Full Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 25-01888 (AHA) v. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, et al., Defendants. Memorandum Opinion and Order The American Bar Association (“ABA”) sued federal agencies and officials, alleging they adopted an unlawful, coordinated policy of sanctioning law firms and their lawyers for engaging in speech the government does not like. The government objected to discovery requests served on the Executive Office of the President (“EOP”) on grounds that they are overbroad under Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367 (2004), and the ABA now moves to compel responses. After considering the parties’ written submissions and holding multiple hearings, balancing the need for discovery in this case against the executive branch’s important interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and safeguarding the confidentiality of its communications, and exploring ways to craft a narrower approach to that balance, the court grants the ABA’s motion in part and denies it in part. Specifically, the court denies the motion as moot as to requests 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, and 12; denies the motion without prejudice as to requests 8, 10, 14, 15, and 16; and grants the motion as to narrowed forms of requests 1, 2, 7, 9, and 13. I. Background In June 2025, the ABA sued federal agencies and officials, alleging the executive branch had adopted an unlawful, coordinated policy of sanctioning law firms and their lawyers for engaging in speech the government does not like. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 4–22. The ABA’s 85-page complaint details a 14-week period leading up to this suit in which the government launched and executed a coordinated campaign to intimidate and punish law firms and their lawyers based on that disfavored speech. ABA v. EOP, 827 F. Supp. 3d 117, 122 (D.D.C. 2026); see ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 61–181. This included a series of executive orders issued in quick succession imposing virtually identical sanctions on law firms and their lawyers, numerous instances in which law firms made concessions to the administration to avoid such sanctions, and explicit statements from government officials recognizing the administration’s commitment to pursuing the sanctions. ABA, 827 F. Supp. 3d at 122–24. Before starting discovery, the parties filed a case management plan that jointly proposed a procedure for prompt resolution of any discovery disputes based on Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367 (2004). ECF No. 55 at 6–8. The court adopted that procedure, ordering the parties to “attempt resolution of Defendants’ overbreadth objection(s) through conferral, e.g., as through modification or narrowing of the request(s),” before requesting a telephone conference and leave to file a motion to compel with the court. ECF No. 57 at 3. The ABA served discovery requests in May 2026, including sixteen requests for production directed to EOP. ECF No. 61-1 at 14–16. The government objected to those requests as overbroad under Cheney. See ECF No. 61-2; ECF No. 61-3 at 1. After the parties conferred regarding the government’s Cheney objections, the court held multiple hearings in an effort to narrow the disputes and to balance the need for discovery in this case against the executive branch’s important 2 interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and safeguarding the confidentiality of its communications. First, the court ordered that the parties’ briefing on the motion to compel “address with specificity how Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367 (2004) applies to each individual document request, and include any proposals for how the requests may be narrowed.” Minute Order (June 25, 2026). In its briefing, the ABA proposed various ways of narrowing several of the requests. See ECF No. 61 at 13–18. The government responded by insisting that, even with the proposed narrowing, the discovery requests were still overbroad under Cheney and the ABA must first pursue other available sources for the records. ECF No. 67. The government’s brief did not propose any ways to narrow the terms of the requests themselves. See id. Second, after the parties’ briefing, the court held a discovery conference to discuss ways to further narrow the ABA’s discovery requests. At the court’s hearing, the government reiterated its general Cheney objections based on executive prerogative and structural considerations, and it also made clear it was not contending that the ABA’s discovery requests posed practical burdens beyond those implicated in ordinary discovery. See ECF No. 75 at 40–41 (government counsel clarifying he was not arguing any practical burden beyond that it is generally “burdensome to search for documents” and “burdensome to review documents for privilege”). The court proposed ways to narrow various requests, including by identifying and limiting the custodians, limiting the time period, and proceeding with discovery in phases. See, e.g., id. at 25–26, 39–40, 42–47, 51– 53, 62–68, 72–74. At the hearing, the government agreed that these methods would be helpful ways to narrow the dispute and reduce any burden on the executive branch. See id. at 42 (government counsel explaining that it has suggested “seeking the identity of certain individuals, custodians that are better suited for interrogatories” as “one way of narrowing”); id. at 53 3 (government agreeing with the court that “presumably knowing who” was in contact with the law firms would be helpful to narrow the requests); id. at 63–64 (government agreeing with the court that “interrogatories are the cleanest way for [it] to provide” the identities of individuals because “whether it’s an interrogatory as opposed to a document request, it does change as far as Cheney goes, because a document request seeking identities of individuals . . . means we’re providing them documents that will inherently include extraneous information”); see also ECF No. 61-3 at 1 (government proposing in a conferral email that requests 10, 11, and 12 “be narrowed by posing the request as an interrogatory as opposed to a broader and more burdensome document request”). Given that discussion, the court directed the government to “file a notice with the court identifying the names of the individuals at issue” for the requests that had been discussed at the hearing. Minute Order (Aug. 3, 2026). The court explained that, “[t]o the extent Defendants believe any individual’s or custodian’s name is properly withheld pursuant to privilege, they shall explain the basis for the privilege, including the relevant legal authorities and required evidentiary basis to support the privilege.” Id. The government’s notice retreated from the narrowing it acknowledged at the hearing and returned to a broader invocation of Cheney. See ECF No. 79 at 1–2 (arguing that discovery “should not proceed against the White House, per Cheney”); ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 5. The government also formally asserted the presidential communications privilege and refused to provide the identities of the individuals and custodians, aside from those already identified in the complaint. See ECF No. 79 at 2; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 5. II. Discussion The ABA moves to compel the government to respond to requests for production that the government objects to as “overly broad” under Cheney. 542 U.S. at 386; see ECF No. 61. The parties agree that a response here does not necessarily mean producing responsive documents; it 4 means producing responsive documents or asserting privilege. See ECF No. 61 at 1, 5; ECF No. 67 at 5. A. The Court Exercises Its General Discretion In Managing Discovery To Avoid Overbreadth Concerns, Even If Cheney Requires Less The parties dispute whether Cheney shields EOP from responding to discovery requests that are overbroad only when the requests seek information that plausibly implicates a claim of privilege (as the ABA reads it) or whether the case is animated by a more general concern about overly burdensome discovery on senior executive officials (as the government reads it). The court starts by reviewing Cheney in detail and concluding the government likely has the better reading. In any event, to the extent not specifically required by Cheney, the further limitations the court places on the requests here are justified by its own discretion to manage discovery, to balance the ABA’s need for the information against the burden on the government. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, 964 F.3d 1203, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“As we have repeatedly recognized, district courts have broad discretion over the structure, timing, and scope of discovery.”). The dispute in Cheney arose from the President’s creation of an energy policy task force, which was chaired by the Vice President and included other federal government officers. 542 U.S. at 373. Two nonprofits sued, asserting that the task force violated disclosure requirements that apply to committees created to advise the executive branch, and they served discovery requests on the Vice President and other senior officials on the task force. Id. at 373–76. The district court “acknowledg[ed] that discovery itself might raise serious constitutional questions” but ordered the government to respond anyways, reasoning that “the Government could assert executive privilege to protect sensitive materials from disclosure.” Id. at 375; see Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Pol’y Dev. Grp., No. 01-cv-01530 (D.D.C.), ECF Nos. 101, 154. The government appealed and 5 sought mandamus, and the D.C. Circuit dismissed the appeal, reasoning that the proper way “to guard against intrusion into the President’s prerogatives” was for the President to “first assert privilege.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 376. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit’s judgment. Id. at 392. It disagreed with the court of appeals’ conclusion that the discovery requests were appropriate simply “because the Executive Branch can invoke executive privilege to maintain the separation of powers.” Id. at 383. The court explained that “[e]xecutive privilege is an extraordinary assertion of power ‘not to be lightly invoked.’” Id. at 389 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953)). “Once executive privilege is asserted, coequal branches of the Government are set on a collision course,” as the “Judiciary is forced into the difficult task of balancing the need for information in a judicial proceeding and the Executive’s Article II prerogatives.” Id. “These ‘occasion[s] for constitutional confrontation between the two branches’ should be avoided whenever possible.” Id. at 389–90 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692 (1974)). The court therefore explained that “special considerations control when the Executive Branch’s interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and safeguarding the confidentiality of its communications are implicated.” Id. at 385; see also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 707 (1997) (explaining that “[t]he high respect that is owed to the office of the Chief Executive . . . is a matter that should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding, including the timing and scope of discovery”). In those circumstances, courts must balance both the “party’s need for information” and “the burden imposed by the discovery orders,” recognizing that a discovery dispute that implicates separation-of-powers considerations “is not a routine” one. