Full Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-26-00464-CV Shaun Demello, Appellant v. 7905 San Felipe Owner LP dba Summer Grove, Appellee FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 5 OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY NO. 26-0851-CC5, THE HONORABLE WILL WARD, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION Shaun Demello appeals from the county court’s final judgment in a forcible-detainer suit awarding possession of residential real property, back rent, and attorneys’ fees to 7905 San Felipe Owner LP dba Summer Grove (Summer Grove). See generally Tex. Prop. Code §§ 24.001–.011 (addressing cause of action for forcible entry and detainer). Because Demello does not raise any issues demonstrating reversible error on appeal, we will affirm. BACKGROUND Summer Grove owns an apartment complex in Austin. Demello and Summer Grove entered a residential apartment lease contract for one of Summer Grove’s units with a term beginning October 15, 2025, under which Demello agreed to pay $1,049 per month in base rent and additional fixed monthly recurring charges for utilities. After Demello failed to pay rent beginning in late 2025, Summer Grove gave Demello a notice to vacate the apartment in February 2026. When he did not do so, Summer Grove filed an eviction suit in justice court seeking possession and past-due rent. The justice court entered judgment for Summer Grove, and Demello appealed to the county court. On May 15, 2026, the parties tried the de novo appeal to the bench. Demello testified, as did Summer Grove’s apartment community manager, Tanayris Vega.1 Vega testified about Demello’s lease, which was admitted as evidence, and the various monthly financial obligations it imposed. Vega testified that Demello owed rent from November 2025 through May 2026 and had not made any partial payments, such that he owed $7,343 in back rent (not including fees or utilities, which Summer Grove did not seek). Demello maintained that he did not owe Summer Grove rent and that the “lease is a forgery,” but he did not present evidence or testimony that explained this position. Demello admitted that he had paid Summer Grove rent in the past. The county court found that Summer Grove was entitled to possession of the premises, Demello owed $7,343 in past-due rent, Demello was to pay Summer Grove $5,752.50 in attorneys’ fees, and Demello was to pay court costs. DISCUSSION On appeal, Demello has filed a pro se brief challenging the county court’s judgment in five issues.2 We construe pro se filings liberally to obtain a just, fair, and equitable adjudication of the parties’ rights, but pro se litigants must comply with the same rules and standards as those represented by counsel. Housing Auth. of City of Aus. v. Elbendary, 581 S.W.3d 488, 491 n.1 1 Summer Grove’s attorney also testified to the attorneys’ fee request. 2 Summer Grove has not filed an appellee’s brief. 2 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.). While Demello’s brief fails at points to present substantive arguments or cite to relevant authorities or the record, we address his issues as best we can based on his arguments. See Norton v. Phan, No. 03-22-00002-CV, 2023 WL 4769530, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin July 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”). As best we can understand from his brief, Demello argues that (1) the trial court denied him “reasonable modifications” under the Americans with Disabilities Act; (2) the lease was forged; (3) the trial court clerk did not file his motions; (4) he was willing to pay, but Summer Grove did not provide him with a clear accounting breakdown of fees owed under the lease; and (5) Summer Grove retaliated against him by seeking his eviction after he disputed rent charges and filed reports with the attorney general’s office. Demello’s second, fourth, and fifth issues generally concern his right to remain in the apartment. “The only issue in an action for forcible detainer is the right to actual possession of the premises.” Marshall v. Housing Auth. of S.A., 198 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. 2006); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.6(f) (“The court must adjudicate the right to actual possession and not title.”). To prevail in the forcible-detainer suit, a landlord must prove only that (a) it owns the property; (b) the defendant is a tenant at will, a tenant at sufferance, or a tenant or subtenant willfully holding over after the termination of the tenant’s right of possession; (c) the landlord gave proper notice to the tenant to vacate the premises; and (d) the tenant refused to vacate. See Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 478 (Tex. 2017). The issue of possession becomes moot if the appellant is no longer in possession of the property, unless the appellant asserts “a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession” of the property. Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787. Here, the record establishes that the writ of possession was executed and the property was 3 tendered to Summer Grove on May 19, 2026. Demello does not present any potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the apartment. See Shields, 526 S.W.3d at 478. There is no dispute that Summer Grove owns the property, that Demello was delinquent on rent, and that Demello refused to vacate after proper notice. Thus, the portion of Demello’s appeal that raises issues of possession is moot. See Dutschmann v. Federal Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 03-14-00561-CV, 2016 WL 5349379, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 21, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.). There are limited non-possession-related issues that may be decided as part of a forcible-detainer action, like a claim for unpaid rent. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.6(e); Goss v. Alvesteffer, No. 03-22-00097-CV, 2023 WL 3873494, at *1 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 8, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). However, Demello has not challenged the award of past-due rent or court costs. Demello’s remaining issues appear to generally concern due-process rights, as he argues that the trial court “exploit[ed]” his disability “by forcing final judgment while [he] was textually unable to function on the record” and the clerk “weaponiz[ed] administrative ‘return comments’ to hold back [his] emergency motions” and “engaged in unauthorized ex parte coordination with opposing counsel to accelerate an eviction order.” Even assuming that these issues are properly before the Court on a forcible-detainer appeal, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.6(e), a review of the record demonstrates that these issues were not preserved for our review, see Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). Further, Demello has not demonstrated how these issues warrant reversal of the judgment rendered after a bench trial in which he participated. See Goss, 2023 WL 3873494, at *2; Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a) (standard for reversible error on appeal). 4 CONCLUSION We overrule Demello’s issues on appeal and affirm the judgment. __________________________________________ Rosa Lopez Theofanis, Justice Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Theofanis Affirmed Filed: October 1, 2026 5