L.A.P. v. R. Evanchick
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket614 M.D. 2019
JudgeDumas
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
L.A.P., :
Petitioner :
: No. 614 M.D. 2019
v. :
: Submitted: July 24, 2026
Robert Evanchick, :
Respondent :
BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE DUMAS FILED: November 19, 2026
L.A.P. (Petitioner), pro se, has filed an amended petition for review in
our original jurisdiction, asserting that the retroactive application of Subchapter I of
the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA II)1 is
unconstitutional. In response, Robert Evanchick2 (Respondent) has filed
preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. Upon review, we sustain those
preliminary objections in part and overrule them in part, and we direct Respondent
to answer the remaining claims.
1
Act of February 21, 2018, P.L. 27, No. 10 (Act 10), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.75, as
amended by the Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 140, No. 29 (Act 29).
2
Evanchick formerly served as Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police. Although
unclear, it appears that Petitioner intended to bring this suit against the former commissioner in his
official capacity.
I. BACKGROUND3
Petitioner is a state inmate currently incarcerated at the State
Correctional Institution at Mahanoy. In 1998, Petitioner pleaded guilty to rape and
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,4 and he was classified as a sexually violent
predator (SVP). After his original sentence was vacated, the Court of Common Pleas
of Bradford County (sentencing court) sentenced Petitioner to an aggregate term of
15 to 30 years of incarceration.5
3
Unless otherwise stated, we derive this background from Petitioner’s amended petition and
its attached exhibits. See Am. Pet., 10/10/25; Foxe v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 214 A.3d 308, 310 n.1
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (observing that courts reviewing preliminary objections may not only consider
the facts pleaded in the petition for review, but also any documents or exhibits attached to it).
Petitioner has pleaded limited facts in support of his claims. See Am. Pet. at viii, 2. Nevertheless,
we construe those facts as true. See Gentilquore v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 326 A.3d 512, 515 n.6 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2024) (en banc). Additionally, we accept as true those facts admitted by Petitioner in his
answer to the preliminary objections filed by Respondent. See Prelim. Objs., 11/25/25; Answer to
Prelim. Objs., 12/5/25.
4
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121(a)(1), 3123(a)(1), respectively.
5
In 1995, our General Assembly enacted Megan’s Law I, Act of October 24, 1995, P.L. 1079,
No. 24, formerly 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9799.6, to establish procedures for adjudicating sexual
offenders, among other purposes. Megan’s Law I required individuals adjudicated by the
sentencing court to be SVPs, to register with the Commonwealth as such and comply with
notification and counseling requirements. See generally id. Following our Supreme Court’s
decision in Commonwealth v. Williams, 733 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1999), which struck down these
procedures, Petitioner’s sentence became invalid.
For additional context, we note the following. The General Assembly enacted Megan’s Law
II, Act of May 10, 2000, P.L. 74, No. 18, formerly 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9799.7. Thereafter, in 2004,
the General Assembly enacted Megan’s Law III, Act of November 24, 2004, P.L. 1243, No. 152,
formerly 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9799.9, which served as an updated version of Megan’s Law and
remained in effect until the General Assembly replaced it with the Sexual Offender Registration
and Notification Act (SORNA I), Act of December 20, 2011, P.L. 446, No. 111, as amended,
formerly 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10 to 9799.41. In Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa.
2017), a plurality of our Supreme Court determined that the retroactive application of SORNA I
violated constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. See Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1193, 1223.
Following our Supreme Court’s decision in Muniz, the General Assembly passed SORNA II.
SORNA II is divided into two distinct subchapters. Subchapter H applies to “individuals who
committed a sexually violent offense on or after December 20, 2012, for which the individual was
(Footnote continued on next page…)
2
Petitioner commenced this action in November 2019. See Pet. for Rev.,
11/5/19. In September 2021, this Court granted Petitioner leave to amend his
petition. See Cmwlth. Ct. Order, 9/1/21. However, Petitioner did not file an
amended pleading, and the matter remained dormant until 2024, when this Court
issued a rule to show cause why the action should not be dismissed. See Cmwlth.
