Full Opinion

Case: 25-30624 Document: 64-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ____________ FILED November 16, 2026 No. 25-30624 Thomas B. Plunkett, III ____________ Clerk Poor Boy Tree Service Incorporated; Mobile Help 4 U Incorporated, Plaintiffs—Appellants, versus City of Winnfield, Defendant—Appellee. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 1:22-CV-2199 ______________________________ Before Stewart, Higginson, and Ho, Circuit Judges. Carl E. Stewart, Circuit Judge: Poor Boy Tree Service, Inc. and Mobile Help 4U, Inc. (collectively, “Poor Boy”) traveled to the City of Winnfield, Louisiana (the “City”) to assist with cleanup and recovery efforts following Hurricane Laura. Poor Boy did not sign a written agreement with the City. However, it maintains that it entered into an oral contract with the City that the mayor and the board of aldermen subsequently ratified. Poor Boy was never paid for the work it completed. As a result, it filed suit alleging breach of an open account relationship. The City moved for summary judgment on Poor Boy’s Case: 25-30624 Document: 64-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 No. 25-30624 claim, arguing that there was no contractual relationship under Louisiana law, and that the parties’ dealings did not constitute an open account relationship. The district court granted the City’s motion. Poor Boy timely appealed. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND. I. A. Factual Background On August 27, 2020, Hurricane Laura made landfall in Louisiana and caused significant damage to the City. Hurricane Laura entered the City as a Category Four hurricane and maintained its strength as it progressed through the City. Following the hurricane, Ty Bewley, owner and operator of Poor Boy, traveled across Louisiana offering cleanup and recovery services. Although it is unclear from the record how Bewley and the City began communicating, it is undisputed that Bewley communicated through text message with at least one City employee, John Paul, about bringing work crews to the City to provide cleanup and recovery services. 1. At some point, both Poor Boy and Mobile Help 4U began performing cleanup and recovery work in the City. Then, on September 8, 2021, Poor Boy prepared an invoice totaling $714,369.51 for work performed. That same day, Mobile Help 4U prepared an invoice totaling $406,468.94 for work performed. The invoices also included a 2% monthly service charge. At various points, Poor Boy reached out to the City to obtain payment. Numerous City officials, including the city clerk and then-mayor George _____________________ 1 It also appears that Poor Boy contacted the City’s police chief about bringing a crew to help. 2 Case: 25-30624 Document: 64-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 No. 25-30624 Moss (“Mayor Moss”) acknowledged Poor Boy’s requests for payment, but never remitted payment to Poor Boy on behalf of the City. B. Procedural History On July 21, 2022, Poor Boy filed an action “to collect on an open account” pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute section 9:2781 et seq. 2 On December 23, 2024, the City moved for summary judgment, arguing that Poor Boy could not show a contractual relationship between itself and the City. On May 19, 2025, the parties appeared before the district court for a hearing on the summary judgment motion. At the hearing, the district court questioned the parties regarding the existence of a potential unjust enrichment claim. The district court subsequently ordered and received briefing on the issue of unjust enrichment. On September 29, 2025, the district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Poor Boy’s claim with prejudice. In its opinion, the district court reasoned that there was a genuine dispute regarding whether the City consented to a contract with Poor Boy. However, the district court still determined that judgment as a matter of law was proper because the Lawrason Act—to which the City is subject—requires the board of aldermen to vote on a contract before it can be executed by the mayor. The district court reasoned that summary judgment was proper because Poor Boy presented no evidence for a reasonable factfinder to determine that the board of aldermen properly authorized a contract between the City and Poor Boy. The district court also determined that there was no applicable exception to that requirement in the instant proceedings. It next considered whether there _____________________ 2 Poor Boy’s complaint did not include a standalone claim for breach of contract, nor did Poor Boy amend its complaint to include that standalone claim. However, the district court appears to have construed Poor Boy’s complaint as raising claims for (1) breach of contractual relationship and (2) breach of an open account. 