CREEKSIDE PARK OWNERS&039; ASSOCIATION v. United States
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket23-772
JudgeKathryn C. Davis
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
_______________________________________
)
CREEKSIDE PARK OWNERS’ )
ASSOCIATION, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, ) No. 23-0772
)
v. ) Filed: November 16, 2026
)
THE UNITED STATES, )
)
Defendant. )
_______________________________________)
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs in this rails-to-trails action assert that the Federal Government’s conversion of
the Seattle and West Coast Railway Company’s (“Railway”) former rail line in the State of
Washington to a public trail was a taking of their reversionary interest in the land underlying the
rail line. According to Plaintiffs, they own land adjacent to the rail line, and because the Railway
only ever acquired an easement over the land, they also own the land underlying the railroad to its
centerline. Nineteen individual claims are at issue in the summary judgment motions now before
the Court. Because the Court concludes that no genuine issues of material fact remain for trial and
that Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate ownership of the land underlying the right of way, Plaintiffs’
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED and the Government’s Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
1. The National Trails System Act
From 1920 to 1990 alone, the country’s railway use plummeted from more than 270,000
miles of railway to approximately 140,000, and railroad companies have continued to abandon
tracks each year. See Preseault v. Interstate Com. Comm’n (Preseault I), 494 U.S. 1, 5 (1990);
Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Wary that
deserted tracks might be permanently lost, Congress enacted the National Trails System Act to
preserve tracks at risk of abandonment by converting them to recreational trails. Preseault I, 494
U.S. at 5–6. The Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) (previously the Interstate Commerce
Commission) has exclusive authority over the construction, operation, and abandonment of
railroad lines throughout the country under the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the
Transportation Act of 1920. See, e.g., Abbott v. United States, 162 Fed. Cl. 445, 449 (2022).
Converting railroad tracks to a trail typically plays out as follows. To preserve a railway
corridor or right of way for possible future use, a system commonly referred to as “railbanking,”
“the railroad company must first file an abandonment application under 49 U.S.C. § 10903, or a
notice of exemption from that process under 49 U.S.C. § 10502.” Burnett v. United States, 139
Fed. Cl. 797, 802 (2018). Any third party interested in railbanking can request a Certificate of
Interim Trail Use (“CITU”) after a railroad company files an application for abandonment, or a
Notice of Interim Trail Use (“NITU”) in abandonment exemptions. Id. Once the railroad company
signals its willingness to negotiate a potential railbanking and interim use agreement, the STB will
issue the CITU or NITU. Id. This procedure “preserves the STB’s jurisdiction over the rail line
and allows the railroad company to discontinue operations and remove track and equipment while
the parties negotiate a railbanking and interim trail use agreement.” Id. If the parties successfully
negotiate an agreement, the NITU or CITU “automatically authorizes the interim trail use.” Id.
“If no agreement is reached, the railroad company may proceed with the abandonment process.”
Id. The railbanking system has allowed the STB “to preserve for possible future railroad use
rights-of-way not currently in service.” Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 6. In the process, however, the
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system “has created a new category of Fifth Amendment takings cases before this Court, referred
to as ‘rails-to-trails’ cases.” 1100 W. Ewing Assoc., LLC v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 357, 361
(2018). In rails-to-trails cases, landowners who own in fee simple the land over which the rail line
runs seek just compensation under the Fifth Amendment for the taking of their property effected
by the conversion of the rail line to a recreational trail. See Preseault v. United States (Preseault
II), 100 F.3d 1525, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
2. The Woodinville Line
The pending dispute focuses on a 2.58-mile railroad segment located between mileposts
23.8 and 26.38 in Woodinville, Washington (“Woodinville Segment”). ECF No. 25-1 at 6, 81.
The Railway began construction of the Woodinville Segment of the railroad in 1888. Id. at 32.
