Ignatius M. Tee, Jr. v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims FOR PUBLICATION No. 25-59C (Filed: June 24, 2026) ) IGNATIUS M. TEE, JR., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) UNITED STATES, ) ) Defendant. ) ) Jason J. Greene (argued), Military Justice Firm, PLLC, Seattle, WA, for plaintiff. Douglas G. Edelschick (argued), Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant. With him on the briefs were Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General; and Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, and Reginald T. Blades, Jr., Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Lt. Col. Suzanne M. Dempsey, Office of the Judge Advocate General, U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington Navy Yard, DC, Of Counsel. OPINION AND ORDER BONILLA, Judge. United States Navy Petty Officer First Class (PO1/E-6) Ignatius M. Tee, Jr. was disenrolled from the Seaman to Admiral–21 (STA-21) program after successive Performance Review Boards (PRB) found he had engaged in inappropriate behavior toward fellow midshipmen. PO1 Tee filed this action challenging the procedures employed by the Navy in convening, adjudicating, and acting on the findings and recommendations of both PRBs. On November 10, 2025, the Court granted-in-part and denied-in-part the government’s motion to dismiss. Tee v. United States, 179 Fed. Cl. 33 (2025). After PO1 Tee filed a third amended complaint asserting an additional claim, the parties filed dispositive cross-motions.1 The Court heard oral argument on June 17, 2026. For the reasons set forth below, PO1 Tee’s dispositive motion is denied, and defendant’s cross-motion for judgment on the administrative record is granted. BACKGROUND2 After the Court ruled on the government’s motion to dismiss, PO1 Tee voluntarily dismissed Count X.3 Currently, only three of PO1 Tee’s ten original claims, plus an additional claim asserted in his third amended complaint, remain: first, that the Navy violated NSTC M-1533.2E § 6-10 ¶ 6(a)(2) by failing to “[p]rovide [PO1 Tee] with . . . a complete copy of the preliminary inquiry” report before the second PRB (PRB-2)4; second, that the Navy violated PO1 Tee’s rights under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 831, by drawing an adverse inference from his refusal to answer questions during PRB-2; third, that the Navy improperly considered whether PO1 Tee should be medically disqualified from the STA-21 program without affording him an opportunity to respond; and fourth, that the Navy unlawfully considered extra-record evidence in deciding whether PO1 Tee should be disenrolled from the STA-21 program. With the filing of the administrative record, additional material facts have come to light. The administrative record includes an unredacted copy of the preliminary inquiry report that is the subject of PO1 Tee’s first claim. Compare AR 491–510 (redacted report), with AR 273–92 (unredacted report).5 The version electronically delivered to PO1 Tee in advance of the PRB-2 proceeding—and, 1 As is typical in military backpay cases, the parties initially filed cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record under Rule 52.1 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC). As addressed infra, PO1 Tee subsequently sought to recast his filing as a motion for summary judgment under RCFC 56. 2 The facts and procedural history of this matter are detailed in the Court’s November 10, 2025 decision. Tee, 179 Fed. Cl. at 36–39. To provide context for the analysis herein, the Court includes a recapitulation of the relevant background, additional information included in the administrative record, and a summary of proceedings post-dating the Court’s prior opinion. 3 As noted in the Court’s November 10, 2025 opinion, Count X involved “tuition reimbursements requested prior to PO1 Tee’s November 2024 disenrollment from the STA-21 program.” Tee, 179 Fed. Cl. at 39. 4 NSTC M-1533.2E is a citation to the April 28, 2023 version of the Naval Service Training Command Regulations for Officer Development Programs Manual (Naval Manual). This version was updated to NSTC M-1533.2F on February 5, 2025. See Regulations for Officer Development (ROD) Programs, NAVAL SERV. TRAINING COMMAND (Feb. 5, 2025) (executive summary), available at https://perma.cc/2FMR-4WKH. As the Court stated in its November 10, 2025 opinion, because the challenged actions took place before the February 2025 update, the April 2023 version of the Naval Manual governs this case. Tee, 179 Fed. Cl. at 37 n.3. 