Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 152-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 1 of 67 FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-12160 ____________________ HM FLORIDA-ORL, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus GOVERNOR OF FLORIDA, et al., Defendants, SECRETARY OF THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 6:23-cv-00950-GAP-LHP ____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 152-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 2 of 67 2 Opinion of the Court 23-12160 Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, BRANCH, GRANT, LUCK, LAGOA, BRASHER, ABUDU, KIDD, and TJOFLAT, ∗ Circuit Judges. BRASHER, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the Court in which WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH, LUCK, LAGOA, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges, joined, and in which NEWSOM and GRANT, Circuit Judges, joined except for Part III.A. GRANT, Circuit Judge, filed a concurring opinion in which NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, joined. ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion in which JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, ABUDU, and KIDD, Circuit Judges, joined. ABUDU, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion. BRASHER, Circuit Judge 1: This appeal is about the constitutionality of Florida’s Protec- tion of Children Act. The Act makes it a misdemeanor to “know- ingly admit a child to an adult live performance.” FLA. STAT. § 827.11(3)-(4). The Act defines an “adult live performance” as a live performance that depicts “nudity, sexual conduct, sexual ex- citement, or specific sexual activities [as defined], lewd conduct, or the lewd exposure of prosthetic or imitation genitals or breasts” ∗ Senior Circuit Judge Tjoflat elected to participate in this decision, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). 1 Six judges join this opinion in full (Chief Judge William Pryor and Judges Branch, Luck, Lagoa, Brasher, and Tjoflat). Two judges join this opinion ex- cept for Part III.A (Judges Newsom and Grant). USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 152-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 3 of 67 23-12160 Opinion of the Court 3 and meets three additional criteria. Id. § 827.11(1)(a). The three ad- ditional criteria are that the performance “[p]redominantly appeals to a prurient, shameful, or morbid interest,” “[i]s patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community of [Florida] as a whole with respect to what is suitable material or conduct for the age of the child present,” and “[t]aken as a whole, is without serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for the age of the child present.” Id. § 827.11(1)(a)(1)-(3). The restaurant Hamburger Mary’s sued to enjoin the Act’s enforcement under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Specif- ically, Hamburger Mary’s takes issue with two parts of the defini- tion of “adult live performance.” First, Hamburger Mary’s argues that the use of the word “lewd” makes the Act overbroad and vague, expanding the ban beyond speech that may be constitution- ally regulated as obscenity. Second, Hamburger Mary’s argues that the use of the phrase “the age of the child present” in two of the Act’s criteria makes it unconstitutionally overbroad and vague, as it imposes an age-variable standard for testing whether speech is obscene. The district court agreed with Hamburger Mary’s and preliminarily enjoined the Florida Department of Business and Pro- fessional Regulation Secretary, Melanie Griffin, from enforcing it against anyone. After a divided panel of this Court affirmed, HM Fla.-ORL, LLC v. Governor of Fla., 137 F.4th 1207 (11th Cir.), we granted re- hearing en banc to consider the scope of the district court’s injunc- tion and the Act’s constitutionality. See HM Fla.-ORL, LLC v. Sec’y of USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 152-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 4 of 67 4 Opinion of the Court 23-12160 Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Pro. Regul., 160 F.4th 1282 (11th Cir. 2025). We also voted en banc to stay the preliminary injunction except as it applied to Hamburger Mary’s. See Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 861 (2025). After additional briefing and with the benefit of oral argu- ment, we are convinced the district court erred in preliminarily en- joining the enforcement of the Act. This is so for two reasons. First, the district court lacked authority to impose a universal injunction that prevented the enforcement of the Act against everyone in Flor- ida. The Supreme Court has held that a so-called “universal injunc- tion” “falls outside the bounds of a federal court’s equitable author- ity under the Judiciary Act,” id. at 847, and we see no exception that would apply in this case. Second, Hamburger Mary’s was not enti- tled to even a more limited preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the Act because its claims do not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. The Supreme Court of Florida’s definition of “lewd” eliminates any overbreadth, and the use of the phrase “age of the child present” does not render the Act unconsti- tutionally vague. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s prelim- inary injunction in its entirety. I. In 2023, the Florida Legislature passed the Act, making it a misdemeanor offense to “knowingly admit a child to an adult live performance.” FLA. STAT. § 827.11(3)-(4). The Act defines the term “adult live performance” as a live show that “depicts or simulates USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 152-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 5 of 67 23-12160 Opinion of the Court 5 nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or specific sexual activi- ties,” as defined under Florida law, as well as “lewd conduct” or the “lewd exposure of prosthetic or imitation genitals or breasts.” Id. § 827.11(1)(a). The Act is limited to adult live performances that “[p]redominantly appeal[] to a prurient, shameful, or morbid inter- est,” are “patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community of [Florida] as a whole with respect to what is suitable material or conduct for the age of the child present,” and “[t]aken as a whole, [are] without serious literary, artistic, political, or scien- tific value for the age of the child present.” Id. § 827.11(1)(a)(1)-(3). The restaurant Hamburger Mary’s sued Florida, its gover- nor, and Melanie Griffin in her official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. All defendants except Griffin were later dismissed. Ham- burger Mary’s facially challenged the Act on First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment free-speech and void-for-vagueness grounds. It argued that “[t]he uncertainty about what specific con- duct this law prohibits” made it unconstitutionally broad and vague. Doc. 1 at 18-20. The restaurant believed that the Act pro- hibited it from admitting minors to its drag shows. Hamburger Mary’s also moved for a temporary restraining order and prelimi- nary injunction. Doc. 6. In its complaint, Hamburger Mary’s explained that it offered a variety of drag performances, which it defines as shows in which performers wear “clothing more conventionally worn by the other sex.” Doc. 1 at 6 (citation omitted). Their shows included a “family friendly” one on Sundays where children were invited to attend. Id. USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 152-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 6 of 67 6 Opinion of the Court 23-12160 If a show was “not suitable for children,” Hamburger Mary’s an- nounced it in advance and barred children from attending. Id. at 19. But Hamburger Mary’s also asserts that Florida has a history of overzealous enforcement of obscenity and related laws against drag venues. So, in response to the Act, Hamburger Mary’s can- celed its family drag shows and barred children from attending its other shows. Id. at 18-19. It also alleged a “20% decrease in book- ings.” Doc. 28 at 3; Doc. 1 at 18. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted the preliminary injunction. See HM Fla.-ORL, LLC v. Griffin, 679 F. Supp. 3d 1332 (M.D. Fla. 2023). It held that Ham- burger Mary’s had established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits because the Act did not survive strict scrutiny and was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. Id. at 1341-44. The district court then enjoined Griffin from enforcing the Act against anyone in the State. Id. at 1345. Griffin appealed. A divided panel of this Court affirmed the district court’s universal preliminary injunction. See HM Fla.-ORL, 137 F.4th at 1248. We vacated the panel opinion and ordered re- hearing en banc. HM Fla.-ORL, 160 F.4th 1282 (mem.). We also stayed the injunction to the extent it extended to nonparties unas- sociated with Hamburger Mary’s. We asked the parties to file briefs addressing “the scope of the district court’s injunction and the district court’s conclusion that Hamburger Mary’s First Amendment claim is likely to succeed on the merits.” USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 152-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 7 of 67 23-12160 Opinion of the Court 7 II. A party is entitled to injunctive relief if (1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) it will suffer irreparable in- jury without the injunction; (3) the threatened injury to the mo- vant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000). We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction. Gonzalez v. Governor of Ga., 978 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020). In conducting our review, we evaluate legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. Id. We re- view de novo questions of constitutional law. Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 857 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2017). III. Hamburger Mary’s lawsuit is a pre-enforcement facial chal- lenge, and the problems with pre-enforcement facial litigation are well known. “For a host of good reasons, courts usually handle constitutional claims case by case, not en masse.” Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 723 (2024). “‘Claims of facial invalidity often rest on speculation’ about the law’s coverage and its future enforcement.” Id. (citing Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008)). “And facial chal- USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 152-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 8 of 67 8 Opinion of the Court 23-12160 lenges threaten to short circuit the democratic process by prevent- ing duly enacted laws from being implemented in constitutional ways.” Id. (citation modified). This case stands as a cautionary tale. Hamburger Mary’s sued because it believed certain words in the Act—“lewd” and “age of the child present”—were so broad or vague as to apply to chil- dren attending its shows. But the State has never threatened Ham- burger Mary’s with prosecution.2 And no state court has ever inter- preted the Act to justify Hamburger Mary’s fear. Likewise, even if it applied by its terms to Hamburger Mary’s shows, no court has addressed whether the Act could constitutionally do so. See Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1989) (“It is not the usual judicial practice, . . . nor do we consider it generally 2 In fact, the State says that the Act’s connection to Hamburger Mary’s is so tenuous that it lacks standing to even bring its claims. We disagree. At the preliminary injunction stage, Hamburger Mary’s need only establish that it is “likely” to have standing. Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 58 (2024). And, be- cause unconstitutional laws may chill speech prior to enforcement, the re- quirements for standing are “somewhat more lenient for facial challenges” in the First Amendment context. Bischoff v. Osceola County, 222 F.3d 874, 883 (11th Cir. 2000). To bring a pre-enforcement challenge, a plaintiff must show (1) that he has “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest,” (2) that his conduct is “arguably proscribed,” and (3) that he is subject to a “credible threat of enforcement.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 159, 161-62 (2014) (citation omitted). Here, based on the allegations in the complaint, Hamburger Mary’s allegedly canceled its “family drag shows” and lost twenty percent of its bookings. Doc. 1 at 18-19. Considering all allegations in the complaint in its favor, we think Hamburger Mary’s “likely” has standing on the current record. USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 152-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 9 of 67 23-12160 Opinion of the Court 9 desirable, to proceed to an overbreadth issue unnecessarily—that is, before it is determined that the statute would be valid as ap- plied.”). The district court’s universal injunction calcifies this un- certainty: as long as it is in effect, there will be no threat of enforce- ment against anyone, and no state or federal court will ever answer these questions with respect to Hamburger Mary’s or anyone else. We believe the district court’s preliminary injunction must be vacated in its entirety. We will address the issues in the order we directed the parties to brief them. First, we conclude that the district court lacked authority to issue a universal injunction. Sec- ond, we hold that Hamburger Mary’s was not entitled to a nar- rower preliminary injunction because its claims are unlikely to suc- ceed on the merits. A. We begin by addressing the authority for the district court to impose a universal injunction. “A universal injunction can be justified only as an exercise of equitable authority.” CASA, 606 U.S. at 841. Because this issue goes to the district court’s authority, we address it first. See id. at 839 (addressing scope of injunctive relief before reaching merits); Trump v. Barbara, No. 25-365 (U.S. June 30, 2026) (addressing the merits). We conclude that the district court erred in granting an injunction that applied against anyone and eve- ryone in Florida. The Supreme Court addressed the scope of a federal court’s authority to enter a universal injunction in CASA. It reasoned that, because a court’s power to issue equitable remedies comes from USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 152-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 10 of 67 10 Opinion of the Court 23-12160 the Judiciary Act of 1789, “the statutory grant encompasses only those sorts of equitable remedies traditionally accorded by courts of equity at our country’s inception.” CASA, 606 U.S. at 841 (cita- tion modified). It held that because universal injunctions lack a “historical pedigree,” courts do not have the authority to issue them. Id. at 847. Instead, they “may administer complete relief be- tween the parties.” Id. at 851 (citation omitted); see also Georgia v. Pres- ident of the United States, 46 F.4th 1283, 1303 (11th Cir. 2022) (injunc- tive relief should be “no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.” (citation omitted)). Hamburger Mary’s asked for, and the district court granted, a universal injunction forbidden by CASA. See 606 U.S. at 851. The district court enjoined the defendants “from instituting, maintain- ing, or prosecuting any enforcement proceedings under the Act.” Doc. 30 at 25 (emphasis added). The district court later explained that “the injunction necessarily must extend to protect all Floridi- ans,” not merely Hamburger Mary’s and its associates, from the enforcement of the Act. Doc. 41 at 10-11. The district court reasoned that a universal injunction was permissible because it applied statewide as opposed to nationwide. But there is no statewide-injunction exception to CASA. CASA’s holding—that universal injunctions exceed a district court’s au- thority—applies equally to statewide injunctions. The Court in CASA made clear that its ruling was not limited to so-called “na- USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 152-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 11 of 67 23-12160 Opinion of the Court 11 tionwide injunctions,” for the “difference between a traditional in- junction and a universal injunction is not so much where it applies, but whom it protects.” 606 U.S. at 837 n.1 (citation omitted). Addi- tionally, in support of its holding, the Court approvingly cited Scott v. Donald, see id. at 843, which concerned an injunction against a state law that the Court restricted “to the parties named as plaintiff and defendants in the bill.” Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 109, 117 (1897). For its part, Hamburger Mary’s argues that the district court had authority to contemplate imposing a universal injunction be- cause it brought a facial overbreadth claim. We disagree. The rea- soning in CASA had nothing to do with a plaintiff’s cause of action. Rather, it concerned the remedies authorized under the Judiciary Act. And, when the Supreme Court held in CASA that federal courts do not have equitable authority to issue relief to nonparties, it did not carve out an exception for First Amendment overbreadth challenges. See CASA, 606 U.S. at 841-47. On the contrary, CASA approvingly cited precedent in which the Supreme Court upheld an injunction of an overbroad municipal ordinance limited “to the particular federal plaintiffs.” Id. at 844 (quoting Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975)). The Court’s failure to leave room for an overbreadth exception is especially telling considering that it took care to exempt the Administrative Procedure Act from its rul- ing. Id. at 847 n.10. Hamburger Mary’s argument also misunderstands the doc- trine of overbreadth. The purpose of the overbreadth doctrine is to USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 152-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 12 of 67 12 Opinion of the Court 23-12160 allow a plaintiff to obtain relief from the operation of a facially un- constitutional statute, even though the statute is constitutional as ap- plied to the plaintiff. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 484-85; Forsyth County v. Na- tionalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992). But the fact that the overbreadth doctrine permits litigants to challenge a statute be- cause of its application to others is unrelated to the district court’s statutory authority to contemplate a particular remedy. In every overbreadth case, the plaintiff still wants the enforcement of the statute enjoined as to itself. In other words, no matter the substance of a plaintiff’s cause of action, a district court has equitable author- ity under the Judiciary Act only to provide the plaintiff with “com- plete relief.” Georgia, 46 F.4th at 1303 (citation omitted); United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 478 (1995) (grant- ing limited injunction in facial First Amendment challenge where a “narrower remedy” provided complete relief). B. Having determined that the district court lacked authority to impose a universal injunction against all enforcement of the Act, we now decide whether it could have imposed a narrower injunc- tion just as to Hamburger Mary’s and its performers. To do so, we must determine if Hamburger Mary’s has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. See Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1176. Hamburger Mary’s brought facial overbreadth and vague- ness claims against the Act. “The type of ‘legislative overkill’ most commonly associated with ‘overbreadth’ results when lawmakers define the scope of a statute to reach both unprotected expression USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 152-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 13 of 67 23-12160 Opinion of the Court 13 as well as, at least potentially, protected speech.” Am. Booksellers v. Webb, 919 F.2d 1493, 1502 (11th Cir. 1990). “Overbroad legislation need not be vague, indeed it may be too clear; its constitutional infirmity is that it sweeps protected activity within its proscrip- tion.” M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir. 1983). On the other hand, “[a] law that does not reach constitutionally protected conduct and therefore satisfies the overbreadth test may nevertheless be challenged on its face as unduly vague, in violation of due process.” Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982). A statute is facially vague when it is plagued with “hopeless indeterminacy,” Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 598 (2015), or when vagueness “permeates the text” of the law, City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999). Hamburger Mary’s choice to litigate this case as a facial chal- lenge comes at a cost. Because facial challenges often rest on spec- ulation about the law’s coverage and future enforcement, they are “hard to win.” Moody, 603 U.S. at 723. Ordinarily, a plaintiff cannot succeed on a facial challenge unless he “establishes that no set of circumstances exists under which the law would be valid, or he shows that the law lacks a plainly legitimate sweep.” Id. (citation modified). In the First Amendment context, however, the standard for facial challenges is looser, though still demanding. To succeed, a plaintiff must prove that the “statute ‘prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech’ relative to its ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 770 (2023) (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008)). To succeed on a USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 152-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 14 of 67 14 Opinion of the Court 23-12160 facial challenge, a plaintiff must prove that the law’s unconstitu- tional applications are “realistic, not fanciful,” and are “substan- tially disproportionate to the statute’s lawful sweep.” Id. In the ab- sence of a “lopsided ratio,” courts may not facially invalidate a stat- ute. Id. at 770, 784. Applying these standards, we hold that the Act does not fa- cially violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments. We begin by explaining that the Act tracks the Miller standard, as adapted for material obscene as to minors. We then address and reject Ham- burger Mary’s arguments for why the Act is unconstitutional de- spite the Miller standard. Specifically, we address Hamburger Mary’s arguments that, despite the Miller standard, the Act’s use of the word “lewd” and its reference to “the age of the child” makes it unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Because the Act is fa- cially constitutional, the district court could not have granted a more limited preliminary injunction against its enforcement. 