Full Opinion

J-A04021-26 2026 PA Super 133 KEVIN & LISA HOLLINGER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellants : : : v. : : : JENNIFER DIETRICH, MICHELE : No. 740 MDA 2025 MCCARTNEY, COLDWELL BANKER RESIDENTIAL BROKERAGE, LISA TIGER, ADVANCE REALTY, INC. D/B/A CENTURY 21 GOLD AND JOHN DOES 1-10, JOHN DOE CORP. 1-10 Appeal from the Order Entered May 7, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Civil Division at No(s): 20-3489 BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and LANE, J. OPINION BY KING, J.: FILED JUNE 23, 2026 Appellants, Kevin and Lisa Hollinger, appeal from the final order of the Berks County Court of Common Pleas, entered on May 7, 2025, which granted the motion for summary judgment and motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Appellee, Jennifer Dietrich (“Dietrich”).1 Appellants challenge the trial court’s November 16, 2020 order sustaining the preliminary objections of Appellees Lisa Tiger (“Tiger”) and Advance Realty, Inc. d/b/a Century 21 Gold (“Advance Realty”) (collectively “Buyers’ Agents”); the July 19, 2021 order granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Appellees Michele McCartney (“McCartney”) and Coldwell Banker (“Coldwell Banker”) ____________________________________________ 1 We have amended the caption to include all defendants listed in Appellants’ complaint. J-A04021-26 (collectively “Seller’s Agents”); the April 13, 2022 orders of the trial court which granted the motion for summary judgment filed by Buyers’ Agents and granted the motion for summary judgment filed by Seller’s Agents; the order entered September 27, 2022, which granted Dietrich’s motions in limine; and the orders entered May 7, 2025, that granted Dietrich’s motion for summary judgment and motion for judgment on the pleadings. We affirm. The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case as follows: On April 24, 2017, [Appellants] entered into an agreement [(“Agreement of Sale”)] to purchase the real property located at 1413 Old Mill Road, Wyomissing, Pennsylvania (“the Property”) from [Dietrich] with settlement to occur on June 29, 2017. [Appellants] were represented by [Buyers’ Agents], while Dietrich was represented by [Seller’s Agents] (collectively “Agent Defendants”). [Appellants] first discovered the Property on the market in 2017 and, after viewing the Property, were impressed with the high-end, quality finishes and construction of the Property. Prior to the transaction, [Appellants] reviewed the Sellers Disclosure Statement (“SDS”), as required pursuant to the Real Estate Seller Disclosure Law (“RESDL”), [68 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7301- 7315], provided by Dietrich, which indicated that the Property had a sump pump in working order and a sump pit, and that she was not aware of any water infiltration into the basement or of any repairs to control water or dampness issues, or other drainage or flooding issues. Dietrich did disclose in the SDS that a rehab and addition of the Property had been completed in 2006, which occurred prior to her marriage to her late husband and subsequent habitation of the Property. Further, Dietrich disclosed that a sewage backup in 2016 had necessitated new carpet, tile, and dry wall to be installed, as well as that the backup was “professionally blew out.” [(Complaint, at Ex. A, p. 5)]. [Appellants] filed suit against all Defendants on March 23, 2020, setting forth causes of action for violation of the -2- J-A04021-26 RESDL, civil conspiracy, fraud, breach of contract, negligence, and violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”). [73 P.S. §§ 201-1 – 201-10]. [Appellants’] Complaint alleged that prior to the [A]greement of [S]ale, [Appellants] reviewed the SDS that Dietrich [had submitted], which did not disclose any water damage. Likewise, [Appellants] noted that they specifically sought assurances from Dietrich, through the Agent Defendants, that no water infiltration had occurred at the Property. However, [Appellants] claimed that shortly after settlement and closing, they noticed flooding in the basement of the Property. Further investigation prompted by concern led [Appellants] to discover, according to them, that the Property had experienced previous flooding in the basement over a long period of time. [Appellants] also alleged that a waterproofing system had been installed after an addition had been completed by Dietrich, which demonstrated that Dietrich knew that water infiltration into the basement was an issue. [Appellants] claimed that they engaged the services of a remediation expert who informed [Appellants] that the cause of the water infiltration was the improperly constructed addition to the Property and the landscape grading performed after the addition was completed. [Appellants] additionally asserted that “many of their neighbors were experiencing similar water infiltration issues, and that the community in general routinely dealt with flooded basements.” [(Complaint at ¶ 44)]. [Appellants] further alleged that [Tiger and McCartney] both lived in the area of the Property and, as