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 385; see also Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712–13 (weighing the “President’s acknowledged need for 6 confidentiality in the communications of his office” against the “constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding”). The Supreme Court expressed concern about the scope of the particular discovery requests before it, explaining that “the breadth of the discovery requests” was “unbounded,” that the plaintiffs asked for “everything under the sky,” and that the discovery sought, in fact, would have given the plaintiffs “all the disclosure to which they would be entitled in the event they prevail on the merits, and much more besides.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 387–88. For example, the requests sought “[a]ll documents concerning any communication relating to the activities” of the energy policy task force, “the activities of any Sub-Groups, or the preparation of the Report” and “[a]ll documents identifying or referring to any staff, personnel, contractors, consultants or employees of the Task Force.” Id. at 387. The court contrasted these requests with the subpoena order it had upheld in Nixon, which “‘precisely identified’ and ‘specific[ally] . . . enumerated’ the relevant materials.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 387 (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 688 & n.5). And the court concluded that, in these circumstances, the discovery authorized by the district court was overly broad, and the Executive Branch should not “bear the onus of critiquing the unacceptable discovery requests line by line.” Id. at 388. In recognizing these concerns, the Supreme Court advised that lower courts considering overly broad discovery requests served on certain high-level executive branch officials are not left with “the sole option of inviting the Executive Branch to invoke executive privilege while remaining otherwise powerless to modify a party’s overly broad discovery requests.” Id. at 389. The court pointed to “sound precedent in the District of Columbia itself for district courts to explore other avenues, short of forcing the Executive to invoke privilege,” giving the example of a court acting to “narrow, on its own, the scope of the subpoenas to allow the Executive ‘to consider 7 whether to invoke executive privilege with respect to . . . a possibly smaller number of documents following the narrowing of the subpoenas.’” Id. at 390 (quoting United States v. Poindexter, 727 F. Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.D.C. 1989)). This court reads Cheney as directing courts to carefully balance the import of the information sought to the plaintiff’s claims against the burden imposed on the executive and, when confronted with overly broad discovery requests, to consider ways to narrow their scope. Although the parties debate whether Cheney is focused on overbreadth only to the extent the requests seek information that will require the invocation of executive privilege, or instead a more general concern for the burden imposed on a coordinate branch, the court need not resolve that question. Regardless of whether the information sought is privileged, the court exercises its discretion to manage discovery to proceed in a manner that carefully weighs the ABA’s need for information against the burden on the executive, including by sequencing discovery in a manner that allows discovery to proceed in stages—even if that exercise of discretion goes beyond what Cheney demands at this stage. B. The Court Grants The ABA’s Motion To Compel In Part And Denies It In Part Although most of the requests in this case pertain to a specific period and a defined universe of documents, and none of them are as broad as the “unbounded” requests the district court authorized in Cheney, the court still takes account of the special considerations present when, as here, “the Executive Branch’s interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and safeguarding the confidentiality of its communications are implicated.