Ct. Order, 4/1/24. Petitioner timely responded and later filed his amended petition
in October 2025, challenging the constitutionality of SORNA II’s registration
requirements.
In his amended petition, Petitioner has pleaded seven causes of action.6
Five of these claims are grounded in the shared premise that Subchapter I of SORNA
II is a punitive statute, from which he asserts violations of the ex post facto7 and
double jeopardy8 clauses of both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions,
the separation of powers doctrine, substantive due process,9 and the prohibition
against bills of attainder.10 See Am. Pet. at 8-15. As to Petitioner’s two remaining
convicted.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(c). Subchapter I applies to individuals who committed a
sexually violent offense “on or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012,” and whose
period of registration has not yet expired or whose registration requirements under a former sexual
offender registration law have not expired. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.52.
6
Petitioner’s first three claims are “Legislative Intent,” “Act 29 is a Punitive Statute,” and
“The Rule of Lenity,” respectively. See Am. Pet. at 3, 5, 6. These are not independent causes of
action for which relief can be granted. Further, in challenging Act 29, it is clear that Petitioner
means to challenge the registration and reporting requirements applicable to him through
Subchapter I of SORNA II. See generally Am. Pet.
7
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Pa. Const. art. I, § 17.
8
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Pa. Const. art. I, § 10.
9
Although Petitioner labels this as a substantive due process claim, the theory that he advances
is predicated on his assertion that Subchapter I imposes additional criminal punishment beyond
his judicial sentence. See Am. Pet. at 8.
10
“A bill of attainder is a legislative enactment which determines guilt and inflicts punishment
upon an identifiable person or group without a judicial trial.” Silo v. Ridge, 728 A.2d 394, 401
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). Both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions prohibit bills of
attainder. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Pa. Const. art. I, § 18.
3
causes of action, he contends that Subchapter I relies on an unconstitutional
irrebuttable presumption and, relatedly, infringes upon his right to protect his
reputation.11 See id. at 15-18.
Respondent then filed preliminary objections in the nature of a
demurrer, and Petitioner timely filed an answer. Following these filings, this Court
directed each party to submit briefs in support of their respective positions. See
Cmwlth. Ct. Order, 12/12/25. Respondent timely filed a brief with this Court. See
Resp’t’s Br., 1/12/26.
Thereafter, in March 2026, this Court notified Petitioner that he had not
filed a brief and afforded him two additional weeks to submit one. See Cmwlth. Ct.
Order, 3/12/26. Petitioner sought an extension, which this Court granted and ordered
Petitioner to serve his brief on Respondent “on or before June 1, 2026, or the Court
will proceed . . . without [his] brief.” See Cmwlth. Ct. Order, 5/12/26. Petitioner
has not filed a brief with this Court, and we now review the matter.
II. DISCUSSION
A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer contests the legal
sufficiency of a pleading. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4). “In ruling on preliminary
objections, we must accept as true all well-pleaded material allegations in the
petition for review, as well as all inferences reasonably deduced therefrom.” Torres
v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). This Court, however, is not
required to accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences from facts,
argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion. See id. A demurrer “will be
11
See Pa. Const. art. I, § 1 (“All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty,
of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own
happiness.”).
4
sustained only in cases where the pleader has clearly failed to state a claim for which
relief can be granted.” Id. “[W]here any doubt exists as to whether the preliminary
objections should be sustained, the doubt must be resolved in favor of overruling the
preliminary objections.” Pa. State Lodge, Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Dep’t of
Conservation & Nat. Res., 909 A.2d 413, 416 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).
A. Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy, Separation of Powers,
Substantive Due Process, and Bill of Attainder
Respondent contends that most of Petitioner’s claims are fatally flawed
because these claims are premised upon the punitive nature of a prior version of
SORNA and fail to account for the changes enacted by the legislature in Subchapter
I. See Resp’t’s Br. at 8-9 (criticizing Petitioner’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s
prior decision in Muniz). Rather, Respondent maintains that Subchapter I does not
constitute criminal punishment and is, therefore, constitutionally permissible. See
id. (citing Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2020)).
In this manner, Respondent demurs specifically to Petitioner’s alleged
violations of the ex post facto and double jeopardy clauses of the United States and
Pennsylvania Constitutions, the separation of powers doctrine, and substantive due
process. Prelim. Objs., 11/12/25, ¶¶ 11, 14-16. Respondent did not object
specifically to Petitioner’s bill of attainder claim. See generally id. However, this
claim is similarly premised upon an allegation that Petitioner is being punished
unlawfully. See Am. Pet., ¶¶ 50-60. Therefore, because Respondent specifically
demurred to Petitioner’s claims on the basis that “[S]ubchapter I of SORNA [II] is
5
non-punitive,” Prelim. Objs., ¶ 12, we will consider Respondent’s demurrer to this
claim as well.12
Following our Supreme Court’s decision in Muniz, the General
Assembly enacted Subchapter I of SORNA II. Subchapter I applies to individuals,
like Petitioner, who were convicted of a sexually violent offense prior to December
20, 2012, and whose period of registration has not expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. §
9799.52. The purpose of Subchapter I is to “[p]rotect the safety and general welfare
of the people of this Commonwealth” and “shall not be construed as punitive.” 42
Pa.C.S. § 9799.51(b)(1), (2).13 Upon review, our Supreme Court confirmed that
12
We caution Respondent that our authority to review preliminary objections is generally
limited to those objections actually raised by Respondent. See Lutweiler v. Northchester Corp.,
319 A.2d 899, 901 n.5 (Pa. 1974) (“Although our rules do allow certain matters to be raised by the
court on its own motion, a failure to state a cause of action is not one of them[.]”); Beers v. Pa.
State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 338 M.D. 2018, filed Aug. 29, 2018), slip op. at 11, 2018 WL
4100235, at *5 (citing Bell v. Rockview State Corr. Facility, 620 A.2d 645 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993)).
See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
13
Section 9799.51(b) provides:
(b) Declaration of policy.--It is hereby declared to be the intention of the General
Assembly to:
(1) Protect the safety and general welfare of the people of this Commonwealth by
providing for registration, community notification and access to information
regarding sexually violent predators and offenders who are about to be released
from custody and will live in or near their neighborhood.
(2) Require the exchange of relevant information about sexually violent predators
and offenders among public agencies and officials and to authorize the release of
necessary and relevant information about sexually violent predators and offenders
to members of the general public, including information available through the
publicly accessible Internet website of the Pennsylvania State Police, as a means of
assuring public protection and shall not be construed as punitive.
(3) Address the Superior Court’s opinion in the case of Commonwealth v. Wilgus,
975 A.2d 1183 ([Pa. Super.] 2009), by requiring sexually violent predators and
offenders without a fixed place of habitation or abode to register under this
subchapter.
(Footnote continued on next page…)
6
purpose and determined that “Subchapter I does not constitute criminal punishment
. . . .” See Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 626. Accordingly, the registration and reporting
requirements in Subchapter I do not violate the ex post facto clause of either the
United States or the Pennsylvania Constitution. See id. at 626-27. Further,
Subchapter I does not violate the double jeopardy clause of either the United States
or Pennsylvania Constitutions, the separation of powers doctrine, or due process.
See id. at 608 n.5.
Finally, Petitioner contends that Subchapter I functions as a bill of
attainder in violation of Article I, Sections 9 and 10, of the Constitution of the United
States and Article I, Section 18, of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Am. Pet., ¶¶ 50-
60. “A bill of attainder is a legislative enactment which determines guilt and inflicts
punishment upon an identifiable person or group without a judicial trial.” Silo v.