During the 1890s and early 1900s, the Railway established the right of way for construction of the
Woodinville Segment by obtaining conveyances from Ira and Susan Woodin and Patrick O’Meara
and condemnation awards against G.A. Estabrook and Charles Estabrook, the then-fee simple
owners of the properties over which the railroad would run. See ECF No. 25-4 at 123–24
(“Woodin deed”); ECF No. 25-4 at 150–51 (“O’Meara deed”); ECF No. 27-4 at 1–4 (“G.A.
Estabrook condemnation”); ECF No. 27-4 at 5–8 (“Charles Estabrook condemnation”).
This case concerns 19 Plaintiffs, all landowners in Woodinville, King County, Washington.
Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 6, ECF No. 25. Plaintiffs purport to own the land parcels adjacent
to the rail line at issue. See, e.g., id. at 7. The property interests of two plaintiffs—Creekside Park
Owners’ Association (“Claim 1”) and Cogan Real Property LLC (“Claim 2”)—derive from the
Woodin deed, which granted a right of way to the Railway. See id. at 13. The Woodin deed states:
In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us, Ira Woodin and
Susan Woodin his wife from the location, construction, and operation of the Seattle
and West Coast Railway in the County of King in Washington Territory, we do
hereby donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle and West Coast Railway
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Company a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said
County, described as follows to-wit:
The South half of the North East quarter and the East half of the North West quarter
of Section Nine in Township Twenty six North of Range Five East.
Containing One hundred and sixty acres Such a right of way strip to be fifty (50)
feet in width on each side of the centre line of the railway track as located across
our said lands by the Engineer of said Railway Company.
It being understood that said Company shall put in a permanent under crossing
under the trestle to be built over the portion of said lands on the north side of the
slough running through said described premises and shall also put in a crossing at
some point beyond said trestle where the track of said road comes to grade it being
further understood that said Company shall pay said grantors at the rate of Seventy
five dollars ($75.00) per acre for all cleared lands actually embraced within the
limits of said right of way it being understood also that said Company shall
construct a fence along one side of said right of way within one year from the
construction of said railway.
And the said Seattle and West Coast Railway Company shall have the right to go
upon the lands adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each
side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road.
To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of
the second part and to its successors and assigns forever.
ECF No. 25-4 at 123–24; see ECF No. 38-1 at 3 (transcription).
Seven plaintiffs’ property interests derive from the O’Meara deed: KPM Woodinville, LLC
(“Claim 3”), Whitescarver Properties, LLC (“Claim 4”), 6th & Union Center LLC (“Claim 5”),
Donald W. Gonzales (“Claim 6”), DT, LLC (“Claim 7”), Lakepointe, Inc. (“Claim 8”), and J.N.
Smith Properties, LLC (“Claim 9”). ECF No. 25 at 13–14. The O’Meara deed also granted the
Railway a right of way. See ECF No. 25-4 at 150–51. Similar to the Woodin deed, the O’Meara
deed states:
In Consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to me Patrick O’Meara
an unmarried man from the location, construction and operation of the Seattle and
West Coast Railway, in the County of King in Washington Territory, I do hereby
donate, grant and convey unto said Seattle and West Coast Railway Company a
right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through my lands in said County,
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described as follows, to wit: The North West quarter of Section Ten in Township
Twenty six North of Range five East[.]
A further consideration for this conveyance being the agreement of said Railway
Company made hereby to pay said grantor the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars
for the land actually embraced within the limits of said right of way and an
additional sum of twenty one and three fourths dollars ($21.75) per acre for all land
in excess of seven acres that may be embraced in said right of way. Such right of
way strip to be fifty (50) feet in width on each side of the center line of the railway
track as located across my said lands by the Engineer of said Railway Company.
The said Railway Company further agrees hereby that, in case said O’Meara should
put up a saw mill or flour mill or other water mill on the stream known as Bear
Creek at any point where it runs through said described premises said, Company
shall build a side track from its main road at a point-thereon nearest by the most
practicable route to said mill site; said Company also agrees to put in two crossings
over said right-of-way for the use of said grantor. And the said Seattle and West
Coast Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said
line for the distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down
all trees dangerous to the operation of said road. To Have and to Hold The said
premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said party of the second part, and to its
successors and assigns forever.
