Fidelity National Title Co. v. Liu CA1/4
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketA176260
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/18/26 Fidelity National Title Co. v. Liu CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE
COMPANY, A176260
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(San Mateo County
v. Super. Ct. No. 22CIV03550)
HUAN LIU,
Defendant and Appellant.
In this interpleader action, Huan Liu (Liu) appeals from a judgment
entered by the trial court after it granted a motion to discharge Fidelity
National Title Company (Fidelity) from all liability arising out of a standoff
between Liu and the late Beverly Flaum (Flaum) over the release from
escrow of certain funds placed on deposit by Liu in connection with a real
estate purchase.
The real estate transaction was never completed, and in order to
return the deposited funds to Liu, the escrow instructions required written
release instructions signed by Liu as buyer and Flaum as seller. When Liu
refused to sign a proposed form of mutual cancellation because he claimed
the contract of sale was still operative, Fidelity filed this interpleader
action.
1
Flaum never appeared in the action and died while it was pending.
After a delay of several years, the court ultimately granted the discharge of
liability to Fidelity, dismissed Fidelity from the action, ordered the
deposited funds released to Liu, awarded Fidelity its attorney’s fees, and
closed the case file. Liu now argues that the discharge was improperly
granted, that the fee award was excessive, and that the action should have
been dismissed for dilatory service and prosecution.
We disagree on all points and affirm.
I.
Liu and Flaum entered into a contract in September 2021 under
which Liu agreed to purchase a house from Flaum. Liu deposited $36,000
into escrow with Fidelity, the designated title company for the transaction.
By early November 2021, Liu claims to have “completed all paperwork
required to close on the property, including inspection and loan approval,”
and having done so, he notified Flaum he was ready to close the
transaction.
So far as the record reveals, however, neither party took further steps
in the ensuing eight months to close the transaction. The reasons why are
unclear. In June 2022, after Fidelity learned that the transaction would
not close (from whom the record does not show), a form agreement entitled
“Cancellation of Contract, Release of Deposit and Cancellation of Escrow”
(the Mutual Cancellation) “was sent” to Flaum and to Liu (by whom it is
not clear).
Because the escrow instructions provided that the deposit money
could be returned to Liu only upon release instructions signed by both
2
parties,1 Fidelity needed both parties to sign the Mutual Cancellation
before it could disburse the deposit to Liu. But according to Lisa Tyler,
Fidelity’s National Escrow Administrator, Fidelity “received the signed
Cancellation of Contract from Seller but did not receive it back from
Buyer.” Insisting that the contract of sale was still in effect, Liu refused to
sign.
On July 11, 2022, Fidelity sent letters to both Liu and Flaum
advising that it faced “conflicting demands” from the parties regarding the
deposit funds, and if it did not receive their “mutually signed instructions
regarding the disbursement of this deposit” by July 21, 2022, it would
submit the escrow file to legal counsel for the filing of an interpleader
action. Liu responded that “[a]n inter pleader [sic] action is not the right
vehicle to use, because the entitlement of the deposit is not in dispute.”
On July 23, 2022, Lou Sanchez, the broker handling the transaction
for both buyer and seller demanded that the closing of escrow occur within
three days. After that deadline passed, Sanchez sent Liu a letter
requesting again that he sign the Mutual Cancellation. Liu again objected,
stating that, due to the delay in closing, his loan approval had expired. He
pointed out that he would have to begin the process of loan approval again.
On August 31, 2022, Flaum sold the property to someone else.
Fidelity filed this interpleader action under Code of Civil Procedure
section 3862 on August 31, 2022. Fidelity’s complaint alleged that it was
the escrow holder for the transaction; that it had received the $36,000
1 Paragraph 2.B. of the escrow instructions provides as follows:
“Release of funds by Escrow Holder . . . requires mutually Signed release
instructions from Buyer and Seller, judicial decision or arbitration award.”
