Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2451-25 JUSTIN LUSINGER AS COLLECTIVE ACTION REPRESENTATIVE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JET COURIERS CORPORATION and BRYAN UCETA, Defendants-Respondents. ____________________________ Argued October 22, 2026 – Decided November 4, 2026 Before Judges Mawla and Chase. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-5242-24. Drake P. Bearden, Jr., argued the cause for appellant (Javerbaum Wurgaft Hicks Kahn Wikstrom & Sinins, attorneys; Drake P. Bearden, Jr., on the briefs). Amy C. Blanchfield argued the cause for respondents (Jasinski, PC, attorneys; David F. Jasinski, of counsel; Amy C. Blanchfield, on the briefs). Alan H. Schorr argued the cause for amicus curiae National Employment Lawyers Association – New Jersey (Schorr Law PC, attorneys; Alan H. Schorr, of counsel and on the brief). Ravi Sattiraju argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (Sattiraju & Tharney, LLP, attorneys; Ravi Sattiraju, of counsel and on the brief; Brian P. McCarthy, on the brief). PER CURIAM Plaintiff Justin Lusinger, acting as collective-action representative, appeals from two orders: a January 9, 2026 order compelling individual arbitration and dismissing his complaint without prejudice, and a March 2, 2026 order denying reconsideration. We affirm the orders compelling arbitration and denying reconsideration. Because the New Jersey Arbitration Act (NJAA), N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -36, requires a stay rather than a dismissal, we reverse that part of the January 9 order and remand for entry of an order staying the action pending arbitration. I. Distribution Cooperative Network (DCN) is a third-party referral service that connects transportation vendors, or drivers, with subscribing clients. Defendant Jet Couriers, a DCN subscriber, receives vendor assignments through DCN. Defendant Bryan Uceta is a branch manager for Jet Couriers. A-2451-25 2 In October 2022, plaintiff signed a delivery vendor agreement with DCN. That agreement states the parties "agree and acknowledge that the relationship of Delivery Vendor with DCN hereunder is that of an independent contractor," and the vendor will provide all services in that capacity. The same day, plaintiff also signed an arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement requires arbitration of any claim arising out of or relating to plaintiff's business relationship with DCN, or the termination of that relationship. It includes a jury-trial waiver and states the obligation to arbitrate survives the termination of plaintiff's business relationship with DCN and its client, Jet Couriers. The agreement also waives class and collective actions. In addition, it contains a third-party-beneficiary provision stating it "shall govern any [c]laim brought by the [drivers] against any customer or client of [] [DCN]." Plaintiff then agreed to provide transportation services to Jet Couriers, a DCN client and third-party beneficiary to the contract. He performed pickups in Easton, Pennsylvania and deliveries in New Jersey. Jet Couriers paid drivers a percentage of the compensation it received. In August 2024, plaintiff filed a complaint on behalf of himself and similarly situated delivery drivers who performed transportation services for Jet A-2451-25 3 Couriers. He alleged defendants: (1) misclassified him and the other drivers as independent contractors rather than employees and (2) failed to pay them minimum wage for hours worked, in violation of the New Jersey Wage Payment Law (WPL), N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1 to -4.14. The complaint does not assert a claim under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to - 49, and contains no allegations of discrimination, retaliation, or harassment. As to the proposed collective action, plaintiff claimed common questions of law and fact predominated over any individual issues and a collective action was the superior method of adjudication. In August 2025, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, compel arbitration, and enforce the class-action waiver. After oral argument, the trial court entered the January 9 order. The court ruled the arbitration agreement was not enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, because plaintiff fell within the section 1 exemption for workers engaged in interstate commerce. It nevertheless held the agreement was enforceable under the NJAA. The court also found N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.7 did not invalidate the arbitration agreement or the class-action waiver because that statute applies to discrimination, retaliation, and harassment claims under the LAD. The court therefore dismissed plaintiff's complaint against Jet Couriers A-2451-25 4 without prejudice and compelled individual arbitration. Uceta's motion to dismiss–which the court converted to a motion for summary judgment–was denied because "there exist[ed] a genuine material issue in dispute requiring additional discovery." Plaintiff moved for reconsideration. He argued the plain language of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.7(b) barred prospective waivers not only of LAD claims, but also the WPL claim. The court denied reconsideration. Applying Rule 4:49-2, it found plaintiff had simply reargued issues the court had already decided on and had failed to show the earlier ruling was palpably incorrect or irrational, or that the court had overlooked controlling law or material facts. The court also found the class-action waiver was not unconscionable because it did not prevent plaintiff or other drivers from vindicating their statutory rights under the WPL. Given the unambiguous terms of the delivery vendor agreement and arbitration agreement, and in light of New Jersey's strong policy favoring arbitration of employment disputes, arbitration was the proper forum. II. We review questions regarding statutory interpretation de novo. Musker v. Suuchi, Inc., 260 N.J. 178, 185 (2025). "It is well settled that the goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature 's intent." A-2451-25 5 Cashin v. Bello, 223 N.J. 328, 335 (2015) (citing Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 592 (2012)); see also Keyworth v. CareOne at Madison Ave., 258 N.J. 359, 379 (2024) (citations omitted). "In most instances, the best indicator of that intent is the plain language chosen by the Legislature." Cashin, 223 N.J. at 335 (quoting State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010)). Statutory interpretation requires words and phrases be given their generally accepted meaning, unless that meaning is inconsistent with the clear intent of the Legislature, or unless the statute provides its own express definition that may differ. See Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 613 (1999); Fairkings Partners, LLC v. Daniels, 482 N.J. Super. 