Id.; see ECF No. 38-18 at 4 (transcription).
Another seven of the plaintiffs’ property interests derive from the G.A. Estabrook
condemnation, which was filed on November 21, 1887. See ECF No. 27-4 at 1–4. The G.A.
Estabrook condemnation award states:
Now on this 21st day of November 1887 this cause coming on for hearing upon
motion of Preston & Albertson, attorneys for said Plaintiff, for Judgment by default
herein against said defendant and for the confirmation of the Appraisers’ Report
heretofore filed in said cause and for the condemnation and appropriation by the
Court to the use of said Seattle and West Coast Railway Company for its corporate
purposes as a Right of Way of that certain strip or parcel of land mentioned and
described in said Appraisers’ Report and hereinafter particularly described . . . .
...
[A]nd after their said appointment said Appraisers duly examined the ground
hereinafter described and did then and there assess the damages sustained by said
defendant to be sustained by them in consequence of the appropriation by said
Plaintiff of said above mentioned strip of land, over and above the additional value
which the owner of adjoining lands would derive from the construction of the
Railway of said Plaintiff . . . .
5
...
Wherefore, by reason of the law and the premises, it is ordered, considered and
adjudged by the court:
1st, That [default is entered against defendant].
2nd, That the said Plaintiff . . . be, and said Company hereby is, authorized and
allowed to appropriate to its own use, for right of way said above mentioned strip
of land now here particularly described as follows, to wit:
A strip of land one hundred feet in width running through the [respective quarter
sections] of Section Three in Township Twenty Six, North of Range Five East, said
Strip being fifty feet on each side of the center line of the railway of said Plaintiff:
Said right of way strip being the strip of land heretofore marked out and now located
as such right of way by the engineers of said Railway Company, a particular
description of the abovementioned center line being as follows: [centerline
description].
3rd, That said described Right of Way strip be, and the same is hereby condemned
and appropriated by the Court to the perpetual use and occupation of said Seattle
and West Coast Railway Company for its corporate purposes.
Id. Plaintiffs owning property traceable to this condemnation include: Maverick Retail, LLC
(“Claim 10”), GT Clearwater LLC (“Claim 11”), Greenbaum Associates (“Claim 12”), Pacific
Systems Building Associates, LLC and deJonge Delta/BC LLC (“Claim 13”), Money Saver
Woodinville Associates, LLC (“Claim 14”), Woodinville Hotel Investors, LLC (“Claim 15”), and
SLH Woodinville Development LLC (“Claim 16”). See ECF No. 25 at 14.
The Charles Estabrook condemnation was also filed on November 21, 1887. See ECF No.
27-4 at 5–8. Its language is materially identical to the G.A. Estabrook condemnation filed on the
same date. See id. at 1–3. One plaintiff, Underwood Gartland 140, LLC (“Claim 17”), traces its
property interest to the Charles Estabrook condemnation. See ECF No. 25 at 14.
The two remaining plaintiffs, Tjossem Properties (comprised of Tjossem Properties IV and
Tjossem Properties V, who jointly own one property) (“Tjossem”) (“Claim 18”) and Lazy Deuce,
LLC (“Lazy Deuce”) (“Claim 19”) were not included in Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary
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Judgement, id. at 6 n.1, but were included in the Government’s Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment, ECF No. 26 at 32. At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel conceded that Lazy Deuce does
not own the property at issue in this case in fee; that Tjossem was already fully compensated in
Haggart v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 70 (2012); and that, accordingly, summary judgment should
be entered against these plaintiffs. See Oral Arg. Tr. at 109:7–111:8, ECF No. 37.
The ultimate successor to the Railway’s interest in the rail line is GNP RLY, Inc. (“GNP”).