2 All undesignated statutory citations are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
3
deposit from Liu; that “on or about June 22, 2022, Mutual Cancellation
Instructions . . . were sent to [Liu] and [Flaum], but no signed Cancellation
Instructions were provided to [Fidelity]”; and that Liu took the view that
the underlying contract of sale was still operative. Liu admitted each of
these allegations in his answer. Concurrently with filing the complaint,
Fidelity obtained an order allowing it to deposit the $36,000 with the court.
Following the filing of the interpleader complaint and the deposit of
the $36,000 with the court, Fidelity had difficulty serving the summons and
complaint on Flaum. It hired a private investigator to conduct a stakeout
of Flaum’s home, and eventually learned from her daughter, S.D., that
Flaum was bedridden. After being informed that S.D. held power of
attorney for Flaum, Fidelity served Flaum by substitute service on S.D. in
April 2023. Fidelity sought to take Flaum’s default, but the clerk denied
the request because the proof of substitute service was inadequate.
In October 2023, Fidelity filed a motion seeking to be discharged from
“all liability involving the rights and obligations of the parties arising out of
the funds previously held in escrow.” The motion was supported by
declarations from both Ms. Tyler and from its attorney, Lori Hershorin. In
March 2024, the court denied Fidelity’s motion for discharge without
prejudice in light of the denial of its request for default.
The court stated that “Plaintiff may renew the [discharge] motion
after Flaum either appears or her default is taken.” When Fidelity again
attempted to serve Flaum personally, it learned that she had died. Upon
receiving that information, Fidelity amended its interpleader complaint to
name as defendants Flaum’s heirs, S.D. and T.F. (Flaum’s son), each of
whom it subsequently served. T.F. signed a disclaimer of interest in the
deposit funds and was dismissed. Fidelity took S.D.’s default.
4
In July 2023, Liu filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings
arguing that “the plaintiff has failed to provide evidence that there is a
dispute on the ownership of and the claim for the deposit, therefore, there
are lack of facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” Finding that the
allegations of the complaint “sufficiently assert competing adverse claims
for the escrow funds to support an interpleader action[,]” the court denied
the motion.
In August 2024, Liu filed a motion to dismiss for dilatory prosecution
under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.420, subdivision (a)(1) (failure to
effect service within two years), and subdivision (a)(2)(A) (failure to bring
the case to trial within three years). Fidelity’s opposition explained in
detail the difficulty it experienced in effecting service on Flaum. The court
found that Fidelity diligently attempted to effect service in a timely
manner, and denied the motion.
Fidelity then brought a second motion seeking to be discharged from
liability and dismissed from the case in September 2025, this time
supported by another declaration from Ms. Hershorin. It requested an
award of attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 386.6 in the
amount of $14,989.49. The court granted the motion, issued an order in
February 2026 discharging Fidelity from the case, awarded Fidelity
$12,000 in attorney’s fees,3 and authorized the release of the deposit funds
to Liu net of a deduction for the attorney’s fee award.
This timely appeal followed.
3 In finding this amount was reasonable, the court indicated it had
reviewed of the time entries submitted by Fidelity’s counsel, found that
some of the time incurred was not necessary to the pursuit of the
interpleader action, and observed that the award would not have been so
high had Liu not “brought so many motions.”
5
II.
“Any person, firm, corporation, association or other entity against
whom double or multiple claims are made, or may be made, by two or more
persons which are such that they may give rise to double or multiple
liability, may bring an action against the claimants to compel them to
interplead and litigate their several claims.” (§ 386, subd. (b).) “An
interpleader action is an equitable proceeding. [Citations.] In an
interpleader action, the court initially determines the right of the plaintiff
to interplead the funds; if that right is sustained, an interlocutory decree is
entered which requires the defendants to interplead and litigate their
claims to the funds.’ ” (Virtanen v. O’Connell (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 688,
698.)