Ridge, 728 A.2d 394, 401 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999); see United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.
437, 445 (1965). Subchapter I does not adjudicate guilt, nor does it inflict
punishment. Therefore, it cannot constitute a bill of attainder. Cf. Commonwealth
v. Mountain, 711 A.2d 473, 478 (Pa. Super. 1998) (rejecting a similar claim that
Megan’s Law functioned as a bill of attainder).14
For these reasons, we agree with Respondent that Petitioner has failed
to state a claim alleging violations of the ex post facto and double jeopardy clauses
of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, the separation of powers
(4) Address the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v.
Muniz, No. 47 MAP 2016 (Pa. 2016), and the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s
decision in Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017).
42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.51(b).
14
We may rely on Superior Court decisions as persuasive authority where they address
analogous issues. See Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2018).
7
doctrine, the prohibition against bills of attainder, and substantive due process.
Accordingly, we sustain the demurrer to these claims. See Lacombe; Torres; cf.
Mountain.
B. Irrebuttable Presumption and Reputation
Petitioner has pleaded that Subchapter I relies on an unconstitutional
irrebuttable presumption that sexual offenders pose a high risk of recidivism. See
Am. Pet. at 17-18. He has also independently pleaded that the statute violates the
right to protect his reputation under the Pennsylvania Constitution. See id. at 15-16.
In support of these claims, Petitioner references a 2013 Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections Report that details recidivism rates among released inmates. See Am.
Pet., Attach. (2013 PA Recidivism Report). According to Petitioner, this report
establishes that certain sexual offenses reoccur less frequently than other offenses,
such as drug offenses. See id. at 15. In Petitioner’s view, the comparatively lower
recidivism rates for sexual offenses indicate that the General Assembly’s
presumption is inaccurate. See id. at 15-18.
Respondent contends that Petitioner’s claim of reputational harm “is
primarily supported by mere legal conclusions.” See Resp’t’s Br. at 9. He maintains
that this Court “is not bound by mere legal conclusions, expressions of opinion, or
argumentative allegations.” See id. (citing Thomas v. Corbett, 90 A.3d 789, 794 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2014)). Respondent does not address separately Petitioner’s irrebuttable
presumption claim. See generally id.; Prelim. Objs., 11/12/25.
“Statutes creating irrebuttable presumptions are not per se violative of
the constitution.” Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 316 A.3d 77, 92 (Pa. 2024).15 “[A]n
15
Torsilieri specifically addressed Subchapter H of SORNA II, not Subchapter I. See
Torsilieri, 316 A.3d at 86-100. However, our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth
(Footnote continued on next page…)
8
irrebuttable presumption doctrine claim may arise whenever a provision states or
implies that one fact (the basic fact) is conclusive evidence of another fact (the
presumed fact) that provides the ostensible rationale for the classification established
by the provision.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “When a legislative
scheme employs presumptions that are overinclusive, the irrebuttable presumption
doctrine requires that an individual have the opportunity to rebut that presumption.”
Id. at 93.
To bring an irrebuttable presumption claim, a litigant must plead facts
showing (1) an interest protected by due process, (2) the use of a presumption that
is not universally true, and (3) the lack of reasonable alternative means to ascertain
the presumed fact. See In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1, 15-16 (Pa. 2014). In the context of
SORNA II, when a challenger asserts independent claims of a statutory irrebuttable
presumption and harm to reputation, our Supreme Court has reasoned that the two
challenges could not be analyzed independently because they rested on the same
presumed fact: that sexual offenders pose a high risk of committing additional sexual
offenses. See Torsilieri, 316 A.3d at 92 (recognizing that both challenges are
“inextricably intertwined”).
