Lemus v. Grover Montano Corp.

Case 1:23-cv-00108-MJS Document 75 Filed 09/14/26 Page 1 of 29 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JESUS LEMUS, Plaintiff, Case No. 23-cv-108-MJS v. GROVER MONTANO CORP., et al., Defendants. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Jesus Lemus (“Lemus”) hired Grover Montano Corporation and its owner, Grover Montano (together, “Montano”), to renovate the basement of his rowhouse in Washington, D.C. More than two years after Montano completed the work, Lemus discovered water damage. Faulting Montano, Lemus sued. After summary judgment, two of Lemus’s claims—breach of contract and violation of the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedure Act (“CPPA”)—proceeded to a bench trial. Lemus argued at trial that Montano breached the parties’ agreement and violated the CPPA by deviating from the approved construction plans in several respects. After careful consideration of the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that Lemus failed to prove his claims. For one thing, none of the challenged plan deviations breached any duty that Montano owed Lemus under their contract or amounted to a material misrepresentation or omission under the CPPA. And for another, Lemus failed to prove that any of the challenged deviations caused any recoverable damages. The Court therefore finds in favor of Montano and against Lemus. 1 1 As noted, Lemus sued both Grover Montano Corporation and Mr. Montano, individually. Because Lemus failed to prove his claims against both, the Court generally finds no need to distinguish between Mr. Montano and his business in this ruling, opting instead to refer collectively to the defendants throughout.  Case 1:23-cv-00108-MJS Document 75 Filed 09/14/26 Page 2 of 29 RELEVANT BACKGROUND Through his operative complaint in this case, Lemus asserted three claims for relief against Montano: (1) violation of the CPPA, D.C. Code §§ 28-3901, et seq.; (2) breach of contract; and (3) negligence. (See generally ECF No. 38, Am. Compl.) In response to the amended complaint, and after a meaningful period of discovery, Montano moved to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment. Construing Montano’s motion through a Rule 56 lens, the Court granted summary judgment in Montano’s favor on Lemus’s negligence claim but concluded that genuine disputes of material fact necessitated a trial on Lemus’s CPPA and breach-of-contract claims. Lemus v. Grover Montano Corp., 2026 WL 875112 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2026). At the parties’ request, the Court then approved a limited period for each side to complete certain “loose-ends discovery” before trial. (ECF Nos. 54, 55.) This included supplementation of written discovery, the ability to depose certain fact witnesses, and (another) chance to depose the other side’s expert. (See id.) Thereafter, the parties completed their pretrial filings in July 2026, which included various motions in limine. Many of those motions were later withdrawn after the parties agreed to proceed to a bench trial in lieu of a jury trial. But the Court did rule on the parties’ dueling motions in limine seeking to exclude certain expert opinions, denying both sets of motions through an oral ruling on the record at the pretrial conference. (See ECF No. 70.) The Court separately resolved, prior to trial, the question of whether the written contract between Lemus and Montano—a three-page document signed in March 2019—was completely integrated under D.C. law, determining that the contract was not completely integrated, but only partially integrated, meaning that, as part of their trial presentation on the breach-of-contract claim, both sides were free to introduce evidence of consistent additional terms, see, e.g., Howard Univ. v. Good Food Servs., Inc., 608 A.2d 116, 126 (D.C. 1992). (See Min. Order, July 6, 2026.) 2  Case 1:23-cv-00108-MJS Document 75 Filed 09/14/26 Page 3 of 29 The Court conducted a three-day bench trial on August 25, 26, and 27. Through his trial presentation, Lemus argued that Montano breached their contract and made material misrepresentations or omissions to Lemus in violation of the CPPA by deviating from the approved construction plans in several specific ways: (1) not installing a four-inch gravel base under the new concrete slab; (2) not installing a perimeter drain; (3) not installing a sump pit and pump; (4) not constructing expansion joints in the concrete slab; and (5) using gypsum board rather than concrete backerboard behind the tiles in parts of the bathroom shower. Under Lemus’s theory, these deviations caused substantial water damage and ultimately required Lemus to hire another contractor to demolish and rebuild the shower and surrounding area in the bathroom. In defense, Montano contested that any of the challenged deviations breached the parties’ contract or gave rise to any other CPPA violation. Montano also argued that Lemus could not prove any causal link between the challenged deviations and the water damage that gave rise to this suit. During trial, the Court received dozens of exhibits and heard testimony from four witnesses. 