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 385. The court’s determinations at this stage come after multiple efforts at narrowing the scope of the requests at issue. First, the court asked the parties for written proposals to narrow the requests, and it later suggested ways to narrow them further at multiple hearings. See, e.g., ECF No. 57 at 2–3 (scheduling order); Minute Order (June 25, 2026); Minute Order (Aug. 3, 2026); 8 ECF No. 75 at 42 (hearing transcript). In response, the ABA proposed several ways to narrow its requests. The government did not, instead maintaining its blanket objections to the requests on the grounds that the contemplated discovery would “disrupt the functioning of the Executive Branch” and “raise substantial separation-of-powers concerns.” ECF No. 67 at 5. Though the government acknowledged at a hearing that several of the court’s own proposals to narrow the requests would be productive, it has declined the court’s invitations to propose its own suggestions; the government has, however, acknowledged that the ABA’s requests do not impose any practical burden beyond ordinary discovery burdens. See ECF No. 75 at 40–42, 53, 63–64. The court finds it appropriate to exercise its discretion to further narrow the ABA’s proposals, at least at this stage. Although the ABA may object that the court’s further narrowing is not strictly required by Cheney, the court finds it prudent as a matter of discovery management to proceed with a more limited scope of discovery, such that any further discovery can be based on a showing that it is necessary and can be further tailored based on EOP’s initial responses. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (requiring courts to consider “whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit”); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (recognizing that Rule 26 “vests the trial judge with broad discretion to tailor discovery narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery”). Phasing discovery in this way may extend the discovery period to some degree, but the court finds that lengthening warranted to balance the important interests at play. Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 952 F.3d 293, 299–300 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“[D]istrict courts have broad discretion in structuring discovery to limit unnecessary or overly burdensome requests.” (quotation marks omitted)). And courts commonly phase discovery to carefully manage the burden placed on producing parties. See, e.g., In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 258 F.R.D. 167, 176 (D.D.C. 2009). 9 The court considers the ABA’s discovery requests in order, grouped when they raise common issues. 1. Requests 1, 2, and 7 The ABA’s first, second, and seventh requests each seek documents that EOP exchanged with the third-party law firms that were targeted by the allegedly unlawful policy. Specifically: • Request 1 seeks: “All communications on or after January 20, 2025 that You sent to, received from, or participated in with: a. Covington & Burling; b. Jenner & Block; c. Perkins Coie; d. Susman Godfrey; and/or e. Wilmer Hale. Please respond separately for each of (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e).” • Request 2 seeks: “All communications on or after January 20, 2025 relating to any possible issuance of any Executive Order against any law firm, or to any Agreement with any law firm and the government, that You sent to, received from, or participated in with: a. Paul Weiss b. Skadden c. Wilkie Farr d. Milbank e. Kirkland & Ellis f. Allen Overy g. Simpson Thatcher h. Latham i. Cadwalader. Please respond separately for each of (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i).”; and • Request 7 seeks: “All Agreements, created on or after January 20, 2025, between the Administration and any Settling Firm. To the extent that any Agreement is not memorialized in a single document, all records sufficient to show all terms of that Agreement.” ECF No. 61-1 at 14–15. The ABA argues that these requests, limited to communications or agreements with a small set of specifically identified firms that are central to their claims, bear no relation to the sweeping requests considered in Cheney. It also argues that the requests, by their terms, avoid materials subject to any claim of privilege because they all involve communications or documents that EOP shared with third parties. These points are well taken. It is clear these requests “stand on an altogether different footing” from the scope of the requests at issue in Cheney. 542 U.S. at 386. Indeed, these requests “precisely identif[y]” the materials sought— communications and documents that are limited to a small number of specifically enumerated law firms, during a particular time period. Id. at 386–87; see ECF No. 61-1 at 7–8 (defining “Settling Firms,” as used in request 7, to include nine law firms); see also Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in 10 Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 532 F.3d 860, 867 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (explaining that a FOIA request “narrowly drawn, targeting nine specific individuals” had “little in common with the broad discovery order at issue” in Cheney). There is no basis to think requests 1, 2, and 7 are the type of requests that would require “the President, Vice President, or their staffs to sort through mountains of files for responsive documents,” and the government does not argue otherwise. Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 532 F.3d at 867; see also Cheney, 542 U.S. at 387 (emphasizing that the “specificity of the . . . requests serves as an important safeguard against unnecessary intrusion into the operation of the Office of the President”). It is also true that responses to these requests would not set off any “collision course” in which the judicial branch “is forced into the difficult task of balancing the need for information in a judicial proceeding and the Executive’s Article II prerogatives” because the requests seek only documents that have already been shared with third parties outside of EOP. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 389. Indeed, the government does not dispute these points—it does not argue these requests are overly broad or suggest they should be further narrowed in any way, and it has not argued the requests would yield materials likely to be subject to executive privilege. See ECF No. 75 at 47, 49–51 (government counsel saying it did not have any narrowing to propose). To the contrary, the government appears to concede it would not have any basis to withhold these documents based on privilege. See id. at 49–50 (acknowledging the ABA is “certainly entitled to whatever information” in the law firms’ possession that is responsive to these requests); ECF No. 67 at 9–10 (not contesting the ABA’s argument that no privilege would apply to these documents). On the other side of the ledger, the government does not dispute these requests are relevant to, and indeed central to, the ABA’s claims that the government adopted and carried out a policy of retaliating against firms based on their speech and representations. See ECF No. 67 at 12; 11 Cheney, 542 U.S. at 385 (directing the court to balance a “party’s need for information” against “the burden imposed by the discovery orders”). The ABA’s First Amendment retaliation claim, for example, concerns whether the government made “coercive threats aimed at punishing or suppressing disfavored speech.” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 197 (2024); see ECF No 1 ¶¶ 206–21. The communications sought in requests 1, 2, and 7 are directly relevant to whether the government made “threat[s] of retaliatory sanctions” against law firms that would have “deterred ABA members and their law firms from engaging in First Amendment protected activity.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 218; see id. ¶ 216 (alleging specific types of threats); see also, e.g., Johnson v. District of Columbia, 182 F.4th 1052, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2026) (considering email communications in the context of a First Amendment retaliation claim). And the ABA’s viewpoint discrimination claim turns in part on whether “the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker” was the government’s “rationale” for the alleged law firm policy. Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); see ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 222–30. The communications and the agreements these discovery requests seek are likely to be competent, probative evidence of the government’s motivations for the alleged policy, including whether its action was designed “to suppress disfavored First Amendment protected activity of the ABA and its members” and was “based on viewpoints held by the ABA and by ABA members and their law firms.” ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 210, 225; see, e.g., Media Matters for Am. v. FTC, No. 25-5302, 2025 WL 2988966, at *8 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 2025) (discussing the role of circumstantial and direct evidence of “the defendant’s expression of hostility to the protected speech” in the context of First Amendment claims). The government’s sole counterargument is that Cheney favors obtaining this information from the third-party law firms themselves rather than EOP. See ECF No. 67 at 9; ECF No. 75 at 47, 51–52. The government represents that “in keeping with Cheney, Defendants have now 12 subpoenaed each of these law firms to obtain the documents that Plaintiff has requested.” ECF No. 67 at 9. In July 2026, the government served third-party subpoenas on the firms seeking “[a]ll communications on or after January 20, 2025 reflecting or relating to any Agreement(s), including any negotiations relating to any Agreements, and any communications concerning the implementation, enforcement, or monitoring of such Agreements” and “[a]ll communications on or after January 20, 2025 relating to any Law Firm Executive Order.” ECF No. 67-1 at 18, 35, 52, 69, 86, 103, 120, 138, 155, 172, 189, 206, 223, 240. At a hearing at the end of that month, the government proposed that, instead of searching its own materials for the documents, it be permitted to work diligently to obtain the documents from the firms through these subpoenas, after which it will share the documents with the ABA. See ECF No. 75 at 47–48, 50 (counsel representing that the government is “working with the law firms who have received the subpoenas to obtain” the information requested by requests 1, 2, and 7 and that the ABA is “certainly entitled to whatever information we obtain from the law firms”). The government also represented that it had agreed to give the law firms twenty-one days to respond to their subpoenas and committed to “engage and figure out how soon we can get that material” and keep the court apprised of any updates. Id. at 47, 57. The ABA noted that the government’s third-party subpoena differed in scope from their discovery requests but might “cover the core conduct of [requests] 1 and 2 and 7.” Id. at 48. On consideration of these representations, the interests recognized in Cheney, and the court’s own discretion to manage discovery, the court adopts the government’s request for it to diligently pursue responses to the third-party subpoenas it served on law firms, such that EOP could exclude any documents received directly from the firms from its own responses. See id. at 47–50; ECF No. 100 at 8. The court accordingly grants in part and denies in part the ABA’s motion to compel a response to requests 1, 2, and 7. At the July 2026 hearing, the government informed 13 the court that it had extended the 15-day response period in the