such, coupled with their knowledge as real estate agents, they knew or should have known that water infiltration was a problem throughout the neighborhood. (Trial Court Opinion, entered 5/7/25, at 1-3). On August 5, 2020, Buyers’ Agents filed preliminary objections to the complaint, arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim for count II-civil conspiracy, count III-fraud, count V-negligence, and count VI-UTPCPL -3- J-A04021-26 violations. On November 16, 2020, the trial court sustained Buyers’ Agents’ preliminary objections to Appellants’ complaint in part and struck count II-civil conspiracy and count III-fraud from the complaint.2 On October 14, 2020, Dietrich filed preliminary objections challenging the sufficiency of the damages claimed and objecting in the nature of a demurrer to count II-civil conspiracy, count III-fraud, count V-negligence, and count VI-UTPCPL violation. On November 16, 2020, the trial court sustained Dietrich’s objections in part, dismissing count II-civil conspiracy and count III- fraud. The court ordered Dietrich to file an answer to the remaining counts. On May 20, 2021, Seller’s Agents filed a motion for judgment on the pleading seeking to dismiss Appellants’ claims for count II-civil conspiracy, count III-fraud, and count V-negligence. On July 19, 2021, the court granted Seller’s Agents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Trial Court Order, entered 7/19/21). On January 10, 2022, Buyers’ Agents filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the claims of count III-fraud, count V-negligence, and count ____________________________________________ 2 Despite the trial court’s striking of count-III, fraud, from the complaint, the Buyers’ Agents and Appellants proceeded as if the fraud claim remained viable; Buyers’ Agents later moved for summary judgment as to count III- fraud, and obtained summary judgment in their favor. (See Buyers’ Agents’ Motion for Summary Judgment, 3/11/22; Trial Court Order, entered 4/13/22). However, because there is no indication that the trial court’s November 16, 2020 order sustaining preliminary objections was ever vacated or amended, the record reflects that order as the operative order disposing of Appellants’ claim for count III-fraud, as to the Buyers’ Agents. -4- J-A04021-26 VII-UTPCPL violations, arguing that Appellants failed to allege sufficient facts to support their claims. Specifically, Buyers’ Agents argued that Appellants failed to allege that they made any false or reckless representations, or that they knew that any representations made by Dietrich were false or reckless. Buyers’ Agents also asserted that the UTPCPL claims against them could not be supported because the UTPCPL did not regulate the behavior of the buyers– Appellants–whom Buyers’ Agents represented in the transaction; and further, Appellants failed to allege any factual support for their claims that Buyers’ Agents engaged in any deceptive or unfair acts. On January 13, 2022, Seller’s Agents filed a second motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Appellants had failed to adduce factual support for count I-RESDL violation because the RESDL requires that an agent have actual knowledge of the material defect to impose liability and Seller’s Agents did not have a duty to complete an independent inspection of the Property. Seller’s Agents further maintained that Appellants failed to identify any specific oral or written misrepresentation to support a violation of the RESDL. Finally, Seller’s Agents insisted that Appellants were further barred from pursuing this claim based on the two-year statute of repose contained in 68 Pa.C.S.A. § 7311(b). Seller’s Agents argued that even though the statute is titled as a “statute of limitations,” it operates as a statute of repose because the viability of an action is extinguished two years after the date of settlement. Subsequently, on March 7, 2022, Dietrich filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings seeking judgment in her favor as -5- J-A04021-26 to the claims for violations of the RESDL and UTPCPL, breach of contract, and negligence. Dietrich first claimed that the RESDL and negligence claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations or repose. Dietrich argued that the only contract between [Appellants] and Dietrich was the Agreement of Sale (“the Agreement [of Sale]”), which included that all representations and claims by Dietrich were not part of the Agreement [of Sale] unless expressly incorporated therein. Because the SDS was not expressly incorporated into the Agreement [of Sale], Dietrich contended, [Appellants] could not use the SDS as a basis for a breach of contract claim. Other terms of the Agreement [of Sale], according to Dietrich, included [Appellants’] inspection requirements, [Appellants’] acceptance of the Property “IN ITS PRESENT CONDITION…,” and a release of Dietrich for defects or conditions of the Property. Finally, Dietrich claims that because the RESDL cause of action is barred by the statute of repose, and because the Agreement [of Sale] released Dietrich of liability