Full Opinion

Filed 11/18/26 Fidelity National Title Co. v. Liu CA1/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY, A176260 Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Mateo County v. Super. Ct. No. 22CIV03550) HUAN LIU, Defendant and Appellant. In this interpleader action, Huan Liu (Liu) appeals from a judgment entered by the trial court after it granted a motion to discharge Fidelity National Title Company (Fidelity) from all liability arising out of a standoff between Liu and the late Beverly Flaum (Flaum) over the release from escrow of certain funds placed on deposit by Liu in connection with a real estate purchase. The real estate transaction was never completed, and in order to return the deposited funds to Liu, the escrow instructions required written release instructions signed by Liu as buyer and Flaum as seller. When Liu refused to sign a proposed form of mutual cancellation because he claimed the contract of sale was still operative, Fidelity filed this interpleader action. 1 Flaum never appeared in the action and died while it was pending. After a delay of several years, the court ultimately granted the discharge of liability to Fidelity, dismissed Fidelity from the action, ordered the deposited funds released to Liu, awarded Fidelity its attorney’s fees, and closed the case file. Liu now argues that the discharge was improperly granted, that the fee award was excessive, and that the action should have been dismissed for dilatory service and prosecution. We disagree on all points and affirm. I. Liu and Flaum entered into a contract in September 2021 under which Liu agreed to purchase a house from Flaum. Liu deposited $36,000 into escrow with Fidelity, the designated title company for the transaction. By early November 2021, Liu claims to have “completed all paperwork required to close on the property, including inspection and loan approval,” and having done so, he notified Flaum he was ready to close the transaction. So far as the record reveals, however, neither party took further steps in the ensuing eight months to close the transaction. The reasons why are unclear. In June 2022, after Fidelity learned that the transaction would not close (from whom the record does not show), a form agreement entitled “Cancellation of Contract, Release of Deposit and Cancellation of Escrow” (the Mutual Cancellation) “was sent” to Flaum and to Liu (by whom it is not clear). Because the escrow instructions provided that the deposit money could be returned to Liu only upon release instructions signed by both 2 parties,1 Fidelity needed both parties to sign the Mutual Cancellation before it could disburse the deposit to Liu. But according to Lisa Tyler, Fidelity’s National Escrow Administrator, Fidelity “received the signed Cancellation of Contract from Seller but did not receive it back from Buyer.” Insisting that the contract of sale was still in effect, Liu refused to sign. On July 11, 2022, Fidelity sent letters to both Liu and Flaum advising that it faced “conflicting demands” from the parties regarding the deposit funds, and if it did not receive their “mutually signed instructions regarding the disbursement of this deposit” by July 21, 2022, it would submit the escrow file to legal counsel for the filing of an interpleader action. Liu responded that “[a]n inter pleader [sic] action is not the right vehicle to use, because the entitlement of the deposit is not in dispute.” On July 23, 2022, Lou Sanchez, the broker handling the transaction for both buyer and seller demanded that the closing of escrow occur within three days. After that deadline passed, Sanchez sent Liu a letter requesting again that he sign the Mutual Cancellation. Liu again objected, stating that, due to the delay in closing, his loan approval had expired. He pointed out that he would have to begin the process of loan approval again. On August 31, 2022, Flaum sold the property to someone else. Fidelity filed this interpleader action under Code of Civil Procedure section 3862 on August 31, 2022. Fidelity’s complaint alleged that it was the escrow holder for the transaction; that it had received the $36,000 1 Paragraph 2.B. of the escrow instructions provides as follows: “Release of funds by Escrow Holder . . . requires mutually Signed release instructions from Buyer and Seller, judicial decision or arbitration award.” 2 All undesignated statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 3 deposit from Liu; that “on or about June 22, 2022, Mutual Cancellation Instructions . . . were sent to [Liu] and [Flaum], but no signed Cancellation Instructions were provided to [Fidelity]”; and that Liu took the view that the underlying contract of sale was still operative. Liu admitted each of these allegations in his answer. Concurrently with filing the complaint, Fidelity obtained an order allowing it to deposit the $36,000 with the court. Following the filing of the interpleader complaint and the deposit of the $36,000 with the court, Fidelity had difficulty serving the summons and complaint on Flaum. It hired a private investigator to conduct a stakeout of Flaum’s home, and eventually learned from her daughter, S.D., that Flaum was bedridden. After being informed that S.D. held power of attorney for Flaum, Fidelity served Flaum by substitute service on S.D. in April 2023. Fidelity sought to take Flaum’s default, but the clerk denied the request because the proof of substitute service was inadequate. In October 2023, Fidelity filed a motion seeking to be discharged from “all liability involving the rights and obligations of the parties arising out of the funds previously held in escrow.” The motion was supported by declarations from both Ms. Tyler and from its attorney, Lori Hershorin. In March 2024, the court denied Fidelity’s motion for discharge without prejudice in light of the denial of its request for default. The court stated that “Plaintiff may renew the [discharge] motion after Flaum either appears or her default is taken.” When Fidelity again attempted to serve Flaum personally, it learned that she had died. Upon receiving that information, Fidelity amended its interpleader complaint to name as defendants Flaum’s heirs, S.D. and T.F. (Flaum’s son), each of whom it subsequently served. T.F. signed a disclaimer of interest in the deposit funds and was dismissed. Fidelity took S.D.’s default. 