If the court sustains the plaintiff’s right to proceed by interpleader,
“ ‘[u]pon an admission of liability and deposit of monies with the court, the
plaintiff then may be discharged from liability and dismissed from the
interpleader action. [Citations.] The effect of such an order is to preserve
the fund, discharge the stakeholder from further liability, and to keep the
fund in the court’s custody until the rights of the potential claimants of the
monies can be adjudicated. [Citations.]’ . . . By implementing an
interpleader action and obtaining a discharge from further liability, the
stakeholder avoids tort liability. [Citation.]” (Virtanen v. O’Connell, supra,
140 Cal.App.4th at p. 698.)
An order discharging a plaintiff in an interpleader action is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. (See Hood v. Gonzales (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 57, 82
[concluding that the court properly exercised its discretion in discharging
the interpleader plaintiff from the action].) Likewise, under section 386.6,
“[i]n ordering the discharge of such party, the court may, in its discretion,
6
award such party his costs and reasonable attorney fees from the amount
in dispute which has been deposited with the court.” (§ 386.6, italics
added.)
Liu’s primary argument here—that, to be entitled to relief by
interpleader, Fidelity was required to show that it faced conflicting claims
by two parties in July 2022—is refuted by the plain language of section 386,
subdivision (b), which states that an interpleader action lies when “double
or multiple claims are made, or may be made, by two or more persons.”
(Italics added.) According to Liu, Flaum never claimed ownership of
deposit funds, as shown by the fact that she never appeared in the action.
But the court in an interpleader action first makes the determination
whether interpleader remedy may be sought, and by the end of August
2022 the circumstances pointed to a “reasonable probability” that
conflicting claims to the funds may be made by Liu and Flaum. (See
Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Rees (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 307, 315.)
Flaum’s later silence tells us nothing, since she died.
Liu makes no effort to attack the sufficiency of Fidelity’s right to seek
interpleader based on the allegations it made when the action was filed,
and instead focuses on the discharge step of the proceeding, which occurred
later. He makes an elaborate argument, unsupported by citation to
precedent, contending that an interpleader plaintiff bears an evidentiary
burden to prove allegations in the complaint at the discharge stage of an
interpleader action and that, even if the plaintiff adequately alleges its
entitlement to proceed by interpleader at the outset of the case, the
discharge determination requires an evidentiary proceeding, with full
opportunity to challenge the plaintiff’s allegations.
7
The premise of Liu’s argument is that, even if the mere allegation of
conflicting claims to ownership of money held by the interpleading plaintiff
is enough to survive a pleading challenge, more must be shown to support
an order discharging the plaintiff from liability and dismissing it from the
action. In Liu’s view, discharge is warranted only if, at the time of the
discharge hearing, the interpleader plaintiff proves that it faces conflicting
claims to ownership of money held by the plaintiff, and presents that proof
in an evidentiary hearing so the interpleader defendants are able to test
the proof. That did not and could not have occurred here, Liu argues,
because Flaum never appeared in the action, leaving the court with nothing
but speculation about her intentions. We are unpersuaded. As Fidelity
points out, “[i]nterpleader does not fail merely because claimants later
default, disclaim, die, settle, or fail to appear.”
To buttress this line of argument, Liu asserts that a showing of
conflicting claims to ownership of money held by the interpleader plaintiff
is a statutory prerequisite to an interpleader discharge. In his reading of
section 386, the statute “requires competing claims to the deposited
property—not merely a contract dispute that creates downstream
uncertainty about who will eventually receive funds.” We disagree.
Granted, in the paradigmatic example of an interpleader action, the
party seeking interpleader is often in possession of money or property that
is the subject of competing claims of ownership by multiple parties.4 But
the text of section 386—which speaks broadly of “double or multiple
liability” (§ 386, subd. (b), italics added)—is more encompassing than the
4 See, e.g., Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 32, 38
(funds; conflicting demands for distribution of funds made by parties
disputing ownership interests of shares in a limited liability company and a
corporation).
