unjust enrichment can be plead as an alternative to an open
account claim, and that it cannot be determined at the preliminary stages of
a case whether a plaintiff “actually has ‘no other remedy at law’”).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s holding
that the mayor lacked the capacity to bind the City to any oral contract.
However, we VACATE the grant of summary judgment as to Poor Boy’s
open account claim and REMAND that claim to the district court for
further consideration. Additionally, we VACATE the district court’s
determination that Poor Boy could not seek recovery under the theory of
unjust enrichment as premature.
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