GAMBILL v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims No. 25-238L (Filed: October 30, 2026) ) MICHAEL GAMBILL, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) ) THE UNITED STATES, ) ) Defendant. ) ) Lindsay S.C. Brinton, Lewis Rice, LLC, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiffs. With her on the briefs were Meghan S. Largent, Michael Armstrong, and Marlee L. Rowe. Kenneth Gordon Long, Senior Attorney, Environmental Enforcement Section, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendant. With him on the briefs was Adam R.F. Gustafson, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural Resources Division. OPINION AND ORDER SOLOMSON, Chief Judge. Ralph Waldo Emerson, in his essay Self-Reliance, offered a line that every schoolchild half-remembers and every litigant should forget: A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall. Speak what you think now in hard words and to-morrow speak 1  what to-morrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict every thing you said to-day. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance, in Essays: First Series 43, 57 (Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1903). 1 Emerson may be right about the soul. But his advice has no place in the courtroom. What is liberty for the philosopher is for the litigant a trap. A great thinker may say one thing today and change his mind tomorrow; a party moving for summary judgment may not. To be clear, this Court takes no issue with pleading legal theories in the alternative — that is fine — but the facts themselves cannot change depending on a party’s preferred legal argument. A litigant may not build a summary-judgment motion on one factual premise, accuse its opponent of admitting that premise, and then try to defeat the opponent’s motion by denying the same premise. That is precisely what Plaintiffs attempted here in this Fifth Amendment rails-to-trails takings case. It does not work. On Plaintiffs’ own summary-judgment record — including what are essentially the parties’ stipulated facts — the railroad acquired the North Carolina rail corridor at issue (the “rail corridor”) in fee simple, which left Plaintiffs nothing for the government to take. Plaintiffs lose based on the summary-judgment record they built. In Plaintiffs’ “Statement of Uncontroverted Facts” of their motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiffs assert that “[i]n late 1894 and early 1895,” the Hendersonville and Brevard Railway, Telegraph and Telephone Company (“HBR”) “acquired its rights” to the rail corridor “via conveyances from the owners of the land over which it built its railroad.” ECF No. 26 (“Pl. MSJ”) at 5, 7. 2 Plaintiffs attached those “Original Conveyances” (or the “source deeds”) as Exhibit M to their motion, correlated them to Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) “Valuation Maps” and schedules (together, the “ICC Valuation Maps”) as Exhibit N, and then matched each Plaintiff to specific source deeds, ICC Valuation Map parcels, and government responses to Plaintiffs’ requests for admissions (“RFAs”). Id. at 7–9. Plaintiffs even included a table depicting the relationships among those evidentiary materials, id. at 8–10, further asserting that the government had “admitted that the Original Conveyances . . . are the 1 Available at https://archive.org/details/worksofemerson02emeruoft/page/57. 2 Citations to the parties’ briefs and exhibits are to the page numbers printed in the footer of the documents themselves, where such numbers exist, rather than to the electronic filing system’s stamped page numbers in the header. Citations to the transcript of the June 24, 2026 oral argument, ECF No. 36 (“Tr.”), are to page and line. 2 relevant conveyances by which HBR acquired its interests in the Corridor.” Id. at 8 n.9. That record architecture is Plaintiffs’ entire case for summary judgment. It establishes the identity and location of the rail corridor segments, including the link among Plaintiffs’ modern parcels, the historic rail corridor, and the property interests Plaintiffs allege were taken without compensation when, on June 29, 2021, the Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (“NITU”) preserving the rail corridor for railbanking and interim use as a recreational trail. 