8
typical scenario involving directly conflicting claims to ownership of the
same money or property.5 The conflicting claims need not always be to
ownership of money or property, but may be to some duty the stakeholder
has with respect to the money or property. (City of Morgan Hill v. Brown,
supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123 [interpleader claimants must “seek the
same thing, debt, or duty”]; see Hancock Oil Co. v. Hopkins (1944) 24
Cal.2d 497, 504.) What we have in this case is a dispute about Fidelity’s
obligation to return the deposit funds without a fully executed Mutual
Cancellation, not about the ownership of the funds.
Faced with a no-win situation that could give rise to liability against
it no matter what it did, Fidelity initiated an interpleader action as means
to force Liu and Flaum to litigate or resolve their differences whether
5 Section 386, subdivision (b), provides, inter alia, that: “Any person,
firm, corporation, association or other entity against whom double or
multiple claims are made, or may be made, by two or more persons which
are such that they may give rise to double or multiple liability, may bring an
action against the claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their
several claims. . . . [¶] The action of interpleader may be maintained
although the claims have not a common origin, are not identical but are
adverse to and independent of one another, or the claims are unliquidated
and no liability on the part of the party bringing the action or filing the
cross-complaint has arisen. The applicant or interpleading party may deny
liability in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants. The applicant or
interpleading party may join as a defendant in such action any other party
against whom claims are made by one or more of the claimants or such
other party may interplead by cross-complaint; provided, however, that
such claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.” (Ibid., italics
added; see Westamerica Bank v. City of Berkeley (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th
598, 608 [“The right to the remedy of interpleader is founded on the
consideration that a person is threatened not just with double liability, but
with double vexation in respect to one liability.”]; Farmers New World Life
Ins. Co. v. Rees, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 315 [“ ‘ “The purpose of
interpleader is to prevent a multiplicity of suits and double vexation.” ’ ”].)
9
Fidelity had the obligation to return the deposit without a fully executed
Mutual Cancellation. The undisputed facts, set forth in Liu’s answer to
Fidelity’s complaint and his response to Fidelity’s motion for discharge, are
that (1) Fidelity received release of deposit instructions that were signed by
only Flaum, and (2) following the agent’s July 23 demand to close escrow
within three days, Liu was unable to do so.
Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for Fidelity to be
concerned not only about potential liability to both parties if it released the
deposit money to Liu without a fully signed Mutual Cancellation, but also
about the possibility that Flaum might take the position Liu forfeited his
claim to the deposit money when he failed to close the transaction by July
26, thereby creating a risk that she might claim entitlement to the deposit
money. On this record, the court had a basis to conclude there was more
than a “ ‘mere pretext or suspicion of double vexation[,]’ ” but rather that
the record “ ‘show[ed] a reasonable probability of double vexation.’ ” (See
Westamerica Bank v. City of Berkeley, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 608.)
Insisting to the contrary, Liu claims that Flaum directed Fidelity to
return the $36,000 in deposit funds when she signed the Mutual
Cancellation. But that argument ignores the fact that this directive was
conditional on Liu signing as well, which he refused to do. Liu also argues
that Flaum had no possible basis to claim ownership of the deposit funds,
since he had performed all conditions necessary to close the transaction and
that Flaum had a continuing contractual obligation to sell to him under a
live contract in July 2021. That may be one interpretation of the facts, but
the court was not compelled to adopt it.
Where a real estate buyer places a deposit into an escrow in
connection with a transaction that goes awry for unexplained reasons, the
10
interpleader procedure relieves the escrow holder of the need to decide
upon the proper disposition of the deposit money and face potential liability
for a misjudgment about that issue. (See Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp.
(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 870–871, 876 [when faced with conflicting claims
over control of bank accounts, bank’s obligation, “like that of any
interpleader party[,] was not to resolve the dispute between the claimants,
but only to deposit money with the court which was to decide the dispute”].)
