Colby Crosby v. Colleton County Sheriff's Office

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1076 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/31/2026 Pg: 1 of 38 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 24-1076 COLBY WILLIAM CROSBY, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of William Jerry Crosby, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. COLLETON COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; SHERIFF GUERRY BUDDY HILL, in his official capacity; JACOB SCOTT, individually, Defendants – Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. Richard Mark Gergel, District Judge. (2:22-cv-03897-RMG) Argued: May 5, 2026 Decided: July 31, 2026 Before RUSHING and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Heytens joined. Senior Judge Floyd wrote an opinion dissenting in part. ARGUED: Nicholas Andrew Charles, MCLEOD LAW GROUP LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. E. Mitchell Griffith, GRIFFITH, FREEMAN & LIIPFERT, LLC, Beaufort, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: W. Mullins McLeod, Jr., MCLEOD LAW GROUP, LLC, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Kelly D. Dean, GRIFFITH, FREEMAN & LIIPFERT, LLC, Beaufort, South Carolina, for Appellees. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1076 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/31/2026 Pg: 2 of 38 RUSHING, Circuit Judge: Jerry Crosby’s wife called 911 to request a welfare check on her husband because he had threatened to harm himself. Tragically, Crosby pulled a gun on the responding officer, who then fired on Crosby, killing him. Crosby’s estate sued the officer, the sheriff, and the sheriff’s office, alleging violations of Crosby’s Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on those claims, and Crosby’s estate appealed. We affirm. I. At 7:44 p.m. on May 1, 2022, Donna Crosby called 911 requesting a welfare check on her husband, Jerry Crosby. Relaying Mrs. Crosby’s request, the 911 dispatcher issued the following notes via the computer-assisted dispatch system: CLR IS REQ A WELFARE CHECK ON HER HUSBAND SHE ADV AROUND 5-530 HE SAID HE WOULD HARM HIMMSELF [sic] CLR ADV HE HAS SAID THIS BEFORE IN THE PAST CLR ADV HE HASNT BEEN HIMSELF LATELY RESD IS LARGE 2 STORY RIVER HOUSE BROWN IN COLOR W CREME [sic] TRIM SUSP DRIVES A WHITE GMC TRUCK SHE ADV THE NEIGHBOR ADDRESS IS 341 PERKINS PATH HIS HOUSE IS ON THE RIVER CLR ADV EARLIER TODAY HE LEFT TO GO TO THE RIVER 2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1076 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/31/2026 Pg: 3 of 38 J.A. 358. Officer Jacob Scott of the Colleton County Sheriff’s Office received this dispatch and responded to the call. 1 Officer Scott’s actions that evening were recorded by his body-worn camera. The footage shows Officer Scott arriving at Crosby’s residence, a two-story riverfront house located at the end of a dirt road on the west bank of the Edisto River. A white GMC truck was parked in the yard in front of a carport. Officer Scott walked directly to a door on the south wall of the house and knocked. During the next minute and thirty-three seconds, he knocked on the same door twice more. Receiving no answer, Officer Scott approached a screen door on the same south wall and peered inside the screened porch, calling out, “Hello?” J.A. Digital Media (6:06–6:36). He did not see or hear anyone, but a dog could be heard barking inside the residence. Officer Scott then climbed an exterior staircase to a screen door leading into a second-floor screened porch that faced east toward the river. He knocked on the screen door and, receiving no response except the dog’s barking, descended the stairs and returned to his patrol car. After retrieving a flashlight from his vehicle and confirming that Crosby was not inside the white truck, Officer Scott approached the house again. He knocked on the door of the first-floor screened porch and again heard the barking dog. He then walked along the outside of the first-floor screened porch while shining the flashlight inside. Daylight was fading. Returning to the house’s south wall, Officer Scott again ascended the exterior 1 In his brief to this Court, Scott uses the title “Officer,” so we do too. 3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1076 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/31/2026 Pg: 4 of 38 staircase closest to the river and shined the flashlight into the second-floor screened porch and the house’s south-facing windows. Officer Scott then opened the screen door and entered the porch. He approached a glass door that separated the porch from the interior of the house and knocked twice. A light was coming from the second-floor hallway, and he shined his flashlight into the windows facing the porch. After about thirty seconds, he knocked again, this time with the bottom end of his flashlight. The dog continued