Full Opinion

Filed 10/23/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR WEI SHI, B350195 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24TRCV03628) v. CITY OF PALOS VERDES ESTATES, Defendant and Respondent. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Amy N. Carter and Alan B. Honeycut, Judges. Reversed. Jeff Lewis Law, Tim Cotter and Jeffrey Lewis for Plaintiff and Appellant. Best Best & Krieger, Kara L. Coronado, Steven Moctezuma and Christopher M. Moffitt for Defendant and Respondent. INTRODUCTION Wei Shi, a homeowner, wanted to build an ADU1 at his home in the City of Palos Verdes Estates. He applied for a permit to do so. The City had a mandatory statutory duty under California law to ministerially approve the ADU permit. (§ 66317.) The City, Shi alleges, failed to comply with its mandatory and ministerial duty. Instead, it deliberately delayed approval of the ADU. Shi sued the City under the Government Claims Act (§ 815.6) to recover for damages caused by the delay. The City demurred. It asserted (and asserts on appeal) a single argument. It argues that the Legislature did not intend section 66317’s requirements concerning ADU permits to protect private homeowners who want to build ADUs. Instead, asserts the City, the injury the Legislature sought to prevent was an abstract harm to the general public, meaning Shi cannot sue under the Government Claims Act. In our view, the City’s argument is incorrect. Shi stated a cause of action under section 815.6 of the Government Claims Act, and the trial court should not have sustained a demurrer to Shi’s first amended complaint. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Shi’s Complaint2 Shi lives in the City. He first applied for a permit to build an ADU in 2020. Shi’s goal was “to complete the ADU construction concurrent with the 1 An “accessory dwelling unit” or “ADU” is an “attached or a detached residential dwelling unit that provides complete independent living facilities for one or more persons and is located on a lot with a proposed or existing primary residence.” (Gov. Code, § 66313, subd. (a).) All undesignated section references are to the Government Code. 2 We focus on the allegations in the first amended complaint (FAC), which is the operative version of the complaint. Because this case comes to us following a demurrer, we accept the truth of all material facts properly 2 completion of the family home” on the lot. Shi alleged that his proposed ADU was subject to the ministerial approval requirements and shortened timeline in the relevant ADU statutes. The current requirements for ministerial approval of ADU permits are in section 66317. That statute provides that an ADU permit application “shall be considered and approved ministerially without discretionary review or a hearing.” (§ 66317, subd. (a)(1).)3 Section 66317 further provides that “[t]he permitting agency shall either approve or deny the application … within 60 days from the date the permitting agency receives a completed application” if there is an existing dwelling on the lot, and if there is not an existing dwelling, as soon as “the permitting agency approves or denies the permit application to create the new … dwelling.” (Id., subd. (a)(3).) Section 66317, subdivision (c) states, “No local ordinance, policy, or regulation, other than an accessory dwelling unit ordinance consistent with this article shall be the basis for the delay or denial of a building permit or a use permit under this section.” Shi alleged that the City did not ministerially approve his ADU application as required. Instead, alleges Shi, the City “imposed a planning process that—in letter and spirit—violated [section 66317] and delayed Mr. Shi’s ADU approval for more than three years.” Among other things, the City pleaded in the operative complaint. (Fox Paine & Co., LLC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. (2026) 20 Cal.5th 188, 206–207.) 3 When Shi sought an ADU permit in 2020, former section 65852.2, subdivision (a)(3) included similar requirements. It was repealed and renumbered in 2024, along with several other statutes involving ADUs. The parties agree the requirements remain substantially the same. For clarity and consistency, when we discuss the ADU approval requirements we refer to the current statute. 3 told Shi that approving his ADU would require a conditional use permit, discretionary review, and approval by the Palos Verdes Homes Association Art Jury. Shi also alleged that City planning commissioner Janine Nendick personally lobbied Shi’s neighbors in opposition to the project. Shi asserted that the City did not approve his ADU permit until 2023. As a result of this delay, Shi’s ADU was completed much later than planned. Shi alleged that the delays caused him to incur damages “including loss of use of his property, increased construction costs, interest expense and costs of design professionals, and diminished property value. [Shi] estimates the total damages suffered exceed one million dollars.” Shi filed his complaint against the City in October 2024 and his FAC in February 2025. He alleged a single cause of action for violation of section 815.6. That statute provides in full, “Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.”4 Shi alleged that the “City had a ministerial duty to approve [Shi’s] ADU application in 2020 when presented.” He further alleged that the “laws passed by California to expedite ADUs were designed to prevent the very types of delays, and costs associated with delays, suffered by … Shi in connection with the approval of his ADU.” 4 Section 815.6 is part of California’s general tort scheme for liability against public entities, known as the “Government Claims Act.” (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 741 [referring to §§ 810 et seq. as the “Government Claims Act”].) 