5 “AR __” is a citation to a Bates-numbered page in the administrative record filed in this case. 2 thus, the version previously presented to the Court in connection with the government’s motion to dismiss—redacted certain information, including the names of victims and witnesses as well as the names, signatures, and contact information of PO1 Tee’s superior officers.6, 7 Relatedly, the administrative record contains contemporaneous communications showing that the Navy invited PO1 Tee “to review all unredacted documents in-person” as early as April 26, 2024—more than two weeks before the PRB-2 hearing took place.8 AR 539; see AR 558; AR 14. The proposed in-person inspection of the unredacted report, however, would be under supervision, and PO1 Tee would be barred from taking written notes or otherwise capturing the information electronically.9 Rejecting what he and his counsel concluded were unacceptable restrictions, PO1 Tee declined the Navy’s invitation. Minutes before the PRB-2 hearing was about to commence, Navy officials produced an unredacted copy of the preliminary inquiry report to PO1 Tee and his counsel for use during the proceeding.10 Next, the administrative record includes what PO1 Tee labels two “extra-record missives” that the Professor of Naval Science (PNS)—the official charged with administering the PRB—delivered to the Naval Service Training Command Commander (CNSTC) during the command’s review of PRB-2. The first missive is the PNS Remarks section of PO1 Tee’s Naval Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (NROTC) Student Disenrollment Report, dated September 9, 2024. The PNS’s remarks summarized PRB-2, defended the procedures followed during PRB-2, and 6 Comparing the reports, the Court noticed two additional redactions: the words “and her roommate” were redacted from a summary of a witness interview; and the words “[h]e added” were redacted from a summary of a different witness interview. Compare AR 291–92, with AR 509–10. 7 PO1 Tee’s command redacted the names of twelve individuals who were contacted or interviewed by the Navy or otherwise gave statements. PO1 Tee’s command also redacted the names of some fourteen other individuals identified in the report. 8 Although PRB-2 was originally scheduled for May 2, 2024, the Navy agreed to delay the hearing until mid-May 2024 at PO1 Tee’s request in the same email in which they offered him the in-person review. 9 The administrative record is unclear as to whether PO1 Tee’s counsel would have been able to view the unredacted preliminary inquiry report. See AR 539 (“OC Tee will be able to review all unredacted documents in-person and will need to schedule a time to do that . . . . He will not be able to have his phone or camera or note taking device (paper, pencil, pen, tablet, etc[.]) when reviewing the documents.” (emphasis added)); ECF 54 at 39 (government noting that, if PO1 Tee had accepted the command’s offer to review the unredacted report, “he could have consulted with counsel during breaks”); ECF 57 at 9 (plaintiff offering analogy wherein “the Defendant told the Court that it cannot give the Court an unredacted copy of the report, but the Court could send a law clerk to sit and read it”). During oral argument, the parties noted that when PO1 Tee’s command invited him to review the unredacted report in person, there was no discussion regarding whether PO1 Tee’s counsel could accompany him. As a practical matter, PO1 Tee’s counsel would have had to travel over 1,500 miles to participate in the in-person review. 10 During oral argument, PO1 Tee’s counsel represented that he returned the unredacted report to the Navy when the hearing concluded. 3 recommended certain follow-on actions. This information was not included in the version of the disenrollment form that PO1 Tee signed on August 9, 2024.11 The second missive is the PNS Summary Letter dated July 29, 2024, addressed to the Director of NROTC Operations. The letter contains a brief overview of the investigation into PO1 Tee’s conduct and a two-page statement culminating in the conclusion that PO1 Tee “is detrimental to the good order and discipline of [his] unit.” AR 52. It also addresses PO1 Tee’s allegations that the NROTC command improperly influenced one of the recorder’s witnesses: [T]he issues raised by [PO1] Tee’s lawyer surrounding [a witness] must be addressed. . . . Comments by [PO1] Tee’s lawyer about her “change in tune” are surely a result of her being corrected for actions unrelated to [PO1] Tee and not a result of the command coaching or influencing her statements. AR 52. PO1 Tee maintains, and the government does not dispute, that he was never given an opportunity to respond to this document. According to PO1 Tee’s Disenrollment Checklist, the NROTC Disenrollment Report requires the student’s signature, whereas the PNS Summary Letter does not.12 The administrative record further contextualizes the medical evaluations PO1 Tee underwent following the