2 Lemus and Montano each testified, and each presented an expert witness on construction-related issues and causation: Lemus called Reynaldo de Guzman, and Montano called Brian Bramel. During Lemus’s case, Montano’s counsel moved to dismiss for lack of subject- matter jurisdiction, arguing that the evidence failed to establish the necessary amount in controversy for diversity purposes. The Court denied that motion. (See Min. Entry, Aug. 25, 2026). 3 In addition, at the close of Lemus’s case, Montano moved for judgment on partial findings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c), which the Court likewise denied. (See Min. Entry, Aug. 26, 2026.) 2 Specifically, the Court admitted at trial and considered the following exhibits: Joint Exhibits 1, 2, 4, 7, 9– 13, 15–17, 21, 22, 24, 38, 59, 62–64, 66, 75, 85, 90, 93–95; Plaintiff’s Exhibits 2–5, 7–15, 31, 33, 35–38, 95–100, 104, 209, and 219; and Defendants’ Exhibits 1, 4, 5, 8, and 9. 3 Counsel’s argument on this point was a rehash of a near-identical argument that the Court rejected in its summary judgment ruling. See Lemus, 2026 WL 875112, at *4 n.5. It fared no better in a trial setting. 3  Case 1:23-cv-00108-MJS Document 75 Filed 09/14/26 Page 4 of 29 At the conclusion of trial, the Court took the matter under advisement. This opinion now serves as the Court’s findings and conclusions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). After carefully considering the entirety of the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that Lemus failed to carry his burden to prove that any of the claimed deviations from the plan drawings constituted a breach of the parties’ contract or triggered any material misrepresentation or omission under the CPPA. Moreover, the Court finds that Lemus failed to prove—including by way of the causation theory proffered by his expert—that any of the challenged plan deviations caused the water damage that he sued over. Accordingly, the Court rules in favor of Montano and against Lemus. GENERAL LEGAL STANDARD In a case tried without a jury, “the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). “The Court’s findings must be ‘sufficient to indicate the factual basis for the ultimate conclusion.’” United States ex rel. Morsell v. NortonLifeLock, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 3d 95, 113 (D.D.C. 2023) (quoting Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415, 422 (1943)). “But the judge need only make brief, definite, pertinent findings and conclusions upon the contested matters; there is no necessity for over-elaboration of detail or particularization of facts.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment). In other words, “the Court need not address all the evidence presented at trial, and must simply make findings sufficient to allow the appellate court to conduct a meaningful review.” Wise v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 3d 53, 57 (D.D.C. 2015). 4  Case 1:23-cv-00108-MJS Document 75 Filed 09/14/26 Page 5 of 29 FINDINGS OF FACT Based on the evidence introduced at trial, the Court makes the following factual findings. 4 I. The Renovation Project and the Parties’ Contract Lemus owns a residential property in Northeast Washington, D.C. (Jt. Stip. ¶ 1; Aug. 25, 2026 Trial Transcript (“Aug. 25 Tr.”) at 23–24 (Lemus).) In early 2019, after walking past a Grover Montano Corporation van parked outside a neighbor’s construction project, Lemus reached out to Montano to discuss a potential renovation of his basement. (Aug. 25 Tr. at 24–25 (Lemus).) Mr. Montano, the owner and president of the company, then met with Lemus to discuss the project and walked Lemus’s property so he could prepare an estimate. (Jt. Stip. ¶ 2; Aug. 25 Tr. at 24–25, 49 (Lemus); Aug. 26, 2026 Trial Transcript (“Aug. 26 Tr.”) at 25–26 (Montano).) Montano agreed to take on the project, and on March 27, 2019, Lemus and Montano signed a contract memorializing the agreed scope of work. (Jt. Ex. 1.) That three-page document enumerated 32 separately numbered construction tasks, ranging from securing the necessary dumpsters, to demolition of the existing concrete floor, to construction