4 In July 2023, Liu filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings arguing that “the plaintiff has failed to provide evidence that there is a dispute on the ownership of and the claim for the deposit, therefore, there are lack of facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” Finding that the allegations of the complaint “sufficiently assert competing adverse claims for the escrow funds to support an interpleader action[,]” the court denied the motion. In August 2024, Liu filed a motion to dismiss for dilatory prosecution under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.420, subdivision (a)(1) (failure to effect service within two years), and subdivision (a)(2)(A) (failure to bring the case to trial within three years). Fidelity’s opposition explained in detail the difficulty it experienced in effecting service on Flaum. The court found that Fidelity diligently attempted to effect service in a timely manner, and denied the motion. Fidelity then brought a second motion seeking to be discharged from liability and dismissed from the case in September 2025, this time supported by another declaration from Ms. Hershorin. It requested an award of attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 386.6 in the amount of $14,989.49. The court granted the motion, issued an order in February 2026 discharging Fidelity from the case, awarded Fidelity $12,000 in attorney’s fees,3 and authorized the release of the deposit funds to Liu net of a deduction for the attorney’s fee award. This timely appeal followed. 3 In finding this amount was reasonable, the court indicated it had reviewed of the time entries submitted by Fidelity’s counsel, found that some of the time incurred was not necessary to the pursuit of the interpleader action, and observed that the award would not have been so high had Liu not “brought so many motions.” 5 II. “Any person, firm, corporation, association or other entity against whom double or multiple claims are made, or may be made, by two or more persons which are such that they may give rise to double or multiple liability, may bring an action against the claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims.” (§ 386, subd. (b).) “An interpleader action is an equitable proceeding. [Citations.] In an interpleader action, the court initially determines the right of the plaintiff to interplead the funds; if that right is sustained, an interlocutory decree is entered which requires the defendants to interplead and litigate their claims to the funds.’ ” (Virtanen v. O’Connell (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 688, 698.) If the court sustains the plaintiff’s right to proceed by interpleader, “ ‘[u]pon an admission of liability and deposit of monies with the court, the plaintiff then may be discharged from liability and dismissed from the interpleader action. [Citations.] The effect of such an order is to preserve the fund, discharge the stakeholder from further liability, and to keep the fund in the court’s custody until the rights of the potential claimants of the monies can be adjudicated. [Citations.]’ . . . By implementing an interpleader action and obtaining a discharge from further liability, the stakeholder avoids tort liability. [Citation.]” (Virtanen v. O’Connell, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 698.) An order discharging a plaintiff in an interpleader action is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (See Hood v. Gonzales (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 57, 82 [concluding that the court properly exercised its discretion in discharging the interpleader plaintiff from the action].) Likewise, under section 386.6, “[i]n ordering the discharge of such party, the court may, in its discretion, 6 award such party his costs and reasonable attorney fees from the amount in dispute which has been deposited with the court.” (§ 386.6, italics added.) Liu’s primary argument here—that, to be entitled to relief by interpleader, Fidelity was required to show that it faced conflicting claims by two parties in July 2022—is refuted by the plain language of section 386, subdivision (b), which states that an interpleader action lies when “double or multiple claims are made, or may be made, by two or more persons.” (Italics added.) According to Liu, Flaum never claimed ownership of deposit funds, as shown by the fact that she never appeared in the action. But the court in an interpleader action first makes the determination whether interpleader remedy may be sought, and by the end of August 2022 the circumstances pointed to a “reasonable probability” that conflicting claims to the funds may be made by Liu and Flaum. (See Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Rees (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 307, 315.) Flaum’s later silence tells us nothing, since she died. Liu makes no effort to attack the sufficiency of Fidelity’s right to seek interpleader based on the allegations it made when the action was filed, and instead focuses on the discharge step of the proceeding, which occurred later. He makes an elaborate argument, unsupported by citation to precedent, contending that an interpleader plaintiff bears an evidentiary burden to prove allegations in the complaint at the discharge stage of an interpleader action and that, even if the plaintiff adequately alleges its entitlement to proceed by interpleader at the outset of the case, the discharge determination requires an evidentiary proceeding, with full opportunity to challenge the plaintiff’s allegations. 