for defects or conditions of the [P]roperty, [Appellants] also fail to sustain their cause of action for violations of the UTPCPL. (Trial Court Opinion, entered 5/7/25, at 4-5) (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Dietrich filed a motion for summary judgment on March 10, 2022, seeking relief on the same basis as set forth in her motion for judgment on the pleadings. On March 11, 2022, Buyers’ Agents and Seller’s Agents filed motions for summary judgment. On April 13, 2022, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment of Buyers’ Agents, entering judgment in favor of Buyers’ Agents on the remaining claims against them: count V-negligence, and count VII-UTPCPL violation. That same day, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment of Seller’s Agents and entered judgment in their favor on the remaining claim against them, count I-RESDL violation. In both orders, -6- J-A04021-26 the trial court explained that the prior motions for judgment on the pleadings filed by Agent Defendants were moot pursuant to the grant of summary judgment relief. Also on April 13, 2022, the trial court denied Dietrich’s motion for summary judgment and granted, in part, Dietrich’s motion for judgment on the pleadings dismissing count III-fraud based on Appellants’ concession that no specific evidence of fraud, sufficient to meet the legal standard, had been offered. The court thereafter scheduled the case for a jury trial to begin on October 4, 2022. On August 8, 2022, Dietrich filed motions in limine. In the first motion, she sought exclusion of any agreement, including the SDS, that was outside of the Agreement of Sale. Dietrich argued that pursuant to the terms of the Agreement of Sale, Appellants accepted the Property “as is,” and specified that the Agreement of Sale was all-inclusive as to the terms of sale and did not include the SDS. Dietrich next sought to exclude the testimony of Appellants’ expert, arguing that Appellants failed to provide any expert reports pursuant to the deadlines set forth in the case management order. Finally, Dietrich sought to exclude any testimony regarding the SDS based on her continued argument that the count I-RESDL violation claim was barred due to the statute of repose, and thus, admission of the SDS was also barred. The court heard argument on the motions in limine and, on September 27, 2022, the court granted Dietrich relief. Specifically, the court excluded -7- J-A04021-26 Appellants’ expert testimony, any testimony regarding the SDS, and testimony to any agreement other than the Agreement of Sale. Appellants initially purported to appeal from the trial court’s orders granting the Agent Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and the order granting Dietrich’s motions in limine. However, this Court quashed the appeal as interlocutory and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. See Hollinger v. Dietrich, No. 1623 MDA 2022, No. 1624 MDA 2022, No. 1625 MDA 2022, No. 1626 MDA 2022, No. 1629 MDA 2022 (Pa.Super. filed Jan. 3, 2024) (unpublished memorandum). Upon remand, the trial court held a status conference during which Dietrich asked the trial court to reconsider Dietrich’s motion for summary judgment. On May 7, 2025, the trial court granted Dietrich’s motion for summary judgment as to count I-RESDL violation, and granted Dietrich’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to count IV-breach of contract, count V- negligence, and count VI-UTPCPL violation. (Trial Court Order, entered 5/7/25). In its accompanying opinion, the trial court explained that it interpreted the RESDL as a statute of repose, rather than a statute of limitations; hence, Appellants had two years from the date of sale to commence an action. The court further found that the statute of repose applicable to the RESDL extinguishes the claims thereto and excludes the SDS. Because Appellants had relied solely on the SDS in support of the remaining claims, the court found that Appellants had failed to aver relevant allegations -8- J-A04021-26 to support the causes of action for breach of contract, negligence, or violations of the UTPCPL. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal, and pursuant to the court’s order, Appellants filed their concise statements of errors complained of on appeal.3 Appellants raise the following issues on appeal. 1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion in its November 16, 2020 order ____________________________________________ 3 On August 19, 2025, this Court entered a rule to show cause why the appeal should not be quashed, because it was unclear whether the May 7, 2025 order was final where it left unresolved the claims against John Doe 1-10 and John Doe Corp. 1-10. Appellants responded arguing that the inclusion of John Doe defendants did not mean that there were outstanding claims remaining. Rather, Appellants maintained that the issue of whether claims remained depended on whether the John Doe defendants constituted “legal parties” to the action. Appellants asserted that because no claims were affirmatively pled against the John Doe defendants, their presence in the pleadings did not prevent the order from being final. Generally, appeals may be taken only from final orders. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). A final order is one that disposes of all claims and all parties. Reason v. Kathryn’s Korner Thrift Shop, 169 A.3d 96, 100 (Pa.Super. 2017) (reiterating that orders which do not dispose of all claims and all parties are interlocutory and unappealable). In Zane v. Friends Hospital, 770 A.2d 339 (Pa.Super. 2001), reversed on other grounds, 575 Pa. 236, 836 A.2d 25 (2003), this Court held that an order was final, despite the presence of “Dr. John Doe” on the caption, because Dr. John Doe was not a legal party as he had never been identified, never been served, and had never entered an appearance in the action. Id. at 340 n.1. Similarly, in Weiley v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 51 A.3d 202 (Pa.Super. 2012), this Court held that where a John Doe defendant was never identified, and had never entered an appearance, he was not a legal party. Id. at 215. Here, we note that the John Doe 1-10 and John Doe Corp. 1-10 defendants were never identified, never served, and had never entered an appearance in the action. Thus, we agree with Appellants that the John Doe defendants did not constitute legal parties to the action, and their presence in the pleadings does not prevent the May 7, 2025 order from being a final order. -9- J-A04021-26 [sustaining Buyers’ Agents’] preliminary objections to [Appellants’] claim for fraud where there was substantial factual evidence demonstrating that … Tiger was aware of water infiltration in [Appellants’] home and failed to inform [Appellants] of such water infiltration, despite [Appellants’] specific requests that the home not be subject to water infiltration, and where such non-disclosure of a material fact is tantamount to a material misrepresentation? 2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion in its April 13, 2022 order granting [Buyers’ Agents’] motion for summary judgment where there was substantial factual evidence demonstrating that … Tiger knew or should have known of water infiltration in [Appellants’] home and failed to inform [Appellants] of such water infiltration in violation of her duties, as well as in violation of the [UTPCPL], and where the Supreme Court and the Superior Court have routinely found that where a buyer’s agent knew or should have known about latent defects in a home, and where the plaintiffs made clear that they were relying on representations relating to the presence of such latent defects, a realtor has a duty to ensure that the representations made are correct[?] 3. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion in its July 19, 2021 order granting [Seller’s Agents’] motion for judgment on the pleadings as to [Appellants’] claims for fraud and negligence where there was substantial factual evidence demonstrating that … McCartney was aware of water infiltration in the [Appellants’] home, had an affirmative duty to disclose it, and failed to inform [Appellants] of such water infiltration, despite [Appellants’] specific requests that the home not be subject to water infiltration[?] 4. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion in its April 13, 2022 Order granting [Seller’s Agents’] motion for summary judgment where there was substantial factual evidence demonstrating that … McCartney knew or should have known of water infiltration in the [Appellants’] home and failed to inform [Appellants] of such water infiltration in violation of her duties under the [RESDL]? - 10 - J-A04021-26 5. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion in its May [7], 2025 order granting … Dietrich’s motion for summary judgment and to exclude testimony regarding the [SDS] on the basis that it is subject to the principles of a statute of repose where there is no controlling law applying the principles of a statute of repose to the statute, and the fact that the statute itself is specifically identified as a statute of limitation, thus compelling the conclusion that the RESDL is not a statute of repose, and is subject to the discovery rule and the equitable tolling doctrine? 6. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion in its May [7], 2025 order granting … Dietrich’s motion for summary judgment and to exclude testimony regarding the [SDS] on the basis that it is subject to the principles of a statute of repose where such preclusion excluded affirmative statements that were relevant to [Appellants’] claims for violation of the [UTPCPL], as well as [Appellants’] claims for breach of contract, and where the mere fact that [Appellants’] claim for violation of the [RESDL] may have lapsed did not render such statements irrelevant or prejudicial? 7. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion in its May [7], 2025 order granting … Dietrich’s motion for summary judgment seeking to exclude any agreement other than the Agreement of Sale where the Agreement of Sale specifically references the [RESDL] and states that “the [RESDL] requires that before an agreement of sale is signed, the seller in a residential real estate transfer must make certain disclosures regarding the property to potential buyers in a form defined by law” and therefore any documents and testimony demonstrating such attempts to either to comply with the law by providing a [SDS], (given that such a requirement is specifically referenced within the Agreement of Sale) by providing her disclosures must be allowed? 8. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion in its May [7], 2025 order granting … Dietrich’s motion for summary judgment ostensibly on the basis that [Appellants] did not submit expert reports where [Appellants] identified John Hoeffert as a witness in their - 11 - J-A04021-26 pre-trial memorandum, and produced his report in discovery well prior to the July 1, 2022 deadline on March 1, 2022, and identified Construction Master Services in their pre-trial memorandum and submitted its proposal to repair the defects in discovery on March 1, 2022, and submitted opposition both filed and at oral argument[?] (Appellants’ Brief at 11-15) (unnecessary capitalization omitted). In their first issue, Appellants contend that the trial court erred when it granted Buyers’ Agents’ preliminary objections to Appellants’ claim for fraud. Specifically, they assert that Buyers’ Agents failed to inform them of water infiltration in the home despite Appellants’ specific requests to purchase a home without water damage. Appellants further maintain that there was substantial evidence that Buyers’ Agents were aware of water infiltration in the home. Appellants insist that at the preliminary objections stage of the proceedings, the trial court was required to accept as true Appellants’ averments that Tiger, who lived in the neighborhood, had knowledge about a history of water infiltration throughout the community. Likewise, Appellants assert that the trial court was obligated to accept as true their pleading that “all Defendants expressly assured Plaintiffs that no such water damage or infiltration had ever occurred. These representations were reflected in the legally-obligated disclosures provided by the seller and the seller’s agent.” (Complaint at ¶ 9). Appellants argue that Buyers’ Agents had a fiduciary duty to disclose the prior water infiltration and yet concealed these facts for their own benefit to earn the commission from the sale of the home. Accordingly, Appellants insist that they pled sufficient facts to support their claim for fraud - 12 - J-A04021-26 against Buyers’ Agents, and the trial court erred in sustaining the preliminary objections. We disagree. The relevant scope and standard of review in examining a challenge to an order sustaining preliminary objections are as follows: Our review of a trial court’s sustaining of preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer is plenary. Such preliminary objections should be sustained only if, assuming the averments of the complaint to be true, the plaintiff has failed to assert a legally cognizable cause of action. We will reverse a trial court’s decision to sustain preliminary objections only if the trial court has committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion. All material facts set forth in the complaint as well as all inferences reasonably [deducible] therefrom are admitted as true for [the purpose of this review]. The question presented by the demurrer is whether, on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible. Where a doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, this doubt should be resolved in favor of overruling it. Lerner v. Lerner, 954 A.2d 1229, 1234 (Pa.Super. 2008) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). See Burgoyne v. Pinecrest Community Ass’n, 924 A.2d 675, 679 (Pa.Super. 2007) (stating: “To be clear and free from doubt that dismissal is appropriate, it must appear with certainty that the law would not permit recovery by the plaintiff upon the facts averred”) (citation omitted). In order to prove fraud the following elements must be shown: (1) a representation; (2) which is material to the transaction at hand; (3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is true or false; (4) with the intent of misleading another into relying on it; (5) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and (6) the resulting injury was proximately caused by the reliance. - 13 - J-A04021-26 Milliken v. Jacono, 60 A.3d 133, 140 (Pa.Super. 2012), aff’d, 628 Pa. 62, 103 A.3d 806 (2014) (citing Youndt v. First National Bank of Port Allegany, 868 A.2d 539, 545 (Pa.Super. 2005)). “Concealment of a material fact can amount to actionable fraud if the seller intentionally concealed a material fact to deceive the purchaser; however, mere silence without a duty to speak will not constitute fraud.” Viguers v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 837 A.2d 534, 540 (Pa.Super. 