of a new bathroom (including a new shower), to relocation of the laundry area, and more. (See id.) Relevant to the claims pressed at trial, the scope of work expressly included “[l]aying of gravel base,” “[i]nstallation of moisture barrier,” and “[l]aying of reinforcement wire mesh,” but did not mention installation of a perimeter drain, a sump pit and pump, or expansion joints. (See id.) The March 2019 contract listed a total price of $50,000, to include “building materials and labor, but excluding finishing materials” to the extent specified. (See id.) The contract stated there 4 The parties stipulated to various facts in their joint pretrial statement. (ECF No. 67 § IV (“Jt. Stip.”).) Where applicable, the Court cites to those joint stipulations of fact. 5  Case 1:23-cv-00108-MJS Document 75 Filed 09/14/26 Page 6 of 29 would be “no additional cost … except if homeowner does modifications.” (See id.) Lemus prepared the contract after discussion with Montano. (Aug. 25 Tr. at 35–36 (Lemus).) On a separate track, Lemus obtained the required building permits and submitted proposed construction plans without Montano’s involvement, working instead with a different company. (Aug. 25 Tr. at 26 (Lemus).) Once approved, Lemus personally picked up the permits and the approved construction plans from the city and placed a copy of the plans at the worksite. (Id. at 26, 30 (Lemus); Pl.’s Ex. 209.) Lemus had previously emailed Montano a preliminary copy of the drawings before they were formally approved. (Aug. 25 Tr. at 100 (Lemus).) The approved plans included a cover page, a comparison of the existing and proposed layouts, a slab schematic, an interior wall schematic, a plumbing schematic, and an electrical schematic. (Jt. Ex. 38.) The top right corner of the cover page included a conspicuous notation that read, “NO LOWERING BASEMENT SLAB.” (Id.) On the slab schematic, the drawing referenced a sump pump and a perimeter drain, and it included a graphic reflecting a “typical slab on grade detail” with four inches of gravel. (Id.) The interior wall schematic included a drawing labeled “bathroom wall detail” that referenced “Durock cement board” or “Hardibacker.” (Id.) Montano began the construction shortly after Lemus obtained the permits and approved drawings. Lemus visited the site several times while the work was underway, at least during the early phases, including to walk the project with Mr. Montano after the old concrete floor was excavated and before the new concrete slab was poured. (Aug. 25 Tr. at 46, 49 (Lemus) & Aug. 26 Tr. at 27-28 (Montano).) Lemus took photographs of the renovation throughout the project. (Aug. 25 Tr. at 51 (Lemus); see also, e.g., Jt. Exs. 17, 59, 62, 63, 66, 75; Pl.’s Ex. 209.) Lemus and Montano agreed to a few expansions of the original scope of work after the construction began. Montano agreed, for example, to replace all the basement drains for an 6  Case 1:23-cv-00108-MJS Document 75 Filed 09/14/26 Page 7 of 29 additional $1,500. (See Jt. Ex. 2; Aug. 25 Tr. at 36–37 (Lemus).) Montano later agreed to take on other tasks, too, including additional plumbing, HVAC-related updates, insulation, and more, all for an added cost. (Jt. Ex. 85 at 37; Aug. 25 Tr. at 43 (Lemus).) Based on the evidence, the Court finds that the parties would typically memorialize these scope expansions in writing. Montano completed the project in or around December 2019 or January 2020 (Aug. 25 Tr. at 55 (Lemus)), although Lemus separately hired other specialists to complete some aspects of the finishing work—for instance, another contractor colored and polished the concrete floors, and a separate contractor installed the glass shower wall in the bathroom. (Aug. 27, 2026 Trial Transcript (“Aug. 27 Tr.”) at 33–35 (Lemus); Aug. 26 Tr. at 45–48, 61–62 (Montano).) The completed renovation work passed all required inspections—building, electrical, and plumbing. (Aug. 25 Tr. at 106 (Lemus); Aug. 26 Tr. at 37 (Montano); Defs.’ Ex. 9.) Lemus paid Montano a total of approximately $57,000 for work on the project. (Aug. 25 Tr. at 122 (Lemus).) II. Lemus Discovers Water Damage in the Bathroom Lemus used the basement bathroom sparingly for the first few years. He only began using it more consistently in early 2022, upon returning from a stretch working abroad. (Aug. 25 Tr. at 58 (Lemus).) In or around March 2022—more than two years after Montano completed the project, and after only a couple months of Lemus using the shower more regularly—Lemus observed water pooling on the floor outside the shower and discovered an area of water damage on the wall adjacent to the shower. (Id. at 58–60 (Lemus); Pl.’s Ex. 8, 15.) There was no evidence presented at trial concerning the presence of water damage before that timeframe. According to Lemus, when he contacted Montano about the damage, Montano said he would only come back to inspect the problems if Lemus paid him for the additional time. (Aug. 25 Tr. at 61–64 (Lemus).) For whatever reason, Montano did not come out to assess the damage 7  Case 1:23-cv-00108-MJS Document 75 Filed 09/14/26 Page 8 of 29 or work with Lemus on any sort of fix. 5 In light of that, and believing he needed to address any problem before it got worse, Lemus hired Roto-Rooter to investigate. (Id. at 64–66; Jt. Ex. 11.) According to the Roto-Rooter invoice, the specialist who inspected the shower and surrounding area in April 2022 opined that the damage was caused by “leaks … from shower tiles.” (Jt. Ex. 11; Aug. 25 Tr. at 114 (Lemus).) From there, Lemus hired another contracting company, Greenwood Construction (“Greenwood”), to repair the damage; Greenwood ended up demolishing and rebuilding the shower area. (Aug. 25 Tr. at 67 (Lemus).) According to Lemus, Greenwood tried to determine if there was an easier fix but told Lemus that “it was obvious that water was going through the tiles and in different directions.” (Id.) The demolition of the shower uncovered noticeable water damage behind the tile and walls. (Pl.’s Exs. 2–5, 7, 35.) There was no evidence presented of any other water damage discovered anywhere else in the basement around that time. Greenwood demolished and then rebuilt the shower in mid-2022 at a total cost to Lemus of approximately $22,000. (Tr. at 81-89; Jt. Exs. 7, 9–13.) There was no evidence presented at trial to show that after Greenwood completed the remediation and rebuild in 2022, any similar or additional water damage occurred in or around the shower area of the bathroom. III. The Challenged Deviations from the Construction Plans As previewed, Lemus’s claims focus on several specific aspects of Montano’s renovation work that Lemus claims improperly deviated from the approved construction plans. Given the centrality of these issues, the Court walks through the relevant evidence as to each. A. The Four-Inch Gravel Base First, Lemus focuses on Montano’s non-installation of a four-inch gravel base beneath the new concrete slab in the basement. The contract did expressly include this deliverable in the agreed 5 Montano did not offer any testimony or evidence on this issue, contrary or otherwise. 8  Case 1:23-cv-00108-MJS Document 75 Filed 09/14/26 Page 9 of 29 scope of work: “[l]aying of gravel base.” (Jt. Ex. 1.) Beyond that general reference, though, the contract did not specify the depth of the gravel base, whether at four inches or otherwise. Lemus points to a section of the construction plans depicting a “typical slab on grade detail” that includes a reference to “4" gravel.” (See Jt. Ex. 38 (emphasis added).) As Lemus reads that section, despite being labeled as depicting a “typical slab,” it means the plans required 4 inches of gravel. The Court does not read the plans so rigidly, particularly since no other evidence established that this was a hard-and-fast requirement, whether by code or otherwise. Once the project was underway and the old concrete slab was demolished, Montano determined he could not place four inches of gravel because that would mean the finished construction would not satisfy the minimum height requirement between the footings and the basement ceiling. Instead, Montano used two inches of gravel sublayer, not four inches, so that the construction would satisfy the height requirement. (Aug. 26 Tr. at 29, 32–34, 42–43 (Montano); Jt. Stip. ¶ 6.)6 Montano testified that he discussed this issue with Lemus, and the Court credits that testimony, especially since other evidence supports it. In late April 2019, before the new concrete was poured, Lemus emailed Montano, in relevant part: “As we discussed earlier today, you do not see a need for a sublayer of gravel before laying the concrete slab.” (Jt. Ex. 24.) The Court acknowledges some incongruence across this evidence—Montano’s testimony that he installed two inches of gravel, versus Lemus’s email appearing to state that Montano would not install any gravel sublayer—but the key takeaway holds either way: Montano discussed the non-installation 6 Montano also installed the plastic moisture barrier and wire mesh beneath the slab, both of which were specified in the contract’s scope of work. (Jt. Ex. 1 ¶¶ 8–9; see also Jt. Exs. 59, 62, 66, 75.) 