The Court further observed that earlier tribunals had employed the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine’s framework to address alleged reputational harms
when those reputational harms arose from the same presumed fact that formed the
basis of a statutory presumption challenge. See id. Building on that approach, the
Torsilieri Court clarified that the offender’s asserted reputational harm, i.e., the
v. Arnett, 353 A.3d 705 (Pa. 2026), applied the Torsilieri Court’s irrebuttable presumption analysis
to a petitioner who brought an irrebuttable presumption challenge to Subchapter I. See Arnett, 353
A.3d at 719-20. The Arnett Court concluded that, “because both subchapters are predicated upon
the same presumption,” the minor differences between Subchapter H and Subchapter I do not
affect the applicability of Torsilieri’s irrebuttable presumption framework. Id. at 720.
9
stigma flowing from being labeled a high-risk and dangerous sexual offender,
therefore serves as the protected due-process interest required under the first prong
of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. See id. at 92, 96. Stated differently,
because the reputational harm flows entirely from the statutory presumption at issue,
it does not serve as a standalone basis for relief, and the irrebuttable presumption
doctrine controls this analysis. See id.
Here, Respondent’s demurrer suffers from multiple flaws. Under
Torsilieri, Petitioner’s alleged reputational harm directly flows into the first prong
of his irrebuttable presumption claim. See Torsilieri, 316 A.3d at 91-96. Therefore,
Petitioner has pleaded an interest protected by due process, the first element in the
irrebuttable presumption analysis. See id. at 96.
Furthermore, Respondent’s characterization of Petitioner’s allegations
is inaccurate. See Prelim. Objs., ¶ 17. While Petitioner’s pleading contains
conclusory statements, it also relies on factual assertions, including statistics drawn
from the 2013 Department of Corrections Report attached to his Amended Petition.
See Am. Pet. at 15. Petitioner has pleaded specific facts, including recidivism
statistics, which he contends undermine the accuracy of Subchapter I’s presumption.
See Am. Pet. at 15; id., Attach. (2013 PA Recidivism Report). These statistics
represent factual allegations and must be accepted as true at this stage of the
proceedings. See Torres, 997 A.2d at 1245. Taken as true, these allegations
correspond to the second element of an irrebuttable presumption claim and are
sufficient to state a claim at this stage. Moreover, Respondent did not explicitly
object to Petitioner’s irrebuttable presumption allegation. See Prelim. Objs.,
11/12/25; Lutweiler, 319 A.2d at 901 n.5. Accordingly, at this stage, Petitioner’s
10
claims alleging an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption and reputational harm
must survive Respondent’s demurrer. See Torres, 997 A.2d at 1245.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we sustain Respondent’s preliminary objections to
Petitioner’s claims alleging violations of the ex post facto and double jeopardy
clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, the separation of
powers doctrine, prohibition against bills of attainder, and substantive due process.
See Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 626-27; cf. Mountain, 711 A.2d at 478. However, we
overrule Respondent’s preliminary objections to Petitioner’s claims alleging that
Subchapter I rests on an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption and infringes
upon his constitutional right to reputation. See Torsilieri, 316 A.3d at 91-96;
Lutweiler, 319 A.2d at 901 n.5.
LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
11
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
L.A.P., :
Petitioner :
: No. 614 M.D. 2019
v. :
:
Robert Evanchick, :
Respondent :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 19th day of November, 2026, upon consideration of
the preliminary objections filed by Robert Evanchick (Respondent), we SUSTAIN
the preliminary objections to L.A.P.’s (Petitioner) claims alleging violations of the
ex post facto clauses, double jeopardy clauses, separation of powers doctrine,
constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder, and substantive due process.
Those claims are dismissed with prejudice. We OVERRULE the preliminary
objections to Petitioner’s claims alleging that Subchapter I relies on an
unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption, and that Subchapter I infringes upon
Petitioner’s constitutional right to reputation. Respondent is directed to file an
answer to these claims as set forth in the Amended Petition within thirty (30) days
of the date of this Order.
LORI A. DUMAS, Judge