first PRB (PRB-1). After PO1 Tee presented concerns that he might harm himself, he was taken to a military mental health facility for evaluation and treatment. Three months later, in February 2024, PO1 Tee 11 In his motion for judgment on the administrative record, PO1 Tee calls attention to the August 9, 2024 version of the disenrollment report at AR 1040. See ECF 51-1 at 24–25 (“[T]he two missives from the PNS . . . were absent . . . . Finally, on August 9, 2024, Plaintiff wrote his written response onto the disenrollment report form and we filed it. AR 1040.”). The Court notes that PO1 Tee’s statement in the version of the disenrollment report at AR 1040 does not exactly match the statement included in the version of the disenrollment report at AR 12. There are two differences. First, the former is dated August 9, 2024, while the latter is dated September 6, 2024. Compare AR 1040, with AR 12. Second, the statements have different concluding paragraphs. Compare AR 1040 (“Per the NSTC form 1533/120, I understand that I do not have any financial obligation and that I do not face recoupment action.”), with AR 12 (“Additionally, if directed onto AES, I respectfully request waiver of financial reimbursement.”). During oral argument, the parties explained that PO1 Tee had to resubmit his student statement due to administrative changes made to the August 9, 2024 version. 12 The Naval Manual requires PO1 Tee’s command to complete the Disenrollment Checklist: When processing a[n] STA-21 [officer candidate] for disenrollment, the following shall be forwarded to NSTC [Officer Development]: (1) Disenrollment Checklist (NSTC 1533/159) and accompanying documents. A PRB is required for all STA-21 disenrollments, including the PNS endorsement with recommendation regarding continued active service and any student rebuttals . . . . NSTC M-1533.2E § 6-17 ¶ 2(a). Appendix P of the Naval Manual—titled “Performance Review Board (PRB) and Disenrollment Guidance”—further mandates that “the unit designated representative shall compile the disenrollment package using [the disenrollment checklist] as a guide.” Id. app. P § 3-3. 4 was “ordered to undergo a [Command Directed Mental Health Examination (CDE)] . . . ‘due to the PRB.’” AR 422. Although PO1 Tee’s counsel repeatedly challenged the grounds for the CDE, see, e.g., AR 424 (“I believe the order [to undergo a CDE] to be retaliatory in nature and unlawful . . . .”), PO1 Tee “signed the CDE informed consent packet” and underwent medical examinations on February 14 and 20, 2024. AR 22–23. During a preliminary discussion between the clinical psychologist assigned to conduct the CDE and PO1 Tee’s commanding officer—which was meant to “provide[] the circumstances around [the commanding officer’s] request for a CDE” and “determine if a CDE was appropriate”—the commanding officer raised a list of questions to be addressed during the CDE: Is the member fit for continued military service in which he will earn a commission as an officer? Is the member suffering from a mental health disorder that would negatively impact or harm those around him or under his charge? The member is suspected of misconduct, does the member’s mental health condition support an investigation into this matter? AR 22–23. While the CDE report concluded that “[a]t this time, PO1 Tee is likely not a suitable candidate for a Commissioned Officer,” it also noted that he was “not endorsing symptoms consistent with a mental health condition” that would prevent his participation in PRB-2. AR 24; accord AR 51. Finally, the administrative record expands on the extent to which the Naval command considered PO1 Tee’s medical status during the disenrollment process. Following PRB-2, on November 19, 2024, the CNSTC sent a letter to the PNS in which he approved PRB-2’s disenrollment recommendation. Therein, the CNSTC enclosed his November 14, 2024 decision letter and a disenrollment authorization form that PO1 Tee would eventually sign and return to the CNSTC. Not among the documents provided to PO1 Tee, however, were other materials apparently reviewed by the CNSTC in determining whether to recommend PO1 Tee’s disenrollment, including: • An April 20, 2024 letter from the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED), which was listed as a “reference” in the CNSTC’s decision letter, AR 3, that concluded PO1 Tee “d[id] not meet established physical standards due to suicidal ideation, anxiety and depression,” AR 21; • The PNS’s two extra-record missives, discussed above, which included a summary of the CDE, confirmed the CDE report “was submitted to [BUMED] for consideration of [PO1 Tee’s] continuance in the STA-21 program,” and recommended that PO1 Tee be disenrolled from the STA-21 program, AR 12–15, 49–52; and 