Manibusan v. Larson

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS EDWARD MANIBUSAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS, Petitioner, v. LARISSA LARSON, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, Respondent. Supreme Court No. 2017-SCC-0024-CQU OPINION Cite as: 2018 MP 7 Decided August 30, 2018 Christopher M. Timmons, Chief of the Civil Division, Office of the Attorney General, Saipan, MP, for Petitioner. Matthew T. Gregory, Saipan, MP, and Kimberlyn K. King-Hinds, Tinian, MP, for Respondent.  Manibusan v. Larson, 2018 MP 7 BEFORE: ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO, Chief Justice; JOHN A. MANGLOÑA, Associate Justice; ROBERT J. TORRES, Justice Pro Tempore. CASTRO, C.J.: ¶1 Attorney General Edward Manibusan (“Petitioner”) and Secretary of Finance Larissa Larson (“Respondent”) (collectively “Parties”) submit two certified questions in their official capacities as Commonwealth officials. Both questions relate to the constitutionality of legislative and executive salary increases enacted pursuant to Public Laws 4-32, 7-31, and 19-83. In particular, the Parties’ dispute focuses on who may review the salaries of executive, legislative, and judicial officers under Article II, Section 11 of the NMI Constitution (“Section 11”), as well as how such salaries are determined under Article II, Section 10 of the NMI Constitution (“Section 10”). We are asked to review the following questions: 1. Did the presence of four sitting members of the legislature on the advisory commission leading to the enactment of Public Law 19-83 violate Article II, Section 11 of the NMI Constitution? If so, did the illegal presence of the legislators on the advisory commission render the salaries for the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, and the legislature in Public Law 19-83 unconstitutional? 2. Were the three salary increases (or any of them) for members of the legislature unconstitutional because they exceeded the change in an accepted price index for the period since the last change, (or in the case of Public Law 4-32, was not based upon a price index at all); or alternatively, were the three salary increases (or any of them) unconstitutional because they exceeded the respective advisory commission’s salary recommendation? Joint Pet. 3. ¶2 We answer the first question by stating that Section 11 does not restrict members of the legislature from serving on the advisory commission discussed in Section 10. Thus, the presence of four sitting members of the legislature on the advisory commission leading to the enactment of Public Law 19-83 did not violate Section 11. In answering the second question, we discuss the procedure for enacting a salary increase under Section 10. To comply with Section 10, an advisory commission must be formed, choose a composite price index (“CPI”), and make a recommendation regarding the salaries of Commonwealth executive, legislative, and judicial officers that complies with the CPI chosen. The legislature may then adopt a salary increase that is no greater than the commission’s recommendation. Because each of the three salary increases contravene at least one of these mandates, they are unconstitutional.  Manibusan v. Larson, 2018 MP 7 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1 ¶3 The Northern Mariana Islands’ Constitution was enacted in 1978, with the initial salaries for the governor, lieutenant governor, and members of the legislature set at $20,000, $18,000, and $8,000, respectively. ¶4 In 1980, the Second Legislature established the first advisory commission on compensation (“First Commission”). The First Commission was tasked with studying and making recommendations regarding the compensation of the governor, lieutenant governor, legislators, judges, the representative to the United States, and mayors. It did not consult any CPI before making its recommendations, stating that “[i]n reviewing the pertinent section of the Constitution and its analysis, the [First] Commission felt that a CPI is not required to be followed by the Legislature for the first change in the salary of the elected officials.” Ex. 1 at 11. The First Commission recommended the salaries of the governor and lieutenant governor be increased to $40,000 and $35,000, respectively, while increasing legislative salaries to $21,000. Following these recommendations, the Fourth Legislature passed Public Law 4-32. The law set the governor’s salary at $50,000, lieutenant governor’s salary at $40,000, and legislators’ salaries at $30,000. ¶5 In 1990, Public Law 7-8 established the second advisory commission on compensation (“Second Commission”). The Second Commission hired a consultant to develop a CPI specific to the Commonwealth. The consultant’s report concluded the local price index increased from 161.2 to 195.2 in the time since the last pay increase with respect to the salaries of the governor, lieutenant governor, and legislators. As a result, the report calculated salaries for the governor, lieutenant governor, and legislature at $60,545, $48,437, and $36,327, respectively. The Second Commission, however, recommended the governor, lieutenant governor, and legislature’s salaries be raised to $70,000, $60,000, and $37,000. Public Law 7-31 was enacted following the Second Commission’s