3 But that record does not establish that Plaintiffs own those rail corridor segments as a matter of law. Ownership turns on what estate the source deeds conveyed to HBR. The government — in its responses to Plaintiffs’ RFAs, in its own motion for summary judgment, and in its response to Plaintiffs’ summary-judgment motion — agreed with Plaintiffs regarding the identity of the property segments and how HBR acquired its interest in the rail corridor, but argues that the conveyances to HBR were in fee simple as a matter of North Carolina law. See ECF No. 25 (“Def. MSJ”) at 6–9, 11–20; ECF No. 28 (“Def. Resp.”) at 12 & n.8, 19; ECF No. 26-9 (“Pl. MSJ Ex. I”) at 5–18. In opposing the government’s motion, however, Plaintiffs attempt to recast as void the very same source deeds they relied upon. See ECF No. 27 (“Pl. Resp.”) at 8–10. Their reply then returned to their opening position: that the source deeds were valid but conveyed, at most, an easement. ECF No. 31 (“Pl. Rep.”) at 14–16. 4 North Carolina law forecloses Plaintiffs’ argument that the source deeds provided HBR with only an easement. According to Plaintiffs’ own motion, relying upon what are essentially stipulated facts, nine recorded conveyances in the record “give, grant, bargain, sell, and convey” to HBR “and its successors forever” “a strip of land,” and refer to that strip as “the land hereby conveyed.” Pl. MSJ at 25–26 (emphasis added). North Carolina presumes that a conveyance of real estate passes fee-simple title unless the instrument plainly expresses or makes evident an intent to convey a lesser estate. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-1. These source deeds do not plainly convey a lesser estate. The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decision in McCotter v. Barnes confirms that railroad-purpose language, a two-dollar consideration, and future location of the precise strip do not transform a 3 The NITU is dated June 28, 2021, and was served on June 29, 2021. Am. Compl. ¶ 7; Pl. MSJ at 12. The parties treat June 29, 2021 as the operative date, and so does this Court. 4 To be precise, Plaintiffs’ opening motion did invoke ambiguity, but only in support of their argument about the nature of the estate the deeds conveyed. See Pl. MSJ at 23, 29–34; infra Part V.C.1. 3 grant of land into an easement. 247 N.C. 480, 101 S.E.2d 330 (1958). The undersigned recently applied that same case — construing this very family of deeds — in Penland v. United States, 183 Fed. Cl. 114 (2026), concurring with Judge Hadji’s reasoning in Bevirt v. United States, 177 Fed. Cl. 275 (2025), recons. denied, 180 Fed. Cl. 217 (2026) (Hadji, J.), appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 26-1703 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 16, 2026). And Judge Bonilla has since reached the same conclusion for the same deed family on this same corridor. Barry v. United States, -- Fed. Cl. --, 2026 WL 3213185, at *10–11 (Oct. 23, 2026). This Court once again adheres to the same reasoning applied in those decisions. Because HBR acquired the rail corridor in fee simple, Plaintiffs cannot show a genuine dispute of fact that any interest in the rail corridor descended to Plaintiffs through their claimed chains of title. In short, even if Plaintiffs owned land next to the rail corridor on the date of the NITU — another fact with which the government agrees — they owned neither the rail corridor nor a reversionary interest in that corridor. The NITU therefore took nothing from them. Moreover, no substantive rule of property law permits the underlying acquisition facts to change with the type of estate conveyed. The same documentary evidence either locates the relevant strips conveyed to the railroad in the 1890s, or it does not. And whether the located strips passed to HBR in fee or as an easement is a separate legal question. But Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways: the deeds and ICC Valuation Maps cannot be reliable enough to locate the rail corridor when Plaintiffs asserted the deeds at issue conveyed easements, yet are latently ambiguous and void once the government demonstrated that, as a matter of law, the same deeds conveyed a fee. Viewed through a procedural lens, Plaintiffs cannot assert that the summary-judgment record supports two mutually exclusive sets of facts. To be clear, this Court’s primary holding is that, under North Carolina law, the source deeds conveyed the rail corridor to HBR in fee simple. That holding alone requires denial of Plaintiffs’ motion. Plaintiffs’ shifting positions matter to the government’s motion, because they explain why Plaintiffs cannot manufacture a factual dispute to escape that holding’s