5  • An October 8, 2024 memorandum from the Director of Officer Development to the CNSTC that discussed the results of PRB-2 and noted that “[PO1] Tee [wa]s . . . medically disqualified by BUMED due to suicid[al] ideation, anxiety, and depression,” AR 20. PO1 Tee characterizes these documents as evidencing a “secretive disqualification process” through which the CNSTC improperly considered whether he was medically able to remain in the STA-21 program and under which his command denied him due process. ECF 51-1 at 12. Notably missing from the administrative record, in contrast, are any additional documents attesting to what occurred during the nearly forty-minute pause in the PRB-2 proceedings. See AR 823 (board adjourning at 11:19 AM and coming to order at 11:58 AM). The Court raised this issue in its November 10, 2025 opinion. Tee, 179 Fed. Cl. at 44 (“Whether the recorder’s proffered questions directed at PO1 Tee were duly sanctioned by the PRB-2’s senior member, whether the questions were in fact clarifying questions reasonably tethered to PO1 Tee’s counsel’s opening statement, and whether the board members adopted an adverse inference from the fact that PO1 Tee refused to answer the recorder’s questions, require a contextual review of the administrative record in this case. The fact that the alleged due process violations spanned non-transcribed exchanges between board members during a recess from the PRB-2 hearing underscores this conclusion.”). After the government filed the administrative record, PO1 Tee moved to complete and supplement it with additional documents and to further amend his complaint to add a count for unlawful consideration of extra-record evidence.13 The Court granted PO1 Tee leave to file a third amended complaint but denied his motion to supplement the administrative record. Regarding the latter, the Court explained that PO1 Tee could renew his motion to supplement the administrative record in his follow-on motion for judgment on the administrative record, but only to the extent he could “explain how and why the NROTC command erred in not considering each document, include specific citations to the naval regulations that were consequently violated, and tie those alleged violations to the remaining allegations in his amended complaint.” ECF 45 at 4. During oral argument, the Court granted-in-part and denied-in-part PO1 Tee’s renewed motion to complete and supplement the administrative record, setting forth its reasons on the record, some of which are reiterated below. As directed, the government completed the administrative record on June 22, 2026. 13 In the same filing, PO1 Tee moved for reconsideration of the Court’s November 10, 2025 decision granting-in-part and denying-in-part the government’s motion to dismiss, which the Court denied. 6  DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review After initially moving for judgment on the administrative record, and as an alternative to his renewed motion to complete and supplement the administrative record, PO1 Tee requested that the Court review his proffered extra-record documents by recasting his dispositive motion “under summary judgment standards and de novo [review].” ECF 58 at 10. In support, PO1 Tee argues: “since [PO]1 Tee came to this Court in the first instance,” rather than first seeking relief from the Board for Correction of Naval Records, “his dispositive motion is more appropriate for de novo review not confined to the [administrative record].” Id. at 8. The Court disagrees. A servicemember’s decision to bypass the Board for Correction of Naval Records (or any other branch’s record correction board) and bring a complaint directly to this Court does not necessitate de novo review. See, e.g., Sieben v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 1, 4–5 (2012) (recounting background, which did not include an appeal to a military record correction board, and noting that “[t]he Court is not called upon to reweigh the evidence, but instead to determine ‘whether the conclusion being reviewed is supported by substantial evidence’” (emphasis in original) (quoting Heisig v. United States, 719 F.2d 1153, 1157 (Fed. Cir. 1983))); Finn v. United States, 548 F.2d 340, 341–42 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (“[W]ithout having applied to the Board for the Correction of Naval Records, plaintiff filed this suit demanding that his 30 percent disability rating be changed to a 60 percent rating. . . . [A] determination by the Secretary that a plaintiff is entitled to a particular percentage disability or is fit for duty will not be overturned unless it was arbitrary or capricious or not supported by substantial evidence.”). Instead, where the Court is tasked with reviewing an agency decision, its review is generally limited to “the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.” Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (per curiam). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained: [T]he Court of Federal Claims reviews [a military board]’s action under the same standard as any other agency action. Thus, the Court of Federal Claims should . . . appl[y] its ordinary standard of review to those disputes of fact occurring in the proceedings at the [military board]: “whether the decision is arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or contrary to law.” This necessarily limits the Court of Federal Claims’ review to the administrative record. Metz v. United States, 466 F.3d 991, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (quoting Porter v. United States, 163 F.3d 1304, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Importantly, this does not strip the Court of “its ability to . . . consider ‘extra-record’ evidence in extremely limited situations.” Id. But the proper vehicle to request that the Court do so is a 7 motion to supplement the administrative record, not a request to modify the standard of review.14 In adjudicating cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record under RCFC 52.1, the Court resolves factual disputes as it would at trial: by making factual findings in accordance with the weight of the evidence presented. Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Court reviews the decision-making body’s proceedings “under a deferential standard of review, essentially the standard under which administrative agency decisions are reviewed: whether the [decision-making body’s] decision is arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Court will “not substitute [its] judgment for that of the military ‘when reasonable minds could reach differing conclusions on the same evidence.’” Mote v. United States, 110 F.4th 1345, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (per curiam) (quoting Heisig, 719 F.2d at 1156). Moreover, “the rule in military pay cases is that no relief is available for a procedural error that is ‘harmless’—i.e., one that does not substantially affect the outcome of the matter.” Kaster v. United States, 158 Fed. Cl. 86, 98 (2022) (first quoting Wagner v. United States, 365 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004); and then citing Christian v. United States, 337 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). II. Preliminary Inquiry Report PO1 Tee asserts that he was not given a “complete” copy of the preliminary inquiry report in violation of governing military procedures. Addressing this issue, the Naval Manual requires: No later than five full business days (not counting the day of notification nor the day of the PRB) before the PRB is scheduled to convene, the recorder shall: 14 None of the cases cited by PO1 Tee require a different conclusion. Two of those cases—Lewis v. United States and Lippmann v. United States—are inapposite because there, the parties were “not requesting that the court review an agency decision . . . .” Lewis v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. 682, 685 (2014); accord Lippmann v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 238, 250 (2016) (“[T]he Court is not reviewing a prior decision of the Coast Guard or a military corrections board . . . .”). Here, the Court is tasked with reviewing an agency decision: namely, the Navy’s decision to disenroll PO1 Tee from the STA-21 program. The third case relied on by PO1 Tee, Tippins v. United States, dealt with the availability of discovery, rather than the proper standard of review, in military pay cases. 149 Fed. Cl. 556, 561 (2020). Finally, in Holt v. United States, the Court was presented with “rather unique circumstances” where the challenged agency action was the refusal to even consider plaintiff’s substantive claims. 64 Fed. Cl. 215, 219–20, appeal dismissed, 159 F. App’x 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2005). That is not the case here. To the extent any of the cited cases suggest otherwise, they are nonbinding, and the undersigned declines PO1 Tee’s invitation to over-extrapolate from them. See CGI Fed. Inc. v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 337, 351 (2014), rev’d on other grounds, 779 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Thermalon Indus., Ltd. v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 411, 420 (1995). 