Full Opinion

[Cite as Alexander v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 2026-Ohio-4570.] IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO JUSTIN A. ALEXANDER Case No. 2025-00982JD Plaintiff Judge Lisa L. Sadler Magistrate Gary Peterson v. ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S OHIO STATE HIGHWAY PATROL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendant {¶1} On July 27, 2026, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56(B). Although plaintiff received an extension of time to respond on or before September 9, 2026, plaintiff did not respond until September 16, 2026. Nevertheless, the court considered plaintiff’s untimely response. 1 On October 1, 2026, defendant filed a reply. For the reasons set forth below, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Standard for Review {¶2} Motions for summary judgment are reviewed under the standard set forth in Civ.R. 56(C): Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary 1 Plaintiff sought additional time to respond to defendant’s motion for summary judgment; however, the motion did not contain a certificate of service, and was denied by the magistrate after providing time to cure the defect. See magistrate’s orders of September 16, 2026, and October 2, 2026. Even if plaintiff had received additional time to conduct discovery, no amount of discovery could change the outcome in this case as explained below. Case No. 2025-00982JD -2- ENTRY judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor. “[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying these portions of the record before the trial court which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party’s claim.” Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St. 3d 280, 292 (1996). To meet this initial burden, the moving party must be able to point to evidentiary materials of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Id. at 292-293. {¶3} If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party bears a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E): When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party’s pleadings, but the party’s response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party. Background {¶4} On December 4, 2025, plaintiff, who at all times relevant was an inmate in the custody and control of defendant, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC), brought this action asserting claims for defamation; negligent or reckless investigation; and malicious, bad-faith, or wanton conduct (immunity challenge). Complaint, ¶ 13-23. However, on March 25, 2026, the court granted, in part, defendant’s December 19, 2025 motion to dismiss, dismissing plaintiff’s claim captioned negligent or reckless investigation and allowing the action to proceed regarding defamation and immunity. Case No. 2025-00982JD -3- ENTRY {¶5} In the complaint, plaintiff states that, on or about February 18, 2025, Trooper Justin Bryant (Bryant), an employee of defendant, “asserted, reported, or communicated falsely to others that Plaintiff had received illegal narcotics through legal mail from a law firm located in Franklin County.” Complaint, ¶ 6. Plaintiff states that “these allegations are false, unsupported by evidence, and made without proper investigation.” Complaint, ¶ 7. Plaintiff asserts that “[p]laintiff never received illegal narcotics, drugs, or any contraband from any law firm.” Complaint, ¶ 8. Plaintiff avers that “Bryant’s statements were communicated to third parties, including law enforcement entities and corrections personnel when he knew, or should have known that [ODRC] Policy 75-MAL-03 is strictly enforced on several levels to ensure that no type of drugs/contraband comes through the legal mail system.” Complaint, ¶ 9. Plaintiff also states that “[d]efendant’s agent Bryant falsely claimed that Plaintiff received illegal drugs from the law firm between August 2022 and December 2022 and that Plaintiff was also involved in money laundering concerning these drugs.” Complaint, ¶ 9. {¶6} Plaintiff states that “[a]lthough Plaintiff is not, and has never claimed to be, a saint, as a result of Bryant’s defamatory actions, Plaintiff suffered embarrassment, humiliation, mental anguish, and emotional distress regarding criminal acts Plaintiff did not commit.” Complaint, ¶ 10. Plaintiff also states that “because of Bryant’s evil, false statements, it had been difficult for Plaintiff to get a law firm to represent him prior to September 2025 because the law firms did not want to be accused of what Bryant falsely accused Plaintiff of.” Complaint, ¶ 9. {¶7} In its motion for summary judgment, defendant argues that Bryant’s statements are substantially true and that this action may be defeated by showing that the gist of the statements are true or substantially true. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment explains that “[t]his case arises from a criminal investigation into a prison narcotics-smuggling operation that began on or around September 1, 2022.” Motion for Summary Judgment, pg. 2; Exhibit D. Defendant asserts that plaintiff was indicted by two Muskingum County grand juries for trafficking controlled substances into correctional institutions, laundering drug-sale proceeds, engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, two counts of aggravated trafficking, three counts of illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse, four counts of money laundering, and five counts of attempted aggravated trafficking. Case No. 2025-00982JD -4- ENTRY Motion for Summary Judgment, pg. 2. Defendant states that a Muskingum County jury subsequently found plaintiff guilty of Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs, Trafficking in Cocaine, Illegal Conveyance of Drugs of Abuse into a Prison, Conspiracy to Manufacture Drugs in the Vicinity of a School, and Money Laundering. Motion for Summary Judgment, pg. 4. Defendant asserts that plaintiff’s criminal convictions, along with the indictments, jury verdicts, and sentencing entries establish the substantial truth of the statements that plaintiff challenges, foreclosing the falsity element of defamation. Motion for Summary Judgment, pg. 4. {¶8} Attached in support of defendant’s motion for summary judgment are certified copies of plaintiff’s indictments by grand juries in Muskingum County, along with the indictments of his co-conspirators, certified copies of jury verdict forms from plaintiff’s criminal cases in Muskingum County, and certified copies of plaintiff’s sentencing entries from those cases. {¶9} The indictments show that plaintiff was indicted for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, on or about August 23, 2022, through December 2022, with a co- conspirator, Norman V. Whiteside, and a number of other co-conspirators both indicted and unindicted. Exhibits A, D. The indictment goes on to state that plaintiff “did operate as an enterprise-in-fact, organized for the purpose of smuggling narcotics into the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and laundering the proceeds of drug transactions completed within the Ohio Department of Corrections operating with a central financial hub in Muskingum County, Ohio.” Exhibit A, pg. 1.2 Plaintiff was indicted on multiple counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs; illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse onto grounds of a specified governmental facility—that facility being the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction; multiple counts of money laundering; attempted aggravated trafficking in drugs, attempted illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse onto grounds of a specified governmental facility; multiple counts of aggravated possession of drugs; multiple counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs; attempted aggravated trafficking in drugs; and attempted illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse onto grounds of a specified governmental facility. Exhibit A, pg. 1-9. Plaintiff was indicted by a grand jury in a second 2 The page numbers shall refer to the pdf pagination of the exhibits collectively. Case No. 2025-00982JD -5- ENTRY case, also arising out of drug conveyances or attempted conveyances between September 2022 through March 2023, and of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity; aggravated trafficking in drugs, trafficking in cocaine; multiple counts of illegal conveyance of weapons, drugs of abuse, or intoxicating liquor onto the grounds of a specified governmental facility; conspiracy; and numerous counts of money laundering. Exhibit D, pg. 26-71. {¶10} Plaintiff was subsequently found guilty on all counts and sentenced by the Muskingum County Common Pleas Court. Exhibit B, pg. 11-21; Exhibit C, pg. 22-25; Exhibit E, pg. 72-110; Exhibit F, pg. 111-114; Exhibit G, pg. 115-118. {¶11} Plaintiff does not dispute, nor could he dispute, the facts as laid out above. Memorandum in Opposition, pg. 2. Rather, plaintiff argues that Bryant defamed him by stating that he used a law firm and used the mail system to convey illegal drugs into the prison. Memorandum in Opposition, pg. 1-2. Plaintiff did not include any Civ.R. 56 evidence in support of his opposition. Law and Analysis {¶12} “In Ohio, defamation occurs when a publication contains a false statement ‘made with some degree of fault, reflecting injuriously on a person’s reputation, or exposing a person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame or disgrace, or affecting a person adversely in his or her trade, business or profession.’” Jackson v. Columbus, 2008-Ohio-1041, ¶ 9, quoting A & B-Abell Elevator Co., Inc. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 73 Ohio St.3d 1, 7 (1995). “To succeed on a defamation claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a false statement, (2) about the plaintiff, (3) published without privilege to a third party, (4) with fault of at least negligence on the part of the defendant, and (5) the statement was either defamatory per se or caused special harm to the plaintiff.” Watley v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2008-Ohio-3691, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.). Truth is a complete defense in an action against libel or slander. R.C. 2739.02; see Ed Schory & Sons v. Francis, 1996-Ohio-194, ¶ 48 (1996) (“In Ohio, truth is a complete defense to a claim for defamation.”). {¶13} Further, “[a] defamation action may be completely defended by showing that the gist, or imputation, of the statement is substantially true, and, hence, the statement is Case No. 2025-00982JD -6- ENTRY not false.” Sweitzer v. Outlet Communs., Inc., 133 Ohio App. 3d 102, 111 (10th Dist. 1999), citing Natl. Medic Serv. Corp. v. E.W. Scripps Co., 61 Ohio App.3d 752, 755 (1989). “Whether a defamatory statement is substantially true is a question of fact.” Id. {¶14} Here, plaintiff’s claim for defamation fails because the alleged defamatory statements made by Bryant on or around February 18, 2025, that plaintiff “had received illegal narcotics through legal mail from a law firm located in Franklin County” and money laundered the proceeds of the narcotics between August 2022 and December 2022, are substantially true. As stated above, plaintiff does not dispute that he was indicted or convicted of illegally conveying drugs into prison or money laundering. Plaintiff takes issue with the portion of the statements that a law firm and the mail system were used as methods for the illegal conveyance. However, the gist or the sting of the statement is that plaintiff illegally conveyed drugs into prison—a statement that plaintiff does not and cannot dispute. Even assuming Bryant may have been incorrect about minor inconsequential details or made the statement prior to plaintiff’s conviction for the same is of no matter. “‘It is sufficient [in defending against a defamation action] to show that the imputation is substantially true, or as it is often put, to justify the “gist,” the “sting,” or the substantial truth of the defamation.’” Krems v. University Hosps. of Cleveland, 133 Ohio App. 3d 6, 9 (8th Dist.1999), quoting Prosser, The Law of Torts, 798-799 (4th Ed. 1971). “This broad definition of the truth defense prevents a defamation claim from resulting in an argument over semantics.” Boyd v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 2015-Ohio- 1394, ¶ 46 (2nd Dist.); see also Boddie v. Landers, 2016-Ohio-1410, ¶ 24-25 (10th Dist.) (noting that certified records of a criminal conviction support the conclusion that a defamatory statement is substantially true even where it was claimed that certain details of the statement were not true). The imputation here is clear: plaintiff illegally conveyed drugs into the prison. That statement is not challenged or in dispute. Thus, the imputation or sting of Bryant’s statements are substantially true. {¶15} Defendant has put forth evidence that the statements by Bryant are substantially true and plaintiff does not dispute that evidence. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact and reasonable minds can only conclude that the imputation or gist of the statements are substantially true. Case No. 2025-00982JD -7- ENTRY {¶16} Finally, to the extent plaintiff seeks an immunity determination with respect to Bryant’s conduct, given the conclusion that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the statements are substantially true, the court has no basis on which to conduct an immunity determination. See Miracle v. Ohio Dept. of Veterans Servs., 2019-Ohio- 3308, ¶ 30 (“Given our conclusion that Miracle failed to state any wrongful-discharge claim arising under state law, the Court of Claims has no basis upon which to conduct an immunity determination.”); Cotten v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2018-Ohio-3392, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.) (“Having concluded that Cotten’s complaint failed to state any claims arising under state law, the trial court no longer had basis upon which to conduct an immunity determination.”); La Riccia v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 2025-Ohio-754, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.) (“Because the court determined it must dismiss appellants’ complaint, the question of whether individual members of the commission were entitled to immunity became moot.”). Accordingly, any request for immunity determinations is moot. Conclusion {¶17} Based on the foregoing, even when construing the evidence most strongly in plaintiff’s favor, defendant has demonstrated that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Defendant met its initial burden by putting forth evidence that the statement was substantially true, and plaintiff failed to meet his reciprocal burden of demonstrating the existence of a material fact. Therefore, the court concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and judgment shall be rendered in favor of defendant. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot. Court costs are assessed against plaintiff. The clerk shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. LISA L. SADLER Judge Filed October 26, 2026 Sent to S.C. Reporter 11/19/26