barking. Officer Scott descended the exterior stairs and peered through a south-facing window on the first floor, which revealed an overhead light shining above a spiral staircase inside the home. Having received no response to his repeated efforts to make contact with Crosby, Officer Scott returned to the first door that he had knocked on upon his arrival at the residence approximately ten minutes earlier. Finding the door unlocked, Officer Scott opened it and announced, “Sheriff’s Office.” J.A. Digital Media (14:04–14:23). He leaned into the room and scanned it with his flashlight. Seeing no one, he closed the door. Officer Scott then entered another door in a similar fashion. He climbed an exterior staircase leading to a west-facing deck on the side of the house opposite the river. There, he knocked on two sets of sliding glass doors while shining his flashlight at the interior curtains. He then opened one sliding glass door and announced, “Sheriff’s Office.” J.A. Digital Media (14:59–15:14). He pushed aside the curtains to reveal an unoccupied bedroom and repeated, “Sheriff’s Office,” and then, “Mr. Crosby, Sheriff’s Office,” before sliding the door shut again. J.A. Digital Media (15:14–15:44). Moving to the other sliding glass door, Officer Scott knocked twice more, announced, “Sheriff’s Office,” and tugged 4 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1076 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/31/2026 Pg: 5 of 38 at the handle to discover the door was locked. J.A. Digital Media (15:44–16:08). After descending the stairs, he shined his flashlight into the glass door of an unoccupied first- floor bedroom under the west-facing deck. Having still received no response from Crosby, Officer Scott returned to the first- floor screened porch facing the river. He announced, “Sheriff’s Office” and entered the porch through an unlocked screen door. J.A. Digital Media (17:00–17:30). Officer Scott saw a cell phone on the floor. He approached a bar on the porch, shined his flashlight on an open notebook and a pill bottle, and said, “Shit.” J.A. Digital Media (17:24–17:44). He then radioed, “Looks like I have a suicide note on the patio,” and requested expedited animal control support, as the dog inside the house continued barking. J.A. Digital Media (17:44–18:25). By this time, another officer, Lindsay Cummings, had arrived on the scene, and Officer Scott told her, “I don’t know, I think he’s upstairs in the bedroom. I can see something in the bedroom, but I gotta do something with this dog.” J.A. Digital Media (18:30–18:50). The door into the first floor of the house from the screened porch was open, and Officer Scott stood in the doorway of the house, scanning with his flashlight and whistling and calling to coax the dog downstairs. After approximately three minutes on the porch, Officer Scott exited. Officer Scott then used the exterior staircase to return to the second-floor screened porch. From there, he entered the house through an unlocked glass door that opened into a living area. As he called the barking dog, Officer Scott crossed the living area toward a hallway. Flashlight in hand, Officer Scott proceeded down the hallway and announced, 5 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1076 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/31/2026 Pg: 6 of 38 “Sheriff’s Office.” J.A. Digital Media (20:53–21:10). Walking down the hallway, he saw a live round of ammunition on the floor. From the bedroom at the end of the hallway, Crosby responded for the first time: Crosby: “What can I do for you?” Scott: “Where are you at, man? This is the Sheriff’s Office. Are you okay?” J.A. Digital Media (21:07–21:18). As Officer Scott continued approaching Crosby’s bedroom, he called out again: Scott: “What was that? Are you okay?” Crosby: “I’m fine.” J.A. Digital Media (21:18–21:22). Having reached the doorway of Crosby’s bedroom, Officer Scott shined his flashlight into the room and saw Crosby in bed underneath the fitted sheet. Crosby’s speech was slurred and his face was red. The dialogue continued: Scott: “Someone called in about you.” Crosby: “Well, get the hell out of my home.” Scott: “Okay. What’s going on?” Crosby: “Get the hell out of my home.” Scott: “I got to make sure you’re okay. Have you taken any pills or anything like that?” Crosby: “What do you want me to do?” Scott: “Can you come out and talk to me real quick?” Crosby: “Get the hell out of my home.” Scott: “We got to check on you.” Crosby: “Get out of my home.” 6 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1076 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/31/2026 Pg: 7 of 38 Scott: “We have to check on you.” Crosby: “Get out of my home.” Scott: “Okay. We’re here for health and welfare. All I got to do is check on you.” Crosby: “Get out of my home.” Scott: “Are you trying to hurt yourself?” Crosby: “Get out of my home.” Scott: “I’m not going to leave this door. So, we just either got to just go outside and talk and we can just handle this.” J.A. Digital Media (21:25–22:04). Crosby then rose from his bed and walked toward Officer Scott as Crosby again said, “Get out of my home.” J.A. Digital Media (22:04–22:06). Officer Scott stepped back into the hallway, saying, “Okay.” J.A. Digital Media (22:06–22:09). Crosby leaned into a closet near the door and retrieved a rifle, as Officer Scott commanded: Scott: “Don’t! No! No! No! No! No! No! No! No! No! No! No! No! No! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t!” J.A. Digital Media (22:10–22:13). While shouting these commands, Officer Scott raised his firearm and backed down the hallway. Crosby picked up the rifle and began raising it with two hands as he stepped toward Officer Scott. Still backing down the hallway, Officer Scott fired four rounds at Crosby and retreated into the living area. Crosby dropped the rifle and collapsed onto the bed. He later died from his injuries. 2 2 A revolver was later found in Crosby’s pocket. 7 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1076 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/31/2026 Pg: 8 of 38 The personal representative of Crosby’s estate sued the Colleton County Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff Guerry Buddy Hill, and Officer Scott in South Carolina state court. Against Officer Scott, Plaintiff asserted Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful entry (Count I) and excessive force (Count II), as well as state-law claims. Against the Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Hill, Plaintiff asserted a claim for failure to train under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VI) and state-law claims. Defendants removed the case to federal court and, after discovery, moved for summary judgment on all claims. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment on the unlawful entry claim. Ruling on the motions, the district court concluded that Officer Scott did not violate Crosby’s Fourth Amendment rights because his entries and use of deadly force were objectively reasonable. The court also held that Officer Scott was entitled to qualified immunity on both Fourth Amendment claims. And having found no constitutional violation, the court determined that Plaintiff could not establish municipal liability. The district court thus granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all the federal claims and denied Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The court remanded the state-law claims to state court; that ruling is not before us. Plaintiff timely appealed the district court’s rulings on the three federal claims. II. “Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment is a question of law we review de novo,” applying the same standard as the district court. Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “there is no genuine dispute as to any 8 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1076 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/31/2026 Pg: 9 of 38 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Betton v. Belue, 942 F.3d 184, 190 (4th Cir. 2019). III. We begin with the Fourth Amendment claims against Officer Scott. The district court determined that no reasonable jury could find that Officer Scott violated Crosby’s Fourth Amendment rights by entering his home or by using deadly force against him. After close review, we agree on both counts. A. The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The “‘core’” of this guarantee is the right to “‘be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion’” in one’s own home. Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 1599 (2021) (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013)). For intrusions into a person’s home, “reasonableness” typically means having a warrant. Case v. Montana, 146 S. Ct. 500, 505 (2026). But “the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). One such exception is “the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” Id. “Accordingly, law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Id.; see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978). This so-called “emergency aid exception” does not require “ironclad proof of a likely serious, life-threatening injury” before officers may enter a home; rather, “[i]t 9 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1076 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/31/2026 Pg: 10 of 38 requires only an objectively reasonable basis for believing that a person within the house is in need of immediate aid.” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47, 49 (2009) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). As the Supreme Court reiterated earlier this year, an officer may enter a home without a warrant if he has “‘an objectively reasonable basis for believing’ that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such harm.” Case, 146 S. Ct. at 507 (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400). We evaluate the objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct “by looking at the ‘totality of the circumstances.’” Id. at 508 (quoting Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353, 1358 (2025)). Decisions applying the emergency aid exception have presented widely varying circumstances. For example, in Brigham City, officers responding to a complaint about a loud nighttime party heard a tumultuous altercation and looked through a window to see a fistfight unfolding in the kitchen. 547 U.S. at 406. The Supreme Court found it “plainly reasonable” for the officers to enter the house and quell the violence. Id. In Case, officers responding to a 911 call learned that Case had called his ex-girlfriend and, in an apparently inebriated state, had threatened to kill himself, spoke of preparing a suicide note, and possibly cocked or even shot a gun. 146 S. Ct. at 503–504. Looking through the windows of Case’s house, officers saw empty beer cans, an empty handgun holster, and a notepad with writing on it. They knocked on the doors and yelled into an open window but got no response. The Supreme Court “read[ily]” concluded that the officers had “an objectively reasonable basis for believing that their intervention was needed to prevent serious harm.” Id. at 508 (internal quotation marks omitted). And in United States v. Taylor, we found it 10 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1076 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/31/2026 Pg: 11 of 38 objectively reasonable for an officer to enter a home when a four-year-old child had wandered away from it and yelling into the home from the doorway produced no response. 624 F.3d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 2010). We concluded that “both the self-evident danger that the abandoned child posed to herself and the inference of danger to her caretaker made it reasonable to conclude that it was necessary to make a brief entry to find someone inside the home—and to do so promptly.” Id. at 632–633; see also United States v. Dean, 243 Fed. App. 780, 782 (4th Cir. 2007) (odor of gasoline fumes and visible open gas can in a wood-framed apartment building justified warrantless entry). In each situation, warrantless entry was constitutional because the officers possessed “an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant face[d] serious danger.” Case, 146 S. Ct. at 505 (internal quotation marks omitted). With this standard firmly in mind, we turn to the circumstances when Officer Scott entered Crosby’s home. Plaintiff contends that Officer Scott entered the house four times before finding the suicide note and pill bottle, which led to the fifth and most intrusive entry into the second-floor living area and down the hallway. First, he entered the second- floor screened porch to knock on the glass door into the house. Second and third, he opened exterior doors and, leaning into the doorway, shined his flashlight into previously obscured portions of the house. And fourth, he entered the first-floor screened porch where a visual scan of the room revealed the suicide note and pill bottle. Like the district court, we will assume that each of these entries is subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. And like the district court, we conclude that, even before Officer Scott found the suicide note and pill bottle, the emergency aid exception justified his warrantless entries. 11 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1076 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/31/2026 Pg: 12 of 38 Considering the totality of the circumstances, Officer Scott had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that his entry “was needed to prevent serious harm.” Id. at 508. Upon arriving at the residence, Officer Scott knew that Crosby’s wife had called 911 to request a welfare check on her husband, who had been acting strangely—an assessment an officer could presume she was well-positioned to make. Officer Scott was aware that Crosby had threatened to harm himself earlier that evening; had threatened to harm himself in the past; and had left to go to the river house, an isolated location. At the house, Officer Scott observed Crosby’s white GMC truck parked outside and confirmed that Crosby was not in the truck. Officer Scott thus had reason to believe that Crosby was in the house and at high risk of harming himself. Yet Officer Scott received no response to his repeated knocking on three different doors over the course of approximately seven minutes (before his first entry). As he walked around the property, he saw a single light on inside the house but could not see Crosby. And no one made any effort to quiet the dog that was barking incessantly inside the house. The lack of response to Officer Scott