report, adopting its salary recommendations for the governor and lieutenant governor but further raising legislators’ salaries to $39,300. ¶6 In 2016, Public Law 19-51 established the third advisory commission on compensation (“Third Commission”). The law required that the Third Commission consist of seven members, with three appointed by the governor, two appointed by the President of the Senate, and two appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Of the seven members appointed, four were sitting members of the legislature. In addition, the law directed the Third Commission to review, study, and evaluate levels of compensation for the governor, lieutenant governor, mayors, and legislators, but did not include judicial officers. The Third Commission “utilize[d] the available data sources from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, utilizing the average CPI for the given years.” Ex. 3 at 6. The Third Commission listed CPI inflation adjusted wages for 1 The following facts are taken, in part, from Petitioner and Respondent’s stipulated facts in their Joint Petition for Certified Question.  Manibusan v. Larson, 2018 MP 7 the governor, lieutenant governor, and legislators at $124,081.94, $106,355.95, and $69,663.15, respectively. It subsequently recommended the governor’s salary be increased to $120,000, and the lieutenant governor’s salary be increased to $100,000, and legislative salaries be increased to $70,000. The Third Commission found compensation of judicial officers comparable to national and regional averages but failed to provide a specific salary recommendation. The legislature adopted the Third Commission’s recommendations in Public Law 19- 83. ¶7 On February 9, 2017, Petitioner filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking “declaratory judgment that the Salary Laws are unconstitutional, and injunctive relief prohibiting the implementation of the salary increases for the governor, lieutenant governor, and members of the legislature pursuant to Public Law No. 19-83.” Opening Br. 17. The court entered a preliminary injunction, enjoining Respondent from taking any action to implement the salary increases pursuant to Public Law 19-83 pending a ruling on its constitutionality. See Manibusan v. Larson, Civ. No. 17-0047 (NMI Super. Ct. July 7, 2017) (Order – Stipulation to Entry Inj. & Stay Proceedings Pending Joint Pet. Certified Question at 1–2). It also ordered the Parties to file their Joint Petition for Certified Question (“Petition”), staying proceedings in the Superior Court pending its result. Id. ¶8 On August 7, 2017, the Parties submitted their Petition, requesting that we clarify the Constitution’s relevant provisions. II. JURISDICTION ¶9 The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over disputes arising between elected or appointed Commonwealth officials regarding the exercise of their responsibilities or powers under the Constitution. NMI CONST. art. IV, § 11. Here, Petitioner is an elected Commonwealth official pursuant to Article III, Section 11 of the NMI Constitution charged with prosecuting violations of Commonwealth law. See NMI CONST. art III, § 11. Respondent is an appointed official with the duty of disbursing funds in accordance with Commonwealth law. 1 CMC §§ 2552–53. It follows that the issue of “whether and to what extent funds should be disbursed in payment of salaries to members of the legislature as well as the Governor and Lieutenant Governor,” Joint Pet. at 1, squarely implicates these officials’ responsibilities. We thus have jurisdiction and may entertain the certified questions. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶ 10 We review certified questions de novo. In re Status of Certain Tenth Legislature Bills, 1998 MP 3 ¶ 1. IV. DISCUSSION A. Membership ¶ 11 Petitioner argues the advisory commission in Section 10 falls within the purview of an independent commission. He further states that because Section 11 precludes legislators from serving on independent commissions, they are prohibited from serving on the advisory commission. He asserts that although the  Manibusan v. Larson, 2018 MP 7 text is not completely clear, principles of statutory construction, historical context, and previous commissions’ compositions evince the drafters’ intent precluding legislators’ membership. Respondent claims that had the framers intended the advisory commission to be independent, they would have explicitly labeled it as such. Rather, she argues, the public laws creating the advisory commission never mentioned a requirement of independence, and that historical documents indicate the advisory commission more closely resembles a dependent commission that allows legislators’ membership. ¶ 12 Whether the advisory commission in Section 10 is an independent commission as contemplated in Section 11 is a matter of constitutional interpretation. We outlined the procedure for constitutional interpretation in Peter-Palican v. Commonwealth, 2012 MP 7 ¶ 6. There, we stated: A basic principle of constitutional construction is that language must be given its plain meaning. We apply the plain, commonly understood meaning of constitutional language unless there is evidence that a contrary meaning was intended. As part of our analysis, we must read constitutional language in the context of the entire provision at issue. Interpretations that would defy common sense or lead to absurd results should be avoided. In the event that a constitutional provision is ambiguous, we must attempt to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the drafters of the provision. Finally, we are hesitant to interpret constitutional language in a way that deviates from the common law absent a clear indication of an intention to do so by the drafters of the provision at issue. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We use these principles to determine the advisory commission’s classification. 1. Text of Sections 10 and 11 ¶ 13 With these considerations in mind, we begin with the language of Sections 10 and 11. We give effect to the text’s plain meaning, if possible, Dep’t of Pub. Lands v. Commonwealth, 2010 MP 14 ¶ 17, and interpret separate sections of the Constitution in harmony with one another. United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir. 1995). Section 10 discusses legislators’ compensation: The members of the legislature shall receive an annual salary of eight thousand dollars and reasonable allowances for expenses provided by law. The salary of members may be changed no more than once every four years and only upon the recommendation of an advisory commission established by law to make recommendations concerning the compensation of Commonwealth executive, legislative and judicial officers. No change in the salary may be made that exceeds the percentage change in an accepted composite price index for the period since the last change. An increase in salary may not apply to the legislature that enacted it. NMI CONST. art. II, § 10. Section 11 discusses legislators’ restrictions on  Manibusan v. Larson, 2018 MP 7 government employment: A member of the legislature may not serve in any other Commonwealth government position including other elective office or an independent board, agency, authority or commission established by this Constitution or by Commonwealth law. A person, having been a member of the legislature, may not serve in any elective or appointive Commonwealth [g]overnment position created by statute during the term for which he or she was elected, for a period of one year following the expiration of the term during which the position was created. NMI CONST. art. II, § 11. ¶ 14 Plainly read, Section 10 does not include restrictions on the composition of the advisory commission. Notably, the Constitution does not specify multiple aspects regarding the commission, including the number of members, their compensation, or, as pertinent to our inquiry, the status of the commission’s members. On the other hand, Section 11 clearly restricts legislators from serving on an independent commission established by the Constitution or Commonwealth law. Nowhere in Section 10 did the drafters specify that the advisory commission was to be independent, and we must presume the drafters intended the terms they included in the Constitution’s text. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 60 (1968) (noting courts should not insert words into statutes that their drafters omitted). We thus refuse to insert terms into Section 10 and determine the commission was not intended to be labeled as independent. ¶ 15 Moreover, the term’s omission is supported by the Constitution’s text. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “independent” as “not subject to the control or influence of another; not associated with another;” and “not dependent or contingent on something else.” Black’s Law Dictionary 659 (6th ed. 1990). However, Section 10 conveys that the advisory commission is 1) established by law; and 2) makes recommendations as to the compensation of executive, legislative, and judicial officers. Thus, not only is the advisory commission’s creation within the control of the legislature, but effectuation of its recommendations is dependent upon their acceptance by the legislature and governor. Such characteristics contravene the plain meaning of independence. And additionally, where a commission was truly intended to operate as independent, it was described as such: “[i]n every case where the governor appoints a board or commission to perform a regulatory or administrative function . . . the members of such a board or commission shall be independent . . . . This section does not apply to boards and commissions that serve a purely advisory function . . . .” NMI CONST. art III, § 21 (emphases added). Article III, Section 21 of the NMI Constitution demonstrates, for example, that although boards appointed by the governor to serve an administrative or regulatory function are required to be independent, the requirement is dispelled for commissions serving solely an advisory function. Such is the case for Section 10’s advisory commission on compensation. The text thus provides that the  Manibusan v. Larson, 2018 MP 7 advisory commission was not meant to be independent, but rather, to serve the legislature in an advisory fashion. Legislative history confirms our interpretation. 