3 Case: 25-30624 Document: 64-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 No. 25-30624 was an open account relationship and held that summary judgment was proper under Cambridge Toxicology Group, Inc. v. Exnicios, 495 F.3d 169, 174 (5th Cir. 2007). Finally, the district court ruled that unjust enrichment was not available to Poor Boy because such relief may only be sustained when the law affords no other potential remedy. Poor Boy timely appealed. II. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 611 F.3d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Perry v. VHS San Antonio Partners, L.L.C., 990 F.3d 918, 926 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Indeed, when a fact “might affect the outcome” of the case, it is material. Id. In reviewing the record, we “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party” and refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence. Vote.Org v. Callanen, 89 F.4th 459, 469 (5th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted). III. Poor Boy raises three arguments on appeal. It first argues that the district court erred in determining that it did not enter into a contractual relationship with the City. Next, it asserts that the district court erred in determining that it could not consider the parties’ dealings an open account under Louisiana law. Finally, it contends that the district court erred in 4 Case: 25-30624 Document: 64-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 No. 25-30624 declining to grant it leave to amend after sua sponte raising the potential applicability of unjust enrichment. We address each argument in turn. A. Oral Contract 1. Contracting on Behalf of Municipalities Poor Boy argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment when there was a genuine dispute regarding contract formation. It concedes that there was no “formal written, signed agreement.” However, it maintains that it entered into a binding oral contract with the City. In support of its argument, it points to emails between representatives of Poor Boy and Mayor Moss wherein the mayor alluded to an obligation to pay Poor Boy upon receipt of funds from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”). In Poor Boy’s view, “the emails and communications in question would . . . show the existence of the oral contract between the parties.” Louisiana law defines a contract as “an agreement by two or more parties whereby obligations are created, modified, or extinguished.” La. Civ. Code art. 1906. To form a valid contract, Louisiana requires “capacity, consent, a lawful cause, and a valid object.” Granger v. Christus Health Cent. La., 144 So. 3d 736, 760–61 (La. 2013). The party claiming rights under the contract bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid contract. Hornbeck Offshore Operators, LLC v. Cross Grp., Inc., 207 So. 3d 1141, 1146 (La. Ct. App. 1 Cir. 2016). Unless the law requires otherwise, “offer and acceptance may be made orally, in writing, or by action or inaction that under the circumstances is clearly indicative of consent.” La. Civ. Code art. 1927. Poor Boy is correct that the district court recognized a dispute regarding contract formation. However, the district court determined that 5 Case: 25-30624 Document: 64-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 No. 25-30624 the dispute was immaterial because Poor Boy had not shown an action by a City official with capacity to enter into a contract. We agree. The City was organized under the Lawrason Act. In municipalities subject to the Lawrason Act “[t]he legislative powers . . . shall be vested in and exercised by the board of aldermen.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33:362(A)(1). The mayor, however, “shall be the chief executive officer of the municipality.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33:362(B). He is empowered to “sign all contracts on behalf of the municipality.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33:404(4). While the mayor is explicitly authorized to sign all contracts on behalf of the respective municipality, the Lawrason Act does not grant him authority to negotiate and enter binding contracts without board approval. The Louisiana Supreme Court considered the propriety of a contract executed by the mayor without board approval in Smith v. Town of Vinton, 25 So. 2d 237 (La. 1946). It held that as a “general rule[,] a [m]ayor acting alone is without power to execute a contract incurring a debt on the part of his city or town. He can act only with and under the authority, usually evidenced by a resolution or ordinance, of the [b]oard of [a]ldermen.” Id. at 241. Louisiana courts have consistently reaffirmed this principle. Bell v. City of Lake Charles, 218 So. 3d 190, 203 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2017); Sunray Servs., Inc. v. City of Minden, 690 So. 2d 970, 973 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997); Daspit v. City of Alexandria, 342 So. 2d 683, 687 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1977). Here, Poor Boy pointed to no evidence that the board of aldermen authorized Mayor Moss to enter into a contract. Assuming, arguendo, that Poor Boy could show consent, a lawful cause, and a valid object, its claim must still fail because Mayor Moss lacked capacity to enter a contract on behalf of the City. The district court’s decision properly held that a mayor may not enter a contract without approval from the board of aldermen. See 6 Case: 25-30624 Document: 64-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 No. 25-30624 Smith, 25 So. 2d at 241. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this point. 2. Ratification of Unauthorized Contract Poor Boy next argues that the district court erred because the mayor and the board of aldermen ratified the unauthorized contract. Poor Boy asserts numerous theories of potential ratification. First, it submits that Mayor Moss ratified the oral contract through emails alluding to an intention to pay the invoices upon receipt of FEMA funds. Next, it argues that the board of aldermen implicitly ratified the oral contract because members of the board were aware that Poor Boy was working to benefit the City. Finally, Poor Boy argues that members of the board were aware of the Poor Boy invoices and never denied the City’s obligation to pay them. These arguments are unavailing. It is true that “[a]n unauthorized contract of an agent may be ratified by the subsequent action or inaction of the principal upon being apprised of the facts.” Sunray Servs., 690 So. 2d at 973. Indeed, Smith contains an exception to the general rule that a contract binding a municipality is invalid unless authorized by the board of aldermen. Specifically, Smith reasons that a city cannot deny the existence of a contract for “necessary repairs to a municipally owned and operated utility” entered “with the full knowledge of all the members of the [board of aldermen], and with no objection or protest being voiced by any of them.” 25 So. 2d at 241. But Poor Boy has not presented any evidence that satisfies the Smith exception. First, Mayor Moss’s email alluding to FEMA funds has no bearing on the City’s ability to enter a contract because it does not relate to whether any member of the board of aldermen was aware of the mayor’s actions. Poor Boy has not named an alderman with knowledge of the unauthorized contract, nor has it presented evidence that Mayor Moss 7 Case: 25-30624 Document: 64-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 No. 25-30624 directly informed an alderman of his email response to Poor Boy. 3 Next, Poor Boy has not cited to an official action by the board of aldermen signaling approval or lack of protest to an unauthorized contract between the City and Poor Boy. In fact, Poor Boy expressly argues that testimony from Mayor Gerald Hamms (“Mayor Hamms”), then a member of the board of aldermen, should not have been considered because he was not privy to any details of the arrangement. 4 Turning to the third argument, Poor Boy cannot now argue that the aldermen implicitly ratified the arrangement simply because they, as residents of the City, benefited from Poor Boy’s work. Accordingly, Poor Boy did not provide a sufficient basis for the district court to conclude that the board ratified an unauthorized contract between the City and Poor Boy. 3. Exceptions to Lawrason Act’s Requirements Finally, Poor Boy has not shown that either Former Governor John Bel Edwards’ (“Governor Edwards”) proclamations or the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act (“LHSEADA”) authorized him to bypass the Lawrason Act’s general requirements. On August 21, 2020, Governor Edwards issued Proclamation Number 108 JBE 2020, to exercise emergency powers pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute section 29:721 et seq. On September 3, 2020, Governor _____________________ 3 The relevant email was sent to numerous individuals. Neither party indicates that any named individual was a member of the board of aldermen. 4 Mayor Hamms’s affidavit does not specifically state that he relied on personal knowledge during his time as an alderman. However, Poor Boy’s brief concedes that Mayor Hamms was a member of the board of aldermen during the relevant period. 