American Bar Association v. Executive Office of the President
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2025-1888
JudgeJudge Amir H. Ali
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 25-01888 (AHA)
v.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, et al.,
Defendants.
Memorandum Opinion and Order
The American Bar Association (“ABA”) sued federal agencies and officials, alleging they
adopted an unlawful, coordinated policy of sanctioning law firms and their lawyers for engaging
in speech the government does not like. The government objected to discovery requests served on
the Executive Office of the President (“EOP”) on grounds that they are overbroad under Cheney
v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367 (2004), and the ABA now moves
to compel responses. After considering the parties’ written submissions and holding multiple
hearings, balancing the need for discovery in this case against the executive branch’s important
interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and safeguarding the confidentiality of its
communications, and exploring ways to craft a narrower approach to that balance, the court grants
the ABA’s motion in part and denies it in part. Specifically, the court denies the motion as moot
as to requests 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, and 12; denies the motion without prejudice as to requests 8, 10, 14,
15, and 16; and grants the motion as to narrowed forms of requests 1, 2, 7, 9, and 13.
I. Background
In June 2025, the ABA sued federal agencies and officials, alleging the executive branch
had adopted an unlawful, coordinated policy of sanctioning law firms and their lawyers for
engaging in speech the government does not like. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 4–22. The ABA’s 85-page
complaint details a 14-week period leading up to this suit in which the government launched and
executed a coordinated campaign to intimidate and punish law firms and their lawyers based on
that disfavored speech. ABA v. EOP, 827 F. Supp. 3d 117, 122 (D.D.C. 2026); see ECF No. 1
¶¶ 61–181. This included a series of executive orders issued in quick succession imposing virtually
identical sanctions on law firms and their lawyers, numerous instances in which law firms made
concessions to the administration to avoid such sanctions, and explicit statements from government
officials recognizing the administration’s commitment to pursuing the sanctions. ABA, 827 F.
Supp. 3d at 122–24.
Before starting discovery, the parties filed a case management plan that jointly proposed a
procedure for prompt resolution of any discovery disputes based on Cheney v. U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367 (2004). ECF No. 55 at 6–8. The court adopted that
procedure, ordering the parties to “attempt resolution of Defendants’ overbreadth objection(s)
through conferral, e.g., as through modification or narrowing of the request(s),” before requesting
a telephone conference and leave to file a motion to compel with the court. ECF No. 57 at 3.
The ABA served discovery requests in May 2026, including sixteen requests for production
directed to EOP. ECF No. 61-1 at 14–16. The government objected to those requests as overbroad
under Cheney. See ECF No. 61-2; ECF No. 61-3 at 1. After the parties conferred regarding the
government’s Cheney objections, the court held multiple hearings in an effort to narrow the
disputes and to balance the need for discovery in this case against the executive branch’s important
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interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and safeguarding the confidentiality of its
communications.
First, the court ordered that the parties’ briefing on the motion to compel “address with
specificity how Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367 (2004) applies to each individual
document request, and include any proposals for how the requests may be narrowed.” Minute
Order (June 25, 2026). In its briefing, the ABA proposed various ways of narrowing several of the
requests. See ECF No. 61 at 13–18. The government responded by insisting that, even with the
proposed narrowing, the discovery requests were still overbroad under Cheney and the ABA must
first pursue other available sources for the records. ECF No. 67. The government’s brief did not
propose any ways to narrow the terms of the requests themselves. See id.