8  ... (2) Provide the student with any and all documents that may be presented in the case against the student, including but not limited to the PRB Convening Order, counseling sheets, witness statements, and a complete copy of the preliminary inquiry (if any) . . . . NSTC M-1533.2E § 6-10 ¶ 6(a) (emphasis added). As noted supra, PO1 Tee was given a redacted copy of the preliminary inquiry report on April 22, 2024—i.e., seven business days before PRB-2 was originally scheduled to convene and more than three weeks before it actually took place. That version redacted the names, signatures, and contact information of certain individuals involved in and implicated by the recorder’s preliminary inquiry. Three days later, on April 25, 2024, Navy officials invited PO1 Tee to “to review all unredacted documents in-person” as early as April 26, 2024, AR 539, again, ahead of the five-day deadline set by the Naval Manual. PO1 Tee was advised, however, that his review of the unredacted report must occur in person, under supervision, and without the possibility of taking notes or otherwise recording or capturing anything in the report. He declined the Navy’s invitation, rejecting restrictions that he and his counsel considered unacceptable.15 PO1 Tee ultimately received a physical copy of the unredacted report minutes before the PRB-2 hearing commenced to use during the proceeding. PO1 Tee focuses on whether the redacted report originally sent to him was “complete.” But that is an oversimplification of the issue before the Court. The dispositive issue is not whether the redacted version of the report given to PO1 Tee was “complete,” but whether the Navy, through the redacted report or otherwise, timely “[p]rovide[d] [PO1 Tee] with . . . a complete copy of the preliminary inquiry [report]” within the meaning of the Naval Manual. NSTC M-1533.2E § 6-10 ¶ 6(a). The Navy did so by not just giving PO1 Tee a minimally redacted (albeit incomplete) version of the report but also inviting him to review the unredacted report ahead of the five-day deadline. “When construing a regulation, the court applies the same interpretative rules it uses when analyzing the language of a statute.” Mass. Mut. Life Ins. v. United States, 782 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Tesoro Haw. Corp. v. United States, 405 F.3d 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). “Accordingly, it is appropriate to first consider the ‘plain language [of the regulation] and consider the terms in accordance with their common meaning.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lockheed Corp. v. Widnall, 113 F.3d 1225, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). “In doing so, the court considers ‘the text of the regulation as a whole, reconciling the section in 15 See ECF 57 at 9 (“[PO1 Tee] didn’t take the command up on their poor-man’s offer to go sit and read the report while being barred from writing notes or taking copies.”). 9 question with sections related to it.’” Id. (quoting Lengerich v. Dep’t of Interior, 454 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). When “interpreting a [regulation], the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole [regulation] (or [regulation]s on the same subject) and the objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its various provisions, and give to it such a construction as will carry into execution the will of the [agency].” Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 194 (1856)). As noted above, the Naval Manual requires the recorder to “[p]rovide the student with . . . a complete copy of the preliminary inquiry [report]” at least five full business days before the PRB is scheduled to convene. NSTC M-1533.2E § 6-10 ¶ 6(a)(2). The verb “to provide” generally means “to supply or make available (something wanted or needed) . . . [or] to make something available to . . . .” Provide, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, available at https://perma.cc/QL99-5A8F. In determining the precise extent to which the Navy must make the preliminary inquiry report available to the student, the Court cannot read that requirement as if it exists in a vacuum. Instead, it must be read in the context of the whole Naval Manual, which contains provisions requiring the Navy to: on one hand, allow officer candidates to defend themselves during PRBs16; and, on the other, protect “personally identifiable information” entrusted to it.17, 18 Keeping those purposes in mind, the Navy can 16 See, e.g., NSTC M-1533.2E app. P § 2-4 ¶ 2(a)(1) (“Per NSTC [Judge Advocate General]—‘The purpose behind th[e] provision’” requiring the Navy to notify the student of the reasons for convening the PRB “is to give the student proper notice regarding why they’re undergoing a PRB so that they may respond appropriately . . . .”). 