Pavonix (Massachusetts), Inc. v. State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Pavonix (Massachusetts), Inc. v. State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch PAVONIX (MASSACHUSETTS), INC. v. STATE OF CONNECTICUT, JUDICIAL BRANCH (AC 48506) Moll, Wilson and Harper, Js. Syllabus The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment denying its motion to compel arbitration and to stay litigation and granting the defendant’s motion to permanently enjoin arbitration. The plaintiff claimed that the court improperly determined that, notwithstanding the permission the plaintiff had received from the claims commissioner to bring an action against the defendant, sovereign immunity barred the plaintiff from pursuing its claims against the defendant by way of private arbitration rather than by way of litigation in the Superior Court. Held: This court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction to consider all of the plaintiff’s claims on appeal directed to the trial court’s order simulta- neously denying its motion to compel arbitration and to stay litigation and granting the defendant’s motion to permanently enjoin arbitration, as the granting of a permanent injunction constitutes an appealable final judgment and the court’s rulings on both motions were inextricably intertwined, the motions having been based on the same facts and the court having addressed the motions together and relied on the same rationale to deny the plaintiff’s motion and to grant the defendant’s motion. The trial court properly determined that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred arbitration in this case, as the plain and unambiguous language of the statute (§ 4-160) under which the plaintiff received permission from the claims commissioner to sue the state does not authorize a waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity from private arbitration and this court could not, by judicial construction, read into statutes provisions that were not clearly stated. Argued February 10—officially released August 25, 2026 Procedural History Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of contract, and for other relief, brought to the Supe- rior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the plaintiff filed a motion to compel arbitration and to stay litigation; thereafter, the defendant filed a motion for an order permanently enjoining arbi- tration; subsequently, the court, Klau, J., rendered judgment granting the defendant’s motion for an order permanently enjoining arbitration and denying the  Pavonix (Massachusetts), Inc. v. State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration and to stay liti- gation, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court; thereafter, this court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss this appeal. Affirmed. Benjamin B. Watson, pro hac vice, with whom were Kenneth J. Krayeske and, on the brief, Jonathan R. Chally, pro hac vice, and Katherine L. D’Ambrosio, pro hac vice, for the appellant (plaintiff). Thadius Bochain, assistant attorney general, with whom were Emily Gait, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, for the appellee (defendant). Opinion HARPER, J. The plaintiff, Pavonix (Massachusetts), Inc., formerly known as Softscape, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its motion to compel arbitration and to stay litigation and simultaneously granting the motion filed by the defendant, the State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch,1 to permanently enjoin arbitration. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court, Klau, J., improperly determined that, notwithstanding the permission the plaintiff received from the claims commissioner to bring an action against the defendant, sovereign immunity barred the plaintiff from pursuing its claims against the defendant by way of private arbi- tration rather than by way of litigation in the Superior Court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff is a technology company that designs and installs web based software products. On November 19, 1999, the defendant issued a written request for proposal (RFP) for the development and delivery of a new case management 1 The Judicial Branch is a department of the state of Connecticut. See Conn. Const., art. II (“[t]he powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them confided to a separate magistracy, to wit, those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another”).  Pavonix (Massachusetts), Inc. v. State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch system for its Court Support Services Division. The RFP listed certain terms and conditions that the defendant expected to be included in any resulting contract, includ- ing a “[s]ettlement of [c]laims” condition that specified that “[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of, or relating to this contract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by Arbitration in accordance with the rules of The American Arbitration Association then in effect.” The plaintiff submitted a response to the RFP on Feb- ruary 1, 2000. In that response, the plaintiff expressly agreed with the arbitration provision set forth in the “[s]ettlement of [c]laims” condition included in the RFP. Thereafter, the defendant selected the plaintiff for the job and the plaintiff “began work implementing, con- figuring, and customizing its state-of-the-art relational enterprise software application database for the [defen- dant], referred to as the Case Management Information System or ‘CMIS.’ ” The plaintiff did so in accordance with a Software Development and License Agreement (agreement) the parties entered into on June 20, 2000. The agreement delineated the parties’ respective rights and obligations with respect to the program the plaintiff was implement- ing and developing for the defendant (licensed program). It also incorporated by reference the arbitration provision from the “[s]ettlement of [c]laims” condition listed in the RFP and further stated that “ANY CLAIM UNDER THIS AGREEMENT MUST BE FILED WITH AN ARBITRA- TOR WITHIN ONE (1) YEAR FROM THE ACCRUAL OF THE CLAIM.” Moreover, the agreement specified that the defendant “is unable to waive [its] [s]overeign immunity in any form.” The plaintiff alleged that, from 2000 to 2005, it per- formed its contractual obligations and delivered a ver- sion of CMIS to the defendant, but that the defendant “failed to pay [the plaintiff] for all its work while retain- ing the licensed program for its own use.” In 2007, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Office of the Claims Commissioner, alleging that the defendant had breached  Pavonix (Massachusetts), Inc. v. State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch the agreement by failing to pay the plaintiff and also by unlawfully disclosing and modifying the licensed pro- gram. After obtaining additional information through discovery, the plaintiff twice amended its complaint, first in 2011, and again in 2012. In its second amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged claims for (1) breach of the agreement, (2) copyright infringement, (3) violation of the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), General Statutes § 35-50 et seq., and (4) violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. In 2023, the Attorney General filed stipulations with the Office of the Claims Commissioner that authorized the plaintiff to sue the defendant. See General Statutes § 4-160 (e).2 The November 20, 2023 amended stipu- lation stated in relevant part that the plaintiff was granted “permission to sue the [defendant] in Superior Court” and that the plaintiff “ ‘shall be deemed to have been granted permission to sue the [defendant] by the [c]laims [c]ommissioner . . . .’ ” It further stated that “[t]he [defendant] reserves the right to raise all subject matter jurisdictional and other defenses available in the Superior Court.” In August 2024, the plaintiff commenced this civil action by way of a three count complaint sounding in (1) breach of contract, (2) misappropriation of trade secrets in violation of CUTSA and (3) unfair trade practices in violation of CUTPA. In the “[i]ntroduction” section of its complaint, the plaintiff stated that it “intends to pursue its claim against the [defendant] in arbitration, as authorized by the agreement. [The plaintiff] is filing the present complaint to ensure its compliance with all applicable statutes of limitation and will file a motion to stay this litigation pending arbitration.” The plaintiff 2 General Statutes § 4-160 (e) provides: “A claimant exclusively seek- ing permission to sue the state shall be deemed to have been granted permission to sue the state by the Claims Commissioner if the Attor- ney General files with the Office of the Claims Commissioner a signed stipulation authorizing permission to sue the state for a particular claim of the claimant.”  Pavonix (Massachusetts), Inc. v. State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch filed an arbitration demand with the American Arbitra- tion Association around the same time it commenced this action. The defendant did not agree to arbitrate. On September 20, 2024, the plaintiff filed its complaint in the Superior Court and also filed a motion to compel arbitration and to stay litigation3 with a supporting memorandum of law. The plaintiff argued that all of its claims against the defendant fell within the scope of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate and that “sovereign immunity is not an obstacle to compelling the [defendant] to participate in arbitration” because it had received permission to “assert its claims in . . . court.” On September 24, 2024, the defendant filed a motion to permanently enjoin arbitration and a memorandum of law in support thereof. The defendant argued that “[s]overeign immunity precludes arbitration of this case; that immunity can only be waived by the legisla- ture and the legislature has not waived it to allow for arbitration over the [agreement]. The only waiver the legislature has made that is applicable in this case is the claims commissioner process, which is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity and only permits actions in the Superior Court.” The defendant then filed an objection to the plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration and to stay litigation on October 21, 2024. It reiterated in that objection that “[t]he [defendant] cannot be compelled to arbitrate without a clear waiver of sovereign immunity, which can only be done by the legislature, and there is no such waiver.” 