or the barking dog gave Officer Scott additional reason to believe that exigent circumstances existed that required him to enter the residence to confirm Crosby’s safety. If Crosby had already harmed himself, he could have been in need of immediate medical care. And if he had not already harmed himself, timely intervention could prevent him from doing so. We further note that Officer Scott’s actions inside the home during each entry were reasonable. During the first entry—into the second-floor screened porch—he proceeded directly to the glass door to the main house and knocked. For the second and third entries, he opened doors and announced himself, scanning rooms with his flashlight without 12 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1076 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/31/2026 Pg: 13 of 38 stepping into the house. During the fourth entry, into the first-floor screened porch, he scanned the room with his flashlight and saw the suicide note and pill bottle in plain view on the bar top. Only at that point did he make a more intrusive entry into the main house to find Crosby, who he reasonably believed was dead or dying inside. Plaintiff protests that Officer Scott did not encounter a chaotic scene or visible signs of distress like those that existed in some other emergency aid cases. See, e.g., Fisher, 558 U.S. at 45–46 (officers found “a household in considerable chaos”: a pickup truck with its front smashed, damaged fenceposts, and broken house windows; blood on the hood of the pickup, on clothes inside it, and on one of the doors to the house; and an individual inside the house screaming and throwing things); Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400–401 (officers responded to a loud party, heard shouting, and observed “an altercation” in which a juvenile “swung a fist and struck one of the adults in the face,” causing the adult to spit blood (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Bustamante-Martinez, 697 Fed. App. 244, 245–246 (4th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (officers observed that the suspect was intoxicated and holding a rifle, and they learned that he had been firing a gun, “had assaulted his wife, [had] threatened to kill himself, and [had] locked himself in a bedroom”). We reject Plaintiff’s effort to impose a requirement of visible chaos or evident distress onto the emergency aid exception. As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, “[t]he objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct under Brigham City, as in other Fourth Amendment contexts, is evaluated by looking at the totality of the circumstances.” Case, 146 S. Ct. at 508 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff’s rule fails to account for 13 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1076 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/31/2026 Pg: 14 of 38 the full range of circumstances that could give rise to “‘an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.’” Id. (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400). “The role of a peace officer includes preventing violence,” “not simply rendering first aid to casualties.” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406. In circumstances where it is objectively reasonable to think that a suicidal individual “could kill [himself] at any moment,” the “Fourth Amendment does not require officers to stand idly outside as the suicide takes place.” Caniglia, 141 S. Ct. at 1604 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Nor does Plaintiff advance his position by relying on our decisions in Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Moss, 963 F.2d 673 (4th Cir. 1992), as amended (May 21, 1992), which both found warrantless entry was not justified on facts meaningfully different from those presented here. In Bailey, officers responding to a request for a welfare check spoke face-to-face with Bailey, who twice “denied any thoughts of suicide” and proceeded to eat his lunch and call a family member on the phone. 349 F.3d at 739–740. We concluded that “no exigent circumstances” justified the officers’ subsequent second entry into Bailey’s home, this time by force. Id. at 743. In Moss, an officer entered a cabin because he thought it was being illegally occupied; he “wanted to locate the owner of [an] illegally parked car”; and “he was concerned to identify the persons connected with the car, who he feared might be lost, injured, or dead in the mountains.” 963 F.2d at 675. We rejected those justifications, finding “nothing about the circumstances then confronting [the officer] . . . that warranted any perception of an emergency requiring immediate entry to attend to them.” Id. at 679. 