See ECF No. 25-1 at 1. On March 18, 2022, GNP filed a verified Notice of Exemption for the
Woodinville Segment. Id. In the Notice, GNP articulated its plan to transfer its property interest
to the City of Woodinville for the purpose of converting the line into a trail in accordance with 49
C.F.R. § 1152.29. Id. at 3. On May 5, 2023, the City of Woodinville submitted a letter to the STB
in its role as trail sponsor requesting the issuance of a NITU for the Woodinville Segment. ECF
No. 25-2 at 1–2. GNP similarly filed a letter stating its support for the NITU. Id. at 6.
B. This Litigation
On May 26, 2023, the STB released its decision and NITU or Abandonment for the
Woodinville Segment. ECF No. 25-3 at 1. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint that same day. ECF
No. 1. A year and a half later, on October 10, 2024, Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment
on 17 of the 19 claims, asserting that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that, as a
matter of Washington state law, Plaintiffs own in fee the land underlying the rail line. See ECF
No. 25 at 7–9. Plaintiffs claim that the source documents—i.e., the Woodin and O’Meara deeds,
as well as the Charles and G.A. Estabrook condemnations—demonstrate that the Railway only
acquired easement interests in the Woodinville Segment from the original grantors. Id. at 26–30.
Plaintiffs also contend that under Washington’s centerline presumption, the Court should presume
Plaintiffs, as owners of the land adjacent to the railroad, own the land underneath the rail line up
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to its centerline. See id. at 32–38. The Government filed its Response and Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment as to all 19 claims on November 22, 2024. ECF No. 26 at 6–7. The
Government argues that Plaintiffs fail to prove they own the land underlying the right of way, as
the source documents conveyed a fee interest to the Railway. Id. Alternatively, the Government
asserts that the centerline presumption either does not apply or has been rebutted by, among other
things, the City of Woodinville’s competing claim of ownership. Id.
On December 20, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Response and Reply. ECF No. 27. Plaintiffs
dispute the Government’s claim that the centerline presumption is inapplicable and, in any event,
rebutted, id. at 6–7, citing chains-of-title documentation prepared by a third party, which they
attached to their brief, see ECF Nos. 27-1, 27-2, 27-3, 27-4. The Government filed its Reply on
January 22, 2025, reiterating its previous arguments, urging the Court to exclude Plaintiffs’ chain-
of-title evidence, and arguing that, in any case, Plaintiffs’ chain-of-title evidence is unavailing.
ECF No. 30 at 5, 12–14. The Court held oral argument on June 26, 2025. See Min. Entry, June
26, 2025. The motions are now ripe for disposition.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment
This Court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule
56(a) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”). A “material” fact is a
fact that “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). A “genuine” dispute exists when a factfinder could reasonably resolve the dispute “in
favor of either party.” Id. at 250. Where parties cross-move for summary judgment, “each motion
is evaluated on its own merits and reasonable inferences are resolved against the party whose
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motion is being considered.” Marriott Int’l Resorts, L.P. v. United States, 586 F.3d 962, 968–69
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
Summary judgment must be granted for the moving party if the nonmoving party “fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). In such a case, “there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323.
B. “Rails-to-Trails” Takings
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const.
amend. V. A rails-to-trails taking occurs when “government action destroys state-defined property
rights by converting a railway easement to a recreational trail, if trail use is outside the scope of
the original railway easement.” Ladd v. United States, 630 F.3d 1015, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing
Ellamae Phillips Co. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). The “threshold
question” in these circumstances “is whether the claimant has a compensable property interest in
the land allegedly taken, which is often answered by analyzing the original deeds that conveyed
the property to the railroad.” Chi. Coating Co. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1164, 1167 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (citing Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 16); see also Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1096
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[O]nly persons with a valid property interest at the time of the taking are entitled
to compensation.”).
As explained by the Federal Circuit, the Government’s liability in rails-to-trails cases turns
on three questions:
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(1) who owns the strip of land involved, specifically, whether the railroad acquired
only an easement or obtained a fee simple estate; (2) if the railroad acquired only
an easement, were the terms of the easement limited to use for railroad purposes,
or did they include future use as a public recreational trail (scope of the easement);
and (3) even if the grant of the railroad’s easement was broad enough to encompass
a recreational trail, had this easement terminated prior to the alleged taking so that
the property owner at the time held a fee simple unencumbered by the easement
(abandonment of the easement).