3 As authority for its motion, the plaintiff cited to, inter alia, General Statutes § 52-409, which provides: “If any action for legal or equitable relief or other proceeding is brought by any party to a written agreement to arbitrate, the court in which the action or proceeding is pending, upon being satisfied that any issue involved in the action or proceeding is referable to arbitration under the agreement, shall, on motion of any party to the arbitration agreement, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration has been had in compliance with the agreement, provided the person making application for the stay shall be ready and willing to proceed with the arbitration.”  Pavonix (Massachusetts), Inc. v. State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch The plaintiff filed an objection and response in oppo- sition to the defendant’s motion to permanently enjoin arbitration on October 24, 2024, and a reply in support of its motion to compel arbitration and to stay litiga- tion on November 5, 2024. The defendant filed a reply in further support of its motion to enjoin arbitration on November 7, 2024. The court, Klau, J., heard oral argument regarding the parties’ competing motions on January 7, 2025, and, on February 4, 2025, issued a memorandum of decision in which it denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitra- tion and to stay litigation and granted the defendant’s motion to permanently enjoin arbitration. The court concluded that, “when the General Assembly delegated to the claims commissioner the power to waive sovereign immunity, it placed limits on the scope of that delegated power. One of those limits is that the claims commis- sioner may only waive sovereign immunity to permit lawsuits against the state in Superior Court. The claims commissioner has no statutory authority to waive sov- ereign immunity and require the state to defend itself in a nonjudicial forum. Moreover, a state agency cannot affect the scope of a waiver of sovereign immunity by including an arbitration provision in a contract.” The court based its conclusion on § 4-160, which it deemed “susceptible of but one reasonable interpretation: it only empowers the claims commissioner to waive sovereign immunity for the purpose of allowing a lawsuit against the state in Superior Court, where the case must remain until it is settled or until judgment enters after trial.” This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary. I Before we address the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, we first must consider the threshold question of whether the ruling from which the plaintiff appeals, namely, the simultaneous denial of the plaintiff’s motion to com- pel arbitration and to stay litigation and granting of the defendant’s motion to permanently enjoin arbitration,  Pavonix (Massachusetts), Inc. v. State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch constitutes an appealable final judgment. “The jurisdic- tion of the appellate courts is restricted to appeals from judgments that are final. . . . The policy concerns underly- ing the final judgment rule are to discourage piecemeal appeals and to facilitate the speedy and orderly disposi- tion of cases at the trial court level. . . . The appellate courts have a duty to dismiss, even on [their] own initia- tive, any appeal that [they lack] jurisdiction to hear. . . . We therefore must always determine the threshold question of whether the appeal is taken from a final judgment before considering the merits of the claim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kellogg v. Middle- sex Mutual Assurance Co., 211 Conn. App. 335, 344, 272 A.3d 677 (2022). “A determination regarding . . . subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law . . . [and, therefore] our review is plenary.” (Internal quo- tation marks omitted.) 707 Blue Hills, LLC v. Kelly, 234 Conn. App. 865, 871, 344 A.3d 1223 (2025). We begin by setting forth the relevant procedural history. On May 9, 2025, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter juris- diction because, in its view, the court’s ruling denying the plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration and to stay litigation and granting the state’s motion to permanently enjoin arbitration does not constitute a final judgment for purposes of appeal. The defendant argued in that motion that “[n]o statute permits the plaintiff to appeal from the denial of its motion to compel,” that there is likewise no “statute giving the plaintiff the right to immediately appeal an interlocutory prohibitory injunction,” and that the court’s collective rulings do not satisfy the finality test for interlocutory orders set forth in State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 463 A.2d 566 (1983).4 Against this backdrop, the defendant maintained that “neither aspect 4 “Under Curcio, interlocutory orders are immediately appealable if the order or ruling (1) terminates a separate and distinct proceeding, or (2) so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cunniffe v. Cunniffe, 150 Conn. App. 419, 431, 91 A.3d 497, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 935, 102 A.3d 1112 (2014).  