520, 526 (App. Div. 2025) (citations omitted). "[W]hen the language of a statute is clear on its face, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." Cashin, 223 N.J. at 335 (alteration in original) (quoting Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "If a plain-language reading of the statute leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then [the court's] interpretive process is over." State v. Amer, 254 N.J. 405, 422 (2023) (quoting State v. Hupka, 203 N.J. 222, 232 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, "[i]f there is ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to more than one plausible interpretation, we A-2451-25 6 may turn to extrinsic evidence, 'including legislative history.'" Williams v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 255 N.J. 36, 46 (2023) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492-93 (2005)). We must read a statute's words "in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole." W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506, 519 (2023) (quoting DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Statutes must also 'be read in their entirety; each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section to provide a harmonious whole.'" In re D.J.B., 216 N.J. 433, 440 (2014) (quoting Burnett v. Cnty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 421 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court in Green and Savage endorsed consideration of the entire statutory scheme, rather than the literal meaning of an isolated phrase. See Green v. Auerbach Chevrolet Corp., 127 N.J. 591, 598 (1992); Savage v. Twp. of Neptune, 257 N.J. 204, 218-19 (2024). The enforceability of an arbitration agreement is also a question of law, which we review de novo. Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 46 (2020). "In reviewing such orders, we are mindful of the strong preference to enforce arbitration agreements, both at the state and federal level." Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013). That preference, "however, is not A-2451-25 7 without limits" as arbitration agreements are subject to customary contract law principles. Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124, 132 (2001); see Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 442 (2014). The NJAA states: "[a]n agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract." N.J.S.A. 2A:23B- 6(a). The statute is substantially similar to the FAA and in addition our public policy favors arbitrating disputes. Atalese, 219 N.J. at 440. Our Supreme Court has ruled the NJAA may apply to arbitration agreements even if parties to the agreements are exempt under the FAA. Arafa v. Health Express Corp., 243 N.J. 147, 153 (2020). III. Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in holding N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.7(b) applies only to LAD claims involving discrimination, retaliation, or harassment, and not his WPL claim. He contends the plain language of the statute shows it extends the prohibition beyond the LAD. Amici curiae, the National Employment Lawyers Association and the New Jersey Association for Justice A-2451-25 8 make the same argument in support of plaintiff. They also contend the court overlooked the historical record of three bills 1 introduced during the 2018-2019 legislative session, as well as their full legislative history. We are not persuaded. The LAD plays a "uniquely important role" in advancing New Jersey's public policy against discrimination. Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., Inc., 225 N.J. 343, 347 (2016). Effective March 18, 2019, the Legislature amended the LAD to add Section 12.7, titled "Certain waivers in employment contract deemed against public policy and unenforceable." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.7. Section 12.7(a) provides: "A provision in any employment contract that waives any substantive or procedural right or remedy relating to a claim of discrimination, retaliation, or harassment shall be deemed against public policy and unenforceable." L. 2019, c. 39, § 1(a) (codified at N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.7a). Section 12.7(b) adds that "[n]o right or remedy" under the LAD "or any other statute or case law shall be prospectively waived." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.7(b). When the FAA does not preempt it, Section 12.7 applies. Antonucci v. Curvature Newco, Inc., 470 N.J. Super. 553, 563-64 (App. Div. 2022). 