consequences. Accordingly, and for the reasons explained in more detail below, Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, ECF No. 26, is DENIED, and the government’s motion for summary judgment on title and liability, ECF No. 25, is GRANTED. I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiffs commenced this action alleging that the STB’s issuance of the NITU effected a Fifth Amendment taking of their asserted reversionary interests in the rail corridor. On June 20, 2025, with leave of this Court, ECF No. 10, Plaintiffs filed their still- operative amended complaint. ECF No. 11 (“Am. Compl.”). The amended complaint 4 alleges that the rail corridor was created by easements, that each Plaintiff owned “land adjacent to” the former railroad right-of-way on the date of the NITU, and that, upon abandonment, Plaintiffs “would have had the exclusive right to physical ownership, possession, and use of their property free of the railroad easement.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 12; id. ¶¶ 15–20. Following the close of discovery, the parties filed simultaneous dispositive motions on December 12, 2025. Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on title and liability; the government cross-moved for summary judgment on the same issues. The key question is this: what did Plaintiffs’ predecessors-in-interest convey to the railroad in 1894 and 1895? Plaintiffs, in their summary-judgment motion, assert that the source deeds are enforceable instruments by which HBR “acquired its rights to the Corridor,” but contend that they conveyed mere easements. Pl. MSJ at 7–9, 23–33. As noted above, the government agrees with Plaintiffs that HBR acquired its rights via the source deeds but contends that the rail corridor strips were transferred to the railroad in fee simple — leaving no property interest to revert to adjacent owners. Def. MSJ at 11– 19. Thus, according to the government, Plaintiffs possessed no property interest for the NITU to take. Id. On January 9, 2026, the parties filed simultaneous response briefs. ECF No. 27; ECF No. 28. On January 28, 2026, each side replied. ECF No. 31; ECF No. 32 (“Def. Rep.”). On February 6, 2026, the government filed a notice of supplemental authority directing this Court to Bevirt and attaching the order denying reconsideration in that case. ECF Nos. 33, 33-1 (Bevirt v. United States, 180 Fed. Cl. 217 (2026) (order denying reconsideration)). This Court held oral argument on June 24, 2026. Tr. 1:16–18. II. JURISDICTION This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the Tucker Act, which grants this Court authority “to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution” or upon federal statutes and regulations. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). A claim that the United States has taken private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, is such a claim, and Plaintiffs assert precisely that: a taking effected by the STB’s issuance of the NITU under the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (“Trails Act”). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1–2, 7–8, 13. 5  Neither party contests this Court’s jurisdiction, and for good reason: rails-to-trails cases present monetary Fifth Amendment takings claims against the United States, which belong in this Court pursuant to the Tucker Act. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1990) (concluding that the 1983 Trails Act amendments “did not withdraw the Tucker Act remedy” for a taking effected under them); Caquelin v. United States, 959 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (explaining that, under Preseault, “the Tucker Act authorizes suit in the Court of Federal Claims” when “the application of the Trails Act results in a Fifth Amendment taking”); Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (setting out the framework for Trails Act takings claims). This Court is satisfied that it has jurisdiction to decide this case. III. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”). 5 A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome under governing law, and a dispute is genuine only if the evidence would allow a reasonable factfinder to resolve the matter for the nonmovant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”). Once the moving party shows the absence of a genuine dispute, the opposing party must identify specific record evidence showing a triable issue. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–24 (1986) (Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial”). Conclusory assertions and attorney argument do not suffice. See SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (“The party 5 RCFC 56(a) is identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). Compare RCFC 56(a), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]o the extent permitted by this court’s jurisdiction, [the RCFC] must be consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [FRCP].” RCFC 83(a); see also RCFC 2002 Rules Committee Note (“[I]nterpretation of [this] [C]ourt’s rules will be guided by case law and the Advisory Committee Notes that accompany the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); RCFC 56 Rules Committee Notes, 2011 Amendment (conforming RCFC 56 to FRCP 56). Accordingly, “[i]nterpretation of an FRCP ‘informs th[is] Court’s analysis’ of the corresponding RCFC.” Lakeland Partners, LLC v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 124, 131 n.3 (2009) (quoting Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 160, 167 (2006)); see also Hall v. United States, 167 Fed. Cl. 226, 230 n.3 (2023); Ideal Innovations, Inc. v. United States, 167 Fed. Cl. 314, 332 n.29 (2023). 6 opposing the motion must point to an evidentiary conflict created on the record; mere denials or conclusory statements are insufficient.” (citing Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1984))); Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Attorneys’ argument is no substitute for evidence.”); Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining, in a takings case, that “[t]he burden is on the [non-movant] to present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact”). Competing motions for summary judgment do not lower the standard. “[T]he court must evaluate each motion on its own merits, resolving reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration.” Silver State Land LLC v. United States, 155 Fed. Cl. 209, 212 (2021) (quoting First Com. Corp. v. United States, 335 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). But cross-motions often reveal that the parties agree on the underlying facts and dispute only the law. That is the case here. The parties’ burdens nonetheless differ. Plaintiffs, as movants who bear the burden of proving ownership, may obtain summary judgment only if the undisputed record establishes that interest. The government, which does not bear that burden, may discharge its burden as movant “by ‘showing’ — that is, pointing out to the [trial] court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. And on the government’s motion, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The effect of the parties’ agreement on the facts is addressed in Part V.C.1. IV. RAILS-TO-TRAILS TAKINGS CLAIMS The Trails Act allows rail corridors that might otherwise be abandoned to be preserved for possible future railroad use while being used on an interim basis as recreational trails. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). “It is settled law that a Fifth Amendment taking occurs in Rails-to-Trails cases when government action destroys state-defined property rights by converting a railway easement to a recreational trail, if trail use is outside the scope of the original railway easement.” Ladd v. United States, 630 F.3d 1015, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Ellamae Phillips Co. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009)); see also Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A NITU can result in a compensable taking because it blocks state-law property rights from reverting to their would-be owners: “[t]he taking, if any, when a railroad right-of-way is converted to interim trail use under the Trails Act occurs when state law reversionary property interests that would otherwise vest in the adjacent landowners are blocked from so vesting.” Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1233. 7  Note what that framework presupposes: an easement. Our appellate court — the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit — framed a now-familiar three- part inquiry in these rails-to-trails takings cases: (1) who owns the land at issue — specifically, whether the railroad acquired only an easement or obtained fee-simple title to that land; (2) if the railroad acquired only an easement, whether the easement’s scope permits trail use; and (3) whether the easement terminated before the alleged taking. Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1533; Ellamae Phillips, 564 F.3d at 1373. If the answer to the first question is that the railroad owns the rail corridor in fee, “the court need not address the two remaining questions because the Plaintiffs did not hold any reversionary interest in the property that was taken.” Kent v. United States, 174 Fed. Cl. 684, 689 (2025). Put in the framework’s own terms: “[i]f . . . the railroad company holds fee simple title to the land over which the railroad operated, no taking can occur because no third party holds underlying fee simple title that would otherwise become unencumbered upon the railroad’s abandonment of operations.” Pressly v. United States, 174 F.4th 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2026); Barron v. United States, -- F.4th --, 2026 WL 3160493, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 22, 2026) (“If [the deeds] conveyed an interest in fee simple, there was no reversionary interest left to the Landowners’ predecessors-in-interest, [and] no taking occurred.”); see also Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“It is axiomatic that only persons with a valid property interest at the time of the taking are entitled to compensation.”). State law governs the “property rights of the parties in a rails-to-trails case.” Castillo v. United States, 952 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see Rogers v. United States, 814 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“We analyze the property rights of the parties in a rails- to-trails case under the relevant state law.” (citing Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1543)). Because the property in this case is in North Carolina, this Court applies North Carolina law. See Bevirt, 177 Fed. Cl. at 281–82 (applying North Carolina law to source deeds from this same corridor); Penland, 183 Fed. Cl. at 122 (same). A Fifth Amendment takings claim proceeds in two steps: the claimant must first establish a cognizable property interest, and only then does a court ask whether that interest was taken. Acceptance Ins. Cos. v. United States, 583 F.3d 849, 854 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (explaining that a court “do[es] not reach th[e] second step” — whether property was taken — “without first identifying a cognizable property interest” (quoting Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2005))). Plaintiffs thus bear the burden to prove the cognizable property interest on which their takings claims depend. See Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“For any Fifth Amendment takings claim, the complaining party must show it owned a distinct 8 property interest at the time it was allegedly taken[.]”); BHL Props., LLC v. United States, 135 Fed. Cl. 222, 229 (2017) (“[I]t is [plaintiffs’] burden to prove [their] ownership of the land abutting the railway corridor; it is not the government’s burden to disprove it.”). Plaintiffs in this case accept their burden. Tr. 18:10–14 (“It’s our burden to show that we own the land within the corridor. . . . And we accept that burden[.]”). On the theory and record Plaintiffs themselves presented, they must prove that: (1) the railroad acquired only an easement in the rail corridor — in which case their predecessors retained the underlying fee, and a reversionary interest could descend through the chains of title to Plaintiffs; and (2) the NITU took that reversionary interest. If the railroad acquired the rail corridor in fee simple, however, there is nothing to revert to adjacent owners, and Plaintiffs lose. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot prevail unless they first establish that they possessed a property interest allegedly taken. V. DISCUSSION: THE GOVERNMENT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT The two motions call for different showings, and this Court addresses them in that light. After setting out the material facts, none of which is disputed, this Court holds that, under North Carolina law, the source deeds conveyed the rail corridor to HBR in fee simple. That holding is the primary ground of decision, and it requires denial of Plaintiffs’ motion: Plaintiffs, who bear the burden of proving a reversionary interest, cannot establish one if the railroad acquired the rail corridor in fee simple. This Court then turns to the government’s motion and, viewing the record in Plaintiffs’ favor, explains why nothing Plaintiffs offered creates a genuine dispute about the property interest their claims