Pavonix (Massachusetts), Inc. v. State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch of the court’s interlocutory ruling is immediately appeal- able” and thus “the ‘inextricably intertwined’ doctrine does not apply.” See, e.g., 707 Blue Hills, LLC v. Kelly, supra, 234 Conn. App. 872 (“[i]n some circumstances, the factual and legal issues raised by a legal argument, the appealability of which is doubtful, may be so ‘inextricably intertwined’ with another argument, the appealability of which is established that we should assume jurisdiction over both” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The plaintiff filed its principal appellate brief in this appeal on May 12, 2025, three days after the defendant filed its motion to dismiss. In that brief, the plaintiff claimed that the “court’s entry of injunctive relief is a final appealable order and provides jurisdiction for this appeal.” The plaintiff argued, more specifically, that (1) the “entry of permanent injunctive relief [has been deemed] a final appealable order” by our Supreme Court in Bozrah v. Chmurynski, 303 Conn. 676, 682, 36 A.3d 210 (2012), (2) the defendant’s motion to per- manently enjoin arbitration was a counterclaim that the court granted in its entirety, thereby giving rise to an immediately appealable final judgment, and (3) the issues presented in the motion to compel arbitration and to stay litigation are inextricably intertwined with the granting of the injunction, thereby constituting an appealable final judgment over which this court has jurisdiction. The plaintiff also filed a timely opposition to the defendant’s motion to dismiss in which it reiter- ated those same arguments. On September 3, 2025, this court denied the defen- dant’s motion to dismiss “without prejudice to the defen- dant addressing in its appellee’s brief, and the plaintiff in its reply brief, if any, whether the denial of the motion to stay under General Statutes § 52-409, which is not a final judgment, is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the granting of the [defendant’s] application for a permanent injunction, which is a final judgment, for the purpose of  Pavonix (Massachusetts), Inc. v. State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch appellate jurisdiction. See Kellogg v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., [supra, 211 Conn. App. 349].” In a footnote in its appellee’s brief, without any explica- tion, the defendant “respectfully disagree[d]” with this court’s order insofar as it “concluded that [this court] had jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal because the [trial] court granted a permanent injunction barring arbitration” and it “reserve[d] the right to reassert its jurisdictional challenge upon further review, if any.” The defendant, however, expressly “acknowledge[d] that the decision to grant a permanent injunction barring arbitra- tion is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the denial of the plaintiff’s § 52-409 motion because the same rationale underlies the court’s decision to permanently enjoin arbitration and deny the plaintiff’s § 52-409 motion: sovereign immunity bars arbitration.” Thus, the defen- dant appears to concede, at least for purposes of this appeal, that “this court has jurisdiction to address the nonappealable ruling on the plaintiff’s § 52-409 motion because this court’s assessment of whether sovereign immunity bars arbitration would be ‘equally applicable’ to the permanent injunction ruling and the denial of the plaintiff’s § 52-409 motion.”5 In its reply brief, the plaintiff reiterated its argument that the court’s “entry of a permanent injunction is a final, appealable order” and claimed that “[t]his court has jurisdiction over the denial of [the plaintiff’s] stay motion . . . because that denial is inextricably intertwined with the grant of the [defendant’s] requested injunctive relief.” We agree with the plaintiff and conclude that we have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the plain- tiff’s appeal from the court’s order denying its motion to 5 During oral argument before this court, when asked to clarify the basis for the defendant’s disagreement with this court’s order denying its motion to dismiss, the defendant’s counsel explained that the defendant does not agree that the granting of its motion to permanently enjoin arbitration constitutes an appealable final judgment. Although counsel suggested that this court could choose to revisit that determination, he stated that, “at this point, we understand and . . . recognize what the court has decided on that issue.”  Pavonix (Massachusetts), Inc. v. State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch compel arbitration and to stay litigation and granting the defendant’s motion to permanently enjoin arbitration. At the outset, we note that our appellate courts have determined that the granting of a permanent injunction constitutes an appealable final judgment. See Bozrah v. Chmurynski, supra, 303 Conn. 682 (entry of permanent injunctive relief constituted final appealable order); Glasson v. Portland, 6 Conn. App. 229, 231 n.3, 504 A.2d 550 (1986) (same); see also Marinos v. Building Rehabilitations, LLC, 67 Conn. App. 86, 87, 787 A.2d 46 (2001) (affirming judgment of trial court enjoin- ing arbitration); Weitz Co. v. Shoreline Care Ltd. Part- nership, 39 Conn. App. 641, 645, 666 A.2d 835 (1995) (same). Indeed, our Supreme Court has explained that “a permanent injunction effects a final determination of [the] rights” at issue. (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Bozrah v. Chmurynski, supra, 682. By contrast, the entry of a temporary injunction, which is generally not an appealable final judgment, simply “[maintains] the status quo while [those] rights . . . are being determined . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In Bozrah, our Supreme Court relied on this distinction to conclude that, where the trial court “made a final determination that the town could search [a] property over the objec- tion of the defendants,” that order was an appealable final judgment because, although the trial court labeled its order as a temporary injunction, it “functioned as a permanent injunction.” Id. In the present case, the defendant’s motion was labeled a “motion to permanently enjoin arbitration,” it sought to permanently enjoin arbitration, and the court granted the defendant the relief it was seeking. In other words, the court granted a permanent injunction that finally determined the rights at issue by precluding arbitra- tion of the plaintiff’s claims. As such, the portion of the plaintiff’s appeal challenging the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant on its motion to permanently  Pavonix (Massachusetts), Inc. v. State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch enjoin arbitration is jurisdictionally proper. See Bozrah v. Chmurynski, supra, 303 Conn. 682. We must therefore consider whether the judgment rendered on the plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration and to stay litigation, which is not an immediately appeal- able final judgment;6 see Travelers Ins. Co. v. General Electric Co., 230 Conn. 106, 107–108, 644 A.2d 346 (1994); Success Centers, Inc. v. Huntington Learning Centers, Inc., 223 Conn. 761, 769–76, 613 A.2d 1320 (1992); is inextricably intertwined with the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant on its motion to per- manently enjoin arbitration. As previously stated in this opinion, the plaintiff argues, and the defendant agrees, that the judgments on the competing motions are inextricably intertwined. Our independent assessment of the competing motions and the court’s memorandum of decision thereon leads us to the same conclusion. See, e.g., A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v. Saint Paul, 192 Conn. App. 245, 257, 217 A.3d 996 (2019) (articu- lating “bedrock principle that parties cannot agree to confer subject matter jurisdiction on a court”), aff’d, 338 Conn. 651, 258 A.3d 1244 (2021). In its motion to compel arbitration and to stay litiga- tion, the plaintiff maintained that all of its claims against the defendant fell within the scope of the parties’ agree- ment to arbitrate and that “sovereign immunity is not an obstacle to compelling the [defendant] to participate in arbitration” because it had received permission to “assert its claims in . . . court.” In its motion to permanently enjoin arbitration, however, the defendant argued that sovereign immunity had been waived only for purposes of allowing an action to be brought against it in the Superior Court and that, consequently, sovereign immunity was a bar to arbitration in this matter. Both motions were based on the same underlying facts and, indeed, the court addressed them together. In doing so, the court assessed 6 The parties do not dispute that the court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration and to stay litigation is not immediately appealable.  Pavonix (Massachusetts), Inc. v. State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch whether sovereign immunity barred the plaintiff from pursuing its claims in an arbitral forum and its conclu- sion that it did was determinative of both motions. In other words, the court relied on the same rationale to deny the plaintiff’s motion and to grant the defendant’s motion. See Kellogg v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., supra, 211 Conn. App. 349. As such, our analysis of the court’s decision to grant a permanent injunction in favor of the defendant will be equally applicable to our analysis of the court’s decision to deny the plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration and to stay litigation. See Collins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 266 Conn. 12, 30, 836 A.2d 1124 (2003) (concluding that CUTPA and non-CUTPA counts were “ ‘inextricably intertwined’ ” where factual and legal bases of claims did not differ); Kellogg v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., supra, 349 (reaching merits of all issues in appeal from denial of motion for summary judgment even though only res judicata defense was immediately appealable because analysis as to res judicata claims was equally applicable to remainder of defendant’s claims). For these reasons, we conclude that we have subject matter jurisdiction to consider all of the plaintiff’s claims on appeal directed to the trial court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration and to stay litigation and simultaneous granting of the defendant’s motion to permanently enjoin arbitration. II With respect to the merits of this appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that the permission it received by way of the process set forth in § 4-160 to bring an action against the defendant waived sovereign immunity only for the purpose of allowing the plaintiff to litigate its claims in the Superior Court and did not authorize the plaintiff to have those claims determined by way of private arbitration instead. The plaintiff maintains that the court misconstrued § 4-160 when it concluded that the “claims commissioner may only waive sovereign immunity to permit lawsuits against the state in Superior Court” and that “[t]he  Pavonix (Massachusetts), Inc. v. State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch claims commissioner has no statutory authority to waive sovereign immunity and require the state to defend itself in a