2. Context, History, and Canons of Construction ¶ 16 In reviewing a provision’s context and history, we may rely upon “committee recommendations, constitutional convention transcripts, and other relevant constitutional history.” Palacios v. Yumul, 2012 MP 12 ¶ 5. In particular, the Analysis of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (“Analysis”) is “extremely persuasive authority when one is called upon to discern the intent of the framers when the language of the Constitution presents an ambiguity.” Rayphand v. Tenorio, 2003 MP 12 ¶ 71.2 We find two sources particularly useful in affirming the advisory commission’s classification. ¶ 17 First, we look to the Analysis’ discussion of Section 10. Its only guidance as to the commission’s membership is: “[t]he Constitution does not include any limitation on or requirement with respect to the number, term of office or compensation of the members of the commission.” Analysis of the Constitution, supra at 61. In the drafters’ discussion of Section 11, however, they specified what government positions legislators were precluded from holding: This section prohibits members of the legislature from serving in any other Commonwealth government position, including independent boards, agencies, authorities or commissions established by the Constitution or by law. These include the department of education, the civil service commission and any other executive or administrative department established under article III, sections 13, 15 and 16. These also include the Marianas Public Land Corporation provided for in article XI, section 4, and the Marianas Public Land Trust provided for in article XI, section 6. All government positions, whether compensated or not, fall within the scope of this section. A legislator may not serve on any independent boards, agencies, authorities or commissions. A legislator may serve on a dependent board, agency, authority or commission established by the legislature, reporting directly to the legislature and performing a task incidental to the lawmaking process. Analysis of the Constitution, supra at 63. Although we ordinarily read the word ‘include’ as a term of enlargement, Commonwealth v. Manglona, 1997 MP 28 ¶ 11, we do not read the Analysis’ prohibition on legislators’ service on independent commissions as precluding legislators’ membership on the advisory commission. By its plain language, the Analysis repeats the Constitution’s mandate that legislators were not to serve on independent commissions. See Analysis of the Constitution, supra at 63. However, no indication is given, either 2 The Analysis’ purpose is to explain each section of the Constitution and “summarize the intent of the Northern Marianas Constitutional Convention in approving each section.” Analysis of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands 1 (1976).  Manibusan v. Larson, 2018 MP 7 in form or in substance, that the advisory commission was intended to operate like the independent commissions specified in Section 11—rather, it is a separate creature of the drafters’ creation. Indeed, unlike the commissions specified in Section 11, the advisory commission’s function is much more closely interwoven with that of the legislature itself. We find such a distinction significant, and thus, find no prohibition on legislators’ service on the advisory commission in the Analysis. ¶ 18 Our reading is further supported by Briefing Paper No. 3: The Legislative Branch of Government (“Briefing Paper 3”).3 In discussing the question of legislators’ compensation, it stated: If the Convention leaves questions of compensation to the determination of the legislature or another agency, it should consider two further possibilities. First, the Constitution could specify an upper limit on how much the legislature could set for compensation. Second, state constitutions often provide that no legislator may receive a salary increase during the term for which he was elected. Such provisions, used by 23 states, are intended to minimize the self-serving aspect of legislators voting to increase their own pay. Recent trends favor independent commissions to set legislators’ pay. Briefing Paper 3, supra at 70. Notably, Briefing Paper 3 cites Article 6, Section 33 of West Virginia’s Constitution, which states in relevant part: The citizens legislative compensation commission is hereby created. It shall be composed of seven members who have been residents of this State for at least ten years prior to the date of appointment, to be appointed by the governor within twenty days after ratification of this amendment, no more than four of whom shall be members of the same political party. The members shall be broadly representative of the public at large. Members of the Legislature and officers and employees of the State or of any county, municipality or other governmental unit of the state shall not be eligible for appointment to or to serve as members of the commission. . . . The members of the commission shall serve without compensation, but shall be entitled to be reimbursed for all reasonable and necessary expenses actually incurred in the performance of their duties as such members. W. VA CONST. art. VI, § 33 (emphasis added); see Briefing Paper 3, supra at 70 3 The Briefing Papers were prepared by lawyers, political scientists and others with relevant expert qualifications in the areas discussed to assist the drafters of the Constitution. Briefing Papers for the Delegates to the Northern Marianas Constitutional Convention, Briefing Paper No. 1: Constitutional Convention Background & Overview 1, 28, 32 (1976).  