Ellamae Phillips, 564 F.3d at 1373 (citing Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1533). To determine whether
the railroad held the property in fee simple or merely possessed an easement, and to determine the
scope of any such easement, the Court looks to state law, which “creates and defines the scope of
the reversionary or other real property interests.” Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 20 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); see also Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1534–37 (relying on state law to determine what
interests were conveyed by the transfers at issue).
Washington law applies in this case because the relevant property is in the State of
Washington. Decisions of the Washington Supreme Court are therefore controlling.
MicroStrategy Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 429 F.3d 1344, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In the absence of
state supreme court precedent, the Court must endeavor to predict how the court would rule. Id.
(quoting Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1118 (10th Cir. 2002)). When doing so, the Court
gives “proper regard” to “relevant rulings of other courts of that state.” Litton Indus. Prods., Inc.
v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 165 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Indeed, the Court must abide by the
opinion of an intermediate state court “unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the
highest court of the state would decide otherwise.” West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237
(1940).
III. DISCUSSION
The present dispute involves three issues: (1) whether Washington law dictates that the
source documents conveyed the property underlying the rail line to the Railway in fee, or whether
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they merely granted the Railway easements across the land; (2) if the source documents granted
the Railway easements only, whether Plaintiffs can demonstrate ownership of the land underlying
the rail line by relying on Washington’s centerline presumption; and (3) if the centerline
presumption applies, whether evidence has rebutted the presumption. For the reasons explained
below, the nine claims traceable to the deeds fail at step one of the Preseault II analysis because
the deeds granted the property underlying the rail line to the Railway in fee simple. As for the
eight claims traceable to the condemnations, however, the Court finds that the Railway acquired
easements only. Nevertheless, these claims fail because Plaintiffs cannot rely on Washington’s
centerline presumption and thus cannot show that they were deprived of a compensable property
interest.
A. The Woodin and O’Meara Deeds Conveyed Fee Title to the Railway.
The parties dispute whether the Woodin and O’Meara deeds granted the Railway fee simple
title or an easement over the land. According to Plaintiffs, the language of the deeds reflects an
intent to convey easements only, as the deeds each grant the Railway a “right of way” in
consideration of the benefits to accrue from the operation of the rail line. See ECF No. 25 at 28.
The Government, however, argues that the “right of way” language is not dispositive because
under Washington law, a railroad can acquire a right of way as an easement or in fee simple, and
thus further purpose-limiting language is required to demonstrate that the Railway acquired solely
an easement. ECF No. 26 at 23–32. The Government also argues that the stated consideration
merely announced the Railway’s reason for acquiring the land but did not otherwise limit the scope
of the conveyance. Id. at 23–24. The Court agrees with the Government: Plaintiffs fail to
demonstrate that they—or their predecessors-in-interest—retained any property interests in the
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land underlying the rail line, and thus the Government’s summary judgment motion must be
granted for Claims 1–9.
1. Washington Law Governing the Interpretation of Railroad Deeds Has Evolved over
Time.
According to the Washington Supreme Court, the term “right of way” has a “twofold
meaning”; it can either “describe a mere right of passage over a tract,” and thus indicate the
conveyance of an easement, or “describe the strip of land which railroad companies purchase” in
fee. Morsbach v. Thurston Cnty., 278 P. 686, 688 (Wash. 1929). Because of this twofold meaning,
the Washington Supreme Court has emphasized that the term “right of way” generally conveys an
easement only where that term is used “as a limitation or to specify the purpose of the grant.”