8 Case: 25-30624 Document: 64-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 No. 25-30624 Edwards issued Proclamation Number 115 JBE 2020, amending 108 JBE 2020, stating: Pursuant to La. R.S. 29:724(D)(1), the Louisiana Procurement Code (La. R.S. 39:1551, et seq.) and Louisiana Public Bid Law (La. R.S. 38:2211, et seq.) and their corresponding rules and regulations are hereby suspended for the purpose of the procurement of any good or services necessary to respond to this emergency, including emergency contracts, cooperative endeavor agreements, and any other emergency amendments to existing contracts. The provisions of this proclamation contained the effective date of August 27, 2020. The Governor continued the suspension of the Louisiana Procurement Code and Louisiana Public Bid Law through subsequent proclamations. Louisiana Revised Statute section 737 provides that: [W]henever a situation develops within or outside of a municipality which the chief executive officer of the municipality determines requires immediate action to preserve the public peace, property, health, or safety within the municipality or to provide for continued operation of municipal government, nothing in this Chapter shall diminish the authority of the chief executive officer of the municipality to undertake immediate emergency response measures within the municipality to preserve the public peace, property, health, or safety within the municipality or to provide for continued operation of the municipal government. Whenever the chief executive officer of the municipality undertakes immediate emergency response measures because of a disaster or emergency, he shall immediately notify the parish president and advise him of the nature of the disaster or emergency and the emergency response measures being undertaken. 9 Case: 25-30624 Document: 64-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 No. 25-30624 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29:737. The plain language of section 29:737 states that “nothing in this Chapter shall diminish the authority of the chief executive officer of the municipality to undertake immediate emergency response measures within the municipality to preserve the public peace, property, health, or safety within the municipality or to provide for continued operation of the municipal government.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29:737. However, the limit the City points to, the Lawrason Act, is not “in this Chapter.” Thus, it cannot serve as a limit on Mayor Moss as the City posits. Still, the City identifies tension between the LHSEADA and the Lawrason Act. The Lawrason Act generally requires a mayor to obtain approval before entering into a contract. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33:362(A)(1); see also Smith, 25 So. 2d at 241. However, the LHSEADA grants the mayor authority to take certain measures during an emergency. These measures include: (1) [s]uspending the provisions of any municipal regulatory ordinance prescribing the procedures for conduct of local business, or the orders, rules, or regulations of any municipal agency, if strict compliance with the provisions of any ordinance, order, rule, or regulation would in any way prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action in coping with the emergency [and] (2) [u]tilizing all available resources of the municipality as reasonably necessary to cope with the emergency. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29:737(B)(1)–(2). 5 _____________________ 5 The remaining authorizations include: (3) Transferring the direction, personnel, or functions of municipal departments and agencies or units thereof for the purpose of performing or facilitating emergency services. 10 Case: 25-30624 Document: 64-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 No. 25-30624 Assuming that Poor Boy is correct that Mayor Moss intended to enter into an oral contract with it, Poor Boy has not shown that Mayor Moss was entitled to do so under the LHSEADA. Indeed, his authority under the LHSEADA did not allow him to suspend the Lawrason Act—a state law. Furthermore, Mayor Moss’s decision did not utilize the “available resources of the municipality” as the arrangement clearly involves a company not previously affiliated with the municipality. Reading these statutes to give effect to them both, the LHSEADA authorized Mayor Moss to exercise emergency authority to the extent his actions did not conflict with other laws. In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511, 517 (5th Cir. 2004) (“When faced with a conflict between two statutes, courts must attempt to interpret them so as to give effect to both statutes.”). The district court’s decision reconciled the executive authority granted through the LHSEADA with the legislative requirements imposed through the Lawrason Act. In short, the district court determined that Mayor Moss could not utilize the LHSEADA to circumvent the Lawrason Act. Accordingly, the district court correctly _____________________ (4) Directing and compelling the evacuation of all or part of the population from any stricken or threatened area within the municipality if he deems this action necessary. (5) Prescribing routes, modes of transportation, and destinations in connection with evacuation within the municipality. (6) Controlling ingress and egress to and from the affected area, the movement of persons within the area, and the occupancy of premises therein. (7) Suspending or limiting the sale, dispensing, or transportation of alcoholic beverages, explosives, and combustibles, excluding those components of firearm ammunition. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29:737(3)–(7). 