Second, after the parties’ briefing, the court held a discovery conference to discuss ways
to further narrow the ABA’s discovery requests. At the court’s hearing, the government reiterated
its general Cheney objections based on executive prerogative and structural considerations, and it
also made clear it was not contending that the ABA’s discovery requests posed practical burdens
beyond those implicated in ordinary discovery. See ECF No. 75 at 40–41 (government counsel
clarifying he was not arguing any practical burden beyond that it is generally “burdensome to
search for documents” and “burdensome to review documents for privilege”). The court proposed
ways to narrow various requests, including by identifying and limiting the custodians, limiting the
time period, and proceeding with discovery in phases. See, e.g., id. at 25–26, 39–40, 42–47, 51–
53, 62–68, 72–74. At the hearing, the government agreed that these methods would be helpful
ways to narrow the dispute and reduce any burden on the executive branch. See id. at 42
(government counsel explaining that it has suggested “seeking the identity of certain individuals,
custodians that are better suited for interrogatories” as “one way of narrowing”); id. at 53
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(government agreeing with the court that “presumably knowing who” was in contact with the law
firms would be helpful to narrow the requests); id. at 63–64 (government agreeing with the court
that “interrogatories are the cleanest way for [it] to provide” the identities of individuals because
“whether it’s an interrogatory as opposed to a document request, it does change as far as Cheney
goes, because a document request seeking identities of individuals . . . means we’re providing
them documents that will inherently include extraneous information”); see also ECF No. 61-3 at
1 (government proposing in a conferral email that requests 10, 11, and 12 “be narrowed by posing
the request as an interrogatory as opposed to a broader and more burdensome document request”).
Given that discussion, the court directed the government to “file a notice with the court
identifying the names of the individuals at issue” for the requests that had been discussed at the
hearing. Minute Order (Aug. 3, 2026). The court explained that, “[t]o the extent Defendants believe
any individual’s or custodian’s name is properly withheld pursuant to privilege, they shall explain
the basis for the privilege, including the relevant legal authorities and required evidentiary basis to
support the privilege.” Id. The government’s notice retreated from the narrowing it acknowledged
at the hearing and returned to a broader invocation of Cheney. See ECF No. 79 at 1–2 (arguing that
discovery “should not proceed against the White House, per Cheney”); ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 5. The
government also formally asserted the presidential communications privilege and refused to
provide the identities of the individuals and custodians, aside from those already identified in the
complaint. See ECF No. 79 at 2; ECF No. 79-1 ¶ 5.
II. Discussion
The ABA moves to compel the government to respond to requests for production that the
government objects to as “overly broad” under Cheney. 542 U.S. at 386; see ECF No. 61. The
parties agree that a response here does not necessarily mean producing responsive documents; it
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means producing responsive documents or asserting privilege. See ECF No. 61 at 1, 5; ECF No.
67 at 5.
A. The Court Exercises Its General Discretion In Managing Discovery To Avoid
Overbreadth Concerns, Even If Cheney Requires Less
The parties dispute whether Cheney shields EOP from responding to discovery requests
that are overbroad only when the requests seek information that plausibly implicates a claim of
privilege (as the ABA reads it) or whether the case is animated by a more general concern about
overly burdensome discovery on senior executive officials (as the government reads it). The court
starts by reviewing Cheney in detail and concluding the government likely has the better reading.
In any event, to the extent not specifically required by Cheney, the further limitations the court
places on the requests here are justified by its own discretion to manage discovery, to balance the
ABA’s need for the information against the burden on the government. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1); Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, 964 F.3d 1203, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“As we have
repeatedly recognized, district courts have broad discretion over the structure, timing, and scope
of discovery.”).
The dispute in Cheney arose from the President’s creation of an energy policy task force,
which was chaired by the Vice President and included other federal government officers. 542 U.S.
at 373. Two nonprofits sued, asserting that the task force violated disclosure requirements that
apply to committees created to advise the executive branch, and they served discovery requests on
the Vice President and other senior officials on the task force. Id. at 373–76. The district court
“acknowledg[ed] that discovery itself might raise serious constitutional questions” but ordered the
government to respond anyways, reasoning that “the Government could assert executive privilege
to protect sensitive materials from disclosure.” Id. at 375; see Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy
Pol’y Dev. Grp., No. 01-cv-01530 (D.D.C.), ECF Nos. 101, 154. The government appealed and
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sought mandamus, and the D.C. Circuit dismissed the appeal, reasoning that the proper way “to
guard against intrusion into the President’s prerogatives” was for the President to “first assert
privilege.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 376.