2003), aff’d, 584 Pa. 120, 881 A.2d 1262 (2005). “[I]n real estate transactions, fraud arises when a seller knowingly makes a misrepresentation, undertakes a concealment calculated to deceive, or commits non-privileged failure to disclose.” Milliken, supra at 140 (quoting Youndt, supra at 545). “Fraud is a generic term used to describe anything calculated to deceive, whether by single act or combination, or by suppression of truth, or suggestion of what is false, whether it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or silence, word of mouth, or look or gesture.” Id. (quoting Youndt, supra at 545). “In Pennsylvania, fraud of any kind must be pleaded in a complaint with particularity.” Kern v. Kern, 892 A.2d 1, 8 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citing Pa.R.Civ.P. 1019(b)). While it is impossible to establish precisely what degree of particularity is required to sufficiently allege fraud, it is well-settled that the following two conditions must always be met: “The pleadings must adequately explain the nature of the claim to the opposing party so as to permit him to prepare a defense[,] and they must be sufficient to convince the court that the averments are not merely subterfuge.” Youndt[, supra at 544-45]. Rudy v. Lesniak, 343 A.3d 1261, 1267-68 (Pa.Super. 2025), appeal denied, - 14 - J-A04021-26 ___ Pa. ___, 355 A.3d 800 (2026). Instantly, Appellants alleged in their complaint that they had expressly requested confirmation that the Property was not subject to any water damage and that “all Defendants expressly assured Plaintiffs that no such water damage or infiltration had ever occurred. These representations were reflected in the legally-obligated disclosures provided by the seller and the seller’s agent.” (Complaint at ¶¶ 9, 34). Appellants averred that they retained Buyers’ Agents as their realtors because they had “represented that they were experts in the area” and that Tiger “resided in a home in the same neighborhood” as the Property. (Id. at ¶¶ 26, 27). Appellants claimed that because they had learned from neighbors that flooding was common in the neighborhood, Tiger knew or should have known of water infiltration in the basement. (Id. at ¶ 45). With respect to count III-fraud, Appellants further pled: 68. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate the preceding paragraphs contained in this pleading as though fully set forth herein. 69. At all times material, Defendants represented that the Home was in compliance with the applicable building codes and industry standards, was in excellent condition, did not contain material defects and was not subject to water infiltration. 70. These statements were misrepresentations as the Home and the surrounding property were improperly constructed and graded, leading to significant and substantial water infiltration. 71. Moreover, as set forth above, Defendants knew or should have known of the water infiltration and grading - 15 - J-A04021-26 defects. 72. Plaintiffs relied on these misrepresentations in deciding to purchase a home from Defendants. 73. As a result of Defendants’, and its agents, misrepresentations, Plaintiffs purchased the Home that was subject to water infiltration and flooding. 74. As a result of Defendants’ deceptive and intentionally fraudulent conduct, Plaintiffs have been significantly damaged. 75. Moreover, Defendants’ conduct has diminished the resale value of Plaintiffs’ Home, as these defects and damages must be disclosed when the Home is sold. 76. Defendants’ actions were outrageous in that they were committed wrongfully, knowingly, oppressively, intentionally, with an evil motive, actual malice, wanton and reckless disregard for the law, gross negligence and/or reckless indifference to the rights of Plaintiffs. Therefore, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover punitive damages. (Complaint at ¶¶ 68-76). In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained its order sustaining the preliminary objections filed by Buyers’ Agents as follows: Instantly, Appellants contend that [Buyers’ Agents] concealed the existence of prior water infiltration. Nevertheless, Appellants did not allege that [Buyers’ Agents] knew of any specific defect or water infiltration at the Property. Likewise, Appellants make no allegation that [Buyers’ Agents] were informed of any previous water infiltration or of defects at the Property and failed to disclose the same to Appellants. Instead, Appellants merely claim that Tiger lived in the same neighborhood and should have known that the Property would be subject to the same flooding issues that other homes in the neighborhood allegedly experienced. - 16 - J-A04021-26 Even accepting as true all well-pleaded facts, we fail to see how [Buyers’ Agents’] alleged knowledge of the neighborhood in general would be material to the specific transaction. Again, there was no allegation that [Buyers’ Agents] knew of any water infiltration at the Property. Nor is there an independent duty to investigate the contents of the SDS. Moreover, Appellants failed to present a prima facie case that [Buyers’ Agents] made any knowing misrepresentation regarding the Property, concealed any information regarding the Property in order to deceive, or that they failed to disclose any non-privileged information regarding the