third-party subpoenas, giving the law firms a few weeks to respond, and confirmed it would keep the court and the ABA apprised of all progress. ECF No. 75 at 49–57. At a more recent hearing about other discovery matters, the government represented it had received only a small number of responsive materials from law firms and had not been in recent contact with the firms. ECF No. 100 at 5–7. The government indicated it was “still evaluating next steps” to get responsive materials from the law firms and has “not foreclosed pressing [the law firms] for further documents.” Id. at 6–7. Given that several months have passed since the July 2026 hearing, the court will give the government until December 28, 2026, to obtain and provide to the ABA the documents it has asked for the opportunity to seek directly from the law firms. Consistent with the government’s position, the court will not require the government to provide responses to the ABA’s discovery requests as to documents that it has obtained from law firms and provided to the ABA by that date; the government shall then respond as to all other documents in its possession that are responsive to requests 1, 2, and 7. The court also considers, on its own initiative, ways to narrow the scope of these requests, and it finds that the ABA’s need for the evidence will not be compromised by further narrowing of the requests at issue in two ways. First, the court narrows request 1 to exclude communications with those firms that are not relevant to the ABA’s claims. See ECF No. 75 at 46 (ABA agreeing that including this limitation “would work certainly”). Second, the court finds it appropriate, at least at this stage, to further narrow the time period for requests 1 and 2. See ECF No. 75 at 46– 47, 51–52 (the court proposing this idea). As to request 1, which relates to law firms that were allegedly targeted by the government but did not ultimately enter into an agreement with it, the court limits the request to communications between January 20, 2025, and April 30, 2025. The last law-firm agreement the ABA identifies was announced on April 11, 2025. See ECF 1 ¶¶ 140–41. 14 Although communications after April 2025 would be relevant to the ABA’s claims, the court finds it prudent to limit the period of search to this approximately three-month period in light of the burdens on the government from a broader search and absent any indication that any communications with the identified law firms continued past April. As to request 2, which relates to law firms that the ABA alleges entered into an agreement with the government, the court limits the request to communications between January 20, 2025, and June 30, 2025. As to these firms, communications in the months after a firm and the government reached an agreement bear on how those agreements were interpreted and implemented. But here too, the court finds it prudent to set an outer bound on the search period in light of the burdens to the government and the absence of any indication that there are relevant communications with the identified law firms after June 2025. Request 7 concerns a very narrow and specifically defined set of documents that are central to the ABA’s claims: the agreements the government made with the settling law firms. The government has not suggested that these agreements, which it acknowledges were made and shared with third parties, implicate executive privilege concerns or would be particularly burdensome to produce. See ECF No. 67 at 9 (the government stating that it has “subpoenaed each of these law firms to obtain the documents that Plaintiff has requested”). And to the extent the government understands request 7 to extend even to elements of any agreement that are not captured in any document or record, requiring “deposition testimony of the managing partners of these firms,” id., the court construes the request as limited to documents or records that capture, in whole or in part, agreements with settling law firms. Accordingly, with the exception of documents the government obtains directly from law firms and provides by December 28, 2026, the government shall respond to the following requests, as further narrowed by the court: 15 • Request 1, as tailored by the plaintiff, the court, and the government’s subpoena requests: All communications between January 20, 2025 and April 30, 2025 relating to any possible issuance of any Executive Order against any law firm, or to any Agreement with any law firm and the government that You sent to, received from, or participated in with: a. Covington & Burling; b. Jenner & Block; c. Perkins Coie; d. Susman Godfrey; and/or e. Wilmer Hale. Please respond separately for each of (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e). • Request 2, as tailored by the plaintiff, the court, and the government’s subpoena requests: All communications between January 20, 2025 and June 30, 2025 relating to any possible issuance of any Executive Order against any law firm, or to any Agreement with any law firm and the government, that You sent to, received from, or participated in with: a. Paul Weiss b. Skadden c. Wilkie Farr d. Milbank e. Kirkland & Ellis f. Allen Overy g. Simpson Thatcher h. Latham i. Cadwalader. Please respond separately for each of (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i). • Request 7, as construed by the court: All Agreements, created on or after January 20, 2025, between the Administration and any Settling Firm. To the extent that any Agreement is not memorialized in a single document, all records sufficient to show all terms of that Agreement. 