The Supreme Court vacated the circuit’s judgment. Id. at 392. It disagreed with the court
of appeals’ conclusion that the discovery requests were appropriate simply “because the Executive
Branch can invoke executive privilege to maintain the separation of powers.” Id. at 383. The court
explained that “[e]xecutive privilege is an extraordinary assertion of power ‘not to be lightly
invoked.’” Id. at 389 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953)). “Once executive
privilege is asserted, coequal branches of the Government are set on a collision course,” as the
“Judiciary is forced into the difficult task of balancing the need for information in a judicial
proceeding and the Executive’s Article II prerogatives.” Id. “These ‘occasion[s] for constitutional
confrontation between the two branches’ should be avoided whenever possible.” Id. at 389–90
(quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692 (1974)).
The court therefore explained that “special considerations control when the Executive
Branch’s interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and safeguarding the confidentiality
of its communications are implicated.” Id. at 385; see also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 707
(1997) (explaining that “[t]he high respect that is owed to the office of the Chief Executive . . . is
a matter that should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding, including the timing and scope
of discovery”). In those circumstances, courts must balance both the “party’s need for information”
and “the burden imposed by the discovery orders,” recognizing that a discovery dispute that
implicates separation-of-powers considerations “is not a routine” one. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 385;
see also Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712–13 (weighing the “President’s acknowledged need for
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confidentiality in the communications of his office” against the “constitutional need for production
of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding”).
The Supreme Court expressed concern about the scope of the particular discovery requests
before it, explaining that “the breadth of the discovery requests” was “unbounded,” that the
plaintiffs asked for “everything under the sky,” and that the discovery sought, in fact, would have
given the plaintiffs “all the disclosure to which they would be entitled in the event they prevail on
the merits, and much more besides.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 387–88. For example, the requests sought
“[a]ll documents concerning any communication relating to the activities” of the energy policy
task force, “the activities of any Sub-Groups, or the preparation of the Report” and “[a]ll
documents identifying or referring to any staff, personnel, contractors, consultants or employees
of the Task Force.” Id. at 387. The court contrasted these requests with the subpoena order it had
upheld in Nixon, which “‘precisely identified’ and ‘specific[ally] . . . enumerated’ the relevant
materials.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 387 (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 688 & n.5). And the court
concluded that, in these circumstances, the discovery authorized by the district court was overly
broad, and the Executive Branch should not “bear the onus of critiquing the unacceptable discovery
requests line by line.” Id. at 388.
In recognizing these concerns, the Supreme Court advised that lower courts considering
overly broad discovery requests served on certain high-level executive branch officials are not left
with “the sole option of inviting the Executive Branch to invoke executive privilege while
remaining otherwise powerless to modify a party’s overly broad discovery requests.” Id. at 389.
The court pointed to “sound precedent in the District of Columbia itself for district courts to
explore other avenues, short of forcing the Executive to invoke privilege,” giving the example of
a court acting to “narrow, on its own, the scope of the subpoenas to allow the Executive ‘to consider
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whether to invoke executive privilege with respect to . . . a possibly smaller number of documents
following the narrowing of the subpoenas.’” Id. at 390 (quoting United States v. Poindexter, 727
F. Supp. 1501, 1504 (D.D.C. 1989)).
This court reads Cheney as directing courts to carefully balance the import of the
information sought to the plaintiff’s claims against the burden imposed on the executive and, when
confronted with overly broad discovery requests, to consider ways to narrow their scope. Although
the parties debate whether Cheney is focused on overbreadth only to the extent the requests seek
information that will require the invocation of executive privilege, or instead a more general
concern for the burden imposed on a coordinate branch, the court need not resolve that question.