17 The Naval Manual contains provisions that require the Navy to protect “personally identifiable information.” See, e.g., NSTC M-1533.2E § 5-22 ¶ 6 (“Privacy Act Requirements. The Privacy Act limits an agency’s collection and sharing of personally identifiable information and imposes safekeeping, access, and other requirements.” (underline in original)); id. § 5-10 (requiring PNS to adhere to “the limitations imposed by the Privacy Act” when disseminating “information promulgated by regulations, manuals, instructions, and notices” to “departmental staff personnel” and “students”); SECNAVINST 5211.5F § 5(a)(3) (“[Navy] personnel have an affirmative responsibility to protect an individual’s privacy when maintaining Personally Identifiable Information . . . about an individual.”). Navy regulations define “personally identifiable information” as “information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, either alone or when combined with other information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual.” SECNAVINST 5211.5F encl. 2 ¶ 12 (“Because there are many different types of information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, the term [personally identifiable information] is necessarily broad.”). It is axiomatic that names and contact information qualify under the Navy’s broad definition of personally identifiable information, as that information can be used to “distinguish or trace [the] . . . identity” of the individuals included in the report. 18 “SECNAVINST 5211.5F” is a citation to the May 20, 2019 letter from the Secretary of the Navy regarding the Navy’s privacy program. See SECNAVINST 5211.5F § 1(b) (“This issuance broadens 10 comply with its requirement to provide an officer candidate with a complete preliminary inquiry report while redacting personally identifiable information from the report in accordance with its Privacy Act responsibilities—as long as it makes that personally identifiable information reasonably available to the officer candidate through other means. Here, the Navy did just that. Three days after sending PO1 Tee and his counsel a minimally redacted version of the preliminary inquiry report, the command made the unredacted report—undisputedly “complete” under the Naval Manual—available to PO1 Tee for his in-person review. Of note, PO1 Tee’s command offered to schedule the in-person review weeks before PRB-2 convened, and the only material information redacted from the report were some twenty-six names of individuals mentioned in the report, only twelve of whom were either contacted by the Navy or gave statements or interviews to the Navy. Given that the key redacted information was relatively limited and that the Navy offered to reveal that information to PO1 Tee, the Court finds that the Navy “provided”—i.e., made reasonably available—the complete preliminary inquiry report to PO1 Tee. PO1 Tee charges that the above-stated conclusion is incorrect because the in-person review proposed by his command, particularly the restrictions imposed, frustrated his ability to adequately prepare for the PRB-2 hearing. The Court disagrees. As explained above, his interests were not the only ones at stake. The Navy was faced with—and forced to strike a balance between—dually applicable and arguably competing requirements: on the one hand, provide PO1 Tee with a full and fair opportunity to defend himself against allegations of substandard conduct; on the other, prevent the improper disclosure of personally identifiable information contained in the unredacted report. Given that the Naval Manual failed to prescribe or otherwise regulate the medium through which the “complete copy” should be “provide[d] [to] the student,” the Navy’s solution was reasonably designed to strike the right balance by giving PO1 Tee notice of the allegations against him without authorizing the unbounded disclosure of the personally identifiable information of victims and witnesses included in the unredacted report. To be sure, the Navy conceivably could have crafted alternative procedures that might also have adequately balanced those competing requirements, possibly including—as PO1 Tee the scope of the Privacy Act . . . guidelines to include policy and procedures contained [here]in . . . and other associated privacy laws.”), available at https://perma.cc/VW3N-YGS9. The Naval Manual cites to SECNAVINST 5211.5F as one of the two “guiding directive[s]” that speak to the Navy’s Privacy Act requirements with which the PNS and its unit must comply. NSTC M-1533.2E § 5-22 ¶ 6. The other is the July 23, 2018 letter from the CNSTC regarding the Naval Service Training Command’s (NSTC) privacy program (hereinafter, NSTCINST 5211.1B). See NSTCINST 5211.1B § 1 (“The purpose of this instruction is to implement Privacy Act . . . actions and policies required by references [contained herein] for the commands, activities, and personnel of the [NSTC].”), available at https://perma.cc/HG79-9VVR. 