Property. Again, Appellants alleged that [Tiger] lived in the same neighborhood and [was an] expert realtor … and thus, imputed knowledge of some neighborhood properties experience flooding to [Buyers’ Agents]. Notwithstanding such an inference, it does not transmute any of such alleged knowledge to material information for the Property. Appellants do not assert that Tiger knew of any water infiltration or flooding at the Property, which would have been material. As such, [the trial court found] no error in sustaining [Buyers’ Agents’ preliminary] objection and dismissing Appellants’ cause of action in fraud against [Buyers’ Agents]. (Trial Court Opinion, entered 8/19/25, at 12-13) (emphasis in original). Accepting all the material facts set forth in the complaint as true, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Appellants failed to assert a legally cognizable cause of action for fraud against Buyers’ Agents. As the trial court acknowledged, Appellants did not aver that Buyers’ Agents had any specific knowledge of water infiltration at the Property. The general averments that because Tiger lived in the area she should have known of water infiltration in the basement of the Property are no more than conclusory statements and, without specific facts from which Tiger’s specific knowledge about the Property - 17 - J-A04021-26 can be reasonably inferred, are insufficient to survive preliminary objections. See Lerner, supra. Accordingly, we discern no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that Appellants failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity against Buyers’ Agents to convince the court that such averments are not merely subterfuge. See Rudy, supra. Appellants’ first issue is meritless. In their second issue, Appellants argue that the trial court erred when it granted Buyers’ Agents’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed Appellants’ claims for count V-negligence and count VII-UTPCPL violation. For purposes of disposition, because this issue encompasses two distinct questions, we first address the court’s grant of summary judgment for count V-negligence and then will proceed to address the grant of summary judgment for count VII-UTPCPL violation. First, Appellants argue that Buyers’ Agents had a duty of care both to know about latent defects in the home and to ensure that any representations concerning the purchase of the Property were correct. Specifically, they assert that even assuming that Buyers’ Agents were not aware of the water infiltration “the circumstances surrounding the transaction bound [Tiger] to ascertain the truth prior to assuring [Appellants] that no water infiltration had occurred.” (Appellants’ Brief at 46). Hence, Appellants argue that a real estate agent has a duty to investigate the truth of any representations made. (Appellants’ Brief at 45-46) (citing Antatis v. Kolarosky, No. 1311 WDA - 18 - J-A04021-26 2019, 2020 WL 1174500 (Pa.Super. filed Mar. 11, 2020) (unpublished memorandum)).4 Alternatively, Appellants suggest that even if this Court has not recognized such a duty in the past, this Court should find a duty in this instance based on the relationship between the parties, the inequity of placing the duty to investigate for water damage on buyers themselves, and a public interest in realtors being required to disclose any knowledge they have about water infiltration. (Id. at 51-53). On these grounds, Appellants conclude that the trial court erred in granting Buyers’ Agents’ motion for summary judgment on their claim of negligence.5 We disagree. Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is well settled: We view the record in the light most favorable to the ____________________________________________ 4 Appellants rely on Antatis in support of their claim that Buyers’ Agents had a duty to investigate the representations made in the SDS. However, we note that Antatis concerned a claim for fraud, not negligence. See id. (wherein buyers’ agent misinformed buyers there was no point in having home inspection and that getting one done prior to closing was waste of time even though agent know of prior water intrusions into home and yet made those comments). Furthermore, Antatis is readily distinguishable from the instant case because the agent in that case had knowledge of prior water intrusion into the home; whereas, here there is no evidence that Buyers’ Agents had any knowledge of prior water intrusion in the Property. Id. Thus, Appellants’ reliance on Antatis affords them no relief. 5 In our discussion of the first issue raised, we affirmed the trial court’s order sustaining the preliminary objections and dismissal of Appellants’ Count III- fraud, against Buyers’ Agents. Although Appellants again have argued that Tiger and Advance Realty’s failure to ascertain the truth about water infiltration amounted to actionable fraud (see Appellants’ Brief at 41-45), we decline to readdress that claim here, where the trial court dismissed the claim of fraud at the preliminary objections stage. (See supra at 4, n.2). - 19 - J-A04021-26 nonmoving party, and all doubts a