Public Interest Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Meagan Wolfe

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit • August 19, 2026

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Date FiledAugust 19, 2026

Docket24-3258

JudgeBrennanconcurs

StatusPublished

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Full Opinion

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-3258 PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MEAGAN WOLFE, Administrator of the Wisconsin Elections Commission, and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. No. 24-cv-285-jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge. ____________________ ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2025 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2026 ____________________ Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and SYKES, Circuit Judges. SYKES, Circuit Judge. The National Voter Registration Act requires each state to adopt streamlined procedures for citi- zens to register to vote in federal elections. See generally, 52 U.S.C. § 20503(a). As relevant here, the Act also requires states to “make available for public inspection” and 2 No. 24-3258 “photocopying at a reasonable cost” all records pertaining to “programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensur- ing ȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱĜȱȱȱȱȬ ers.” Id. § 20507(i)(1). Some states are exempt from the Act—namely, those that have Ĵed same-day polling-place registration or have not required registration at all since August 1, 1994. Id. § 20503(b). Only a few states qualify for the exemption. Wisconsin is one: It ȱěȱ-day polling-place regis- tration continuously since at least that date. The Public Interest Legal Foundation asked the Wisconsin Elections Commission for a copy of the state’s voter registra- tion list. Because Wisconsin is exempt from the Act, the Commission processed the request under the state public- records law. See WIS. STAT. §§ 6.36(1)(b)(1), 19.35(1). Wisconsin requires the redaction of voters’ birth information and charges a fee to produce the record, up to a maximum of $12,500. Because the statewide voter list is lengthy, the maxi- mum fee applied. The Foundation objected to the fee and redaction, so it sued to invalidate Wisconsin’s exemption and compel the Commission to produce the registration list in accordance with federal law. The suit rests on two novel legal theories. The primary claim is that the Act’s exemption violates the principle of equal state sovereignty as recognized in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). Alternatively, the Foundation alleges that the exemption violates the “congru- ence and proportionality” requirement for legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against the states. See City of Boerne v. Flores, No. 24-3258 3 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The district judge rejected these theories and dismissed the case. We Ĝ. ȱȱȱĴǰȱboth legal theories con- cern the rights of the states. But the Foundation isn’t trying to vindicate states’ rights. Quite the contrary: It has deployed these legal theories against Wisconsin’s interests. We doubt that the prudential doctrine of third-party standing is mallea- ble enough to support this maneuver. But we can bypass that question because the suit is Ě ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯ Shelby County involved a provision in the Voting Rights Act that sin- gled out certain states for onerous regulatory burdens. The exemption at issue here does exactly the opposite: It relieves Wisconsin from federal regulatory burdens because its voter- registration laws already align with federal policy. And the “congruence and proportionality” principle announced in City of Boerne applies to laws enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress adopted the Voter Regis- tration Act under its Elections Clause power. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1. I. Background ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱęȱȬ ization that seeks to promote the integrity of the electoral pro- cess. As part of this mission, the Foundation regularly in- spects state voter rolls looking for the unlawful inclusion of ineligible voters or the unlawful removal of eligible voters. To that end, in January 2024 the Foundation asked the Wisconsin Elections Commission for a copy of the state’s voter registra- tion list pursuant to the National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501 et seq. 4 No. 24-3258 The Act was adopted in 1993 to simplify the process for citizens to register to vote in federal elections. Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273, 275 (1997). It requires each state to provide at least three methods for voter registration: by mail, in person at designated locations, and as part of an application for a driver’s license. § 20503(a); see §§ 20504–06. The Act further directs states to ensure that anyone who submits a “valid voter registration form” at least 30 days before an election is in fact “registered to vote” in that election. § 20507(a)(1). And ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĜȱ list of voters except “at the request of the registrant” (or in cases of criminal conviction, mental incapacity, or death). § 20507(a)(3). Key here is the Act’s public-disclosure provision, which directs each state to maintain, for at least two years, all records pertaining to “the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and cur- ¢ȱȱĜȱȱȱȱ,” and to make these rec- ords “available for public inspection” and “photocopying at a reasonable cost.” § 20507(i)(1). As we’ve noted, the Act exempts some states: It “does not apply” to states that have Ĵed same-day polling-place registration or have not required registration at all “under law that is ȱ ěȱ continuously on and after August 1, 1994.” § 20503(b). Wisconsin ęȱȱȱ¡ǲȱȱhas per- Ĵȱ-day polling-place voter registration since at least that date. See WIS. STAT. § 6.55(2)(a) (providing for same-day voter registration). Only a handful of other states are also ex- empt: North Dakota, which has no registration requirement; No. 24-3258 5 and Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Wyoming, which permit same-day polling-place registration. 1 Because Wisconsin is exempt, the Commission advised the Foundation that it would process the request under the state public-records law. See §§ 6.36(1)(b)(1), 19.35(1). Wisconsin law ȱȱę¢ȱ voters’ birth dates, so the Commission could not disclose that information. § 6.36(1)(b)(1)(a). Wisconsin also charges a fee to obtain a copy of voting records. Starting at $25 per electronic report, the fee increases by $5 for each set of 1,000 records requested until it reaches a statutory maximum of $12,500. § 6.36(6); 2 WIS. ADMIN. CODE EL § 3.50(4). Given the size of the state’s voter roll, the maximum fee of $12,500 applied to the Foundation’s request. The Foundation balked at the fee and nondisclosure of Ȃȱȱǰȱȱȱęȱthe Commission of its 1 See The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) Q&A 2, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CIV. RTS. DIV., https://www.justice.gov/crt/national-voter-regis- tration-act-1993-nvra. 2 The statute directs the Commission to set the fee based on both the cost to maintain the list and the cost to produce a copy. In relevant part, the statute provides: The commission shall establish by rule the fee for obtain- ing a copy of the official registration list, or a portion of the list, including access to the subscription service estab- lished under s. 5.05(14)(b). The amount of the fee shall be set, after consultation with county and municipal election officials, at an amount estimated to cover both the cost of reproduction and the cost of maintaining the list at the state and local level. WIS. STAT. § 6.36(6). 6 No. 24-3258 intent to sue for violation of the Voter Registration Act. See § ŘŖśŗŖǻǼȱ ǻȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ). The Foundation asserted that Wisconsin’s exemption from the Act iȱȃȱȱěȄȱafter the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County. Commission ěȱreplied by email reiterating that Wisconsin is exempt from the Act and again explaining that the Commission would process the request under Wis- consin’s public-records law. As it had warned, the Foundation responded with this suit challenging the Commission’s refusal to produce a complete copy of the state’s voter roll—including voters’ birth-date in- formation—at a “reasonable cost” as required by the Voter Registration Act. § 20507(i)(1). The complaint alleges that the Act’s exemption violates the “equal state sovereignty” princi- ple articulated in Shelby County and the “congruence and pro- portionality” requirement announced in City of Boerne. Among other remedies, the suit seeks a declaration invalidat- ing the exemption provision and an order compelling Wisconsin to comply with the terms of the Act. The Commission moved to dismiss the case, invoking Wisconsin’s exemption and arguing that neither Shelby County nor City of Boerne calls its validity into question. As Ĵȱ¢ȱŘŞ U.S.C. § 2403(a), the United States intervened to defend the constitutionality of the exemption, agreeing with the Commission that Shelby County and City of Boerne do not apply. The government also challenged the Foundation’s standing to sue under the prudential doctrine of third-party standing. Because the Foundation’s legal theories rest not on its own rights but on those of the states, the government ar- gued that the Foundation was improperly asserting “the rights of others.” Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004). No. 24-3258 7 The district judge granted the motion. He began his anal- ysis with the question of standing, holding that the Founda- tion’s allegation of an informational injury was Ĝȱ ȱ support Article III standing. He expressed some concern about prudential standing, but he set that issue aside and opted to address the case on the merits. The judge concluded that neither Shelby County nor City of Boerne casts doubt on the validity of the Voter Registration Act’s exemption provision. Both cases, the judge explained, concerned federal statutes that imposed burdens on the states; using them to invalidate Wisconsin’s exemption from federal burdens woulȱĚȱthem on their heads. The judge accordingly dismissed the case. This appeal followed. II. Discussion We review the judge’s dismissal order de novo. Milchtein v. Milwaukee County, 42 F.4th 814, 821 (7th Cir. 2022). To sur- vive a motion to dismiss, a federal complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). ȱěȂȱfactual allegations are taken as true at the plead- ings stage, but the same presumption does not apply to legal conclusions. Nobles v. Mullin, 177 F.4th 886, 896 (7th Cir. 2026). A claim that lacks the support of a cognizable legal theory cannot proceed, so we evaluate the viability of the Founda- tion’s claim under “the governing sources of law” on which it is based. Id. We start with a few words on the Foundation’s standing to sue. Like the district judgeǰȱ Ȃȱ ęȱ that the com- plaint adequately alleges Article III standing, though our rea- ȱȱ ȱě. Ĵȱȱ ȱȱȬ ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ 8 No. 24-3258 injury, the Foundation has alleged a traditional pocketbook injury—ę¢ǰȱ the $12,500 fee that Wisconsin charges for a copy of the state’s voter roll. Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 ǯǯȱŜřŗǰȱŜřŜȱǻŘŖŘřǼȱǻȱȃȱȱ¢ȄȱĜȱ to establish Article III standing.). That alleged ęȱȱ ěȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱother circuits have concluded that the Foundation lacked Article III standing to sue for access to state voting records. E.g., Pub. Int. Legal Found. v. Benson, 136 F.4th 613, 631–32 (6th Cir. 2025); Pub. Int. Legal Found. v. Sec’y of Pennsylvania, 136 F.4th 456, 469 (3d Cir. 2025). We’re not so sure about prudential standing, however. As ȱȱĴǰȱȱ¢ȱȃȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ interests” and “cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). That rule poses a problem for the Founda- tion’s claim, which is largely premised on the rights and pre- rogatives of the states in our system of federalism. The Foun- dation obviously has no claim to sovereignty—let alone the right of equal state sovereignty as described in Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 544. A similar problem ěȱ ȱ Ȃȱ theory based on City of Boerne. Simply put, the Foundation cannot accuse Congress of intruding into its regulatory au- thority or usurping its police powers; it has none. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534. But a general rule requiring a party to assert his own in- terests is just that—a general rule. And a claim rooted in prin- ciples of federalism may implicate individual rights that aren’t immediately apparent. As the Supreme Court recog- nized in Bond v. United States, our federal balance is in one sense “an end in itself”: It ensures that the “States function as No. 24-3258 9 political entities in their own right.” 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011). But in another sense, it “secures to citizens the liberties that ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȄȱ Id. (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)). “When government acts in excess of its lawful powers,” those liber- ties are “at stake.” Id. at 222. Accordingly, citizens have a “di- rect interest in objecting to laws” that upset this federal bal- ance—at least in some cases. Id. Put another way, “[f]idelity to principles of federalism is not for the States alone to vindi- cate.” Id.; see Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 703– 04 (7th Cir. 1999). The Foundation leans heavily on Bond, but there are rea- sons to doubt its application here. To start, Bond involved a defensive challenge to a statute on federalism grounds. Carol Anne Bond was criminally charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 229, which prohibits the possession of chemical weapons; she moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the statute as applied to her exceeded Congress’s powers in violation of the federalism principles secured by the Tenth Amendment. Bond, 564 U.S. at 214. The Supreme Court concluded that the ȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȬ lenge as a defense to the criminal charges. Id. at 220–26. The Court relied in part on I.N.S. v. Chadha, which likewise in- volved a defensive constitutional challenge to a statute authorizing a so-called legislative veto in the context of de- portation proceedings. 