1 Senate Bill 104 (introduced on January 9, 2018); Senate Bill 121 (introduced on January 9, 2018); and Senate Bill 1790 (the 2019 Wage Theft Act, introduced in February 2018). A-2451-25 9 Plaintiff reads the phrase "any other statute or case law" in isolation. But we must read Section 12.7(b) together with Section 12.7(a), and within the larger structure of the LAD. Read in that context, Section 12.7 protects rights and remedies relating to discrimination, retaliation, or harassment, whether those rights arise under the LAD or under another statute or body of case law. See N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.7(a). Plaintiff's broader reading would give Section 12.7 a sweeping effect far beyond the LAD. It would convert the statute into a general prohibition on arbitration agreements and class-action waivers for virtually any employment- related statutory claim. Nothing in the text or structure of the enactment supports that reading. Had the Legislature intended to invalidate arbitration agreements covering all statutory employment claims, it could have amended the NJAA or spoken in unmistakably clear terms. It did neither. Instead, it placed Section 12.7 in the LAD and left the NJAA unchanged. We presume the Legislature acted with full awareness of existing statutes and judicial decisions. See State v. Goodwin, 224 N.J. 102, 113 (2016) (citing In re Expungement Petition of J.S., 223 N.J. 54, 75 (2015)). That conclusion is underscored by the Legislature's later treatment of the WPL. Only months after it enacted Section 12.7, the Legislature amended the A-2451-25 10 WPL through the Wage Theft Act, L. 2019, c. 212, but did not include any comparable anti-waiver language or otherwise prohibit arbitration agreements or class-action waivers for wage-and-hour claims. When the Legislature uses a term in one statute and omits it from another, courts should not imply the omitted language. GE Solid State, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax'n, 132 N.J. 298, 308 (1993). Pursuant to these principles, we interpret the phrase "any other statute or case law" as a catch-all. It protects rights and remedies relating to discrimination, retaliation, or harassment that arise outside the LAD as well as within it. Antonucci, 470 N.J. Super. at 563 (internal quotation marks omitted). It does not create a general ban on prospective waivers for every employment - related statutory claim. Because plaintiff alleges only wage violations under the WPL, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.7 does not bar defendants from compelling arbitration. Plaintiff also argues the trial court erred in denying reconsideration because it treated unconscionability as the governing test for enforceability. He contends Section 12.7(b), not the unconscionability doctrine, makes the arbitration agreement unenforceable because it prospectively waives his right to pursue collective claims and his right to a jury trial. Courts assess unconscionability by considering several factors, including: "(1) the subject matter of the contract[;] (2) the parties' relative bargaining A-2451-25 11 positions[;] (3) the degree of economic compulsion motivating the adhering party[;] and (4) the public interest affected by the contract." Pace v. Hamilton Cove, 258 N.J. 82, 103 (2024) (citation omitted). Procedural unconscionability focuses on how the contract was formed, while substantive unconscionability examines the fairness of the terms themselves. Id. at 103. Public policy remains central to that analysis, especially when the contract is one of adhesion. Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 189 N.J. 1, 12, 15-16 (2006). The Muhammad Court invalidated a class-action waiver in a consumer contract because the waiver effectively prevented borrowers with small claims from pursuing relief and therefore blocked vindication of statutory rights. Id. at 20. There, the plaintiff signed a standard-form loan agreement, which required individual arbitration. Id. at 6. The Court held the strong public interest in enabling consumers to enforce their rights outweighed the bank 's interest in enforcing the waiver. Id. at 22. This case is different. In Arafa, the Court addressed arbitration agreements in employment contracts where workers sought to pursue collective wage claims. 243 N.J. at 154. The Court held the workers knowingly and voluntarily agreed to waive a jury trial and arbitrate their statutory wage claims. A-2451-25 12 Id. at 172. It also reaffirmed that when a party "agree[s] to arbitrate a statutory claim, the party does not" surrender the statute's substantive protections; the party merely chooses an arbitral forum instead of a judicial one. Id. at 170 (quoting Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 93 (2002)). The trial court correctly concluded the arbitration agreement here was not unconscionable. The record does not show plaintiff signed the agreement involuntarily. Plaintiff identifies no facts suggesting unfamiliarity with the contract, a gross disparity in bargaining power, economic compulsion, duress, fraud, incapacity, or any other recognized contract defense that would justify revocation of the agreement. Nor does the agreement deprive him of any substantive right under the WPL. As in Arafa, plaintiff may still pursue his wage claims in arbitration. We also reject plaintiff's argument the WPL itself invalidates the agreement. The WPL authorizes a worker to bring an action on behalf of similarly situated workers. N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.10(c). That authorization matters, but it does not by itself render a contractual waiver of collective procedures unenforceable. Unlike the consumer contract in Muhammad, the delivery vendor agreement and arbitration agreement plaintiff signed do not raise the A-2451-25 13 same public-policy concerns because they do not prevent plaintiff from vindicating his statutory rights under the WPL. Finally, although the trial court's decision to compel arbitration was correct, we part company with its decision to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. The NJAA provides: If the court orders arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a claim subject to the arbitration. If a claim subject to the arbitration is severable, the court may limit the stay to that claim. [N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-7(g) (emphasis added).] Because the court ordered arbitration, it should have stayed the proceeding rather than dismissed it. We therefore reverse the dismissal and remand for entry of an order staying the matter pending completion of arbitration. Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-2451-25 14