require: Plaintiffs are bound by the acquisition facts they proposed; their prescription and centerline theories presuppose the easement they failed to prove; their Snapshots are not evidence of title; they waived any argument that a particular deed conveyed a strip narrower than the rail corridor; and, as to the Goodrich parcel, they identify no railroad interest north of Shaw’s Creek that the NITU preserved. Finally, this Court addresses Plaintiffs’ late theory that the source deeds are void and holds, in the alternative, that it fails on its own terms: at worst the deeds are latently ambiguous, and the parties’ agreed-upon record supplies the evidence that locates the rail corridor. A. The Material Facts Are Not in Dispute The facts recited here are drawn from the parties’ pleadings, cross-motions, and supporting exhibits (the summary-judgment record evidence). The material facts are not in dispute. 9  Plaintiffs are ten individuals or trusts who own six modern parcels in Henderson County, North Carolina. Am. Compl. at 4–6. They allege that those parcels are adjacent to and underlying portions of a former rail corridor — approximately 19.1 miles running through Henderson and Transylvania Counties in North Carolina — and that the STB’s June 29, 2021 NITU took their property (without compensation) by preserving the rail corridor for railbanking and interim use as the Ecusta Trail. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3–12; Pl. MSJ at 2–5. As explained above, whether Plaintiffs had a cognizable property interest in the rail corridor when the NITU issued depends, in turn, on what HBR acquired from Plaintiffs’ predecessors in the 1890s. If HBR acquired only railroad easements, Plaintiffs may have valid takings claims. If HBR acquired fee-simple title to the rail corridor, Plaintiffs have no reversionary interest, and no compensable taking occurred. See supra Part IV. In that regard, the parties did not present dueling title stories. Plaintiffs identified the source deeds. Pl. MSJ at 7–9, Ex. M. Plaintiffs linked them to the ICC Valuation Map parcels. Pl. MSJ at 8–9, Ex. N. Plaintiffs also obtained admissions from the government regarding how HBR acquired its interest in the rail corridor, Pl. MSJ Ex. I, and then boasted to this Court that the United States had even admitted the relevant linkages. Pl. MSJ at 8 n.9, 9. The parties thus agree on how HBR acquired its rights to the rail corridor. The parties also agree regarding the railroad succession history. HBR acquired rail corridor rights in 1894 and 1895. Pl. MSJ at 7; see also Def. MSJ at 6–9. The Transylvania Railroad Company succeeded HBR in 1899; the Southern Railway–Carolina Division operated the line under lease beginning in 1906; Norfolk Southern Railway Company succeeded in 1982; and Blue Ridge Southern Railroad, L.L.C. (“Blue Ridge”) acquired the line with STB approval in 2014, by quit-claim deed effective July 26, 2014, and recorded November 14, 2014. Def. MSJ at 6–7, Exs. 12–16; Pl. MSJ at 10. The parties agree that each successive railroad possessed the same interest HBR originally acquired — no more, no less. Def. MSJ at 6–9; Pl. MSJ at 9–10, 34; see also Bevirt, 180 Fed. Cl. at 219 (reconsideration order) (noting the same agreement). Plaintiffs’ counsel further agreed with the corollary: “everyone agrees, the original conveyances can’t convey anything more than what’s listed in them.” Tr. 37:5–9. Indeed, the point is an ancient maxim: nemo dat quod non habet — no one can give what they do not have. See Nemo dat quod non habet, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024); Tr. 16:12–17 (counsel agreeing with this Court that property “conveyed in fee” to the railroad “cannot then be conveyed down the chain” to Plaintiffs). 10  The parties agree regarding the basic NITU chronology. In April of 2021, Blue Ridge filed a Verified Notice of Exemption, indicating that it sought abandonment authority to make the line eligible for interim trail use and did not intend to consummate abandonment. Def. MSJ at 7–8; ECF No. 11-1 at 3, 5–6. Blue Ridge and Ecusta Rails2Trails (“Ecusta R2T”) jointly sought interim trail use in June 2021. Def. MSJ at 8; Am. Compl. ¶ 5. The STB issued the NITU on June 29, 2021. Def. MSJ at 8–9; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 7. On August 12, 2021 — six weeks after the NITU — Blue Ridge conveyed its interest to Ecusta R2T by a special warranty deed, granting, bargaining, selling, and conveying the rail corridor “in fee