Marcus v. Cassara

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Marcus v. Cassara ADRIAN MARCUS v. DAWN CASSARA (AC 48659) Suarez, Wilson and Flynn, Js. Syllabus The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgments denying her post- judgment motions for contempt relating to the alleged failure of the plaintiff to pay his share of costs associated with certain extracurricular activities of the parties’ children. She claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly deviated from a prior court order regarding the allocation of expenses for the children’s extracurricular activities. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motions for contempt, as the court correctly construed the meaning of the term “extracurricular activities,” as used in the prior order, as not including vacation like activities, and the court’s finding that the children’s skiing, snowboarding, and fly-fishing activities were recreational, vacation like activities and, therefore, were not within the scope of the prior order was not clearly erroneous. This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court violated her right to due process by making inconsistent contempt findings, delaying the adjudication of her contempt motions while prioritizing the plaintiff’s motion for modification, and failing to impose appropriate sanc- tions, costs, and statutory interest, as the claim was inadequately briefed. Argued September 9—officially released November 10, 2026 Procedural History Application for custody of the parties’ minor children, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the court, Gordon, J.; judgment awarding, inter alia, joint legal custody of the minor children to the parties and issuing certain orders; thereafter, the case was trans- ferred to the judicial district of Danbury, where the court, Vizcarrondo, J., denied in part the defendant’s motion for contempt and issued certain orders; subse- quently, the court, Vizcarrondo, J., issued a corrected memorandum of decision, and the defendant appealed to this court; thereafter, the court, Figueroa Laskos, J., denied the defendant’s motions for contempt and issued certain orders, and the defendant filed an amended appeal. Affirmed.  Marcus v. Cassara Dawn Cassara, self-represented, the appellant (defen- dant). WILSON, J. The self-represented defendant, Dawn Cassara, appeals from the trial court’s judgments deny- ing her postjudgment motions for contempt relating to the failure of the plaintiff, Adrian Marcus,1 to pay his share of costs associated with certain extracurricular activities of the parties’ children. On appeal, the defen- dant claims that the court (1) improperly deviated from a prior court order regarding the allocation of expenses for the children’s extracurricular activities, as reaf- firmed in Marcus v. Cassara, 223 Conn. App. 69, 308 A.3d 39 (2023), and improperly denied her motions for contempt, and (2) violated her right to due process by making inconsistent contempt findings, delaying the adjudication of her contempt motions while prioritiz- ing the plaintiff’s motion for modification, and failing to impose appropriate sanctions, costs, and statutory interest. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. “The parties, who were never married, have three children together: a daughter born in July, 2005, and twin sons born in December, 2006. In June, 2008, the plaintiff filed a custody appli- cation requesting joint legal custody of the children, with the children’s primary residence being with the defendant. “On December 10, 2009, after a bench trial, the . . . court, Gordon, J., issued an oral ruling that included custody and visitation orders . . . . The court awarded the parties joint legal custody of the children but ordered that the defendant would have physical custody and final decision-making authority with respect to matters involving the children and that the plaintiff would have 1 The plaintiff did not file a brief in this court. On January 22, 2026, this court ordered that the appeal shall be considered on the basis of the defendant’s brief and appendix, the record, as defined by Practice Book § 60-4, and the defendant’s oral argument. See Batista v. Cortes, 203 Conn. App. 365, 366 n.1, 248 A.3d 763 (2021).  Marcus v. Cassara visitation rights. . . . [T]he court ordered [inter alia] the parties to share expenses for the children’s extracurricu- lar activities in the same proportion as the percentage allocations contained in the child support guidelines, with the plaintiff being responsible for 72 percent and the defendant being responsible for 28 percent of those costs. Specifically, the court set forth that ‘the parties shall share the cost for any extracurricular activities for the minor children, so long as those activities are reasonable, also in proportion to the childcare expense calculation [in] the guidelines.’ ” (Footnote omitted.) Id., 71–72. In 2022, the court, Hon. Heidi G. Winslow, judge trial referee, granted the plaintiff’s motion for modification of the 2009 order pertaining to the children’s extracur- ricular activities expenses (2009 order) and eliminated the plaintiff’s obligations under the order. This court reversed the judgment and remanded the case with direc- tion to reconsider the plaintiff’s motion for modification. See id., 97. On remand, the court, Figueroa Laskos, J., denied the motion. On April 30, 2024, the defendant filed a motion for contempt, alleging that the plaintiff was noncompliant with the 2009 order because he had not paid his share of expenses with respect to certain of the children’s extra- curricular activities. Following a hearing, the court, Vizcarrondo, J., issued a memorandum of decision on January 8, 2025, in which, with respect to expenses related to the children’s participation in organized sports and dance activities, it found that the plaintiff was liable for $4400.35 but was entitled to credits for past pay- ments, including a $2000 payment made in May 2024, which reduced his arrearage to $1660.26.2 The court also found the plaintiff in contempt for his failure to timely pay those expenses and ordered him to pay an additional $250 to the defendant in court costs. With respect to 2 The plaintiff conceded that he was obligated to contribute to the expenses related to the children’s participation in these “historical extracurricular activities” and assented to the entry of a consent order for those expenses.  Marcus v. Cassara expenses related to the sons’ participation in skiing, snowboarding, and fly-fishing activities, however, the court, citing Scott v. Scott, 215 Conn. App. 24, 282 A.3d 470 (2022), declined to find the plaintiff in contempt for his nonpayment of expenses related to those activities on the ground that, under the facts of the present case, they were recreational, vacation like activities, and “the plaintiff’s obligation to pay extracurricular [activities] expenses does not extend to [such] activities, the cost of which should properly be borne by each parent in the exercise of their individual parenting time.” The court also found that the defendant was seeking to subsidize the children’s vacation like activities under the guise of extracurricular activities and that her “overreach is not aberrative but part of a long-standing pattern of conduct.” The court concluded: “[T]he defendant cannot sustain her burden to demonstrate by clear and convinc- ing evidence . . . that the plaintiff’s refusal to pay vaca- tion like . . . expenses constitutes wilful noncompliance with a clear and unambiguous court order.”3 On April 21, 2025, the defendant appealed to this court from the trial court’s decision.4 The court, Figueroa Laskos, J., subsequently issued an order on May 2, 2025, denying three motions for contempt filed by the defen- dant in 2019 and 2020 pertaining to the plaintiff’s failure to pay or reimburse the defendant for expenses related to the children’s extracurricular activities. In its order, the court found that, although many of the claimed expenses were related to “reasonable extracurricular activities” subject to reimbursement from the plaintiff, 3 The court also concluded that, “because the defendant acted beyond the scope of her decision-making authority under the 2009 order, the plaintiff’s refusal to contribute to those costs does not constitute wilful [noncompliance with] a clear and unambiguous court order.” 4 We note that, on March 31, 2025, in connection with a motion to reargue and reconsider filed by the defendant, the court issued a cor- rected memorandum of decision to correct a computational error and nonsubstantive typographical errors in its memorandum of decision. The court also stated therein that “the court’s conclusion—that the defendant sought to subsidize the children’s vacation like activities under the guise of extracurricular activities—remains unchanged.”  Marcus v. Cassara the expenses for the sons’ skiing activities were not within the scope of the 2009 order.5 Specifically, the court stated: “The . . . skiing activities are more recreational, quasi-vacation activities where the plaintiff is excluded from participation while the defendant is an active par- ticipant. The [sons’] participation in these activities is not solely extracurricular, they are more recreational family time with [the defendant], more akin to vacation like experience than an extracurricular activity. Vacation like expenses should be the responsibility of the parent enjoying the activity. . . . Therefore, the court finds that these expenses are not reasonable extracurricular activities requiring reimbursement from the plaintiff.” The court concluded: “[N]either party is without fault for the current situation. The court does not find clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff wilfully failed to follow the [2009 order].”6 The defendant thereafter filed an amended appeal to challenge the court’s May 2, 2025 order. I The defendant first claims that the court improperly deviated from the 2009 order and improperly denied her motions for contempt. We disagree. We begin by setting forth the standard of review and legal principles relevant to our resolution of the defen- dant’s claim. “Contempt is a disobedience to the rules and orders of a court which has power to punish for such an offense. . . . Our review of a trial court’s judgment of civil contempt involves a two part inquiry. [W]e first consider the threshold question of whether the underlying order constituted a court order that was sufficiently clear and 5 The court also found that “the expenses for desks, monitors, chairs, cords and cables . . . are not reasonable extracurricular activities that require reimbursement from the plaintiff.” 