Regardless of whether the information sought is privileged, the court exercises its discretion to
manage discovery to proceed in a manner that carefully weighs the ABA’s need for information
against the burden on the executive, including by sequencing discovery in a manner that allows
discovery to proceed in stages—even if that exercise of discretion goes beyond what Cheney
demands at this stage.
B. The Court Grants The ABA’s Motion To Compel In Part And Denies It In Part
Although most of the requests in this case pertain to a specific period and a defined universe
of documents, and none of them are as broad as the “unbounded” requests the district court
authorized in Cheney, the court still takes account of the special considerations present when, as
here, “the Executive Branch’s interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and safeguarding
the confidentiality of its communications are implicated.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 385.
The court’s determinations at this stage come after multiple efforts at narrowing the scope
of the requests at issue. First, the court asked the parties for written proposals to narrow the
requests, and it later suggested ways to narrow them further at multiple hearings. See, e.g., ECF
No. 57 at 2–3 (scheduling order); Minute Order (June 25, 2026); Minute Order (Aug. 3, 2026);
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ECF No. 75 at 42 (hearing transcript). In response, the ABA proposed several ways to narrow its
requests. The government did not, instead maintaining its blanket objections to the requests on the
grounds that the contemplated discovery would “disrupt the functioning of the Executive Branch”
and “raise substantial separation-of-powers concerns.” ECF No. 67 at 5. Though the government
acknowledged at a hearing that several of the court’s own proposals to narrow the requests would
be productive, it has declined the court’s invitations to propose its own suggestions; the
government has, however, acknowledged that the ABA’s requests do not impose any practical
burden beyond ordinary discovery burdens. See ECF No. 75 at 40–42, 53, 63–64.
The court finds it appropriate to exercise its discretion to further narrow the ABA’s
proposals, at least at this stage. Although the ABA may object that the court’s further narrowing
is not strictly required by Cheney, the court finds it prudent as a matter of discovery management
to proceed with a more limited scope of discovery, such that any further discovery can be based
on a showing that it is necessary and can be further tailored based on EOP’s initial responses. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (requiring courts to consider “whether the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit”); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598
(1998) (recognizing that Rule 26 “vests the trial judge with broad discretion to tailor discovery
narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery”). Phasing discovery in this way may extend the
discovery period to some degree, but the court finds that lengthening warranted to balance the
important interests at play. Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 952 F.3d 293, 299–300 (D.C.
Cir. 2020) (“[D]istrict courts have broad discretion in structuring discovery to limit unnecessary
or overly burdensome requests.” (quotation marks omitted)). And courts commonly phase
discovery to carefully manage the burden placed on producing parties. See, e.g., In re Rail Freight
Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 258 F.R.D. 167, 176 (D.D.C. 2009).
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The court considers the ABA’s discovery requests in order, grouped when they raise
common issues.
1. Requests 1, 2, and 7
The ABA’s first, second, and seventh requests each seek documents that EOP exchanged
with the third-party law firms that were targeted by the allegedly unlawful policy. Specifically:
• Request 1 seeks: “All communications on or after January 20, 2025 that You sent to,
received from, or participated in with: a. Covington & Burling; b. Jenner & Block; c.
Perkins Coie; d. Susman Godfrey; and/or e. Wilmer Hale. Please respond separately for
each of (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e).”
• Request 2 seeks: “All communications on or after January 20, 2025 relating to any possible
issuance of any Executive Order against any law firm, or to any Agreement with any law
firm and the government, that You sent to, received from, or participated in with: a. Paul
Weiss b. Skadden c. Wilkie Farr d. Milbank e. Kirkland & Ellis f. Allen Overy g. Simpson
Thatcher h. Latham i. Cadwalader. Please respond separately for each of (a), (b), (c), (d),
(e), (f), (g), (h), and (i).”; and
• Request 7 seeks: “All Agreements, created on or after January 20, 2025, between the
Administration and any Settling Firm. To the extent that any Agreement is not
memorialized in a single document, all records sufficient to show all terms of that
Agreement.”
