Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D20-926 _____________________________ JIMMY LEE GILLIAM, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Mark Borello, Judge. March 17, 2021 LONG, J. Appellant, Jimmy Lee Gilliam, moved for discharge arguing Florida’s speedy trial rule prevented the State from proceeding against him. The trial court denied the motion. Because discharge should have been granted and the issue is dispositive, we reverse. Facts A warrant was issued for Mr. Gilliam in Duval County. On August 25, 2018, he was stopped by law enforcement in St. Lucie County. The officer reported, “[u]pon running Gilliam, dispatch advised he had an extraditable felony warrant out of Duval County. I placed Gilliam in custody and advised him why.” After placing him “in custody,” the officer performed a search of Mr. Gilliam. The search revealed drugs and drug paraphernalia. The St. Lucie County Jail booked Mr. Gilliam on the new drug charges but never booked him on the Duval County warrant. He remained incarcerated in St. Lucie County for sixteen months while he resolved the new charges. He was not booked on the warrant until December 21, 2019, after St. Lucie County released him to Duval County authorities. The State then filed its first information on February 3, 2020. The day after the information was filed, Mr. Gilliam’s counsel moved for discharge, arguing he was lawfully arrested on August 25, 2018, and the speedy trial date had expired on February 18, 2019—175 days after the arrest. The State argued Mr. Gilliam was not arrested, for speedy trial purposes, in 2018 because he was not advised of the warrant during first appearance. The trial court denied the motion for discharge. Mr. Gilliam asked the trial court to rule that the motion and underlying issue were dispositive to preserve the matter for appeal. The trial court agreed. Following denial of the motion, Mr. Gilliam entered a negotiated plea and was sentenced accordingly. Preservation of a Dispositive Issue The State now argues the issue is not dispositive and not properly preserved for appeal. 1 In Rentz v. State, this Court articulated the standard on review of a trial court’s determination that an issue is dispositive: A determination by the trial court that an issue is dispositive will also preserve an issue for appellate review; however, it is subject to an abuse of discretion standard on review. Vaughn v. State, 711 So. 2d 64, 66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Thus, an appellate court can overturn a trial judge’s decision that an issue is dispositive if that decision is “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.” Johnson v. State, 40 So. 3d 883, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). 1 The State made no objection when Mr. Gilliam asked the trial court to find the issue dispositive. 2 285 So. 3d 1009, 1013 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Mr. Gilliam’s motion to discharge was dispositive. “An issue is dispositive when it is clear that there will be no trial, regardless of the outcome on appeal.” Id. at 1013 (citing Hicks v. State, 277 So. 3d 153, 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019); Williams v. State, 134 So. 3d 975, 976 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)). The State claims that regardless of the speedy trial deadline, it could still try Mr. Gilliam under the “recapture period” of Florida’s speedy trial rule. Mr. Gilliam has made his speedy trial claim under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a), which provides for a speedy trial without demand. Under this portion of the rule a defendant must be tried for a felony within 175 days of arrest. If a defendant is not tried within 175 days, “the defendant shall be entitled to the appropriate remedy as set forth in subdivision (p).” Subdivision (p) provides that the State is entitled to a notice of expiration of speedy trial time. And after notice, the State then gets the benefit of what has been dubbed the recapture period: No later than 5 days from the date of the filing of a notice of expiration of speedy trial time, the court shall hold a hearing on the notice and . . . shall order that the defendant be brought to trial within 10 days. A defendant not brought to trial within the 10-day period through no fault of the defendant, on motion of the defendant or the court, shall be forever discharged from the crime. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(p)(3). But the Florida Supreme Court has held that this portion of the rule applies only when the information or indictment charging the defendant is made within the speedy trial period. And that the State is not entitled to the rule’s recapture period if it fails to file charges until after the 175-day speedy trial period has lapsed. See State v. Williams, 791 So. 2d 1088, 1091 (Fla. 2001) (“[W]e hold that the speedy trial time begins to run when an accused is taken into custody and continues to run even if the State does not act until after the expiration of that speedy trial period. The State 3 may not file charges based on the same conduct after the speedy trial period has expired.”); see also Doctor v. State, 68 So. 3d 335, 336–37 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“[T]he state loses the benefit of the recapture provision if it neglects to file charges until after expiration of the 175-day speedy trial period.”); Garrett v. State, 87 So. 3d 799, 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (holding that because the 175- day speedy trial period had run before criminal charges were filed, the petitioner had a right to discharge). 2 Mr. Gilliam’s argument turns on the claim that the State neglected to file an information within 175 days of his arrest for the underlying crime. As a result, Mr. Gilliam’s motion for discharge is dispositive because the State would not be entitled to the recapture period if Mr. Gilliam succeeds on the merits of this appeal. 3 The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in finding this issue to be dispositive. 2 We follow this precedent while noting this weighty exception is not contained in the rule. As the dissent in Williams noted: There is nothing in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 that precludes an accused . . . who has been arrested and not formally charged from filing a notice of expiration of speedy trial directed to the case pending on the arrest. The filing of such notice should trigger the recapture period provided for in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(p) and allow an opportunity for the State to file an information and proceed with prosecution. 791 So. 2d 1088, 1092 (Fla. 2001) (Wells, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting Williams v. State, 774 So. 2d 23, 25 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (Fulmer, C.J., concurring)). 