simple.” Def. MSJ at 9 & Ex. 18. That leaves but a single dispositive question of law for this Court to decide: what interest did HBR acquire via the source deeds? In answering that question, the critical facts come directly from Plaintiffs’ opening motion. See Pl. MSJ at 7–10. Plaintiffs’ exhibit list (attached to their motion) divides the record into ownership documents, discovery responses, source deeds, ICC Valuation Maps, railroad-history and STB filings, and summary charts of that documentary evidence. Pl. MSJ at vi–viii. Plaintiffs attached the nine source deeds as Exhibits M-1 through M-9 and the corresponding ICC Valuation Maps as Exhibits N-1 and N-2. See Pl. MSJ Ex. M (ECF No. 26-13); Pl. MSJ Ex. N (ECF No. 26-14). In addition, Plaintiffs included Geographic Information System (“GIS”) “Snapshots” prepared by Straup Solutions LLC in 2025 at Plaintiffs’ direction. Pl. MSJ Ex. C-1, ECF No. 26-3 at 3 (GAMBILL_000001); Pl. MSJ Ex. F-1, ECF No. 26-6 at 3 (GAMBILL_000032). Plaintiffs assert that each Snapshot layers three sources onto a single map of the relevant area at issue: (1) the rail corridor shown on the ICC Valuation Maps; (2) the county’s tax parcel maps or descriptions; and (3) each Plaintiff’s land as described in a modern deed or plat. Pl. MSJ at 9; Tr. 45:21–46:6. 6 Based on those documents, Plaintiffs made a straightforward assertion with which the government agrees: “In late 1894 and early 1895, HBR acquired its rights to the Corridor via conveyances from the owners of the land over which it built its railroad.” Pl. MSJ at 7. The following table reproduces the substance of the parties’ agreed-upon linkages between each Plaintiff’s property adjacent to the rail corridor segment at issue, the source deeds, and the rail corridor as depicted on the ICC Valuation Maps — all 6 Several Snapshots also purport to mark an “Area of Take” by length, width, and square footage. See, e.g., Pl. MSJ Ex. C-1, ECF No. 26-3 at 3 (GAMBILL_000001). 11 supported by government admissions that Plaintiffs sought during discovery, see Pl. MSJ at 5–10, as well as the government’s own virtually identical table: 7 Identification No. of Property ICC Supporting Plaintiffs’ Adjacent to Rail Original Railroad Plaintiffs Valuation RFAs Corridor Source Deed Snapshot 8 Map (Pl. MSJ Ex. I) (Pl. MSJ Ex. I at 4 (Chart A)) Ewart, Book 33, V49-01-01 Gambill 9568177479 RFA Nos. 2–4 Ex. C-1 Page 17 (Ex. M-1) (Ex. N-1) Cantrell, Book 33, V49-02-13 Page 44 (Ex. M-2) (Ex. N-2) Holloway 9549089544 RFA Nos. 8–12; Ex. D-1 M.J. Allen, Book 33, V49-02-14 Interrog. No. 4. Page 45 (Ex. M-3) (Ex. N-2) Toms, Book 33, V49-02-03 Callahan 9559127167 RFA Nos. 18–20 Ex. E-1 Page 13 (Ex. M-4) (Ex. N-2) Johnson, Book 33, V49-02-07 Corn and Page 36 (Ex. M-5) (Ex. N-2) RFA Nos. 24–28; 9549646851 Ex. F-1 Thayer Clayton, Book 33, V49-02-06 Interrog. No. 4. Page 34 (Ex. M-6) (Ex. N-2) Guice, Book 33, V49-01-04 Page 21 (Ex. M-7) (Ex. N-1) RFA Nos. 34–38; Dunn 9558985630 Ex. G-1 Smith & Pace, Book 33, V49-01-03 Interrog. No. 4 Page 19 (Ex. M-8) (Ex. N-1) G.W. Allen, Book 33, V49-01-09 Goodrich 9559318518 RFA Nos. 44–46 Ex. H-1 Page 29 (Ex. M-9) (Ex. N-1) Footnote 9 of Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is particularly important to this Court’s resolution of the parties’ pending motions. There, Plaintiffs asserted: “Taken together, the United States has admitted that the Original Conveyances above are the relevant conveyances by which HBR acquired its interests in the Corridor and are the relevant Original Conveyances as to each of the relevant Plaintiffs.” Pl. MSJ at 8 n.9. Far from suggesting that the source deeds were void, Plaintiffs maintained they were the very instruments by which HBR “acquired its interests in the Corridor.” Id. 7 The government included in its summary-judgment motion a substantially identical table with the same facts. See Def. MSJ at 12 (“Plaintiffs have produced to the United States, and the United States has confirmed, the following source deeds, valuation maps, and the corresponding properties of the Plaintiffs allegedly adjacent to the rail corridor in the order as listed in the Amended Complaint and Plaintiffs[’] Initial Disclosures and Supplemental Initial Disclosures.”). 8 The government objects to this Court’s consideration of Plaintiffs’ Snapshots, which were created for this case, as discussed in Part V.C.3. 