Brown v. State, 924 P.2d 908, 913 (Wash. 1996). “Conversely, where there is no language in the
deed relating to the purpose of the grant or limiting the estate conveyed, and it conveys a definite
strip of land, the deed will be construed to convey fee simple title.” Id. Ultimately, however, “the
intention of the parties to the conveyance is of paramount importance and must . . . prevail in a
given case.” Swan v. O’Leary, 225 P.2d 199, 200 (Wash. 1950). Thus, courts should take a
wholistic approach to “ascertain the parties[’] intent by performing a deed-by-deed inquiry into
the interests conveyed based on (1) the particular language of the deed, (2) the form of the deed,
and (3) the surrounding circumstances and subsequent conduct of the parties.” Kershaw Sunnyside
Ranches, Inc. v. Yakima Interurban Lines Ass’n, 126 P.3d 16, 22 (Wash. 2006).
Early Washington Supreme Court decisions finding that railroads acquired mere easements
consistently grounded their analysis in purpose-limiting language. See, e.g., Biles v. Tacoma, O.
& G.H.R. Co., 32 P. 211, 212–13 (Wash. 1893) (finding an easement where the deed said the “strip
of land” was “to be used for a right-of-way or other railroad purposes” (emphases added));
Reichenbach v. Wash. Short Line Ry. Co., 38 P. 1126, 1126–27 (Wash. 1894) (deed granted “a
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right of way for said railroad” and included in the habendum clause, “so long as the same shall
be used for the operation of a railroad” (emphases added)), overruled on other grounds by Brown
v. Baldwin, 89 P. 483 (Wash. 1907), as recognized in Carlson v. Curren, 93 P. 315 (Wash. 1908);
Pac. Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber & Shingle Mill Co., 111 P. 578, 579 (Wash. 1910) (habendum
clause stated that the railroad received the property “forever, for railway purposes”); Morsbach,
278 P. at 687–90 (deed granted a “right of way for the construction of said company’s railroad”
(emphasis added)); Swan, 225 P.2d at 199–201 (deed conveyed “a strip of land” “for the purpose
of a Railroad right-of-way”); Roeder Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 716 P.2d 855, 857–59 (Wash.
1986) (deed conveyed tracts and parcels of land “for all railroad and other right of way purposes”
(emphasis added)). Such cases thus establish that where the granting (or habendum) clause of a
conveyance declares the purpose of the deed to be a railroad right of way, the deed generally grants
an easement only. Swan, 225 P.2d at 201.
In Brown v. State, 924 P.2d 908 (Wash. 1996), however, the Washington Supreme Court
reframed the analysis, emphasizing that courts must look beyond the purpose of the conveyance
and also examine the following set of factors to elucidate the intent of the parties and determine
the interest granted:
(1) whether the deed conveyed a strip of land, and did not contain additional
language relating to the use or purpose to which the land was to be put, or in other
ways limiting the estate conveyed; (2) whether the deed conveyed a strip of land
and limited its use to a specific purpose; (3) whether the deed conveyed a right of
way over a tract of land, rather than a strip thereof; (4) whether the deed granted
only the privilege of constructing, operating, or maintaining a railroad over the
land; (5) whether the deed contained a clause providing that if the railroad ceased
to operate, the land conveyed would revert to the grantor; (6) whether the
consideration expressed was substantial or nominal; and (7) whether the
conveyance did or did not contain a habendum clause, and many other
considerations suggested by the language of the particular deed.
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Id. at 912 (citing Swan, 225 P.2d at 200–01). The Washington Supreme Court additionally
instructed courts to “look at the circumstances surrounding the deed’s execution and the
subsequent conduct of the parties” as further evidence of the parties’ intent. Id. Importantly,
Brown involved a statutory warranty form deed, which presumptively conveys fee simple title.