Here, when Flaum unilaterally tried to cancel the transaction, Liu
objected and indicated he needed more time to obtain financing; but Liu’s
refusal to sign the Mutual Cancellation and failure to close the transaction
by July 26 presented Fidelity with a quandary. In light of this impasse,
Fidelity was not required to take Liu’s side in the standoff and ignore its
own potential liability for making the wrong call about how to handle the
deposit money in the absence of mutually signed instructions from both
parties.
Arguing that his due process rights were violated, Liu reiterates his
theme that, in the absence of an appearance in the action from Flaum, he
had no opportunity to test whether, in fact, she ever intended to claim the
deposit money as her own. But proof from Flaum was unnecessary. The
trial court was entitled to infer from the overall circumstances that,
without fully signed deposit release instructions, Fidelity was facing
“double or multiple liability” (§ 386, subd. (b)) arising out of the standoff
between the parties. From Flaum, Fidelity faced a potential claim if it
released the deposit funds without mutually signed instructions; and from
Liu, it faced a potential claim if it did the opposite, failed to release the
deposit funds, and continued to insist upon receipt of mutually signed
instructions.
11
Whether at a statutory or constitutional level, we perceive no error in
the procedure the court followed. While a trial is required to resolve
actually or potentially conflicting claims among interpleader defendants
after the discharge and dismissal of the interpleader plaintiff (see § 386,
subds. (b), (e)), nothing in the statutory scheme requires a trial court to
proceed by evidentiary contest at the discharge stage of the proceeding.
Here, there was a factual predicate for the discharge order, since most of
the essential facts were admitted in Liu’s answer and, to the extent they
were not, there were placed before the court in the form of declarations
from Ms. Tyler, Fidelity’s National Escrow Administrator, and from
Fidelity’s counsel, Ms. Hershorin. At the interlocutory step of deciding
Fidelity’s right to maintain the action, to a discharge from liability, and to
dismissal from the action, the court had discretion to proceed by
evidentiary contest or by motion.6 We see no abuse of discretion in the
procedural route it chose.
Liu contends that the Tyler and Hershorin declarations raised
credibility questions which could only be resolved upon adversarial testing
in an evidentiary hearing, but he fails to identify precisely what statements
in these declarations he has in mind. These were not percipient witnesses
who offered evidence about things they saw, heard, or felt. What they
offered was largely based on documented events, as memorialized in
6 Cf. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 16, 19
(“ ‘The first step [in an interpleader action] is a trial or hearing by the court
on the issue of the plaintiff’s right to interplead. If the proof is sufficient (or
the right is admitted by failure to object or by stipulation . . .), the court
makes an interlocutory order. This directs the plaintiff stakeholder to
deposit the amount or deliver the property, and requires the defendant
claimants to interplead and litigate their claims among themselves.’ ”; first
italics added, second italics in original).
12
emails, letters, contractual instruments, and in Hershorin’s case, time
sheets. There is no question Liu had a full and fair opportunity to contest
the discharge motion that ended the case in September 2025. He had
written notice of what was at issue in the motion and the chance to counter
the Tyler and Hershorin declarations with declarations of his own; nothing
stopped him from deposing these witnesses, if he wished to do so; and he
could have contested the admissibility of any of statements they made if he
had a basis to do so. He did none of those things.
Liu attempts to shore up his claim of procedural error with a policy
argument that it is inappropriate to submit contract disputes to
adjudication by interpleader, a procedure he says should be available only
for adjudication of disputes over conflicting claims to money or property. If
we affirm here, he suggests, we will be endorsing the use of section 386 as a
general purpose mechanism to force the involuntary adjudication by
interpleader of any contractual dispute between parties to an escrow where
the escrow company may wish to seek a judicial determination of the
dispute.