11 Case: 25-30624 Document: 64-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 No. 25-30624 determined that Poor Boy was not exempt from obtaining board of aldermen approval before entering a contract with the City. Having considered each of Poor Boy’s arguments regarding a potential oral contract, we agree with the district court that Poor Boy’s oral contract claim failed as a matter of law. B. Open Account Poor Boy also argues that the district court erred by determining that the parties’ arrangement could not be considered an open account as a matter of law. Section 9:2781 of the Louisiana Code specifies that an open account includes “any account for which a part or all of the balance is past due, whether or not the account reflects one or more transactions and whether or not at the time of contracting the parties expected future transactions.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2781(D). The district court’s holding relied heavily on the fact that the parties had no prior dealings before Hurricane Laura. Thus, the district court contextualized all the services provided in light of the disaster recovery efforts. In the district court’s view, Poor Boy and the City could not have an open account relationship because each individual service that Poor Boy performed was meant to assist the City in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Laura, and the parties had no expectation of a continued relationship once the recovery efforts were completed. The district court’s decision applies the factors from Cambridge Toxicology Group, wherein we held that the parties’ dealings did not constitute an open account relationship—in part—because the parties did not have a history of working together. 495 F.3d at 174. We noted that “[a]lthough the statute permits recovery based on a single transaction, this feature alone does not subject [the challenged agreement] to the open account statute.” Id. 12 Case: 25-30624 Document: 64-1 Page: 13 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 No. 25-30624 Six months after our decision in Cambridge Toxicology Group, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered the open account statute and held that: [La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2781 (D)] must be applied as written. Under a plain reading of that statute, there is no requirement that there must be one or more transactions between the parties, nor is there any requirement that the parties must anticipate future transactions. To the extent the prior case law has imposed any requirements which are inconsistent with the clear language of [La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2781 (D)], those cases are overruled. Frey Plumbing Co. v. Foster, 996 So. 2d 969, 972 (La. 2008). Frey Plumbing expressly overruled all Louisiana cases requiring an open account relationship to be premised on multiple transactions, which includes the line of cases we relied on in Cambridge Toxicology Group. Accordingly, the district court erred in holding that the parties’ relationship could not constitute an open account because they had no prior dealings and had not expressly contemplated future dealings. However, the parties did not raise Frey Plumbing before the district court. Thus, the district court was without the benefit of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s guidance in rendering its decision on this issue. Because section 9:2781 “must be applied as written” we VACATE the grant of summary judgment on this claim and REMAND it to the district court for further consideration under Frey Plumbing and its progeny. 6 _____________________ 6 In supplemental briefing before this court, the City also cites Uniti Fiber, LLC v. Miller Pipeline, LLC, 407 So. 3d 893, 897 (La. Ct. App. 5 Cir. 2025) as support for its argument that there can be no open account without an underlying contractual agreement. Because we remand the open account claim to the district court, we decline to consider the merits of this argument. 13 Case: 25-30624 Document: 64-1 Page: 14 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 No. 25-30624 C. Unjust Enrichment Finally, Poor Boy argues that the district court erred by declining to grant it leave to amend its complaint to include a claim for unjust enrichment. Under Louisiana law, one “who has been enriched without cause at the expense of another person is bound to compensate that person.” La. Civ. Code art. 2298. The remedy provided by the unjust enrichment statute “is subsidiary and shall not be available if the law provides another remedy for the impoverishment or declares a contrary rule.” La. Civ. Code art. 2298. In line with article 2298, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that unjust enrichment is “only applicable to fill a gap where no express remedy is provided.” Walters v. MedSouth Record Mgmt., LLC, 38 So. 3d 241, 242 (La. 2010) (quoting Mouton v. State, 525 So. 2d 1136, 1142 (La. Ct. App. 1 Cir. 1988)). Here, the district court determined that unjust enrichment was unavailable to Poor Boy because the law provided a potential remedy through its claim for breach of an open account, despite its holding that there was no contract or open account arrangement between Poor Boy and the City. But, nullity or absence of a contract, or absence of an open account are situations where Louisiana courts have allowed an unjust enrichment claim. 