7 The premise of Liu’s argument is that, even if the mere allegation of conflicting claims to ownership of money held by the interpleading plaintiff is enough to survive a pleading challenge, more must be shown to support an order discharging the plaintiff from liability and dismissing it from the action. In Liu’s view, discharge is warranted only if, at the time of the discharge hearing, the interpleader plaintiff proves that it faces conflicting claims to ownership of money held by the plaintiff, and presents that proof in an evidentiary hearing so the interpleader defendants are able to test the proof. That did not and could not have occurred here, Liu argues, because Flaum never appeared in the action, leaving the court with nothing but speculation about her intentions. We are unpersuaded. As Fidelity points out, “[i]nterpleader does not fail merely because claimants later default, disclaim, die, settle, or fail to appear.” To buttress this line of argument, Liu asserts that a showing of conflicting claims to ownership of money held by the interpleader plaintiff is a statutory prerequisite to an interpleader discharge. In his reading of section 386, the statute “requires competing claims to the deposited property—not merely a contract dispute that creates downstream uncertainty about who will eventually receive funds.” We disagree. Granted, in the paradigmatic example of an interpleader action, the party seeking interpleader is often in possession of money or property that is the subject of competing claims of ownership by multiple parties.4 But the text of section 386—which speaks broadly of “double or multiple liability” (§ 386, subd. (b), italics added)—is more encompassing than the 4 See, e.g., Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 32, 38 (funds; conflicting demands for distribution of funds made by parties disputing ownership interests of shares in a limited liability company and a corporation). 8 typical scenario involving directly conflicting claims to ownership of the same money or property.5 The conflicting claims need not always be to ownership of money or property, but may be to some duty the stakeholder has with respect to the money or property. (City of Morgan Hill v. Brown, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123 [interpleader claimants must “seek the same thing, debt, or duty”]; see Hancock Oil Co. v. Hopkins (1944) 24 Cal.2d 497, 504.) What we have in this case is a dispute about Fidelity’s obligation to return the deposit funds without a fully executed Mutual Cancellation, not about the ownership of the funds. Faced with a no-win situation that could give rise to liability against it no matter what it did, Fidelity initiated an interpleader action as means to force Liu and Flaum to litigate or resolve their differences whether 5 Section 386, subdivision (b), provides, inter alia, that: “Any person, firm, corporation, association or other entity against whom double or multiple claims are made, or may be made, by two or more persons which are such that they may give rise to double or multiple liability, may bring an action against the claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims. . . . [¶] The action of interpleader may be maintained although the claims have not a common origin, are not identical but are adverse to and independent of one another, or the claims are unliquidated and no liability on the part of the party bringing the action or filing the cross-complaint has arisen. The applicant or interpleading party may deny liability in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants. The applicant or interpleading party may join as a defendant in such action any other party against whom claims are made by one or more of the claimants or such other party may interplead by cross-complaint; provided, however, that such claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.” (Ibid., italics added; see Westamerica Bank v. City of Berkeley (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 598, 608 [“The right to the remedy of interpleader is founded on the consideration that a person is threatened not just with double liability, but with double vexation in respect to one liability.”]; Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Rees, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 315 [“ ‘ “The purpose of interpleader is to prevent a multiplicity of suits and double vexation.” ’ ”].) 9 Fidelity had the obligation to return the deposit without a fully executed Mutual Cancellation. The undisputed facts, set forth in Liu’s answer to Fidelity’s complaint and his response to Fidelity’s motion for discharge, are that (1) Fidelity received release of deposit instructions that were signed by only Flaum, and (2) following the agent’s July 23 demand to close escrow within three days, Liu was unable to do so. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for Fidelity to be concerned not only about potential liability to both parties if it released the deposit money to Liu without a fully signed Mutual Cancellation, but also about the possibility that Flaum might take the position Liu forfeited his claim to the deposit money when he failed to close the transaction by July 26, thereby creating a risk that she might claim entitlement to the deposit money. On this record, the court had a basis to conclude there was more than a “ ‘mere pretext or suspicion of double vexation[,]’ ” but rather that the record “ ‘show[ed] a reasonable probability of double vexation.’ ” (See Westamerica Bank v. City of Berkeley, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 608.) Insisting to the contrary, Liu claims that Flaum directed Fidelity to return the $36,000 in deposit funds when she signed the Mutual Cancellation. But that argument ignores the fact that this directive was conditional on Liu signing as well, which he refused to do. Liu also argues that Flaum had no possible basis to claim ownership of the deposit funds, since he had performed all conditions necessary to close the transaction and that Flaum had a continuing contractual obligation to sell to him under a live contract in July 2021. That may be one interpretation of the facts, but the court was not compelled to adopt it. Where a real estate buyer places a deposit into an escrow in connection with a transaction that goes awry for unexplained reasons, the 10 interpleader procedure relieves the escrow holder of the need to decide upon the proper disposition of the deposit money and face potential liability for a misjudgment about that issue. (See Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 870–871, 876 [when faced with conflicting claims over control of bank accounts, bank’s obligation, “like that of any interpleader party[,] was not to resolve the dispute between the claimants, but only to deposit money with the court which was to decide the dispute”].) Here, when Flaum unilaterally tried to cancel the transaction, Liu objected and indicated he needed more time to obtain financing; but Liu’s refusal to sign the Mutual Cancellation and failure to close the transaction by July 26 presented Fidelity with a quandary. In light of this impasse, Fidelity was not required to take Liu’s side in the standoff and ignore its own potential liability for making the wrong call about how to handle the deposit money in the absence of mutually signed instructions from both parties. Arguing that his due process rights were violated, Liu reiterates his theme that, in the absence of an appearance in the action from Flaum, he had no opportunity to test whether, in fact, she ever intended to claim the deposit money as her own. But proof from Flaum was unnecessary. The trial court was entitled to infer from the overall circumstances that, without fully signed deposit release instructions, Fidelity was facing “double or multiple liability” (§ 386, subd. (b)) arising out of the standoff between the parties. From Flaum, Fidelity faced a potential claim if it released the deposit funds without mutually signed instructions; and from Liu, it faced a potential claim if it did the opposite, failed to release the deposit funds, and continued to insist upon receipt of mutually signed instructions. 11 Whether at a statutory or constitutional level, we perceive no error in the procedure the court followed. While a trial is required to resolve actually or potentially conflicting claims among interpleader defendants after the discharge and dismissal of the interpleader plaintiff (see § 386, subds. (b), (e)), nothing in the statutory scheme requires a trial court to proceed by evidentiary contest at the discharge stage of the proceeding. Here, there was a factual predicate for the discharge order, since most of the essential facts were admitted in Liu’s answer and, to the extent they were not, there were placed before the court in the form of declarations from Ms. Tyler, Fidelity’s National Escrow Administrator, and from Fidelity’s counsel, Ms. Hershorin. At the interlocutory step of deciding Fidelity’s right to maintain the action, to a discharge from liability, and to dismissal from the action, the court had discretion to proceed by evidentiary contest or by motion.6 We see no abuse of discretion in the procedural route it chose. Liu contends that the Tyler and Hershorin declarations raised credibility questions which could only be resolved upon adversarial testing in an evidentiary hearing, but he fails to identify precisely what statements in these declarations he has in mind. These were not percipient witnesses who offered evidence about things they saw, heard, or felt. What they offered was largely based on documented events, as memorialized in 6 Cf. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 16, 19 (“ ‘The first step [in an interpleader action] is a trial or hearing by the court on the issue of the plaintiff’s right to interplead. If the proof is sufficient (or the right is admitted by failure to object or by stipulation . . .), the court makes an interlocutory order. This directs the plaintiff stakeholder to deposit the amount or deliver the property, and requires the defendant claimants to interplead and litigate their claims among themselves.’ ”; first italics added, second italics in original). 