11 suggested—the use of a protective order.19 But keeping in mind the text of the Naval Manual and its stated goals, the process the Navy followed was not erroneous. PO1 Tee’s choices to repeatedly object to the Navy’s procedures, characterize the Navy’s offer to review the unredacted report in person as “meaningless,” AR 532, and continue requesting a physical copy of the unredacted report do not alter that conclusion. At bottom, PO1 Tee charges that the Navy’s redaction of the identities and contact information of the victims, witnesses, and other sources of information included in the version of the preliminary inquiry report furnished to PO1 Tee frustrated the preparation of his defense ahead of the PRB-2 hearing. See ECF 51-1 at 31 (“Throughout the report, the names of all the[] [witnesses, alleged victims, and sources of information] are redacted. . . . The value of Plaintiff and his counsel getting those names pre-board was . . . of unique importance.”). Understandably so, as the Naval Manual implies the importance of receiving a list of witnesses “expected to be called in the Recorder’s case . . . .” See NSTC M-1533.2E § 6-10 ¶ 6(a)(3). As a matter of practicality, moreover, the identities of the individuals reported as substantiating specific allegations lodged against PO1 Tee likely would assist him and his counsel in preparing to rebut those charges. But the Navy had to balance PO1 Tee’s interest in mounting a defense against its obligation to protect witnesses—including those identified as victims—from improper disclosure of their personally identifiable information. Cf. Mikhashov v. Dep’t of Def., No. 22-3485, 2024 WL 4332601, at *16 (D.D.C. Sep. 26, 2024) (collecting cases where “courts . . . upheld the withholding of . . . witness statements pertaining to internal investigations . . . [because] such information implicates a ‘privacy interest in the information being withheld’” (additional citations omitted) (quoting Insider Inc. v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 92 F.4th 1131, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2024))); Horvath v. U.S. Secret Serv., 419 F. Supp. 3d 40, 48 (D.D.C. 2019) (upholding agency’s redaction of information that “would reveal the identity of the [declarants and interviewees] who provided sworn statements or were interviewed as part of the investigation because” the information implicated “substantial privacy interests”). And to the extent PO1 Tee was prejudiced by not knowing the names of his accusers, responsibility for that lack of knowledge cannot lie exclusively with the Navy when PO1 Tee declined the opportunity to review the unredacted report. Accordingly, PO1 Tee’s charge that the Navy violated the requirement in NSTC M-1533.2E § 6-10 ¶ 6(a)(2) to timely “provide [PO1 Tee] with . . . a complete copy of the preliminary inquiry [report]” must be rejected. 19 See AR 532 (“If the command has a concern, it can be addressed by issuing a simple 1-page protective order.”); AR 1400 (PO1 Tee’s proffered protective order referenced in AR 532); ECF 57 at 6–7 (“If the Privacy Act prevented Plaintiff from receiving the complete, unredacted report pre-PRB, then why does he get a copy now? Yes, it’s under a protective order, but Plaintiff’s counsel offered to sign a protective order . . . before PRB 2 in our pleas to get the unredacted report.” (emphasis omitted)). The Court does not decide whether the use of a protective order would have satisfied the Navy’s obligations under NSTC M-1533.2E § 6-10 ¶ 6(a)(2). 12  III. UCMJ Article 31 PO1 Tee next argues that, during the PRB-2 proceeding, the recorder violated his rights under Article 31 of the UCMJ. The Court outlined the issues necessary to resolve this dispute in its November 10, 2025 decision denying the government’s motion to dismiss: The principal charge focuses on the PRB-2 reporter’s alleged persistence in asking PO1 Tee sixty-four pre-planned questions notwithstanding the accused’s steadfast invocation of his right against self-incrimination under Article 31 of the UCMJ. PO1 Tee asserts that the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree further infected the PRB-2 proceedings during an off-the-record discussion among the board members, leaving at least one observer with the impression that the “spectacle” was designed “to demonstrate that [PO1] Tee invoked his right to remain silent because he had something to hide and because he was guilty.” ECF 15-5 at 1. Article 31 of the UCMJ, titled “Compulsory self-incrimination prohibited,” provides, in relevant part: (a) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any question the answer to which may tend to incriminate him. .... (d) No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article, or through