Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D20-2511 _____________________________ LASHONTA RENEA JACKSON, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Vontavia Kiara Robinson, Deceased, on behalf of multiple beneficiaries, Appellant, v. THE FLORIDA HIGHWAY PATROL, a Division of the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County. Monica Brasington, Judge. November 24, 2021 LONG, J. Lashonta Renea Jackson, as personal representative of the estate of Vontavia Kiara Robinson, appeals a trial court’s order granting summary judgment for the Florida Highway Patrol. At issue on appeal is whether the Florida Highway Patrol owed a common law duty to protect Robinson on a public interstate during a low visibility incident. The trial court found the Florida Highway Patrol owed no individualized duty to Robinson and entered judgment for the Florida Highway Patrol. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion and affirm. On January 28, 2012, the Florida Highway Patrol responded to reports of reduced visibility on I-75 due to a nearby fire. Troopers placed “Fog/Smoke” signs, and then eventually closed the highway after a traffic crash. The closure began just after midnight and went into the early morning hours of January 29. After approximately three and a half hours, troopers determined the highway was safe to reopen. Thirty minutes after reopening, a trooper observed “solid smoke and fog” while driving the highway and “heard accidents occurring behind him.” I-75 was shut down again. One of these accidents caused the death of Robinson. The parties agree that neither the Florida Highway Patrol, nor any of its members, had any communication or contact with Robinson before or during the time I-75 was closed or after it reopened. Jackson, as personal representative for Robinson’s estate, sued the Florida Highway Patrol in tort for negligence. In government tort suits, the plaintiff must prove “the defendant breached a common-law or statutory tort duty owed to the plaintiff individually and not a tort duty owed to the public generally.” Holodak v. Lockwood, 726 So. 2d 815, 816 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). “Patrolling the state highways, controlling the flow of traffic, and enforcing the traffic laws are duties FHP owes to the general public, as opposed to an individual person.” Pollock v. Florida Dep’t of Highway Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928, 935 (Fla. 2004). “The responsibility to enforce the laws for the good of the public cannot engender a duty to act with care toward any one individual, unless an official assumes a special duty with regard to that person.” Id. Because the Florida Highway Patrol had no contact with Robinson whatsoever, no special duty was created. See id. at 935–36 (explaining a special duty arises “when law enforcement officers become directly involved in circumstances which place people within a ‘zone of risk’” or “makes a direct representation to a plaintiff”). Nor was the low visibility incident caused, created, or exacerbated by the Florida Highway Patrol. City of St. Petersburg v. Collom, 419 So. 2d 1082, 1086 (Fla. 1982) (“When such a condition is knowingly created by a governmental entity, then it 2 reasonably follows that the governmental entity has the responsibility to protect the public from that condition.”). In these circumstances, the Florida Highway Patrol had no duty to Robinson aside from its general duty to the public. We therefore affirm. AFFIRMED. ROWE, C.J., and WINOKUR, J., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Julie Aleve Fine and Jack J. Fine of Fine, Farkash & Parlapiano, PA, Gainesville, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Britt Thomas, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. 3