12 emails, letters, contractual instruments, and in Hershorin’s case, time sheets. There is no question Liu had a full and fair opportunity to contest the discharge motion that ended the case in September 2025. He had written notice of what was at issue in the motion and the chance to counter the Tyler and Hershorin declarations with declarations of his own; nothing stopped him from deposing these witnesses, if he wished to do so; and he could have contested the admissibility of any of statements they made if he had a basis to do so. He did none of those things. Liu attempts to shore up his claim of procedural error with a policy argument that it is inappropriate to submit contract disputes to adjudication by interpleader, a procedure he says should be available only for adjudication of disputes over conflicting claims to money or property. If we affirm here, he suggests, we will be endorsing the use of section 386 as a general purpose mechanism to force the involuntary adjudication by interpleader of any contractual dispute between parties to an escrow where the escrow company may wish to seek a judicial determination of the dispute. This policy argument sweeps too broadly. Putting aside the fact that Liu seems to be positing a false dichotomy (claims to money or property often turn on contract disputes), we are not dealing with the universe of all possible contractual disputes among parties to an escrow, wholly unconnected to potential disputes over money or property held by the escrow holder. What we have here is a specific dispute over a form of contract cancellation where mutually acknowledged instruction directing an escrow company how to proceed was a condition to the release of an escrow deposit. Civil Code section 1057.3 expressly contemplates that 13 exactly this type of contractual dispute may be submitted to adjudication by interpleader by the escrow holder. Under Civil Code section 1057.3, subdivision (a), “[i]t shall be the obligation of a buyer and seller who enter into a contract to purchase and sell real property to ensure that all funds deposited into an escrow account are returned to the person who deposited the funds or who is otherwise entitled to the funds under the contract, if the purchase of the property is not completed by the date set forth in the contract for the close of escrow or any duly executed extension thereof.” Flaum appears to have tried to meet that obligation by signing the Mutual Cancellation. Even though Civil Code section 1057.3, subdivision (e) provides that “[n]either any document required by the escrow holder to release funds deposited in an escrow account nor the acceptance of funds released from escrow, by any principal to the escrow transaction, shall be deemed a cancellation or termination of the underlying contract to purchase and sell real property”—which would have allowed Liu to execute mutual release instructions without prejudice to his legal position that the contract remained operative—Liu refused to sign.7 7 The breadth of the proposed Mutual Cancellation appears to have led to the impasse. By using a form of release more narrowly drawn to address only the disbursement of the deposit funds (which appears to be all paragraph 2.B. of the escrow instructions required) rather than, in addition, cancellation of the underlying contract, Liu and Flaum might have been able to avoid the need for an interpleader action. But it seems to us either one of them could have proposed such a course. Regardless of who was at fault for not finding a practical way to resolve the impasse over the handling of the deposit funds and the status of the contract in July 2022, the bottom line is that Fidelity never received mutually signed directions from the parties instructing it how to handle the deposit in compliance with paragraph 2.B. of the escrow instructions, despite having made clear on July 11 that it needed such a document. 14 Under these circumstances, the most pertinent aspect of Civil Code section 1057.3 as it applies here is subdivision (g). That provision pertains not to the buyer and seller, but to the escrow holder: It states, “[n]othing in this section restricts the ability of an escrow holder to file an interpleader action in the event of a dispute as to the proper distribution of funds deposited in an escrow account.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1057.3, subd. (g), italics added.) III. Near the end of his opening brief, Liu makes two brief arguments that merit commensurately brief attention from us. First, he argues that the trial court “awarded fees from disputed funds in a proceeding whose foundational allegation was never established, on a fee request the court itself found inadequately documented and inflated.” Second, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss the action because (1) Flaum was not served within three years as required by section 583.210; and (2) the action was not brought to trial within three years and thus should have been dismissed under section 583.420, subdivision (a)(2)(A). Each of these rulings is reviewable for abuse of discretion. As to the attorney’s fees, the record shows that the trial court gave careful scrutiny to the amount of the attorney’s fees claimed, reviewed the time sheets Fidelity submitted in detail, eliminated some of the time claimed as unnecessarily incurred, and in the end reduced the total amount to ensure the awarded fees were in line with customary market rates in San Mateo County. No more need be said than that we are satisfied the amount of the court’s award was within its discretion. As to the dilatory prosecution arguments, the sum total of the difficulties Fidelity faced in serving the complaint, 15 amending it to name Flaum’s heirs upon learning of her death, serving T.F. and obtaining his disclaimer, and taking S.D.’s default, when all of these circumstances are considered in toto, supplies an adequate basis for the court to reject Liu’s claims of undue delay. As a result, we see no abuse of discretion here either. IV. DISPOSITION Affirmed. Respondent to collect costs of appeal. STREETER, J. WE CONCUR: BROWN, P. J. GORDON, J.* * Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 16