462 U.S. 919, 925–28 (1983). In both Bond and Chadha, the challengers’ constitutional interests were clear: The statutes in question were being used to prosecute or deport them. Thȱȱȱěǯȱhe Foun- dation has raised federalism principles oěensively; it seeks to invalidate the Voter Registration Act’s exemption provision 10 No. 24-3258 and force Wisconsin’s compliance with the Act’s public- disclosure requirements. Unlike in Bond and Chadha, the Foundation is not invoking federalism principles as a shield against congressional encroachment on states’ rights and in- dividual liberty. It is instead deploying Shelby County and City of Boerne to impose federal regulatory burdens on Wisconsin. That strikes us as a misapplication of the principle recognized in Bond. But we do not need to decide. The general rule against as- serting the interests of third parties is prudential: “It does not involve the Constitution’s ‘case-or-controversy requirement’” and thus does not inform our jurisdiction. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 591 U.S. 299, 317 (2020) (quoting Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 128–29). So like the district judge, we set it aside and focus on the merits of the Foundation’s constitutional claim. We can be brief. The Foundation’s main contention is that the Voter Registration Act’s exemption provision is invalid under the principle of equal state sovereignty articulated in Shelby County. That case involved a constitutional challenge to the “preclearance” requirement in § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Applicable to only nine states in full and several others in part, § 5 required that covered jurisdictions “obtain federal permission before enacting any law related to voting.” Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 535; see 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a). The Supreme Court observed that requiring a state to obtain federal ap- proval before pursuing its own legislative objectives was “a drastic departure from basic principles of federalism.” Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 535. And singling out certain states for the preclearance requirement marked “an equally dramatic de- parture from the principle that all States enjoy equal No. 24-3258 11 sovereignty.” Id. Both features of the preclearance regime were “extraordinary and unprecedented.” Id. at 549. As the Court explained, our constitutional structure pre- serves the “broad autonomy” of each state to structure its own government, to legislate for the health and welfare of its citi- zens, and “to regulate elections”—all without “beseech[ing] the Federal Government for permission.” Id. at 543–44 (quo- ȱĴǼǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȃ¢ȱȬ der the Constitution” and is entitled to equality “in power, dignity[,] and authority.” Id. ȱśŚŚȱǻȱĴǼǯ Because § 5’s preclearance requirement “sharply de- part[ed]” from these ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱĜȱ ęǰȱȱȱinvalidated the statutory formula spec- ifying which jurisdictions were subject to preclearance. Id.; see 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b). The coverage formula swept in states “by reference to literacy tests and low voter registration and turn- out in the 1960s and early 1970s”—in other words, “decades- old data relevant to decades-old problems.” Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 551, 553. And because Congress had failed to up- ȱȱȱȱĚȱ-day conditions, the Court declared the formula unconstitutional; without an operative coverage formula, there was no “basis for subjecting jurisdic- tions to preclearance.” Id. at 557. With this background in mind, the problems with the Foundation’s reliance on Shelby County are hard to miss. To start, the preclearance requirement imposed onerous burdens on certain states for their past behavior. The statutory exemp- tion at issue here does precisely the opposite: It relieves certain states from generally applicable regulatory burdens. 