ECF No. 61-1 at 14–15. The ABA argues that these requests, limited to communications or
agreements with a small set of specifically identified firms that are central to their claims, bear no
relation to the sweeping requests considered in Cheney. It also argues that the requests, by their
terms, avoid materials subject to any claim of privilege because they all involve communications
or documents that EOP shared with third parties. These points are well taken. It is clear these
requests “stand on an altogether different footing” from the scope of the requests at issue in
Cheney. 542 U.S. at 386. Indeed, these requests “precisely identif[y]” the materials sought—
communications and documents that are limited to a small number of specifically enumerated law
firms, during a particular time period. Id. at 386–87; see ECF No. 61-1 at 7–8 (defining “Settling
Firms,” as used in request 7, to include nine law firms); see also Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in
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Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 532 F.3d 860, 867 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (explaining that a FOIA
request “narrowly drawn, targeting nine specific individuals” had “little in common with the broad
discovery order at issue” in Cheney). There is no basis to think requests 1, 2, and 7 are the type of
requests that would require “the President, Vice President, or their staffs to sort through mountains
of files for responsive documents,” and the government does not argue otherwise. Citizens for
Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 532 F.3d at 867; see also Cheney, 542 U.S. at 387 (emphasizing that the
“specificity of the . . . requests serves as an important safeguard against unnecessary intrusion into
the operation of the Office of the President”). It is also true that responses to these requests would
not set off any “collision course” in which the judicial branch “is forced into the difficult task of
balancing the need for information in a judicial proceeding and the Executive’s Article II
prerogatives” because the requests seek only documents that have already been shared with third
parties outside of EOP. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 389. Indeed, the government does not dispute these
points—it does not argue these requests are overly broad or suggest they should be further
narrowed in any way, and it has not argued the requests would yield materials likely to be subject
to executive privilege. See ECF No. 75 at 47, 49–51 (government counsel saying it did not have
any narrowing to propose). To the contrary, the government appears to concede it would not have
any basis to withhold these documents based on privilege. See id. at 49–50 (acknowledging the
ABA is “certainly entitled to whatever information” in the law firms’ possession that is responsive
to these requests); ECF No. 67 at 9–10 (not contesting the ABA’s argument that no privilege would
apply to these documents).
On the other side of the ledger, the government does not dispute these requests are relevant
to, and indeed central to, the ABA’s claims that the government adopted and carried out a policy
of retaliating against firms based on their speech and representations. See ECF No. 67 at 12;
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Cheney, 542 U.S. at 385 (directing the court to balance a “party’s need for information” against
“the burden imposed by the discovery orders”). The ABA’s First Amendment retaliation claim,
for example, concerns whether the government made “coercive threats aimed at punishing or
suppressing disfavored speech.” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 197 (2024); see
ECF No 1 ¶¶ 206–21. The communications sought in requests 1, 2, and 7 are directly relevant to
whether the government made “threat[s] of retaliatory sanctions” against law firms that would
have “deterred ABA members and their law firms from engaging in First Amendment protected
activity.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 218; see id. ¶ 216 (alleging specific types of threats); see also, e.g., Johnson
v. District of Columbia, 182 F.4th 1052, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2026) (considering email communications
in the context of a First Amendment retaliation claim). And the ABA’s viewpoint discrimination
claim turns in part on whether “the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of
the speaker” was the government’s “rationale” for the alleged law firm policy. Rosenberger v.
Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); see ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 222–30. The communications
and the agreements these discovery requests seek are likely to be competent, probative evidence
of the government’s motivations for the alleged policy, including whether its action was designed
“to suppress disfavored First Amendment protected activity of the ABA and its members” and was
“based on viewpoints held by the ABA and by ABA members and their law firms.” ECF No. 1
¶¶ 210, 225; see, e.g., Media Matters for Am. v. FTC, No. 25-5302, 2025 WL 2988966, at *8 (D.C.