nonjudicial forum.” Relying on subsection (h) of § 4-160,7 the plaintiff argues that “§ 4-160 provides that, once the state waives its sovereign immunity, its rights and liabilities in the resulting legal action are the same as a private person. . . . There is no question that a court can enforce an arbitration agreement against a private person. . . . There should likewise be no question that it can enforce an arbitration agreement against the state, where the state has waived sovereign immunity from the claims to be arbitrated.” (Citations omitted.) In other words, the plaintiff argues that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the waiver of the defendant’s sovereign immunity from suit on the plaintiff’s claims also waives the defendant’s sovereign immunity from private arbitration on those claims. The defendant claims, in response, that the court prop- erly concluded that the doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes arbitration in this case. In support of this claim, the defendant advances two arguments. First, the defendant claims that “this court can . . . affirm on the alternative ground that the plaintiff’s arbitration demand is beyond the narrow scope of the permission to sue that was granted under § 4-160 (e).” Second, the defendant contends that “the court correctly held that sovereign immunity barred arbitration because the legis- lature intended for only the Superior Court to adjudicate the state’s liability in an action stemming from [the Office of the Claims Commissioner].” We agree with the defendant’s second argument. We begin with the following relevant standards and legal principles. “The principle that the state cannot 7 General Statutes § 4-160 (h) provides in relevant part: “In each action authorized by the Claims Commissioner . . . or any action where permission to sue the state has been deemed to have been granted by the Claims Commissioner . . . (1) the state waives its immunity from liability and from suit in each such action and waives all defenses which might arise from the eleemosynary or governmental nature of the activity complained of, and (2) the rights and liability of the state in each such action shall be coextensive with and shall equal the rights and liability of private persons in like circumstances.”  Pavonix (Massachusetts), Inc. v. State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law. . . . The doctrine of sovereign immunity operates as a strong presumption in favor of the state’s immunity from liability or suit. . . . [T]o circumvent the strong presumption of sovereign immunity in [an] action for monetary damages, the bur- den is on the [claimant] to show that . . . the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waived the state’s sovereign immunity . . . . In the absence of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, the [claimant] may not bring an action against the state for monetary damages without authorization from the . . . [claims] commissioner to do so. . . . “When sovereign immunity has not been waived, the . . . [claims] commissioner is authorized by statute to hear monetary claims against the state and determine whether the claimant has a cognizable claim. . . . The . . . [claims] commissioner, if he [or she] deems it just and equitable, may sanction suit against the state on any claim which, in his [or her] opinion, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Avoletta, 212 Conn. App. 309, 321–22, 275 A.3d 716 (2022), aff’d, 347 Conn. 629, 298 A.3d 1211 (2023). “[P]rior to 1959, before the legislature created the office of the claims commission, the General Assembly in the first instance considered what action, if any, was appropriate on claims made against the state. . . . It reached a point where the number of claims submitted to the legislature became a major burden and this interfered with the more important function of enacting general legislation. . . . [The] director [of the claims commis- sion] explained [that the commission was created] to ensure that equity and justice [would be] done. A statu- tory procedure for the disposition of claims against the state, to be administered by a claims commission, was adopted by the enactment of Public Acts 1959, No. 685. Subsequently, in 1975, the legislature substituted a  Pavonix (Massachusetts), Inc. v. State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch claims commissioner . . . for the claims commission. . . . Therefore, the [claims] commissioner is in reality the conscience of the state, assuming in part the prior role of the legislature to ensure that justice and equity is done. It is the [claims] commissioner who now determines what claims should be paid, what claims should be referred to the legislature for payment, or which claimants should be authorized to institute an action against the state. . . . “The legislative scheme by which the [claims] com- missioner reviews possible claims against the state is contained in [chapter 53 of the General Statutes, General Statutes §§ 4-141 through 4-165c], inclusive.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Reilly v. Smith, 84 Conn. App. 849, 854–55, 855 A.2d 1000, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 938, 861 A.2d 513 (2004). “The claims commissioner . . . may waive [the state’s sovereign] immunity, pursuant to . . . § 4-160 (a), and consent to suit.” Krozser v. New Haven, 212 Conn. 415, 423, 562 A.2d 1080 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S. Ct. 757, 107 L. Ed. 2d 774 (1990); see also Envirotest Systems Corp. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 293 Conn. 382, 399, 978 A.2d 49 (2009) (§ 4-160 (a) empow- ers claims commissioner to waive sovereign immunity and authorize suit against state); Chotkowski v. State, 240 Conn. 246, 270, 690 A.2d 368 (1997) (same). Indeed, our Supreme Court has long “recognized that [t]he sole purpose of § 4-160 . . . is to remove the bar of sovereign immunity when the claims commissioner determines that it would be just and equitable to permit a claimant to seek redress against the state.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families, 352 Conn. 736, 752, 339 A.3d 598 (2025). The issue of whether the permission the plaintiff received to sue the state, in accordance with the proce- dure set forth in § 4-160, waived the defendant’s sov- ereign immunity from private arbitration presents an issue of statutory interpretation over which we exercise plenary review. See Perez v. University of Connecticut, 182 Conn. App. 278, 287, 189 A.3d 664 (2018). “Our  Pavonix (Massachusetts), Inc. v. State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch analysis is guided by General Statutes § 1-2z and the general rules of statutory construction8 . . . subject to a significant qualification. . . . That is, where, as here, the claim is that the legislature has abrogated the common law, [w]e recognize only those alterations of the common law that are clearly expressed in the language of the statute . . . . [We do so] because the traditional principles of justice [on] which the common law is founded should be perpetuated. . . . Indeed, it is well established that, [w]hen a statute is in derogation of common law or creates a liability where formerly none existed, it should receive a strict construction and is not to be extended, modified, repealed or enlarged in its scope by the mechanics of [statutory] construction.” (Citations omitted; footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jamie G. v. Dept. of Children & Families, supra, 352 Conn. 746. With these principles in mind, we turn to the language of § 4-160. Subsection (a) of § 4-160 provides in relevant part: “Whenever the Claims Commissioner deems it just and equitable, the Claims Commissioner . . . may authorize suit against the state on any claim9 which, in the opinion of the Claims Commissioner, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable. . . .” (Footnote added.) After permission to sue the state has been granted, or deemed granted; see General Statutes § 4-160 (e), (f) and (h); “[t]he claimant shall bring such action against the state as party defendant in the judicial district in which the claimant resides or, if the claimant is not a resident 8 “When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascer- tain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning . . . § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the mean- ing of such text is plain and [unambiguous] and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perez v. University of Connecticut, supra, 182 Conn. App. 288. 9 A “[c]laim,” by statutory definition, “means a petition for the pay- ment or refund of money by the state or for permission to sue the state.” General Statutes § 4-141.  Pavonix (Massachusetts), Inc. v. State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch of this state, in the judicial district of Hartford or in the judicial district in which the claim arose.” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 4-160 (i). The claimant must do so by way of “[c]ivil process directed against the state . . . .” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 4-160 (j). Thereafter, once this procedure has been followed and the case is pending against the state in court, in the appropriate judicial district, the statute specifies that “[i]ssues arising in such actions shall be tried to the court without a jury”; (emphasis added) General Statutes § 4-160 (k); and that “[t]he laws and rules of practice governing disclosures in civil actions shall apply . . . in any such action.” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 4-160 (l). Moreover, § 4-160 (m) provides that “[t]he Attorney General, with the consent of the court, may compromise or settle any such action” and that “[t]he terms of every such compromise or settlement shall be expressed in a judgment of the court”; § 4-160 (n) provides that “[c]osts may be allowed against the state as the court deems just”; and § 4-160 (o) provides that “[t]he clerk of the court in which judgment is entered against the state shall forward a certified copy of such judgment to the Comptroller. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Finally, subsection (p) of § 4-160 provides in relevant part that “the Attorney General shall report to the joint standing committee of the General Assembly having cognizance of matters relating to the judiciary on the status and disposition of all actions authorized pursu- ant to this section . . . or brought against the state under any other provision of law and in which the interests of the state are represented by the Attorney General. . . .” The Attorney General’s report “shall include,” inter alia, “(1) [t]he number of such actions pending in state and federal court . . . (2) the number of new actions brought in the preceding year in state and federal court . . . [and] (3) the number of actions disposed of in the preceding