14 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1076 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/31/2026 Pg: 15 of 38 The same cannot be said here. Officer Scott had credible information from Crosby’s wife that Crosby intended to harm himself and had left for the river house. Officer Scott saw evidence that Crosby was present at the river house around eight o’clock that evening yet did not respond to the officer’s repeated knocking or to the dog’s incessant barking from inside the home. In these circumstances, Officer Scott had “‘an objectively reasonable basis for believing’ that his entry was direly needed to prevent or deal with serious harm,” namely, Crosby’s potential attempt to take his own life. Case, 146 S. Ct. at 507 (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400). Officer Scott’s decision to enter the home in an effort to make contact with Crosby and prevent that result was reasonable and, therefore, constitutional. B. We turn next to Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force. That claim is also “analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). “When deadly force is used,” we apply “a more specific test for objective reasonableness.” Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227, 233 (4th Cir. 2022). In such a case, we ask whether a “reasonable officer in that situation would have had ‘probable cause to believe that the suspect pose[d] a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.’” Id. (quoting Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 477 (4th Cir. 2005)). This inquiry requires that we assess the “totality of the circumstances,” which includes “the situation at the precise time of the shooting” as well as “facts and events leading up to the climactic moment.” Barnes, 145 S. Ct. at 1356, 1358; see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). At all times, our perspective must remain that of “a reasonable officer on 15 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1076 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/31/2026 Pg: 16 of 38 the scene” rather than “the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. This Court has consistently “discerned an objective basis for lethal force” when “a person in possession of, or suspected to be in possession of, a weapon” does “not obey [an officer’s] commands and instead makes some sort of furtive or other threatening movement with the weapon.” Benton v. Layton, 139 F.4th 281, 290 (4th Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such conduct “signal[s] to the officer that the suspect intends to use [the weapon] in a way that imminently threatens the safety of the officer or another person.” Knibbs v. Momphard, 30 F.4th 200, 225 (4th Cir. 2022). Considering the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Officer Scott had probable cause to believe that Crosby posed an immediate threat to his safety when he fired his service weapon. Officer Scott had announced himself and, from the doorway of Crosby’s bedroom, explained to Crosby that he was with the Sheriff’s Office and was there to check on Crosby’s welfare in response to a call. After hearing this, Crosby rose from the bed and retrieved a rifle from an open closet near the doorway where Officer Scott stood. Officer Scott then commanded: “Don’t! No! No! No! No! No! No! No! No! No! No! No! No! No! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t! Don’t!” J.A. Digital Media (22:10–22:13). Ignoring those commands, Crosby continued advancing toward Officer Scott, readying the rifle with both hands. A reasonable officer in that situation would have had probable cause to believe that Crosby intended to use the rifle in a way that imminently threatened the officer with physical harm. Accordingly, the use of deadly force was objectively reasonable. “No citizen can fairly expect to draw a gun on police without risking tragic consequences. And 16 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1076 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/31/2026 Pg: 17 of 38 no court can expect any human being to remain passive in the face of an active threat on his or her life.” Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 644 (4th Cir. 1996). The parties dispute whether Crosby pointed the rifle directly at Officer Scott before Officer Scott fired. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the body- worn camera footage and enhanced photographs are not crystal clear about how high Crosby managed to raise his rifle before he was shot. The evidence unquestionably shows, however, that unlike in the cases on which Plaintiff relies, Crosby was not holding the gun “with the barrel safely pointed towards the ceiling,” Knibbs, 30 F.4th at 214, or carrying it “in one hand, with its muzzle pointed at the ground,” Cooper v. Sheehan, 735 F.3d 153, 159 (4th Cir. 2013); see also Pena v. Porter, 316 Fed. App. 303, 307 (4th Cir. 2009). Even accepting Plaintiff’s position that Crosby did not manage to point his rifle directly at Officer Scott, Officer Scott’s use of lethal force was nevertheless