9  Case 1:23-cv-00108-MJS Document 75 Filed 09/14/26 Page 10 of 29 of a four-inch gravel sublayer with Lemus, and Lemus understood from that discussion that Montano would not be installing four inches of gravel beneath the new slab. 7 B. The Perimeter Drain and Sump Pit and Pump Next, Lemus takes issue with Montano’s non-installation of a perimeter drain and a sump pit and pump in the basement slab. Unlike the gravel sublayer, the contract did not expressly include these deliverables in the agreed scope of work. (See Jt. Ex. 1; Aug. 25 Tr. at 119, 125 (Lemus).) The contract notwithstanding, Lemus relies on two references in the slab schematic of the plan drawings. One reads “perimeter drain, typ” and points to a dotted line that appears to depict a drain around the slab perimeter, and the other reads “sump pump” and points to a circle in the upper right corner. (Jt. Ex. 38.) Once again, Lemus construes both references as a plan- imposed requirement for a perimeter drain and sump pump. But once again, the Court is not convinced. For starters, the perimeter drain reference is accompanied by the qualifier “typ”—i.e., typical—which strongly indicates that it depicts the features of a typical build rather than an absolute requirement for this specific project. And although the sump pump reference does not include that same qualifier, the Court believes other aspects of the drawings undermine a finding that the sump pump depicted on the schematic was a requirement, including the fact that the sump 7 The Court found Lemus’s testimony about the gravel, in particular, to be a bit cagey. After Lemus testified about the above email—which was meant to memorialize a discussion with Montano about not installing a full gravel sublayer—Lemus’s counsel asked him, “[D]id [Montano] ever tell you that the required gravel base had not been installed to the specific depth”; Lemus answered with a categorical, “No.” (Aug. 25 Tr. at 76 (Lemus).) That answer did not make sense given Lemus’s email and related testimony, so the Court followed up. Apparently, in answering counsel’s question with an unqualified “No,” Lemus was splitting hairs over the question’s use of the word “required”—i.e., Lemus explained that, although Montano explained he was not installing gravel to a certain depth, Montano did not tell him that the plans supposedly required the gravel. (Id. at 76–77 (Lemus).) But notably, Lemus’s original answer to counsel did not make any effort to provide that context. While not outright misleading, this anecdote struck the Court as an example of Lemus trying to shade his testimony in a light more favorable to him. 10  Case 1:23-cv-00108-MJS Document 75 Filed 09/14/26 Page 11 of 29 pump appears to be situated in a location that would impede both the hallway access into the relocated laundry area and the new sink in the laundry area. (See Jt. Ex. 38.) The parties stipulated that Montano did not install a perimeter drain, sump pit, or sump pump. (Jt. Stip. ¶ 5; Aug. 26 Tr. at 73 (Montano).) Montano testified that after he excavated the old concrete slab and observed the footings, he told Lemus that he could not dig down further to install drain tubes or a sump pump because he would need to go under the footing and lower the slab more, which the plans did not authorize. (Aug. 26 Tr. at 29–30, 40–41, 81–84 (Montano). 8 More, Montano testified that Lemus understood and agreed with that limitation. (Id. at 89.) The Court credits that testimony, notwithstanding Lemus’s contrary account. And even though there is no accompanying email explicitly memorializing these points, it strikes the Court as likely that these topics would have been addressed as part of the broader discussion when Lemus walked the jobsite with Montano before the new concrete was poured and the two spoke about the overall inability to excavate further, as would have been required for Montano to complete these items. C. The Concrete Expansion Joints In addition, Lemus complains about the non-installation of expansion joints in the concrete slab. Here again, the contract did not include this deliverable in the agreed scope of work. (See Jt. Ex. 1; Aug. 25 Tr. at 119, 125 (Lemus).) But Lemus points to a section of the construction plans that reference a “typical control joint @ slab on grade” (Jt. Ex. 38), arguing that this language meant control joints were required for this project. But for the same reasons explained, the Court does not read the plans so definitively, especially given the use of the “typical” qualifier. Otherwise, there was very little evidence presented during trial on the issue of expansion joints— the subject essentially just fell by the wayside over the course of the proceedings. 8 Recall the prominent disclaimer on the plans: “NO LOWERING CONCRETE SLAB.” (Jt. Ex. 38.) 