1. The Constitution protects speech, but not obscenity. The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. As a general matter, this provision forbids the government from “restrict[ing] expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (citation modified). But the First Amendment has never been treated as absolute. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961). The Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]here are certain USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 152-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 15 of 67 23-12160 Opinion of the Court 15 well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). It has been “categorically settled” that obscenity is one such class of unprotected speech. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). In Miller, the Court limited the category of obscenity to sex- ual material that meets each of the following three requirements: (a) “the average person, applying contemporary community stand- ards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,” (b) “the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law,” as written or “authoritatively construed,” and (c) “the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Id. at 24 (citation modified). Although Miller concerned a state law regulating “adult” ma- terial, id. at 16, it recognized that states have a “legitimate interest” in prohibiting the exhibition of obscene material to prevent “expo- sure to juveniles,” id. at 18-19. For support, the Court cited Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Id. at 19. That precedent upheld a prohibition on the sale to minors of sexual material obscene from a child’s perspective. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 645, 647. Because of “its strong and abiding interest in youth,” a state may regulate the dissemination of material that is obscene for minors, even though it is not obscene as to adults. Interstate Cir., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968) (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629). The Court has USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 152-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 16 of 67 16 Opinion of the Court 23-12160 since consistently reaffirmed that states have “broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults.” Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978) (citing Ginsberg as justi- fying the “special treatment” of indecent broadcasting). Consistent with these precedents, the Court has adapted the Miller test for minors, “broaden[ing]” its definition of obscenity to cover material obscene from a child’s perspective. Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Paxton, 606 U.S. 461, 474 (2025). Under Paxton’s “Miller-for- minors” test, a state may prevent minors from accessing works that “(a) taken as a whole, and under contemporary community stand- ards, appeal to the prurient interest of minors; (b) depict or describe specifically defined sexual conduct in a way that is patently offen- sive for minors; and (c) taken as a whole, lack serious literary, artis- tic, political, or scientific value for minors.” Id. These restrictions “trigger no heightened First Amendment scrutiny and are subject only to rational-basis review, even though they encompass speech that is not obscene for adults.” Id. (citation modified). For our part, this Court has likewise held that “a state may deny minors access to materials acceptable for adults but obscene for minors.” Webb, 919 F.2d at 1501. In Webb, we upheld against vagueness and overbreadth challenges a Georgia law that regulated the display of adult material at bookstores deemed “harmful to mi- nors.” Id. at 1505-06. (The law that prohibited the sale of such ma- terial to minors was unchallenged on appeal. Id. at 1506). We rec- ognized that, no matter the rights of adults, “[m]inors have no right USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 152-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 17 of 67 23-12160 Opinion of the Court 17 to view or in any way consume this material—even if they do not purchase or otherwise take control of it.” Id. at 1501. Applying these precedents, the Act is a straightforward reg- ulation of obscenity. The Act prohibits knowingly admitting a child to an “adult live performance.” FLA. STAT. § 827.11(3). The Act de- fines such performances as “any show, exhibition, or other presen- tation in front of a live audience which, in whole or in part, depicts or simulates nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or specific sexual activities . . ., lewd conduct, or the lewd exposure of pros- thetic or imitation genitals or breasts.” Id. § 827.11(1)(a). The kind of conduct the Act covers, as defined by Florida, fits squarely within the “permissible scope” of obscenity regulation. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. All the enumerated activities refer to sexual subject matter. For example, Florida law defines “nudity” as “the showing of the human male or female genitals” or “the depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state,” FLA. STAT. § 847.001(11), “sexual conduct” as “actual or simulated sexual in- tercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturba- tion, or sadomasochistic abuse,” id. § 847.001(19), “sexual excite- ment” as “the condition of the human male or female genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal,” id. § 847.001(20), and “specific sexual activities” as the “exhibition” of “[h]uman gen- itals in the state of sexual stimulation or arousal” as well as the breasts and buttocks, “[a]cts of human masturbation, sexual inter- course, sodomy, cunnilingus, fellatio, or any excretory function,” USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 152-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 18 of 67 18 Opinion of the Court 23-12160 and “[t]he fondling or erotic touching of human genitals,” id. § 847.001(23). Of course, not every depiction of sexual conduct is obscene. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975) (“Clearly all nudity cannot be deemed obscene even as to minors.”). But here, enumerated sexual activities are proscribed by the Act only if they predominately appeal to the prurient interest, are patently offen- sive to prevailing adult standards with respect to what is suitable for that child’s age, and lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for that child’s age. FLA. STAT. § 827.11(1)(a)(1)-(3). So, under a straightforward reading of the Act, nudity will count as obscenity only if it satisfies the three elements of the Miller-for-mi- nors test. Under Supreme Court precedent, the Constitution re- quires no more. Paxton, 606 U.S. at 474. Hamburger Mary’s complains that the Act, unlike the law upheld in Ginsberg, does not allow an exception for parental con- sent. But neither the Supreme Court nor our Circuit has ever held that a regulation of materials obscene for minors must contain a parental consent exception. Neither Miller nor Paxton referenced such an exception. And the law we upheld in Webb also did not contain one. After all, whether material is obscene—and therefore proscribable under the Constitution—has nothing to do with whether an adult wants a child to view the material. Moreover, be- cause we are addressing only Hamburger Mary’s free speech rights, we need not and do not decide whether parents have a right under USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 152-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 19 of 67 23-12160 Opinion of the Court 19 state or federal law to expose their children to obscene material. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 1014 (2021) (Parents’ Bill of Rights). Because the Act tracks the Miller standard as adapted for mi- nors, it receives rational basis review and is presumptively consti- tutional. Paxton, 606 U.S. at 474; F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993). 2. To escape the obvious implications of Miller, Hamburger Mary’s attacks the Act’s use of the word “lewd.” It emphasizes the lack of a statutory definition and argues that the term, read in con- text, reaches protected expression. Hamburger Mary’s says that the scope of “lewd” makes the Act overbroad and vague. We disagree for two reasons. First, Hamburger Mary’s is wrong when it complains that “lewd” is undefined. Miller itself recognized that its specificity re- quirement may be met when a court “authoritatively construe[s]” state law. 413 U.S. at 24. And that is exactly what we have here. The Florida Supreme Court in Chesebrough v. State, a precedent pre- dating both Miller and the Act, authoritatively construed the mean- ing of the word “lewd.” 255 So. 2d 675, 677 (Fla. 1971). In Chesebrough, the state law at issue prohibited the commission of lewd acts in the presence of minors. Id. at 676-77. The Court de- fined “lewd” as “gross indecency with respect to the sexual rela- tions” and “the unlawful indulgence of lust, signifying that form of immorality which has a relation to sexual impurity.” Id. at 677; see USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 152-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2026 Page: 20 of 67 20 Opinion of the Court 23-12160 Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404, 410-11 (Fla. 1991) (reaffirming Chesebrough). We can, and should, import this definition into the current Act. Florida legislators are presumed to operate with relevant judi- cial precedents in mind when enacting subsequent legislation. Ford v. Wainwright, 451 So. 2d 471, 475 (Fla. 1984). And the words sur- rounding “lewd” in this statute suggest that the Chesebrough defini- tion is the right one. See Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., 432 U.S. 312, 322 (1977) (“[W]ords grouped in a list should be given related meaning.” (emphasis added)); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 195 (2012) (same). Here, the phrase “lewd conduct” is written after the Act lists “nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or specific sex- ual activities as those terms are defined in s. 847.001.” FLA. STAT. § 827.11(1)(a). Because words grouped in a list should be given a related meaning, we can reasonably construe “lewd conduct” as something similar to the other kinds of depictions of sexual con- duct listed in the Act. Hamburger Mary’s only contrary argument is that Chesebrough’s definition of “lewd” would make other words in the Act surplusage. It says that the other enumerated activities suppos- edly exhaust the kinds of sexual conduct states may permissibly regulate. But this interpretation of “lewd conduct” elevates the rule against surplusage over more apposite canons of construction. It is true that we do not “needlessly” read a statute in a way that renders language superfluous. Barton v. U.S.