Manibusan v. Larson, 2018 MP 7 n.129. ¶ 19 Briefing Paper 3 and its references provide us with two inferences. First, the discussion in Briefing Paper 3 demonstrates the drafters were cognizant of trends favoring independent commissions to determine legislative salaries. Second, the reference to West Virginia’s constitution indicates the drafters were provided with at least one example of how to draft a provision precluding legislators’ service on the advisory commission. The drafters could have easily used West Virginia’s provision as a model, complete with its absolute bar on legislator’s membership. And yet, they elected not to add further detail to Section 10 or specifically indicate that members of the legislature were not eligible to be appointed to the commission.4 We find the drafters’ awareness of and election not to adopt language specifying an independent advisory commission and barring members of the legislature from serving on the advisory commission to be compelling. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 579–80 (2006) (“Congress’ rejection of the very language that would have achieved the result the Government urges weighs heavily against the Government’s interpretation.”). ¶ 20 As other jurisdictions chose to avoid the appearance of impropriety through prohibitions on legislators’ membership on advisory commissions, our drafters ameliorated these concerns through other mechanisms. Specifically, Section 10’s mandate that “[a]n increase in salary may not apply to the legislature that enacted it” demonstrates that the drafters considered Briefing Paper 3 and followed it where they thought appropriate. NMI CONST. art. II, § 10; see also Analysis of the Constitution, supra at 62 (“The section further provides that the legislature that enacts a salary increase may not benefit from the increase.”). Briefing Paper 3 noted that where the legislature’s compensation was determined by another body, 23 states limited their salary increases from going into effect until the following term. See Briefing Paper 3, supra at 70. The drafters adopted such a recommendation and likely thought it sufficient to “minimize the self- serving aspect of legislators voting to increase their own pay.” Id. at 70. Additionally, the requirement that “[n]o change in the salary may be made that exceeds the percentage change in an accepted composite price index for the period since the last change” is preserved regardless of the commission’s 4 Report No. 3 by the Committee on Governmental Institutions (“Report No. 3”) further supports this point. See Committee on Governmental Institutions Report No. 3 (Nov. 4, 1976). In the report, the committee specified that it “wished to avoid a situation in which the legislature would be tempted to give itself an undeserved salary increase, or would appear to have given itself such an increase.” Id. at 18-19. The Committee believed Section 10 met this concern, stating as such and explaining that “the requirement of a recommendation by a commission considering the salaries received by members of all three branches of government will eliminate any impression that the legislature is acting out of self interest.” Id. at 19. Plainly, the commission’s independence was not required, as the requirement that the committee consider the salaries of all three branches alleviated the committee’s concerns.  Manibusan v. Larson, 2018 MP 7 composition. NMI CONST. art. II, § 10. ¶ 21 The dissent presumes that if the advisory commission includes legislators, the commission will act unfairly and the legislature will enact possibly inflated recommendations. Even if the advisory commission were composed of diverse members with no legislators present, there is no guarantee that these members would not be beholden to the direction and control of the appointing authority and act in a similarly irresponsible manner. However, should the legislature improperly discharge their duties in connection to the advisory commission, the consequences of such dereliction will likely manifest themselves through the democratic system. The ability to hold advisory commission members accountable through the electoral process, the establishment of upper limits on compensation, and the prohibition against a legislature that enacted a salary increase from benefiting from the increase, are sufficient protections against any nefarious legislators. Thus, although the drafters could have made the advisory commission independent to further diminish any appearance of being self- serving, we believe they found the system enacted sufficient to address such concerns. ¶ 22 We write further, however, to emphasize that the Constitution only establishes minimum requirements for the commission’s establishment. The legislature is, of course, free to provide protections greater than what the Constitution mandates. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 47 (1970); see Couture v. Bd. of Educ. of the Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 535 F.3d 1243, 1255 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The Constitution establishes certain minimum thresholds . . . . It is to be expected—and hoped—that states, school boards, police departments, and other agencies will go beyond constitutional minima. . . .”). Because the advisory commission must consider the salaries of executive, legislative, and judicial officers when it convenes, implementing processes that allow all branches to appoint commission members and serve on the commission will further reduce the risk of appearing self-serving and allow diversified views. The First Commission established pursuant to Public Law 2-10, for example, included members from all three branches, see Ex. 1 at 4, allowing for salary recommendations to be endorsed by various representatives of the Commonwealth government.5 But while a practice that incorporates 5 Section 1 of Public Law 2-10 instructed: [T]he Advisory Commission . . . shall consist of seven members as follows: (a) Two members to be appointed by the Governor, (b) two members to be appointed by the Chief Judge of the Commonwealth Trial Court, (c) one member to be appointed by the President of the Senate, (d) one member to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (e) one representative of the Personnel Office. PL 2-10, § 1. The division of appointment powers amongst the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, not surprisingly, resulted in a diverse membership. The First Commission included: the mayor of Saipan, Clerk of the Commonwealth Trial Court,  Manibusan v. Larson, 2018 MP 7 representatives from all three branches in composing the commission has merit, we answer only the question before us, concluding that the Constitution’s discussion of independent commissions does not include the advisory commission on compensation. ¶ 23 As such, members of the legislature are not precluded from serving on the commission. We thus conclude the presence of four sitting members of the legislature on the Third Commission did not violate Section 11. We now turn to the second certified question, requiring us to discuss the proper procedure for enacting a salary increase. B. Procedure ¶ 24 Petitioner argues that each of the legislature’s salary increases is unconstitutional because they violated the procedure mandated by the Constitution for enacting a salary adjustment. He asserts that each increase either exceeded the change in an accepted price index, was not based on any price index at all, or exceeded the advisory commission’s recommendation. Respondent claims it is not possible to specify a date for each index’s adjustment and that the accepted price index does not need to be specified or chosen by the commission. She concedes, however, that the legislature may “not exceed the [salary] increase recommended by the [a]dvisory [c]ommission.” Resp. Br. 10.6 The disagreement requires us to examine the procedure outlined by the Constitution for instituting legislative salary increases. ¶ 25 Like the first question, the second certified question implicates constitutional interpretation and construction. We thus begin with the language of the Commonwealth Constitution, Cruz, 2013 MP 15 ¶ 15, and follow our established guidelines for constitutional interpretation. See Peter-Palican, 2012 MP 7 ¶ 6. ¶ 26 We first review the text of Section 10. We read the plain language of Section 10 to establish five requirements as to legislative salary increases. First, legislative salaries may not be increased more than once every four years. NMI CONST. art. II, § 10. Second, they may only be increased upon the Chief of the Personnel Office of Classification & Compensation, Director of Health Services, Treasurer, Commonwealth Trial Court Judge, and Chief Accountant of the Marianas Public Land Corporation. See Ex. 1 at 4. 6 Although in her Response Brief, Respondent acknowledged the legislature may not exceed the salary recommendation provided by the advisory commission, she maintained that the provision at issue is ambiguous and that we should nonetheless find all three salary increases to be constitutional. Further, Counsel for Respondent clarified during oral argument that she does not concede that a salary increase may not exceed the respective advisory commission’s salary recommendation. We thus maintain that our interpretation of Section 10 is rooted in a live controversy and is not advisory in nature. Contra Taisague v. Inos, 2014 MP 13 ¶ 9 (“Because this portion of question one and two were conceded, our answer to these questions would be an advisory opinion.”).  Manibusan v. Larson, 2018 MP 7 recommendation of the advisory commission. NMI CONST. art. II, § 10. Third, when the advisory commission is established, it must make recommendations concerning the compensation of executive, legislative and judicial officers. NMI CONST. art. II, § 10. Fourth, no salary change may “exceed[] the percentage change in an accepted composite price index” for the period since the last salary change. NMI CONST. art. II, § 10. And fifth, increases in compensation may not take effect until the start of the next legislative term. NMI CONST. art. II, § 10. ¶ 27 We find the first, third, and fifth requirements unambiguous and the plain language of these provisions controlling. In doing so, we note Public Law 19-51 contravened Section 10’s third requirement. The Constitution’s text dispels of any ambiguity as to the advisory commission’s role in making compensation recommendations for executive, legislative, and judicial