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Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas OPINION No. 04-25-00820-CV Skipton S. REYNOLDS, Appellant v. Estella MARTINEZ and Michael Martinez, and ABMF, LLC, Appellees From the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2024-CI-09984 Honorable Nicole Garza, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Velia J. Meza, Justice Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice Delivered and Filed: November 10, 2026 REVERSED AND RENDERED A Colorado notary challenges personal jurisdiction over claims he negligently notarized a deed in Colorado. The deed conveyed land in Texas. Because we conclude the notary’s contacts with Texas are not substantially connected to the operative facts of the underlying litigation, we reverse and render. 04-25-00820-CV BACKGROUND Estella and Michael Martinez owned a vacant lot in Bexar County, Texas. According to the pleadings, an unidentified woman impersonated the Martinezes, listed their property for sale, and purported to convey it to ABMF, LLC. The deed, dated January 11, 2023, bore the notary certificate of Skipton Reynolds, a Colorado lawyer and notary. ABMF alleged that Reynolds notarized the deed in Arapahoe County, Colorado and that it was recorded in Bexar County the next day. Vena Homes, LLC began building a house on the lot for ABMF. The Martinezes discovered the construction and told ABMF and Vena Homes that they had not sold the property. Construction stopped, and ABMF gave the Martinezes a quitclaim deed to the property. The resulting litigation included claims that Reynolds notarized the deed without confirming the identity of the individuals purporting to be the Martinezes. 1 Reynolds filed a special appearance challenging personal jurisdiction arguing that his notary credentials were stolen and that he was impersonated. After a hearing, the trial court denied the special appearance. This interlocutory appeal followed. DISCUSSION On appeal Reynolds argues that the facts pleaded by ABMF fail to invoke the Texas long- arm statute. If sufficient, however, he argues that the long-arm statute does not reach notary services performed in Colorado and that he negated the only alleged jurisdictional contact to Texas. 1 Relevant here, a notary public is authorized to take acknowledgments. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 406.016(a)(1); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 121.001(b)(3); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-21-502 (6)–(8). An acknowledgment is the signer’s declaration before the notary that the signer signed the document for its stated purposes. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 121.004(a); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-21-502(1). The notary must know or have satisfactory evidence that the person appearing signed the document and is the person identified in it. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 121.005(a); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-21-505(1). The notary then records the acknowledgment in a certificate. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 121.004(b); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-21-515(1). -2- 04-25-00820-CV A defendant may negate personal jurisdiction by disproving the alleged jurisdictional facts or by showing that those facts, even if true, do not establish jurisdiction. Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 659 (Tex. 2010). For our analysis, we accept the plaintiffs’ jurisdictional allegations as true, including that Reynolds notarized the deed in Colorado knowing that it concerned Texas property and was intended for use in Texas. 1 Personal jurisdiction Whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is a question of law we review de novo. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002). When the trial court issues no findings of fact or conclusions of law, we imply findings necessary to support its ruling if the evidence supports them. Id. at 795. The plaintiff initially must plead allegations bringing the nonresident within the reach of Texas’s long-arm statute. Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 658. The defendant then bears the burden to negate the alleged bases for personal jurisdiction. Id. at 658–59. A defendant may do so by showing that the alleged facts, even if true, do not establish jurisdiction. Id. at 659. Texas courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if the long-arm statute authorizes it and the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with due process. Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 356 (Tex. 1990). Texas’s long-arm statute “reach[es] as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process will allow.” Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991). Thus, “[p]ersonal jurisdiction is proper when [a] nonresident defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum state, and the exercise of jurisdiction comports with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 575 (Tex. 2007) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The “minimum -3- 04-25-00820-CV contacts” required for personal jurisdiction are those showing the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privileges and protections of the forum’s law. Id. A nonresident defendant’s contacts can result in two types of personal jurisdiction. Where the defendant’s contacts are “continuous and systematic” so as to make them “essentially at home in the forum state,” general jurisdiction is established regardless of whether the litigation arises from those contacts. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the defendant’s contacts give rise or relate to the litigation, specific jurisdiction may instead attach. Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575–76 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). The parties agree that Reynolds is not subject to general jurisdiction. We therefore consider whether the alleged facts establish specific jurisdiction. 2 Purposeful availment To satisfy due process, a defendant’s contacts with the forum state must be purposeful, and the defendant must seek some benefit, advantage, or profit through the forum’s laws. Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tex. 2005). We consider only those contacts that are the defendant’s own, not the unilateral activity of a third party. Id. ABMF argues that, by notarizing a deed conveying Texas property, Reynolds purposefully participated in a transaction involving Texas property. ABMF relies on Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., in which a nonresident defendant purchased property in Texas. 278 S.W.3d 333, 339–40 (Tex. 2009). The Texas Supreme Court upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 339–40. In doing so, it contrasted the defendant’s willing purchase of Texas property, which showed purposeful availment, with a customer-initiated sale, as in Michiana, -4- 04-25-00820-CV where the Texas contacts were determined by the unilateral decision of another. Id. at 340 (citing Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 784). In Michiana, an Indiana seller—the defendant—knew that a purchaser would take a recreational vehicle to Texas. 168 S.W.3d at 787. Even so, the purchaser’s choice of destination did not establish purposeful availment by the seller. Id. at 787–88. The court distinguished a seller’s efforts to serve the Texas market from a customer’s unilateral decision to use an out-of- state purchase in Texas. Id. at 785–87. This case is more like Michiana than Retamco. The allegation here is that Reynolds provided notary services in Colorado for a transaction concerning Texas land. The plaintiffs do not allege that Reynolds solicited the transaction or acquired any interest in the property. Notarizing the document was his own conduct, but his knowledge that it would be used in Texas does not, on these facts, establish that Reynolds sought the benefits or protections of Texas law. See Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 787–88. The Texas connection arose from the unilateral choices of the individual seeking his notary services. We conclude that these allegations do not establish purposeful availment. 3 Relatedness Even assuming the alleged contacts could establish purposeful availment, the negligence claims against Reynolds must still be sufficiently connected to those contacts. ABMF—again relying on Retamco—argues that its claims arise directly from Reynolds’s services because the notarization enabled a fraudulent conveyance of Texas land. Due process demands “a substantial connection between [a defendant’s forum] contacts and the operative facts of the litigation.” Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585. Relatedness does not require a strict causal relationship, but it still requires a connection between the defendant’s forum -5- 04-25-00820-CV activities and the particular controversy. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 362 (2021). In Moki Mac, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that an expedition company’s promotional activities in Texas were insufficiently related to claims concerning its guides’ conduct on an Arizona hiking trip. 221 S.W.3d at 585, 588. The court drew support from Brocail v. Anderson, in which a Michigan physician prescribed follow-up treatment for a patient who had returned to Texas. Id. at 588 (discussing Brocail v. Anderson, 132 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied)). The Brocail court held that, because the core of the case—the exercise of medical judgment—occurred in Michigan, merely sending a prescription to Texas was too insubstantial a contact to establish jurisdiction in Texas. Brocail, 132 S.W.3d at 563. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied this approach to legal services in Markette v. X- Ray X-Press Corp., 240 S.W.3d 464, 468–69 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (op. on reh’g). An Indiana attorney advised his Texas client that it could allow a default judgment in Indiana and later challenge personal jurisdiction when enforcement was sought in Texas. Id. at 465–66. The client followed the advice, lost, and then sued for legal malpractice in Texas. Id. at 466. Although the advice concerned Texas law and was communicated to a client in Texas, the attorney exercised his legal judgment and formed his opinions in Indiana. Id. at 468–69. The operative facts thus concerned primarily Indiana contacts; the communication of legal advice to Texas was not substantially connected to the malpractice claim. Id. Our decision in Eakin v. Acosta likewise focused on the professional work underlying the claims. 21 S.W.3d 405, 410 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.), overruled on other grounds by BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 794 & n.1. There a Texas client hired a Florida lawyer to represent -6- 04-25-00820-CV him in a Florida lawsuit. Eakin, 21 S.W.3d at 407. The client complained that the lawyer failed to prepare for trial, call appropriate witnesses, and research applicable law. Id. at 410. Because the lawyer performed that work in Florida, his communications with the client in Texas did not establish a basis for jurisdiction. Id. Here, the claims concern Reynolds’s alleged negligence when notarizing a deed in Colorado. ABMF again points to Retamco for support. But that case concerned Texas property that was essential to a fraudulent-transfer claim against the defendant. 278 S.W.3d at 341. This case is about negligent services, not about a fraudulent transfer claim against Reynolds. The location of the land conveyed in the deed does not bear in any manner on whether Reynolds exercised reasonable care in notarizing the deed, i.e., verifying the signer’s identity. As in Markette, Brocail, and Eakin, these services occurred wholly outside Texas. The alleged Texas contacts—the deed’s subject matter and intended use—are not substantially connected to the operative facts of the claims against Reynolds. See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585, 587–88; Markette, 240 S.W.3d at 468–69; Brocail, 132 S.W.3d at 563; see also Eakin, 21 S.W.3d at 410. Because the alleged facts do not establish specific jurisdiction, the trial court should have granted Reynolds’s special appearance. See Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 659; Markette, 240 S.W.3d at 469. We sustain Reynolds’s second issue and need not address his remaining issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. CONCLUSION We reverse the trial court’s order denying Skipton Reynolds’s special appearance and render judgment dismissing the claims against him for want of personal jurisdiction. Velia J. Meza, Justice -7-