12 No. 24-3258 Recall, too, that the exemption applies to states that since August 1, 1994, have had no registration requirement at all or have ěȱ-day registration at the polls. In substance, then, the Act’s exemption functions more like an equalizer. The Act requires all states to provide ample opportunity for their citizens to register to vote in federal elections and ex- empts the states whose registration laws have consistently aligned with this federal policy since the Act’s adoption. The Act thus does not “sharply depart[]” from basic federalism and equal-sovereignty principles; it conforms to them. Id. at 544. Moreover, the Voting Rights Act—the law at issue in Shelby County—was enacted pursuant to Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power. Louisiana v. Callais, 146 S. Ct. 1131, 1144 (2026). That authority is not all- encompassing: It extends only to legislation that ȃěǽǾ by ‘appropriate’ measures” the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohi- bition on discriminatory voting practices. South Carolina v. Kaĵenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2). To be considered “appropriate,” ȱȱȱȱȱȱȃǽǾȱ ȱȱĴȱ and spirit of the [C]onstitution.” Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 555 ǻęȱȱȱǼ ǻȱĴǼ. That includes basic federalism and equal-sovereignty principles, which are ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱĴȱȱǯ In contrast, Congress enacted the Voter Registration Act pursuant to its power under the Elections Clause. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Sullivan, 5 F.4th 714, 723 (7th Cir. 2021). That clause authorizes Congress to alter or supplant state regulations prescribing the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.” No. 24-3258 13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. Unlike Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power, its Elections Clause power “is paramount”; Congress may exercise it “at any time[] and to any extent which [Congress] deems expedient.” Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 9 (2013) (quoting Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 392 (1880)). And because the role of the states in regulating federal elections has always been subject to Congress’s preemptive Elections Clause authority, the federalism concerns that animated Shelby County “are somewhat weaker here.” Id. at 14. That brings us back to the fundamental mismatch between this case and Shelby County. The Foundation’s requested rem- edy would entail the imposition of federal regulatory burdens on Wisconsin and the other states exempt from the Act—not, as in Shelby County, the elimination of such burdens. As the dis- trict court correctly observed, that result would turn Shelby County on its head. Indeed, for all the reasons we’ve dis- cussed, the Foundation’s reliance on Shelby County is clearly misplaced; the case has no application here. We turn, then, to the Foundation’s argument under City of Boerne, which it essentially treats as an afterthought. Under- standably so. City of Boerne is similarly irrelevant. That case concerned the scope of Congress’s authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to “enforce” the Amendment “by ap- propriate legislation.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Because that authority is limited to enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court held that Congress may not enact legislation that “alters the meaning” of the constitutional right. 521 U.S. at 519. In other words, Congress’s § 5 authority is remedial; it may impose “measures 14 No. 24-3258 that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions,” but it may not “make a substantive change in the governing law.” Id. To mark the boundaries of this distinction, the Court an- nounced what has come to be known as the “congruence and proportionality” test for § 5 legislation: “There must be a con- gruence and proportionality between the injury to be pre- vented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.” Id. at 520. Without this connection, “legislation may become sub- ȱȱȱȱěǯȄȱId. The Court held that alt- hough Congress has “wide latitude” to draw the substan- tive/remedial line, the “distinction exists and must be ob- served.” Id. The statute at issue in City of Boerne, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), Ĵed to change the substance of the free-exercise right. Id. at 532. And that, the Court said, was “broader than is appropriate if the goal is to prevent and remedy constitutional violations.” Id. at 535. Accordingly, the Court held that RFRA ȃĚǽǾȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ congruence” and was “a considerable congressional intrusion into the States’ traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens.” Id. at 533–34. There are several reasons why City of Boerne doesn’t help the