officers. It plainly pronounces that the commission, when it convenes, must consider and make a specific recommendation concerning the compensation of each branch. See NMI CONST. art. II, § 10. Although Public Law 19-51 acknowledged that its purpose was to “create an [a]dvisory [c]ommission to review and make recommendation on the compensation for the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, the Mayors, Legislators, Justices, and Judges.” PL 19-51, § 1 (emphasis added), the commission’s actual duties differed. As indicated in Section 5(a), its duties were only to “[r]eview, study and evaluate the level of compensation for the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, the Mayors, and Legislators . . . .” PL 19-51, § 5(a). Following such a directive, the advisory commission only made recommendations as to the governor, lieutenant governor, mayors, and legislators, neglecting to include a specific salary recommendation for judicial officers. See Ex. 3 at 6. To properly follow the directive of Section 10, the advisory commission, when it convenes, must provide a review of and specific salary recommendation for executive, legislative, and judicial officers.7 Further, mayors are not included in the Constitution’s discussion of the advisory commission, and thus need not be given consideration. Compare NMI CONST. art. II, § 10 with NMI CONST. art. VI, § 4; see Analysis of the Constitution, supra at 129–30. ¶ 28 However, we agree with the Parties in that the second and fourth requirements are ambiguous, as both are reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations. See Babauta v. Superior Court, 4 NMI 309, 312 n.18 (1995) 7 We write further to note that an advisory commission recommendation is not required for changes in judicial salaries. Unlike executive and legislative salaries, the Constitution provides that the compensation of judicial officers “shall be provided by law.” NMI CONST. art. IV, § 6. Although the advisory commission is mandated by Section 10 to make recommendations concerning the compensation of Commonwealth executive, legislative and judicial officers, changes in judicial compensation may be effectuated with or without an advisory commission recommendation, and a recommendation by the advisory commission regarding judicial salaries is not mandatory. Furthermore, the judicial branch’s independence is additionally emphasized in that “[t]he salary of a justice or judge may not be decreased during a term of office.” NMI CONST. art. IV, § 6; cf. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  Manibusan v. Larson, 2018 MP 7 (explaining a court may go beyond a provision’s text “where a statute may reasonably be read in two ways, or where no single path of meaning clearly appears” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We review these interpretations. The requirement that a salary change be made only upon the commission’s recommendation (“Second Requirement”) may reasonably be read in two ways. The Second Requirement may be interpreted as simply requiring the advisory commission to make a salary recommendation. It may also reasonably be read to require both that the commission make a recommendation and that the resulting salary change be limited by the amount recommended by the commission. ¶ 29 The requirement that the salary increase fall within the percentage change of an accepted CPI for the period since the last change (“Fourth Requirement”) may also reasonably be read in at least two ways. The Fourth Requirement may be interpreted to require that a salary increase simply comport with any CPI published by the United States government for the United States or any territory presently or formerly under United States jurisdiction. It may also be read to require that the advisory commission 1) choose a CPI; 2) review the percentage change of that CPI for the period since the last salary change; and 3) make a recommendation that falls within the percentage change of that CPI. Seeing as the constitutional language of the Second and Fourth Requirements “is susceptible to two or more plausible meanings, . . . we may consider context, history of the provision’s drafting, and relevant canons of construction to determine which meaning was intended[,]” Cruz, 2013 MP 15 ¶ 15 (citations omitted), and effectuate the drafters’ intent. Peter-Palican, 2012 MP 7 ¶ 6. 1. Second Requirement: Commission Recommendation ¶ 30 In ascertaining the drafters’ intent as to the Second Requirement, we begin with the Analysis. It describes the Second Requirement as follows: This section permits the legislature to adjust the amount of salary only upon the recommendation of an advisory commission . . . . The Constitution does not include any limitation on or requirement with respect to the number, term of office or compensation of the members of the commission. The Constitution does prevent the legislature from enacting a salary adjustment that is more than the maximum amount recommended by the commission. If no commission is established or if a commission is established and does not report, no salary adjustment may be enacted by the legislature. Analysis of the Constitution, supra at 61–62 (emphases added). We have always considered the Analysis an extremely persuasive authority. Tenorio, 2003 MP 12 ¶ 71. Here, too, w