objectively reasonable. “This Circuit has consistently held that an officer does not have to wait until a gun is pointed at the officer before the officer is entitled to take action.” Anderson v. Russell, 247 F.3d 125, 131 (4th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). A reasonable officer would perceive Crosby’s actions—crossing the room to retrieve a rifle, ignoring commands to stop, and advancing toward the officer while raising the rifle with both hands—as an indication of “immediate intent to harm.” Knibbs, 30 F.4th at 217; see Hensley ex rel. North Carolina v. Price, 876 F.3d 573, 585 (4th Cir. 2017) (“If an officer directs a suspect to stop, to show his hands or the like, the suspect’s continued movement likely will raise in the officer’s mind objectively grave and serious suspicions about the suspect’s intentions.”). Indeed, Crosby’s “threatening movement[s]” were brazen and just as 17 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1076 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/31/2026 Pg: 18 of 38 menacing as the “furtive” movements we have found threatening in other cases, if not more so. Benton, 139 F.4th at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Craven v. Novelli, No. 23-1393, 2024 WL 1952590, at *8 (4th Cir. May 3, 2024) (describing cases). Moreover, Crosby retrieved the rifle while he was talking face-to-face with Officer Scott, after being informed that Officer Scott was with the Sheriff’s Office and there to perform a welfare check. This scenario is not like that in Knibbs, where a reasonable officer on a home’s unlit porch after midnight “would have recognized that it was unknown whether [the person inside the home] could discern who was outside on his porch before answering the door.” 30 F.4th at 219. Officer Scott stood in Crosby’s bedroom doorway wearing his uniform, with the word “Sheriff” on his chest. He repeatedly told Crosby he was with the Sheriff’s Office and was there to check on Crosby’s welfare. And Crosby’s initial responses to Officer Scott—“What can I do for you,” “I’m fine,” and “What do you want me to do”—suggested that he heard Officer Scott and understood that he was law enforcement, not an intruder. J.A. Digital Media (21:07–22:04). The recorded one-minute conversation between Crosby and Officer Scott belies Plaintiff’s assertion of a genuine factual dispute regarding whether a reasonable officer would have thought that Crosby may be unaware that Officer Scott was law enforcement. The other cases on which Plaintiff relies are also unlike this one in important ways. In Cooper, the officers did not announce themselves or issue any commands before they began firing on the plaintiff, who had stepped onto his porch to investigate a nocturnal disturbance while holding a shotgun in one hand with the muzzle pointed toward the ground. 735 F.3d at 155–156, 159–160. That is a far cry from these undisputed facts, 18 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1076 Doc: 50 Filed: 07/31/2026 Pg: 19 of 38 where Crosby picked up a rifle mid-conversation with an officer who had identified himself and explained the reason for his presence. Similarly, in Betton, the officer broke down the plaintiff’s door and, after entering, “shot [the plaintiff], who was holding a firearm ‘down,’ without first identifying himself as a member of law enforcement or giving any commands to [the plaintiff].” 942 F.3d at 192. And in Pena, officers did not identify themselves or give any warning or commands before shooting the plaintiff “almost immediately” after he opened his door carrying a rifle in one hand, pointed down. 316 Fed. App. at 307, 310– 311. These scenarios are nothing like the facts here. Crosby retrieved a rifle while talking to an announced law enforcement officer and then, disobeying commands to stop, advanced toward the officer while hoisting the rifle with both hands. In that circumstance, Officer Scott’s decision to fire was not unreasonable. Plaintiff lastly argues that a reasonable officer would have left Crosby’s residence after he said he was “fine” and told the officer to “get out of [his] home.” Opening Br. 43. Plaintiff appears to be suggesting that Officer Scott created, or at least contributed to, the dangerous situation in which he ultimately found himself, although Plaintiff does not explain how that should factor into the reasonableness analysis. In any event, we disagree with Plaintiff’s premise. Officer Scott was aware that Crosby had threatened to harm himself. He had found a pill bottle next to an apparent suicide note, and he had seen a live round of ammunition in the hallway outside Crosby’s bedroom. When Officer Scott found Crosby, he was oddly positioned under the bed’s fitted sheet, his face red and his speech slurred. In that situation, an officer could have reasonably been skeptical of Crosby’s assertion that he was “fine” and could have reasonably sought firmer assu