3 The State has advanced no argument that Mr. Gilliam was not tried within 175 days for reasons attributable to him or that he was unavailable for trial within that period. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(j)(2)−(3). 4 Application of the Speedy Trial Rule The right to a speedy trial is triggered “when the person is arrested as a result of the conduct or criminal episode that gave rise to the crime charged.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191(d)(1). The Florida Supreme Court has consistently held that the speedy trial period begins upon a defendant’s initial arrest. See Bulgin v. State, 912 So. 2d 307, 310 (Fla. 2005) (“[T]he 175–day speedy trial period begins upon a defendant’s initial arrest.”); Weed v. State, 411 So. 2d 863, 865 (Fla. 1982) (“[T]he date of the original arrest is the focal point for speedy trial considerations, irrespective of changes made in charges.”); State v. Naveira, 873 So. 2d 300, 305 (Fla. 2004) (citing Genden v. Fuller, 648 So. 2d 1183, 1184 (Fla. 1994)) (“The speedy trial period begins when a defendant is first taken into custody, not when charges are first filed.”). “A formal arrest, complete with fingerprinting and formal charges, is not always necessary to start the running of the speedy trial time.” State v. Christian, 442 So. 2d 988, 989 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (citing Bannister v. State, 382 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)). In fact, only four elements are necessary for a custodial detention to constitute an arrest and trigger the speedy trial rule: It is uniformly held that an arrest, in the technical and restricted sense of the criminal law, is ‘the apprehension or taking into custody of an alleged offender, in order that he may be brought into the proper court to answer for a crime.’ When used in this sense, an arrest involves the following elements: (1) A purpose or intention to effect an arrest under a real or pretended authority; (2) An actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person to be arrested by a person having present power to control the person arrested; (3) A communication by the arresting officer to the person whose arrest is sought, of an intention or purpose then and there to effect an arrest; and (4) An understanding by the person whose arrest is sought that it is the intention of the arresting officer then and there to arrest and detain him. 5 Melton v. State, 75 So. 2d 291, 294 (Fla. 1954) (citations omitted). “All four Melton elements must be present to conclude that an arrest has occurred.” Davis v. State, 253 So. 3d 1234, 1238 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (citing Brown v. State, 623 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)). Mr. Gilliam argues that the circumstances of his arrest in St. Lucie County on August 25, 2018, satisfied all four Melton elements and started the speedy trial clock. We agree. The first and third factors, “(1) A purpose or intention to effect an arrest under a real or pretended authority” and “(3) A communication by the arresting officer to the person whose arrest is sought, of an intention or purpose then and there to effect an arrest,” are established by the police report detailing the circumstances of the encounter. 4 The officer explained in the report: “Upon running Gilliam, dispatch advised he had an extraditable felony warrant out of Duval County. I placed Gilliam in custody and advised him why.” (emphasis added). This statement shows that the officer intended to effect an arrest under the authority of the Duval County warrant and explained that intent to Mr. Gilliam. A search of Mr. Gilliam was conducted after his arrest. The search revealed that Mr. Gilliam was in possession of illegal drugs. The drugs found on Mr. Gilliam served as the basis for new charges in St. Lucie County. This post-arrest search further demonstrates that the officer intended to, and did in fact, place Mr. Gilliam in custody for the Duval County warrant. The State asserts that Mr. Gilliam was merely “in the process of being detained based on the warrant . . . when intervening circumstances led to his arrest on unrelated drug charges.” So, as the State describes it, the “intervening circumstance” was a warrantless search, without consent, of Mr. Gilliam. This argument is not supported by the evidence and fails to explain the officer’s conduct. “Where a person is arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate, numerous cases have held that the person is in ‘custody’ within the 4 The parties stipulated to the entry of the police report as an exhibit in evidence at the motion hearing. 6 meaning of the speedy trial rule.” Singletary v. State, 322 So. 2d 551, 554 (Fla. 1975). The State also argues that Mr. Gilliam was not constructively seized or detained to satisfy the second Melton element because Mr. Gilliam was not booked into the St. Lucie County Jail on the warrant or advised of the warrant at first appearance in St. Lucie County. This Court has held that being advised of an out of county warrant at first appearance on unrelated charges can be enough to constitute a constructive detention and start the running of the speedy trial clock. See Hill v. State, 132 So. 3d 925, 929–30 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). Yet an advisement at first appearance, while sufficient, is not required. “Formalities such as booking and fingerprinting are not necessary to begin the speedy trial clock.” Brown v. State, 843 So. 2d 328, 330 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). The fact that Mr. Gilliam was not booked on the Duval County warrant or advised of the warrant at first appearance in St. Lucie’s County is not dispositive. The fact that Mr. Gilliam was actually detained for the warrant satisfies the second element of Melton. The remaining element, “(4) An understanding by the person whose arrest is sought that it is the intention of the arresting officer then and there to arrest and detain him,” does not appear to be in dispute. It is clear from the record that Mr. Gilliam was told he was being placed in custody for the Duval County warrant and accepted the officer’s authority to detain and search him. When the officer placed Mr. Gilliam in custody on August 25, 2018, for the Duval County warrant and advised him why, the detention constituted an arrest and the start of the speedy trial clock. The state did not file an information on the warrant’s underlying felony charge until February 3, 2020—well after the expiration of the 175-day speedy trial deadline. The trial court therefore erred when it denied Mr. Gilliam’s motion for discharge. REVERSED and REMANDED. LEWIS and NORDBY, JJ., concur. 7 _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Jasmine Quintera Russell, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Tabitha Herrera, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. 8