12  Moreover, Plaintiffs framed the supporting facts as government admissions. See Pl. MSJ at 8 n.9. And for good reason: Plaintiffs obtained the government’s agreement via Requests for Admissions pursuant to RCFC 36. Pl. MSJ Ex. I. For each relevant source deed, 9 Plaintiffs asked the government to “admit that the deed . . . is identified on [the relevant] ICC Valuation Map . . . as the original conveyance by which the railroad acquired its interest in the portion of the corridor adjacent to the [Plaintiffs’] Property.” Pl. MSJ Ex. I at RFA Nos. 4 (Ewart Deed); 10 (Cantrell Deed); 20 (Toms Deed); 26 (Clayton Deed); 46 (G.W. Allen Deed) (RFA Nos. 10 and 26 read “as one of the original conveyances”). And as to each, the government admitted the fact per Plaintiffs’ request, with the qualification that “[t]his admission does not include any admission regarding legal description or boundaries of that property, or whether the Plaintiff has any legal interest in the railroad corridor that is the subject of” the takings claim. Id. Accordingly, this Court holds the parties to their agreement as summarized in Plaintiffs’ own proposed findings of uncontroverted fact, wherein Plaintiffs asserted HBR acquired the rail corridor rights at issue via the source deeds and the related ICC Valuation Map parcels Plaintiffs themselves relied upon. See infra Part V.C.1. The parties’ legal dispute centers on the nature of those rights — a legal question for this Court to decide. In that regard, while the government admitted the predicate facts that identify the relevant instruments and rail corridor segments, the government did not admit the ultimate legal conclusion that Plaintiffs owned the rail corridor or that HBR held only easements. To the contrary, the government expressly denied that the source deeds described easements, instead maintaining that the deeds were fee-simple conveyances that “grant, bargain and convey” to the railroad “and its successors forever a strip of land.” Pl. MSJ Ex. I at 6–14 (RFA Nos. 5–6, 13–16, 21–22, 29–32, 39–42, 49–50), 17–18 (Response to Interrogatory No. 5). Quite apart from the parties’ agreement, Plaintiffs’ factual presentation is supported by the documentary evidence in the summary-judgment record. The source deeds were executed between August 1894 and February 1895 and recorded together on February 28, 1895. Pl. MSJ at 8; Def. MSJ at 6, 12, Exs. 2–10. The parties treat the Ewart 9 The government denied the relevancy of one deed Plaintiffs had “inadvertently included” (the Anders deed), and Plaintiffs agree the government “properly denied [those] admissions.” See Pl. MSJ at 8 n.9; Pl. MSJ Ex. I at 14, 16 (RFA Nos. 47–48; Response to Interrogatory No. 3). The government denied the requests about four other deeds (RFA Nos. 12, 28, 36, and 38) not because those deeds were irrelevant, but because each was “one of two original conveyances” for the parcel concerned. Pl. MSJ Ex. I at 16–17 (Response to Interrogatory No. 4); see Pl. MSJ at 8 n.9. 13 deed as a representative example; it provides that the grantors: [G]ive, grant, bargain, sell, and convey to [HBR] and its successors forever a strip of land of sufficient width [upon] which to locate, construct, operate, and maintain a standard gauge rail road through said premises . . . such strip so marked out and indicated to be the land hereby conveyed provided that this deed shall be void unless said railroad company shall have constructed a railroad . . . on or before the first day of January 1897. Pl. MSJ at 25–26 (quoting Plaintiffs’ transcription of the Ewart deed, Ex. M-1; alteration reflects the handwritten deed, Pl. MSJ Ex. M-1, GAMBILL_000005); see also Def. MSJ at 13 (quoting Ex. 10, the G.W. Allen deed, which the government’s brief mislabeled as the J.P. Johnson deed, Ex. 6, see Tr. 106:10–111:25). 10 The deeds recite consideration and they refer to a strip to be marked (or, as in the Allen deed, already marked) by the railroad’s engineer or engineers and indicated on a map placed on file as required by law. Pl. MSJ at 25–27; Def. MSJ at 12–13. The deeds contain no habendum clause and no covenants of seizin or warranty. Pl. MSJ at 28; Def. Resp. at 6–8. 11 Finally, the summary-judgment record includes ICC Valuation Maps, which, as explained in Part V.D.5 infra, are evidence of what land the source deeds conveyed. Congress required the ICC to investigate the value of railroad property, including grants of land to common carriers. Pressly, 174 F.4th at 1377–78 (discussing the Federal Valuation of Common Carriers Act). In response, railroads submitted valuation maps and schedules to the ICC identifying