Cir. Oct. 23, 2025) (discussing the role of circumstantial and direct evidence of “the defendant’s
expression of hostility to the protected speech” in the context of First Amendment claims).
The government’s sole counterargument is that Cheney favors obtaining this information
from the third-party law firms themselves rather than EOP. See ECF No. 67 at 9; ECF No. 75 at
47, 51–52. The government represents that “in keeping with Cheney, Defendants have now
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subpoenaed each of these law firms to obtain the documents that Plaintiff has requested.” ECF No.
67 at 9. In July 2026, the government served third-party subpoenas on the firms seeking “[a]ll
communications on or after January 20, 2025 reflecting or relating to any Agreement(s), including
any negotiations relating to any Agreements, and any communications concerning the
implementation, enforcement, or monitoring of such Agreements” and “[a]ll communications on
or after January 20, 2025 relating to any Law Firm Executive Order.” ECF No. 67-1 at 18, 35, 52,
69, 86, 103, 120, 138, 155, 172, 189, 206, 223, 240. At a hearing at the end of that month, the
government proposed that, instead of searching its own materials for the documents, it be permitted
to work diligently to obtain the documents from the firms through these subpoenas, after which it
will share the documents with the ABA. See ECF No. 75 at 47–48, 50 (counsel representing that
the government is “working with the law firms who have received the subpoenas to obtain” the
information requested by requests 1, 2, and 7 and that the ABA is “certainly entitled to whatever
information we obtain from the law firms”). The government also represented that it had agreed
to give the law firms twenty-one days to respond to their subpoenas and committed to “engage and
figure out how soon we can get that material” and keep the court apprised of any updates. Id. at
47, 57. The ABA noted that the government’s third-party subpoena differed in scope from their
discovery requests but might “cover the core conduct of [requests] 1 and 2 and 7.” Id. at 48.
On consideration of these representations, the interests recognized in Cheney, and the
court’s own discretion to manage discovery, the court adopts the government’s request for it to
diligently pursue responses to the third-party subpoenas it served on law firms, such that EOP
could exclude any documents received directly from the firms from its own responses. See id. at
47–50; ECF No. 100 at 8. The court accordingly grants in part and denies in part the ABA’s motion
to compel a response to requests 1, 2, and 7. At the July 2026 hearing, the government informed
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the court that it had extended the 15-day response period in the third-party subpoenas, giving the
law firms a few weeks to respond, and confirmed it would keep the court and the ABA apprised
of all progress. ECF No. 75 at 49–57. At a more recent hearing about other discovery matters, the
government represented it had received only a small number of responsive materials from law
firms and had not been in recent contact with the firms. ECF No. 100 at 5–7. The government
indicated it was “still evaluating next steps” to get responsive materials from the law firms and has
“not foreclosed pressing [the law firms] for further documents.” Id. at 6–7. Given that several
months have passed since the July 2026 hearing, the court will give the government until December
28, 2026, to obtain and provide to the ABA the documents it has asked for the opportunity to seek
directly from the law firms. Consistent with the government’s position, the court will not require
the government to provide responses to the ABA’s discovery requests as to documents that it has
obtained from law firms and provided to the ABA by that date; the government shall then respond
as to all other documents in its possession that are responsive to requests 1, 2, and 7.
The court also considers, on its own initiative, ways to narrow the scope of these requests,
and it finds that the ABA’s need for the evidence will not be compromised by further narrowing
of the requests at issue in two ways. First, the court narrows request 1 to exclude communications
with those firms that are not relevant to the ABA’s claims. See ECF No. 75 at 46 (ABA agreeing
that including this limitation “would work certainly”). Second, the court finds it appropriate, at
least at this stage, to further narrow the time period for requests 1 and 2. See ECF No. 75 at 46–
47, 51–52 (the court proposing this idea). As to request 1, which relates to law firms that were
allegedly targeted by the government but did not ultimately enter into an agreement with it, the
court limits the request to communications between January 20, 2025, and April 30, 2025. The last
law-firm agreement the ABA identifies was announced on April 11, 2025. See ECF 1 ¶¶ 140–41.