Foundation here. We’ve already noted the most obvious one: Congress adopted the Voter Registration Act pursuant to its Elections Clause power—not its authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment—so the “congruence and propor- tionality” test does not apply. And as the district judge aptly observed, a case about Congress’s authority to curtail the states’ traditional ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ Ĵȱ ǻȱ ¢Ǽȱ about Congress’s authority to exempt certain states from an No. 24-3258 15 otherwise valid federal regulatory regime. In short, City of Boerne is simply inapposite. The Foundation tries to shore up its case with what is es- sentially a political argument, warning that Congress might wield its Elections Clause power ȱęȱpartisan allies and punish foes. Whatever can be said about that prospect—and we note that other constitutional provisions would likely stand in the way—the Voter Registration Act’s exemption provision ȱȱęȱȱ. The exemption did not open the door to partisan mischief or tit-for-tat retaliation. Quite the opposite. The exemption, along with the rest of the Act, simply made it “easier to register to vote in federal elections.” Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 792 (7th Cir. 1995). AFFIRMED 16 No. 24-3258 BRENNAN, Chief Judge, concurring. The majority opinion persuasively explains why this suit fails on the merits, and I agree with that analysis in full. I write separately to highlight another fundamental problem with this case: the Public Inter- est Legal Foundation may lack Article III standing to bring this suit. Though “we cannot reach the merits of a case” without satisfying this “bedrock constitutional requirement,” Wis. Voter All. v. Millis, 166 F.4th 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2026) (per cu- riam), the Foundation’s theory of standing is challenging to evaluate because it implicates multiple unresolved circuit splits. In fact, there is now a split about whether the Founda- tion itself has standing to bring suits like this one. Compare Pub. Int. Legal Found. v. Sec’y Commw. of Pa., 136 F.4th 456, 461– 70 (3d Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1785 (2026) (dismissed for lack of standing), and Pub. Int. Legal Found. v. Benson, 136 F.4th 613, 629–32 (6th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1772 (2026) (dismissed for lack of standing), with Pub. Int. Legal Found., Inc. v. Wooten, 164 F.4th 362, 365–66 (4th Cir. 2026) (re- manding to evaluate standing), and Pub. Int. Legal Found., Inc. v. Nago, 174 F.4th 664, 670–77 (9th Cir. 2026) (standing). Unique features of this case make it a poor vehicle for ad- dressing these questions. But this action highlights the need to clarify the test for identifying informational injuries and or- ganizational standing after TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), and FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367 (2024). I In its quest to apply the National Voter Registration Act to the state of Wisconsin, the Foundation’s principal argument No. 24-3258 17 for standing is that it ě an “informational injury.” The ȱȱȱ£ȱȱȃȱěȱěȱȱȁȬ ¢ȱ ȱ ȂȄȱ Ĝȱ for Article III standing “when the ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ disclosed pursuant to a statute.” Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998) (citing Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989)). It appears this rule has survived recent developments in standing jurisprudence. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 342 (2016) (citing Akins and Pub. Citizen). The Foundation ę lawsuits around the country based on a ¢ȱȱȱěs an informational injury every time a state declines to produce voter records in the exact format it de- sires. Wisely, my colleagues have declined to decide whether ȱȱȱěȱȱȱ ¢. Accord Sec’y Commw. of Pa., 136 F.4th at 459; Benson, 136 F.4th at 629. And though a close call, I am less persuaded that the Founda- tion has done enough to allege a “classic pocketbook injury.” Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631, 636 (2023). I have found no evidence in the record that the Foundation spent any money. And there may be another way for the Foundation to obtain the information it seeks without imposing federal law on Wisconsin or paying the $12,500 fee for electronic access. At least in this case, the Foundation may lack standing three times over. It supplied no evidence that it was denied any of the requested informationǲȱȱęȱȱ ȱ consequences from the alleged denial; and it did not discuss whether it could assert standing for its own injuries. Several circuits have held that an advocacy organization cannot sue to redress informational injuries in federal court without mak- ing these three showings. The allegations in the Foundation’s 18 No. 24-3258 ȱȱȃȱȱȄȱȱǰȱȱĴȱ ȱ ȱȱȱęǯȱCommon Cause Ind. v. Lawson, 937 F.3d 944, 964 (7th Cir. 2019) (Brennan, J., concurring). Because this case comes to us at the motion to dismiss phase, though, the unu- sual allegations here might cross the threshold. Wis. Voter All., ŗŜŜȱ ǯŚȱ ȱ ŜřŘȱ ǻěȂȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ stage). A To start, the record suggests that the Foundation has not actually been “deni[ed] … information subject to public dis- closure.” Casillas v. Madison Ave. Assocs., Inc., 926 F.3d 329, 337–řŞȱǻŝȱǯȱŘŖŗşǼȱǻĴǰȱ ǯǼ; accord TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 441 (citing Casillas with approval for this proposition). This is the central ȱȱęȱȱȱ¢ǯȱ But after comparing the materials covered by the National Voter Registration Act’s disclosure provision, the documents requested by the Foundation, and the information made available under Wisconsin law, the Foundation may not have been denied the information it requested. ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱ. It requires states to “make available for public inspection … all records con- cerning the implementation of programs and activities con- ducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency ȱĜȱȱȱȱǯȄȱśŘȱǯǯǯȱȗ 20507(i)(1). Many kinds of records come into this statute’s ambit. Project Vote / Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long, 682 F.3d 331, 336 (4th Cir. 2012) ǻȃȱ ȱȁȂȱ… suggests an expansive meaning”). But there are also limits to that disclosure. For one, the statute “does not require electronic production” of docu- ments “at all.” Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Sec’y of State, No. 24-3258 19 105 F.4th 1324, 1335 (11th Cir. 2024). The phrase “make avail- able for public inspection” is a term of art drawn from the Freedom of Information Act context, and it does not encom- pass digital disclosure of documents. Id. at 1332–35. Congress amended FOIA to provide for electronic disclosure; it has not done the same for this Act, which has not been amended since it was enacted in 1993. Id. at 1333. For another, no appellate court has held that the Act re- quires states to disclose certain kinds of sensitive information about voters along with the requested documents. Project Vote, 682 F.3d at 339–40 (appropriate to redact Social Security Numbers from voter rolls released under the Act); Pub. Int. Legal Found. v. N.C. State Bd. of Educ., 996 F.3d 257, 267 (4th Cir. 2021) (A ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȁ¢ȱ sensitive information’ in otherwise disclosable documents.”). Therefore, the Act subjects information to public disclosure in ȱę, constrained way. The Foundation requested two kinds of records—ȱĜȬ cial list of voters registered in Wisconsin and several years’ worth of “Deceased Reports” produced by the Electronic Reg- istration Information Center, a national voting database. Both records fall into the Act’s broad disclosure provision. The critical question is whether Wisconsin denied the Foundation access to these documents. On my reading of the record, it did not. Following a statutory requirement, the state makes its voter rolls “open to public inspection” and “elec- tronically accessible.” WIS. STAT. ȗ 6.36(1)(b); WIS. ADMIN. CODE EL 3.50(2). This law both encompasses and exceeds the disclosure required under the federal Act. There is also no rea- son to think “Deceased Reports” are not “records” open to public inspection under Wisconsin’s Freedom of Information 20 No. 24-3258 Act, at least according to the record in this case. WIS. STAT. ȗ 19.35(1)(a), (2). In other words, Wisconsin’s current public disclosure laws may permit access to all desired documents. Even more, when the Foundation requested these docu- ments, Wisconsin did not turn it away. ȱȱȱęȱǰȱ ȱĜȱȱthe Foundation to the online voter regis- tration list, which is the state’s preferred means for dissemi- nating this information. As to its second request, the record does not speak either way about whether it was denied. The ȱĜȱȱȱ¢ȱȃǽǾȱȱȱȱȱ to the second part of your request soon.” ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ¡ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱĜȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ continue to “process requests” like this one under state law. The Foundation supplied neither allegation nor evidence of whether the state complied with or formally rejected this re- quest. Whether these allegations show a “deni[al]” of requested documents is questionable. Casillas, 926 F.3d at 338. That is especially so if all the information the Foundation requested could be obtained under state law. At the least, the Founda- tion has not ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ show an informational injury. Wis. Voter All., 166 F.4th at 632. The Foundation also complains that ȱĜȱȱȱ provide the requested documents for free, in the desired format, and without releasing certain pieces of redacted infor- mation. But this does not change whether there is an informa- ȱ¢ǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱę as a pocketbook injury without further allegations of compelled spending. Assume that the Foundation succeeded on the merits and the National Voter Registration Act was applied to the State No. 24-3258 21 of Wisconsin. It would still not be entitled to obtain the de- sired documents for free. Rather, the Foundation must pay for ȃ¢ȱȱȱȱǯȄȱśŘȱǯǯǯȱȗ 20507(i)(1). That language is identical to the state-law analog. See WIS. STAT. ȗȗ 6.45(2) & 19.35(3)(a) (“An authority may impose a fee upon the requester of a copy of a record which may not ex- ceed the actual, necessary and direct cost of reproduction and transcription of the record.”) And in its initial records request, the Foundation made clear that it was willing and able to pay such costs to obtain the documents it desired. Even though accessing voter rolls online incurs a cost of $5 per thousand voters, then, the Foundation might have ac- quired these documents for its desired price. It is not apparent to me that the reproduction costs qualify as a pocketbook in- jury. After all, the Foundation did not actually pay a dime to the state. It instead proceeded straight to federal court. To al- lege a denial of information or a pocketbook injury under these circumstances, the Foundation must supply at least some evidence that other “pathways are [not] viable” if it wants to show a cognizable injury. Wis. Voter All., 166 F.4th at 637 n.5; see also id. at 636 n.4. The record does not answer these questions, which means the Foundation may not have dis- charged its burden to identify facts supporting Article III standing. Id. at 632. In sum, the Foundation had an avenue to obtain the infor- mation it sought without recourse to federal court. It has not ěȱȱȱ¢ȱif it did not engage in a gen- ȱěȱȱȱ desired documents through state- law procedures. The Act it seeks to invoke is narrower than the state laws—it does not provide for electronic disclosure of documents at all, while Wisconsin law does. ȱěȱȱ 22 No. 24-3258 ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱ “certainly impending” when it disregards a cost-ěȱȬ ternative. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 402 (2013). At the least, it is questionable whether the Foundation has adequately alleged Article III standing, even at the motion to dismiss stage. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (Ĝ allegations needed for court to “presum[e] ǳȱęȱȱǳȱȱȱȱȄǼǯ B The Foundation may lack Article III standing for two fur- ther reasons: it ȱȃęȱȱȁ ȱȂȱ from failing to receive” access to the voter rolls, TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 442 (ȱ Ĵ), and it has not explained whether it can assert standing for its own injuries. Both grounds are implicated in the circuit split over whether the Foundation can assert an informational injury. Downstream Consequences. In TransUnion, the Supreme Court said, “An asserted informational injury that causes no ȱ ěȱ ȱ ¢ȱ III.” Id. (citation modi- ęǼǯȱ This formulation of the test could be in tension with Spokeoǯȱ ȱȱĴȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱ ȱȃȱěȱǳȱȱȱȱ any additional ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱęȄȱ in a statute to have standing. 578 U.S. at 342. And Spokeo seems more consistent with the cases supplying a foundation for the informational injury doctrine. Both Akins and Public Citizen seem to treat the denial of information sought through a sun- shine statute as a cognizable harm in its own right. Akins, 524 U.S. at 20–21; Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 448–50. No. 24-3258 23 ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ whether TransUnion added a new requirement to the test for informational injuries. Compare, e.g., Harty v. W. Point Realty, Inc., 28 F.4th 435, 444 (2d Cir. 2022) (“Even assuming that ǽěǾȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ which he [was] ȱǳȱȱȱȱȱȁ ȱ consequences from failing to receive the required infor- mation.’”), with Laufer v. Naranda Hotels, LLC, 60 F.4th 156, 170 (4th Cir. 2023) (holding that TransUnion did not change the requirements outlined in Akins). A few years ago, the Su- preme Court granted certiorari in Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Lau- fer, 601 U.S. 1 (2023), a case involving