See id. at 912 (noting that property owners must “show[] that the original parties intended to adapt
the statutory form to grant easements instead of fees simple”). After performing this multifactor
analysis, Brown held that “construing the deeds [at issue] to convey fees simple more accurately
reflects the intent of the parties, given the form of the deeds and the fact they convey ‘fee simple
title’ to definite strips of land given without any limitation or qualification.” Id. at 915. 1
The Washington Supreme Court clarified its Brown opinion in Kershaw Sunnyside
Ranches, Inc. v. Yakima Interurban Lines Association, 126 P.3d 16 (Wash. 2006), its most recent
pronouncement on the issue of railway deeds. The Kershaw court stated that Brown did not
overrule the general presumption that a granting clause’s use of the term right of way “as a
limitation or to define the purpose of the grant” conveys an easement. 126 P.3d at 22. Instead, it
explained that “the Brown court partially qualified this rule” by focusing on a factor-based analysis
that “ascertain[s] the parties[’] intent” through “a deed-by-deed inquiry into the interests
1
Although Brown relied on seven factors to determine whether the parties intended to adapt
the statutory form to grant an easement, the Brown court pulled the factors from Swan, see Brown,
924 P.2d at 912 (citing Swan, 225 P.2d at 200), which more broadly invoked them as a means to
“arrive at the intention of the parties,” Swan, 225 P.2d at 200. Thus, even though the Woodin and
O’Meara deeds do not follow the statutory form, the Court will use the Brown factors to ascertain
the intent of the parties in the case at hand. See Kershaw, 126 P.3d at 22 (describing the Brown
factors as “factors courts should consider in reading railroad deed language”); King Cnty. v.
Rasmussen, 299 F.3d 1077, 1084–85 (9th Cir. 2002) (relying on the factors to determine whether
a deed conveyed fee simple or an easement); Ray v. King Cnty., 86 P.3d 183, 187 (Wash. Ct. App.
2004) (applying the Brown factors to determine the parties’ intent); ECF No. 25 at 17 n.9 (“These
considerations and factors as discussed in Swan later became part of the Court’s analysis in
Brown.”).
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conveyed.” Id. In so doing, “Brown refined the principle relied on in [the court’s prior cases]” to
emphasize “a more thorough examination of the deed.” Id. at 23. In Kershaw, the deed at issue
conveyed a strip of land “to be used by [the railroad] as a right of way for a railway,” language
that resembled earlier Washington Supreme Court cases where the term right of way was “used to
establish the purpose of the grant and thus presumptively convey[] an easement interest.” Id. at
22–23 (emphases in original). But like Brown, the deed at issue in Kershaw was in the statutory
warranty form, and thus presumptively conveyed fee simple title as well. Id. at 23. Considering
these competing presumptions, the court examined the Brown factors to further ascertain the
parties’ intent and ultimately concluded that “there [was] insufficient evidence to overcome the
presumption that an easement was created.” Id. at 25.
Plaintiffs provide a similar and thorough summary of Washington Supreme Court caselaw,
see ECF No. 25 at 14–25, but they fail to wrestle with the unique language in the Woodin and
O’Meara deeds. Instead, they attempt to analogize this case to favorable Washington Supreme
Court precedent in which the deeds at issue expressly limited the purpose or scope of the
conveyances. This analogy fails. As explained below, the Woodin and O’Meara deeds reflect no
such purpose-limiting language. Thus, no presumption of an easement applies, and the Court must
turn to the Brown factors—all of which are either neutral or suggest that the original grantors
intended to convey fee simple title to the Railway.
2. The Woodin and O’Meara Deeds Do Not Use the Term Right of Way as a
Limitation or to Define the Purpose of the Conveyance.
None of the above-quoted Washington Supreme Court cases involved language quite like
the deeds at issue here. The Woodin deed states: “In consideration of the benefits and advantages
to accrue to us . . . from the location, construction, and operation of the [railway] . . . [the grantors]
do hereby donate, grant, and convey” unto the Railway “a right-of-way one hundred (100) feet in
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width[.]” Id. at 26. The deed continues: “Such right-of-way strip to be fifty (50) feet in width on
each side of the centre line of the railway track[.]” Id. The deed also contains the following
habendum clause: “To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said
party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever.” Id. The O’Meara deed is
largely identical: “In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to [the
grantor] . . . from the location, construction, and operation of the [railway] . . . [the grantor] . . .
hereby donate[s], grant[s] and convey[s]” unto the Railway “a right of way one hundred (100) feet
in width . . . . Such right of way strip to be fifty (50) feet in width on each side of the center line
of the railway track[.]” Id. at 27. The O’Meara deed also contains a habendum clause that mirrors
that of the Woodin deed. See id. at 28. Plaintiffs argue that the deeds conveyed easements only,
as each “deed is titled ‘Right-of-Way Deed’ and specifically grants a ‘right-of-way’ in the granting
clause.” Id.