2. Requests 3, 4, 5, and 6 The ABA’s third, fourth, fifth, and sixth discovery requests seek communications between the government and third-party individuals. Specifically, these requests seek all communications on or after January 20, 2025, with two individuals, Boris Epshteyn and Steve Bannon, “relating to the possible issuance of any Executive Order against any Law Firm” or “reflecting negotiations relating to any Agreements” as to those two individuals. ECF No. 61-1 at 14–15. The ABA moves to compel a response to these requests and, in response, the government does not argue that Cheney applies. At one of the court’s discovery conferences, the government explicitly waived any invocation of Cheney in response to these requests, taking the position that the ABA had satisfied any obligation to “explore other avenues” for obtaining the information and confirming: “We’re past the Cheney stage, and we’re going to litigate whether we satisfy the privilege or whether a privilege can be overcome.” ECF No. 75 at 37–38, 54–55. Given the government’s affirmative concession that it must respond, the court finds it unnecessary at this 16 juncture to compel such a response. The court therefore denies the motion to compel responses to these requests as moot. 3. Requests 8 and 14 The ABA’s eighth and fourteenth document requests seek communications involving offices and agencies within EOP and other agencies. Request 8 seeks “[a]ll records created on or after January 20, 2025 related to the terms of the Administration’s Agreements with any Settling Firm, including all communications between or among the White House, the Office of Management and Budget (‘OMB’), the EEOC, and/or the U.S. Department of Justice (‘DOJ’), concerning the Agreements or terms thereof.” ECF No. 61-1 at 15. Request 14 seeks “[a]ll documents and communications exchanged with Agency Defendants relating to the implementation, interpretation, and/or enforcement of any Law Firm Order.” Id. at 16. The court denies the motion to compel EOP’s response to these requests. In the course of the court’s effort to narrow the requests, the ABA agreed to first obtain responsive documents from other defendant agencies. ECF No. 61 at 18–19. The court agrees this approach best balances the important interests at stake, allowing the plaintiff to obtain the documents in the first instance from defendants that do not raise the important considerations discussed in Cheney and, to the extent necessary thereafter, make tailored requests to EOP based on specific information received in the first phase. The government agreed to this phased approach. See ECF No. 75 at 44 (government agreeing that “a phased approach of focusing on other defendant agencies” and “getting the discovery there” first is “the proper procedure”); id. at 40 (government agreeing that after the ABA first obtains documents from agency defendants, it can “figure out what [it] still need[s] to prove up [its] case, and then [it] would be able to articulate why [it] need[s]” such documents from the White House); see also id. at 57 (the ABA indicating it is “fine phasing it that way”). 17 4. Requests 9 and 13 The ABA’s ninth and thirteenth document requests seek: • Request 9: “All records created on or after January 20, 2025, related to the issuance of any Law Firm Order.” • Request 13: “Documents of ‘President Trump’s policy team’ relating to ‘executing on [President Trump’s] directive to hold Big Law accountable for their weaponization of justice and their lies,’ as referred to in the statements of White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt set forth in ¶146 of the Complaint.” ECF No. 61-1 at 15–16. The ABA has since proposed ways to narrow both requests. It has proposed limiting request 9 to the following types of records related to issuance of the law firm orders: “(1) all drafts of Law Firm Orders, including any redlines, edits, and comments thereto, however communicated, and including communications transmitting such drafts, redlines, edits, and comments; (2) emails that refer to any of the firms who received a Law Firm Order and the word ‘EO’ (or other synonyms used to refer to an Executive Order); (3) all memoranda related to the issuance or prospective issuance of Law Firm Orders, including drafts thereof and communications transmitting and responding to such memoranda; (4) all notes from meetings at which the issuance of any Law Firm Orders was discussed.” ECF No. 61 at 16. And the ABA proposes narrowing request 13 to “(1) all memoranda related to President Trump’s directive to ‘hold Big Law accountable for their weaponization of justice and their lies,’ including drafts thereof and communications transmitting and responding to such memoranda; (2) emails that refer to or discuss the President’s directive; and (3) all notes from meetings at which the directive was discussed.” Id. at 18. The court finds it appropriate to further limit these requests in three respects to significantly reduce the government’s burden in responding. First, the court will not order EOP to respond to either request for notes from meetings at which the issuance of law firm orders or the policy 18 directive were discussed. Although such responses would likely be warranted in the ordinary incidents of discovery given the nature of the claims here, the interests recognized in Cheney counsel otherwise. 542 U.S. at 381–82 (recognizing that the interests of the executive “remove this c