This policy argument sweeps too broadly. Putting aside the fact that
Liu seems to be positing a false dichotomy (claims to money or property
often turn on contract disputes), we are not dealing with the universe of all
possible contractual disputes among parties to an escrow, wholly
unconnected to potential disputes over money or property held by the
escrow holder. What we have here is a specific dispute over a form of
contract cancellation where mutually acknowledged instruction directing
an escrow company how to proceed was a condition to the release of an
escrow deposit. Civil Code section 1057.3 expressly contemplates that
13
exactly this type of contractual dispute may be submitted to adjudication by
interpleader by the escrow holder.
Under Civil Code section 1057.3, subdivision (a), “[i]t shall be the
obligation of a buyer and seller who enter into a contract to purchase and
sell real property to ensure that all funds deposited into an escrow account
are returned to the person who deposited the funds or who is otherwise
entitled to the funds under the contract, if the purchase of the property is
not completed by the date set forth in the contract for the close of escrow or
any duly executed extension thereof.” Flaum appears to have tried to meet
that obligation by signing the Mutual Cancellation.
Even though Civil Code section 1057.3, subdivision (e) provides that
“[n]either any document required by the escrow holder to release funds
deposited in an escrow account nor the acceptance of funds released from
escrow, by any principal to the escrow transaction, shall be deemed a
cancellation or termination of the underlying contract to purchase and sell
real property”—which would have allowed Liu to execute mutual release
instructions without prejudice to his legal position that the contract
remained operative—Liu refused to sign.7
7 The breadth of the proposed Mutual Cancellation appears to have
led to the impasse. By using a form of release more narrowly drawn to
address only the disbursement of the deposit funds (which appears to be all
paragraph 2.B. of the escrow instructions required) rather than, in
addition, cancellation of the underlying contract, Liu and Flaum might
have been able to avoid the need for an interpleader action. But it seems to
us either one of them could have proposed such a course. Regardless of who
was at fault for not finding a practical way to resolve the impasse over the
handling of the deposit funds and the status of the contract in July 2022,
the bottom line is that Fidelity never received mutually signed directions
from the parties instructing it how to handle the deposit in compliance with
paragraph 2.B. of the escrow instructions, despite having made clear on
July 11 that it needed such a document.
14
Under these circumstances, the most pertinent aspect of Civil Code
section 1057.3 as it applies here is subdivision (g). That provision pertains
not to the buyer and seller, but to the escrow holder: It states, “[n]othing in
this section restricts the ability of an escrow holder to file an interpleader
action in the event of a dispute as to the proper distribution of funds
deposited in an escrow account.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1057.3, subd. (g), italics
added.)
III.
Near the end of his opening brief, Liu makes two brief arguments
that merit commensurately brief attention from us.
First, he argues that the trial court “awarded fees from disputed
funds in a proceeding whose foundational allegation was never established,
on a fee request the court itself found inadequately documented and
inflated.” Second, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to dismiss the action because (1) Flaum was not served within three
years as required by section 583.210; and (2) the action was not brought to
trial within three years and thus should have been dismissed under section
583.420, subdivision (a)(2)(A).
Each of these rulings is reviewable for abuse of discretion. As to the
attorney’s fees, the record shows that the trial court gave careful scrutiny to
the amount of the attorney’s fees claimed, reviewed the time sheets Fidelity
submitted in detail, eliminated some of the time claimed as unnecessarily
incurred, and in the end reduced the total amount to ensure the awarded
fees were in line with customary market rates in San Mateo County. No
more need be said than that we are satisfied the amount of the court’s
award was within its discretion. As to the dilatory prosecution arguments,
the sum total of the difficulties Fidelity faced in serving the complaint,
15
amending it to name Flaum’s heirs upon learning of her death, serving T.F.
and obtaining his disclaimer, and taking S.D.’s default, when all of these
circumstances are considered in toto, supplies an adequate basis for the
court to reject Liu’s claims of undue delay. As a result, we see no abuse of
discretion here either.
IV. DISPOSITION
Affirmed. Respondent to collect costs of appeal.
STREETER, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
GORDON, J.*
* Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
16