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Although communications after April 2025 would be relevant to the ABA’s claims, the court finds
it prudent to limit the period of search to this approximately three-month period in light of the
burdens on the government from a broader search and absent any indication that any
communications with the identified law firms continued past April. As to request 2, which relates
to law firms that the ABA alleges entered into an agreement with the government, the court limits
the request to communications between January 20, 2025, and June 30, 2025. As to these firms,
communications in the months after a firm and the government reached an agreement bear on how
those agreements were interpreted and implemented. But here too, the court finds it prudent to set
an outer bound on the search period in light of the burdens to the government and the absence of
any indication that there are relevant communications with the identified law firms after June 2025.
Request 7 concerns a very narrow and specifically defined set of documents that are central
to the ABA’s claims: the agreements the government made with the settling law firms. The
government has not suggested that these agreements, which it acknowledges were made and shared
with third parties, implicate executive privilege concerns or would be particularly burdensome to
produce. See ECF No. 67 at 9 (the government stating that it has “subpoenaed each of these law
firms to obtain the documents that Plaintiff has requested”). And to the extent the government
understands request 7 to extend even to elements of any agreement that are not captured in any
document or record, requiring “deposition testimony of the managing partners of these firms,” id.,
the court construes the request as limited to documents or records that capture, in whole or in part,
agreements with settling law firms.
Accordingly, with the exception of documents the government obtains directly from law
firms and provides by December 28, 2026, the government shall respond to the following requests,
as further narrowed by the court:
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• Request 1, as tailored by the plaintiff, the court, and the government’s subpoena requests:
All communications between January 20, 2025 and April 30, 2025 relating to any possible
issuance of any Executive Order against any law firm, or to any Agreement with any law
firm and the government that You sent to, received from, or participated in with: a.
Covington & Burling; b. Jenner & Block; c. Perkins Coie; d. Susman Godfrey; and/or e.
Wilmer Hale. Please respond separately for each of (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e).
• Request 2, as tailored by the plaintiff, the court, and the government’s subpoena requests:
All communications between January 20, 2025 and June 30, 2025 relating to any possible
issuance of any Executive Order against any law firm, or to any Agreement with any law
firm and the government, that You sent to, received from, or participated in with: a. Paul
Weiss b. Skadden c. Wilkie Farr d. Milbank e. Kirkland & Ellis f. Allen Overy g. Simpson
Thatcher h. Latham i. Cadwalader. Please respond separately for each of (a), (b), (c), (d),
(e), (f), (g), (h), and (i).
• Request 7, as construed by the court: All Agreements, created on or after January 20, 2025,
between the Administration and any Settling Firm. To the extent that any Agreement is not
memorialized in a single document, all records sufficient to show all terms of that
Agreement.
2. Requests 3, 4, 5, and 6
The ABA’s third, fourth, fifth, and sixth discovery requests seek communications between
the government and third-party individuals. Specifically, these requests seek all communications
on or after January 20, 2025, with two individuals, Boris Epshteyn and Steve Bannon, “relating to
the possible issuance of any Executive Order against any Law Firm” or “reflecting negotiations
relating to any Agreements” as to those two individuals. ECF No. 61-1 at 14–15.
The ABA moves to compel a response to these requests and, in response, the government
does not argue that Cheney applies. At one of the court’s discovery conferences, the government
explicitly waived any invocation of Cheney in response to these requests, taking the position that
the ABA had satisfied any obligation to “explore other avenues” for obtaining the information and
confirming: “We’re past the Cheney stage, and we’re going to litigate whether we satisfy the
privilege or whether a privilege can be overcome.” ECF No. 75 at 37–38, 54–55. Given the
government’s affirmative concession that it must respond, the court finds it unnecessary at this
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juncture to compel such a response. The court therefore denies the motion to compel responses to
these requests as moot.