4 He sought compensatory damages, injunctive relief, costs, and attorney fees. B. The City’s Demurrer The City demurred to the FAC on the grounds that Shi failed to sufficiently allege a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.) The City noted that a cause of action under section 815.6 requires, among other elements, that the mandatory duty imposed by the statute was designed to protect against the particular kind of injury the plaintiff suffered. (See, e.g., Guzman v. County of Monterey (2009) 46 Cal.4th 887, 898.) The City argued that Shi failed to meet this element. The City contended that under the relevant ADU laws, “it is clear that there was no legislative intent for these statutes to protect against the injuries [Shi] claims, and as such, there is no cause of action under Government Code section 815.6.” Shi opposed the City’s demurrer, and the City replied. C. Demurrer Ruling The trial court sustained the City’s demurrer in a written ruling. The court granted both parties’ requests for judicial notice of legislative history materials. However, the court stated, “When interpreting a statute, the Court may only look to extrinsic evidence if the statute is ambiguous. [Citation.] Here, neither party has argued that the statute is ambiguous and, thus, the Court will look to only the plain meaning of the statute.” The court found that “the purpose of [former] section 65852.2 and section 66317, as demonstrated by the plain meaning of the statute, was to alleviate California’s housing crisis by streamlining the permitting process for the building of ADUs, not to protect individuals from the additional costs created by permitting and approval delays. The statute aims to create more houses for California residents, not protect the investments of individuals 5 who choose to build ADUs. While [Shi] argues that not allowing for a private right of action under [former section] 65852.2 and [section] 66317 would render the statutes ineffective, plaintiffs have succeeded in bringing writs of mandate against cities that fail to properly permit ADUs. (Riddick v. City of Malibu (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 956, 965.) Thus, the Court finds that [former] section 65852.2 and section 66317 do not protect against the harms the FAC alleges.” The court therefore sustained the City’s demurrer with leave to amend. Shi elected not to further amend his complaint. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the City, and Shi timely appealed. DISCUSSION “‘We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a demurrer and examine the operative complaint to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.’” (Optronic Technologies, Inc. v. Celestron Acquisition, LLC (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 770, 782.) Shi asserted a cause of action under section 815.6 of the Government Claims Act. That cause of action “has three elements that must be satisfied to impose public entity liability: (1) a mandatory duty was imposed on the public entity by an enactment; (2) the enactment was designed to protect against the particular kind of injury allegedly suffered; and (3) the breach of the mandatory statutory duty proximately caused the injury.” 5 (B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168, 179.) The parties do not dispute the first and third elements. Thus, we assume without deciding that (1) section 66317 imposed a mandatory duty on 5 “Enactment” includes a statute, ordinance, or regulation. (§ 810.6.) Section 66317 is an enactment. 6 the City to ministerially approve Shi’s ADU permit in a timely manner, and (2) a breach of that duty caused Shi’s injuries. The issue before us, therefore, is the second element under section 815.6, whether the mandatory duty in section 66317 was designed to protect against the injuries Shi suffered. To meet the second element of section 815.6, a “plaintiff must show the injury is ‘“one of the consequences which the [enacting body] sought to prevent through imposing the alleged mandatory duty.””’ (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 499 (Haggis).) Notably, this question focuses on the Legislature’s intent in imposing the duty—not its intent in enacting the statute. “Our inquiry in this regard goes to the legislative purpose of imposing the duty. That the enactment ‘confers some benefit’ on the class to which plaintiff belongs is not enough; if the benefit is ‘incidental’ to the enactment’s protective purpose, the enactment cannot serve as a predicate for liability under section 815.6.” (Ibid.) “We must, therefore, examine the language, function and apparent purpose of [the statute] to determine if [it] creates a mandatory duty designed to protect against the kind of injury plaintiff allegedly suffered here.” (Id. at p. 500.) These are statutory interpretation issues, which we consider de novo as a matter of law. (Fix the City, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 957, 972.) We do not find statutory interpretation difficult here. Section 66317 imposes a mandatory duty on local governments to promptly and ministerially consider and approve ADU permits. Intended beneficiaries of that duty are applicants for ADU permits—people like Shi. Allowing permit applicants to receive the benefit of ministerial approval of an ADU without discretionary requirements and burdensome local regulations is not “incidental” to section 66317. It is the point of section 66317. 7 To state the obvious, permit applicants like Shi seek the permits that local governments must timely and ministerially approve under section 66317. The permit applicant receives the direct benefit of timely and ministerial approval. If the permit is not timely and ministerially approved, the applicant suffers. The mandatory duty (ministerial approval) is directly designed to protect against the kind of injury Shi suffered (the City’s failure to timely and ministerially consider and approve a permit). Thus, under Haggis, Shi does not seek an “incidental” benefit. We believe section 66317’s text unambiguously compels that interpretation. But were there any doubt, related statutory provisions concerning ADUs confirm it. “To ascertain legislative intent, we consider the words [of a statute] in the context of the statutory framework as a whole, and seek ‘where reasonably possible, [to] harmonize statutes, reconcile seeming inconsistencies in them, and construe them to give force and effect to all of their provisions.”’ (Michael S. Yu, a Law Corp. v. Superior Court (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 636, 646.) In section 66310, the Legislature expressly stated that “[ADUs] are … an essential component of California’s housing supply.” (§ 66310, subd. (h).) Among other reasons for this conclusion, the Legislature found that “[h]omeowners who create accessory dwelling units benefit from added income, and an increased sense of security.” (Id., subd. (c).) In section 66311, the Legislature declared its “intent” to establish that local regulations governing ADUs “are not so arbitrary, excessive, or burdensome so as to unreasonably restrict the ability of homeowners to create [ADUs].” (§ 66311.) Put differently, the Legislature has stated expressly that its provisions encouraging the timely construction of ADUs are also intended to benefit homeowners who construct them. 8 Although we do not rely on it because the statute is unambiguous, we note that the legislative history also supports our interpretation.6 Shi points us to the legislative history of Senate Bill No. 1069 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1069), which enacted the predecessor provision to section 66317. An assembly committee analysis explained that “SB 1069 proposes a common- sense, cost-effective approach that will allow homeowners to share empty rooms in their homes and property, add incomes to meet family budgets, improve the safety of accessory dwellings, and make good use of existing infill property across California while easing the housing crisis.” (Assem. Com. on Housing and Community Development, Analysis of SB 1069, June 15, 2016, p. 6.) Another analysis described a need for SB 1069 as arising because “some local governments have placed onerous requirements on individuals that want to construct these units on their property.” (Sen. Com. on Governance and Finance, Analysis of SB 1069, April 20, 2016, p. 4.) In opposition, the City asserts that “the ADU statutes were designed to alleviate the housing crisis, not create a private right of action” for private homeowners. The City also notes that “there is no reference to damages or compensation for delays” in the ADU statutes’ permitting provisions. This argument misses the point. Shi does not assert that the “ADU statutes” create a private right of action. Instead, he argues that they create a ministerial duty, which, in turn, allows him to bring a claim under section 6 Shi relies heavily on legislative history in his briefing. The City argues that Shi forfeited these arguments by failing to argue below that the statutes are ambiguous. The decision to consider legislative history in connection with analyzing the construction of a statute is ultimately ours, not the parties’. Here, while we do not rely upon legislative history because the statute is unambiguous, we choose to discuss that history for the sake of clarifying our statutory interpretation. (See, e.g., Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor America (2025) 17 Cal.5th 592, 609, fn. 10.) 9 815.6. For the reasons given above, we agree with Shi’s argument. Thus, it is immaterial that section 66317 does not itself create a private right of action or provide for damages for delays. “It is section 815.6, not the predicate enactment, that creates the private right of action.” (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 499–500, italics omitted; see also Henderson v. Newport- Mesa Unified School Dist. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 478, 494 [explaining that the trial court “confused the issue of whether the statute imposes a mandatory duty with the issue of whether it specifies a particular remedy. Those are two distinct questions, and the test for determining the existence of a private right of action [under § 815.6] does not include any requirement that a statute actually specify a remedy”].) The City also argues that the Legislature enacted section 66317 and related provisions to help California solve its broader housing crisis. To that extent, the City is correct. Section 66310 states that as “California faces a severe housing crisis,” ADUs are “a valuable form of housing in California” and “an essential component of California’s housing supply.” (§ 66310, subds. (e), (a), (h).) But that the Legislature wanted ADUs built to alleviate the housing crisis does not mean that section 66317 was not intended to protect homeowners. To the contrary. The means by which the Legislature sought to alleviate the housing crisis through section 66317 was to encourage homeowners to apply for permits and build ADUs without undue interference from local governments. Significantly, section 66317 does not place a duty upon local agencies to alleviate the housing crisis. Rather, section 66317 places a duty on local governments to consider and approve permits ministerially. Thus, as we explained above, permit seekers are the direct and intended beneficiaries of the relevant duty—what matters for the second 10 element of a claim under section 815.6. This is so even if the Legislature also intended section 66317 to have broader beneficial effects on California’s housing supply. Finally, the City contends this case is similar to Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th 490. We disagree. The issue in Haggis was whether the plaintiff there, a subsequent purchaser of a property, could sue the City of Los Angeles for failing to comply with a ministerial duty to record instability notices issued to the property’s former owners. (Id. at pp. 495–497.) The Supreme Court, based on a detailed analysis of the relevant statute, found that the purpose of the recordation requirement was to encourage existing landowners to perform stabilization work, not to protect subsequent purchasers. (Id. at pp. 502–503.) The facts of Haggis have little to do with this case. In sum, section 66317 was designed to protect against the delays that Shi suffered. Shi adequately alleged a cause of action under section 815.6. The trial court erred in sustaining the City’s demurrer. DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed. Shi is entitled to recover his costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION DAUM, J. We concur: 11 ZUKIN, P. J. MORI, J. 12