Upon review, the Court finds that the deeds do not presumptively convey easements under
Washington law, as neither “uses the term ‘right of way’ as a limitation or to define the purpose
of the grant.” Kershaw, 126 P.3d at 22. Instead, the deeds use the term “right of way” as a means
to “describe the strip of land which [the Railway] purchase[d].” Morsbach, 278 P. at 688; see also
Brown, 924 P.2d at 913 (“[A] railroad can own rights of way in fee simple or as easements.”).
Unlike the deeds at issue in the many Washington Supreme Court cases reviewed above, the
Woodin and O’Meara deeds do not state that the right of way strips were conveyed “for the purpose
of a Railroad right-of-way,” Swan, 225 P.2d at 199 (emphasis omitted), nor that the right-of-way
strips were “to be used for . . . railroad purposes,” Biles, 32 P. at 212; see also Roeder, 716 P.2d at
857, or “for said railroad,” Reichenbach, 38 P. at 1126; see also Morsbach, 278 P. at 687; Kershaw,
126 P.3d at 22. The fact that the deeds are titled “Right-of-Way Deed” also provides minimal
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support for Plaintiffs’ argument, as the Washington Supreme Court has explicitly noted that a
deed’s title is not dispositive; a “Right-of-Way Deed” may nonetheless convey fee simple title.
See, e.g., Brown, 924 P.2d at 915.
Although Plaintiffs argue that the deeds limit the conveyances to railroad purposes by
citing as consideration “the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location, construction
and operation of the railroad,” ECF No. 25 at 28 (quotation marks omitted), the Court disagrees
with that reading. As correctly argued by the Government, Plaintiffs “conflate the purpose of the
conveyance with a grant for a specific purpose”—that is, they misconstrue the Railway’s reason
for purchasing the right of way as a limitation on how the Railway was permitted to use it. ECF
No. 26 at 30. The consideration cited by Plaintiffs establishes that the Railway intended to use its
interest to construct and operate a railroad—but the Railway could effectuate that purpose
regardless of whether it received an easement or fee simple title. Indeed, Brown explicitly stated
that “[i]dentifying the purpose of the conveyance . . . does not resolve the issue at hand because a
railroad can own rights of way in fee simple or as easements.” 924 P.2d at 913. Thus, although
there was “no question” that the railroad “acquired the property for railroad purposes” under the
deeds at issue in Brown, the court nonetheless found that the deeds conveyed fee simple title. Id.
Accordingly, the Court does not find that the stated consideration provides support for Plaintiffs’
argument that the Woodin and O’Meara deeds limited the purpose of the conveyances. See King
Cnty. v. Rasmussen, 299 F.3d 1077, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002) (interpreting a deed with identical
“precatory language” and finding it significant that the language “did not actually condition the
conveyance on such use”).
The only Washington Supreme Court case holding that a deed conveyed an easement
despite a lack of clear purpose-limiting language is Veach v. Culp, 599 P.2d 526 (Wash. 1979). In
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that case, the court held that a deed conveyed an easement where the grantors “remise[d],
release[d], and forever quit claim[ed] . . . all that certain lot, piece, or parcel of land . . . to wit: A
right-of-way one hundred feet wide.” Id. at 527. The court based its holding on Swan, which
stated that a “deed passes an easement only” where “the granting clause . . . declares the purpose
of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad.” Id. at 528 (quoting Swan, 225 P.2d at 201). In
finding that the deed granted the railroad an easement only, the Veach court indicated that inclusion
of t