3. Requests 8 and 14
The ABA’s eighth and fourteenth document requests seek communications involving
offices and agencies within EOP and other agencies. Request 8 seeks “[a]ll records created on or
after January 20, 2025 related to the terms of the Administration’s Agreements with any Settling
Firm, including all communications between or among the White House, the Office of
Management and Budget (‘OMB’), the EEOC, and/or the U.S. Department of Justice (‘DOJ’),
concerning the Agreements or terms thereof.” ECF No. 61-1 at 15. Request 14 seeks “[a]ll
documents and communications exchanged with Agency Defendants relating to the
implementation, interpretation, and/or enforcement of any Law Firm Order.” Id. at 16.
The court denies the motion to compel EOP’s response to these requests. In the course of
the court’s effort to narrow the requests, the ABA agreed to first obtain responsive documents
from other defendant agencies. ECF No. 61 at 18–19. The court agrees this approach best balances
the important interests at stake, allowing the plaintiff to obtain the documents in the first instance
from defendants that do not raise the important considerations discussed in Cheney and, to the
extent necessary thereafter, make tailored requests to EOP based on specific information received
in the first phase. The government agreed to this phased approach. See ECF No. 75 at 44
(government agreeing that “a phased approach of focusing on other defendant agencies” and
“getting the discovery there” first is “the proper procedure”); id. at 40 (government agreeing that
after the ABA first obtains documents from agency defendants, it can “figure out what [it] still
need[s] to prove up [its] case, and then [it] would be able to articulate why [it] need[s]” such
documents from the White House); see also id. at 57 (the ABA indicating it is “fine phasing it that
way”).
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4. Requests 9 and 13
The ABA’s ninth and thirteenth document requests seek:
• Request 9: “All records created on or after January 20, 2025, related to the issuance of any
Law Firm Order.”
• Request 13: “Documents of ‘President Trump’s policy team’ relating to ‘executing on
[President Trump’s] directive to hold Big Law accountable for their weaponization of
justice and their lies,’ as referred to in the statements of White House Press Secretary
Karoline Leavitt set forth in ¶146 of the Complaint.”
ECF No. 61-1 at 15–16. The ABA has since proposed ways to narrow both requests. It has
proposed limiting request 9 to the following types of records related to issuance of the law firm
orders: “(1) all drafts of Law Firm Orders, including any redlines, edits, and comments thereto,
however communicated, and including communications transmitting such drafts, redlines, edits,
and comments; (2) emails that refer to any of the firms who received a Law Firm Order and the
word ‘EO’ (or other synonyms used to refer to an Executive Order); (3) all memoranda related to
the issuance or prospective issuance of Law Firm Orders, including drafts thereof and
communications transmitting and responding to such memoranda; (4) all notes from meetings at
which the issuance of any Law Firm Orders was discussed.” ECF No. 61 at 16. And the ABA
proposes narrowing request 13 to “(1) all memoranda related to President Trump’s directive to
‘hold Big Law accountable for their weaponization of justice and their lies,’ including drafts
thereof and communications transmitting and responding to such memoranda; (2) emails that refer
to or discuss the President’s directive; and (3) all notes from meetings at which the directive was
discussed.” Id. at 18.
The court finds it appropriate to further limit these requests in three respects to significantly
reduce the government’s burden in responding. First, the court will not order EOP to respond to
either request for notes from meetings at which the issuance of law firm orders or the policy
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directive were discussed. Although such responses would likely be warranted in the ordinary
incidents of discovery given the nature of the claims here, the interests recognized in Cheney
counsel otherwise. 542 U.S. at 381–82 (recognizing that the interests of the executive “remove this
c