6 The court determined that the plaintiff was entitled to a credit of $1011.14. On November 21, 2025, the court issued an order vacating the $1011.14 credit awarded to the plaintiff and directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant $988.86 in light of the parties’ stipulation that “a $2000 credit . . . had been applied by two courts result[ing] in a double credit to the plaintiff.”  Marcus v. Cassara unambiguous so as to support a judgment of contempt. . . . Second, if we conclude that the underlying court order was sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we must then determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in issuing, or refusing to issue, a judgment of contempt, which includes a review of the trial court’s determination of whether the violation was wilful or excused by a good faith dispute or misunderstanding.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hall v. Hall, 335 Conn. 377, 391–92, 238 A.3d 687 (2020). “Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, [w]e will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . [Thus, our] review of such rulings is limited to the questions of whether the trial court cor- rectly applied the law and reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it did.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Trent v. Trent, 226 Conn. App. 791, 798, 321 A.3d 454 (2024). Moreover, to the extent that our review requires us to construe the meaning of a prior court order or judgment, this presents an issue of law over which our review is plenary. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Cunningham, 204 Conn. App. 366, 373, 254 A.3d 330 (2021). “As a general rule, judgments are to be construed in the same fashion as other written instruments. . . . The determinative factor is the intention of the court as gathered from all parts of the judgment. . . . The interpretation of a judgment may involve the circumstances surrounding the making of the judgment. . . . Effect must be given to that which is clearly implied as well as to that which is expressed. . . . The judgment should admit of a consistent construction as a whole.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. O’Brien, 231 Conn. App. 779, 786, 334 A.3d 558 (2025). A We first address the issue of whether the court devi- ated from the 2009 order regarding the allocation of expenses for the children’s extracurricular activities.  Marcus v. Cassara The crux of the issue centers on the meaning of the term “extracurricular activities,” as used in the 2009 order. Because the 2009 order does not define the term “extra- curricular activities” or otherwise indicate its meaning, it is appropriate for this court to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in contemporary dictionaries. See, e.g., Mazza v. Mazza, 216 Conn. App. 285, 294, 285 A.3d 90 (2022), cert. granted, 346 Conn. 904, 287 A.3d 600 (2023) (appeal withdrawn May 28, 2024). Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines “extracurricular” in relevant part as “not falling within the scope of a regular curriculum . . . of or relating to offi- cially or semiofficially approved and usu[ally] organized student activities (as athletics) connected with school and usu[ally] carrying no academic credit”; Merriam- Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed. 2003) p. 444; and “activity” in relevant part as “a pursuit in which a person is active . . . .” Id., p. 13. In light of these defini- tions, it is clear that the ordinary meaning of the term “extracurricular activities” does not include vacation like activities, and there is nothing in our case law that indicates to the contrary. See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, supra, 215 Conn. App. 48 (concluding that trial court prop- erly found that plaintiff was not required to reimburse defendant for claimed extracurricular activity expenses related to vacation like activity). In both its January 8, 2025 decision and May 2, 2025 order, the court correctly construed the meaning of the term “extracurricular activities,” as used in the 2009 order, as not including vacation like activities. Accord- ingly, we conclude that the defendant’s claim that the court deviated from the 2009 order regarding the allo- cation of expenses for the children’s extracurricular activities is without merit. B We next address the defendant’s claim that the court improperly denied her motions for contempt. Specifi- cally, she argues that the court improperly failed to find the plaintiff in contempt for his nonpayment of expenses  Marcus v. Cassara related to the participation of the parties’ sons in skiing, snowboarding, and fly-fishing activities and to require him to reimburse her for those expenses. We disagree.7 The defendant’s claim essentially challenges the factual findings underlying the court’s contempt determination. “We review the factual findings that underlie a court’s contempt determination pursuant to the clearly errone- ous standard.” Jacob-Dick v. Dick, 231 Conn. App. 404, 412, 333 A.3d 210 (2025). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous when it is not supported by any evidence in the record or when there is evidence to support it, but the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” (Internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Rettman v. Rettman, 234 Conn. App. 147, 171, 344 A.3d 240 (2025). In applying this standard, “we give great deference to the findings of the trial court because of its function to weigh and interpret the evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) M. C. v. A. W., 226 Conn. App. 444, 450, 319 A.3d 183 (2024). The 2009 order requires the plaintiff to pay 72 percent of the costs of the children’s reasonable extracurricular activities within thirty days. In her motions for con- tempt, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff consis- tently had failed to pay or reimburse the defendant for his share of expenses related to the children’s extracur- ricular activities. The children participated in numer- ous extracurricular activities that were not in dispute, including organized sports and dance activities. The court ordered the plaintiff to reimburse the defendant for expenses related to those activities. The court, however, also determined that some of the children’s activities were “not reasonable extracurricular activities requiring reimbursement from the plaintiff.” Specifically, with respect to the sons’ skiing, snowboarding, and fly-fishing activities, the court found that, under the facts of this 7 Insofar as the defendant claims that the court improperly found that “the expenses for desks, monitors, chairs, cords and cables . . . are not reasonable extracurricular activities that require reimbursement from the plaintiff,” we also reject that claim.  Marcus v. Cassara case, they were recreational, vacation like activities8 and, therefore, were not reasonable extracurricular activities subject to reimbursement under the 2009 order. On the basis of our careful review of the record, we conclude that the court’s finding that the sons’ skiing, snowboarding, and fly-fishing activities were recre- ational, vacation like activities and, therefore, were not within the scope of the 2009 order, was not clearly erroneous. The court, therefore, correctly determined that the defendant did not sustain her burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the plaintiff wil- fully violated the court’s 2009 order. See Puff v. Puff, 334 Conn. 341, 365, 222 A.3d 493 (2020) (“[i]t is the burden of the party seeking an order of contempt to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, both a clear and unambiguous directive to the alleged contemnor and the alleged contemnor’s wilful noncompliance with that directive”). Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motions for contempt. II The defendant next claims that the court violated her right to due process by making inconsistent contempt findings, delaying the adjudication of her contempt motions while prioritizing the plaintiff’s motion for modification, and failing to impose appropriate sanc- tions, costs, and statutory interest. We conclude that this claim is inadequately briefed and, therefore, decline to review it. “We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analy- sis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the 8 The court set forth extensive facts underlying its finding that the sons’ skiing, snowboarding, and fly-fishing activities were recreational, vacation like activities.  Marcus v. Cassara statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court to judiciously and efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. . . . In addition, briefing is inadequate when it is not only short, but confusing, repetitive, and disor- ganized.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alterio v. Spak, 237 Conn. App. 84, 90, 349 A.3d 614 (2026). “Moreover, [t]he parties may not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between the facts of the case and the law cited.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Amelio v. Amelio, 241 Conn. App. 786, 793, ___ A.3d ___ (2026). In the present case, the defendant’s briefing of her due process claim is confusing and disorganized. More- over, it contains minimal citation to legal authority9 and abstract assertions rather than meaningful analysis, lacks substantive discussion, and fails to analyze the relationship between the facts of the case and the appli- cable law. Although we recognize that the defendant is self-represented, the solicitous treatment we afford self-represented parties does not allow us to address a claim that is inadequately briefed. See, e.g., Stanley v. Scott, 222 Conn. App. 301, 306, 304 A.3d 892 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 945, 308 A.3d 34 (2024). The defendant’s brief is inadequate for us to conduct any meaningful review of her due process claim, and, there- fore, we decline to review it. The judgments are affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred. 9 We note that all of the case citations provided by the defendant in support of her due process claim are either inaccurate or wholly erro- neous and that, of the seventeen case citations contained in her entire appellate brief, only two are accurate.