11  Case 1:23-cv-00108-MJS Document 75 Filed 09/14/26 Page 12 of 29 D. Gypsum Board Substrate vs. Concrete Backerboard Finally, Lemus faults Montano’s use of green gypsum board instead of “Durock” cement board as a tile substrate in the bathroom shower. The contract did not specify a particular material to be used for that purpose. (Jt. Ex. 1; Aug. 25 Tr. at 125 (Lemus).) The plans, though, did include several wall schematics, including a “bathroom wall detail” that identifies “1/2" Durock/cement board or 1/4" Hardibacker.” (Jt. Ex. 38.) Based on the evidence, cement board is somewhat more resilient to moisture than gypsum board. (Aug. 25 Tr. at 152 (de Guzman).) The parties stipulated that Montano “used green gypsum board in at least part of the shower enclosure rather than Durock cement board.” (Jt. Stip. ¶ 7.) Montano did use cement board for at least the bench seat in the shower, but elsewhere in the shower enclosure, he used the green gypsum board as the substrate material. (Aug. 26. Tr. at 53-56 (Montano).) Montano did not tell Lemus that he used gypsum board instead of cement board in some areas. (Aug. 25 Tr. at 75 (Lemus); Aug. 26 Tr. at 92 (Montano).) Both experts agreed that in today’s world—for construction being completed in 2026—the best practice would be to use cement board for an enclosed shower area. (Aug. 25 Tr. at 212–13 (de Guzman); Aug. 26 Tr. at 133–35 (Bramel).) But based on the evidence, the Court finds that it was not improper or even necessarily unusual to use green gypsum board for that purpose, at least during the time of this job. (Aug. 26 Tr. at 56–57 (Montano).) Both materials were code-compliant when this work was done in 2019. (Aug. 26 Tr. at 56 (Montano); Aug. 26 Tr. at 133–35 (Bramel); Aug. 25 Tr. at 212–13 (de Guzman).) 9 9 De Guzman originally said gypsum board would not be a code-compliant material for this use. But on cross, he could not identify the code section that would have required cement board, and he ultimately conceded to being unsure either way. (See Aug. 25 Tr. at 213 (de Guzman) (Q: “Can you identify the governing code, sitting here today, that requires Durock versus the green board?” A: “No, I cannot really attest to that right now.” Q: “Is there one?” A: “I believe so.” Q: “But you’re not sure?” A: “No.”).) Relatedly, de Guzman pointed to a specification sheet for green gypsum board that suggests that it was “not suitable for use as a substrate for tile in wet areas such as tubs and showers,” but there was no evidence establishing the date of that document, let alone that it was guidance applicable during this build in 2019. 12  Case 1:23-cv-00108-MJS Document 75 Filed 09/14/26 Page 13 of 29 IV. Damages During trial, Lemus introduced evidence concerning two general categories of damages. The first category focused on additional financial costs that Lemus incurred to fix and reconstruct the bathroom shower area after discovering the water damage. He paid $263.94 to Roto-Rooter to complete the initial assessment and investigation. (Aug. 25 Tr. at 65–66 (Lemus); Jt. Ex. 11.) He paid $15,000 in labor costs to Greenwood to complete the remediation and reconstruction work. (Aug. 25 Tr. at 81–84 (Lemus); Jt. Ex. 9.) He paid $3,122.13 for new shower glass. (Aug. 25 Tr. at 84-85; Jt. Ex. 7.) And he paid $4,399.39 for new shower tiles across three transactions from two different stores. (Aug. 25 Tr. at 85–89; Jt. Ex. 10 ($1,347.68); Jt. Ex. 12 ($824.95); Jt. Ex. 13 ($2,226.76).) Taken together, this evidence established that Lemus spent a total of $22,785.46 on the shower-related repair work in the basement bathroom. The second category of damages focused on additional remediation measures for the overall drainage set-up in the basement. Specifically, Lemus’s expert witness, de Guzman, recommended several modifications to the basement with rough cost estimates associated with each: (1) the installation of a perimeter drain and sump pit and pump (roughly $20,000); (2) the installation of trench drains (roughly $3,000); (3) the installation of a dehumidifier within the HVAC system (roughly $800); (4) the creation of expansion joints in the concrete slab (roughly $1,500); and (5) the treatment of any new mold as soon as it is discovered (roughly $20 to spray for mold and mildew removal). (Aug. 25 Tr. at 165–73 (de Guzman).) On cross examination, however, de Guzman admitted that those cost figures were just “guesstimates.” (Id. at 176–77 (de Guzman).) He acknowledged, for instance, that his $20,000 estimate to install a perimeter drain and sump pit and pump could be as low as $10,000, or anywhere in between. (Id.) And even on redirect from Lemus’s own counsel, de Guzman confirmed the same point: “to