7 “[I]t is not _____________________ 7 Gilstrap v. Cross Realty, Inc., 428 So. 3d 997, 1003 (La. Ct. App. 5 Cir. 2025) (“[o]nce the district court determined that no contract existed and granted summary judgment on that issue, the unjust enrichment claim became Gilstrap's only recourse”); Carr & Assocs., Inc. v. Jones, 368 So. 3d 593, 605, (La. Ct. App. 1 Cir. 2023), writ denied, 370 So. 3d 1075 (La. 2023) (“regardless of whether the parties orally contracted for [the] services, we readily apply the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment to support recovery [] for [the] services” which the evidence showed was provided); Gulfstream Servs., Inc. v. Hot Energy Servs., Inc., 907 So. 2d 96, 100 (La. Ct. App. 1 Cir. 2005), writ denied, 904 So. 2d 706 (La. 2005) (in suit on open account, where trial court found the parties had not agreed to an open account, “[i]n the absence of a contract or agreement, the only legal remedy available in this case arises under La. C.C. art. 2298”). 14 Case: 25-30624 Document: 64-1 Page: 15 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 No. 25-30624 the success or failure of other causes of action, but rather the existence of other causes of action, that determine whether unjust enrichment can be applied.” Garber v. Badon & Ranier, 981 So. 2d 92, 100 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2008). Here, the district court did not state that the open account claim failed, for example, because it had been brought untimely, or because it lacked evidentiary support; it held there was no open account relationship as a matter of law because the parties did not engage in the type of transactions that qualified as an open account. This is not a situation where the plaintiff has another claim available but cannot prevail on that claim because of prescription, failure to plead the claim, or some other defect. Of course, Louisiana courts have consistently held that a plaintiff cannot seek to recover for unjust enrichment when another remedy exists at law. 8 As stated above, we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the open account claim and remand for consideration of Frey Plumbing and its progeny. Until the district court decides whether there is, or _____________________ 8 Walters, 38 So. 3d at 242 (plaintiff’s delictual action had prescribed and so unjust enrichment was not available as an alternative remedy); 5301 Jefferson Hwy, LLC v. A. Maloney Moving & Storage, Inc., 392 So. 3d 337, 353 (La. Ct. App. 5 Cir. 2024) (sustaining the trial court’s determination that several tort claims that plaintiff plead or could have pursued were prescribed); Russo v. OnPath Fed. Credit Union, 388 So. 3d 1274, 1281 (La. Ct. App. 5 Cir. 2024) (defendant showed additional amounts would have been due under an incentive plan and so plaintiffs had no unjust enrichment claim); Pinegrove Elec. Supply Co., Inc. v. Cat Key Constr., Inc., 88 So. 3d 1097, 1101–02 (La. Ct. App. 5 Cir. 2012) (plaintiff’s open account claim had prescribed, and it also had available a remedy under the Private Works Act, so there was no cause of action in unjust enrichment). Garber, 981 So. 2d at 100 (denying unjust enrichment claim because supplemental petition did not sufficiently allege facts to support the claim). 15 Case: 25-30624 Document: 64-1 Page: 16 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 No. 25-30624 is not, a claim on an open account, there cannot be a determination of whether Poor Boy is foreclosed from amending its complaint to assert an unjust enrichment claim. Fluid Disposal Specialties, Inc. v. UniFirst Corp., 316 So. 3d 1222, 1228-29 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2019), aff’d on rehearing, 316 So. 3d 1252 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2020), writ denied, 302 So. 3d 1116 (La. 2020) (noting that unjust enrichment can be plead as an alternative to an open account claim, and that it cannot be determined at the preliminary stages of a case whether a plaintiff “actually has ‘no other remedy at law’”). IV. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s holding that the mayor lacked the capacity to bind the City to any oral contract. However, we VACATE the grant of summary judgment as to Poor Boy’s open account claim and REMAND that claim to the district court for further consideration. Additionally, we VACATE the district court’s determination that Poor Boy could not seek recovery under the theory of unjust enrichment as premature. 16