really close the gap 13  Case 1:23-cv-00108-MJS Document 75 Filed 09/14/26 Page 14 of 29 between the guesstimate and the actual costs of the construction remedies, I have to do quantifiable items, like how many gravel, how many concrete, how many linear feet of pipe, and all those kind of things”—things that he did not do. (Aug. 26 Tr. at 11–12 (de Guzman).) V. Causation To attempt to establish a causal link between the challenged deviations from the plans and his claimed damages, Lemus put forward his expert witness, de Guzman. De Guzman, in turn, proffered a theory attributing the bathroom water damage to groundwater infiltration due to the non-installation in the basement of a four-inch gravel sublayer, perimeter drain, and sump pit and pump. (See generally Aug. 25 Tr. at 158–60 (de Guzman); Aug. 26 Tr. at 5–11 (de Guzman).) De Guzman testified about how those components, if installed, would have worked together to mitigate any groundwater: groundwater would first be collected in the gravel sublayer, at which point it would travel outward to the perimeter drains, and then flow through the perimeter drains to the sump pit where it would be removed by the pump. But without those components, de Guzman opined, groundwater will infiltrate the basement walls: Now, what will happen, eventually, if there is no gravel, this water will not break until it hits the bottom of the concrete slab. And as I understand, in the materials theory that the concrete slab is absorbing. It’s very porous on some occasion, because water tends to be absorbed by the porosity of the concrete. What it does is that that will continue until it reaches the top of the concrete slab. Now, when the concrete slab top eventually gets saturated because of the capillary action of water, the base plate that runs through the wall is getting absorbed, the water is absorbing that base plate. And eventually, travels up, because the wood is very porous, and it travels up, up to the point where it reaches a level where the water doesn’t have any more hydrostatic pressure. It saturates this area, and eventually becomes moist, which drives the mold to come in. And eventually, it rots the wood in due time. So in the absence of the perimeter drain, in the absence of the gravel, this thing could happen. And eventually, if you miss any of this component, that will cause some damage. 14  Case 1:23-cv-00108-MJS Document 75 Filed 09/14/26 Page 15 of 29 (Aug. 26 Tr. at 7–8 (de Guzman).) On follow-up from the Court, de Guzman stated that in the scenario he was describing—if groundwater was the source of the damage due to the absence of the various drainage components—he would expect to see water damage throughout the basement, in many different areas, rather than isolated to one specific place. (Id. at 9–11 (de Guzman).) 10 Montano presented Bramel as a rebuttal expert on the issue of causation. Bramel opined that the most likely source of the damage discovered in the bathroom was water condensation coming off the outside of the glass shower wall, running down to the shower seat and into the wall. (Aug. 26 Tr. at 136–37, 139–41, 148 (Bramel).) Bramel opined there was no evidence to support de Guzman’s theory that groundwater caused that damage. (Id. at 141, 148 (Bramel).) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. The Breach-of-Contract Claim To prevail on a breach-of-contract claim under D.C. law, “a party must establish (1) a valid contract between the parties; (2) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract; (3) a breach of that duty; and (4) damages caused by breach.” Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C. 2009). Applying these elements here, Lemus fails to carry the day for two reasons: he failed to prove that any of the challenged plan deviations breached any duty under the parties’ contract, and he failed to prove that the damages established by the evidence at trial were caused by any of the construction deviations at issue. The Court takes each point in turn. 10 De Guzman did not opine at trial that the use of green gypsum board instead of cement board in parts of the shower was the cause of the water damage Lemus discovered in or around March 2022. Instead, the thrust of de Guzman’s testimony on that subject was essentially twofold: (1) de Guzman believed the plans required concrete backerboard throughout the shower area, such that Montano’s use of green gypsum board as a substitute was inconsistent with the plan requirements (Aug. 25 Tr. at 156–57 (de Guzman); and (2) he agreed with Lemus’s counsel that “cement board is more resilient to moisture” than gypsum board (id. at 152 (de Guzman)). Those points, of course, are a far cry from opining that Montano’s use of the green gypsum board—whether consistent or inconsistent with the plan documents—caused the water damage. 15  Case 1:23-cv-00108-MJS Document 75 Filed 09/14/26 Page 16 of 29 A. Element of Breach. It is axiomatic that “[w]ithout a contractual duty, there can be no breach of contract.” Ihebereme v. Cap. One, N.A., 730 F. Supp. 2d 40, 48 (D.D.C. 2010); see also Hawthorne v. Rushmore Loan Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 2021 WL 3856626, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2021). So, the Court begins with the question of whether Montano agreed to any contractual duty to complete the renovation work that Lemus argues improperly deviated from the approved plans. “The District of Columbia follows the objective law of contracts, which generally means that the written language embodying the terms of an agreement will govern the rights and liabilities of the parties, regardless of the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the contract, unless the written language is not susceptible of a clear and definite undertaking, or unless there is fraud, duress, or mutual mistake.” Armenian Assembly of Am., Inc. v. Cafesjian, 758 F.3d 265, 278 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). One gloss on that principle, though, focuses on the question of contract integration. Under D.C. law, a “completely integrated” agreement is one “adopted by the parties as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.” Howard Univ. v. Good Food Servs., Inc., 608 A.2d 116, 126 (D.C. 1992). If a contract is completely integrated, then “no additional terms [can] be considered in interpreting the contract,” whether consistent terms or inconsistent terms. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 210 cmt. a (A.L.I. 1981)). By contrast, a “partially integrated” agreement—one that is not meant “to be exclusive on all matters of [a] contractual relationship”—can be interpreted using “consistent additional terms” drawn from outside the contract itself. Id. Here, the Court ruled before trial that the March 2019 contract (Jt. Ex. 1) was not completely integrated, meaning the parties could introduce evidence of consistent additional terms in arguing for a particular interpretation. (See Min. Order, July 6, 2026.) Lemus followed that 16  Case 1:23-cv-00108-MJS Document 75 Filed 09/14/26 Page 17 of 29 approach. His trial theory rested heavily on the premise that the parties intended the March 2019 contract to be read alongside the approved construction plans to define the full terms of their agreement. Based on the evidence, the Court agrees with that proposition, but only to a point. The March 2019 contract defined the project’s scope of work. It enumerated the specific construction tasks that Montano agreed to take on and the specific budget that Lemus agreed to pay Montano for those tasks. Understanding the March 2019 contract in this way, the Court concludes that the parties intended the plan drawings to further elucidate, where applicable, how and where Montano would complete the enumerated tasks in their contract. For instance, where the contract specified that Montano would “[c]reate a new bathroom shower,” the plan drawings supplemented that provision by delineating where the shower should be built, its rough dimensions, and so on. As another example, where the contract specified that Montano would “[c]reate a new utility sink/pet wash area,” the plan drawings likewise supplemented that provision by indicating where that feature should be installed, its rough dimensions, and so on. Reading the contract and the plans together in this way shows how the consistent additional terms in the construction plans add to the proper interpretation of the parties’ broader agreement. But that does not mean the parties intended to subsume every facet of the plans into the contract, especially to the extent certain workstreams or tasks were not among the enumerated activities stated on a line-by-line basis in the contract. If anything, using the plans in that manner would be tantamount to reading inconsistent terms into the contract, especially given the contract’s acknowledgement that there would be “additional costs” for “modifications” to the scope of work (see Jt. Ex. 1)—a contractual understanding that was borne out by the parties’ ensuing course of dealings in negotiating extra payments for added work not originally listed in the March 2019 17  Case 1:23-cv-00108-MJS Document 75 Filed 09/14/26 Page 18 of 29 contract, e.g., the replacement of basement drains, additional HVAC work, and more. (See Jt. Ex. 2; Jt. Ex