Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Anderson

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Anderson BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A., TRUSTEE v. AMY L. ANDERSON ET AL. (AC 48581) Alvord, Elgo and Seeley, Js.* Syllabus The named defendant, A, appealed from the trial court’s judgment denying a motion to open a judgment of foreclosure by sale that had been rendered with respect to certain real property. A claimed that the court, inter alia, abused its discretion in denying the defendant J’s motion to open. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion or act unreasonably in denying J’s motion to open, as the court held a hearing on the motion and J failed to proffer any evidence in support of his assertion that he was expecting income that would enable him to fully discharge the debt to the plaintiff. Submitted on briefs June 3—officially released September 29, 2026 Procedural History Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real prop- erty of the named defendant et al., and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Baio, J., rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale; thereafter, the court, Cobb, J., denied the motion to open filed by the defendant Joseph A. Anderson, from which the named defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed. Amy L. Anderson, self-represented, filed a brief as the appellant (named defendant). Benjamin T. Staskiewicz filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff). Opinion ELGO, J. The self-represented defendant, Amy L. Anderson, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying the February 28, 2025 motion to open a judgment of foreclosure by sale filed by her brother, the defendant * The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.  Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Anderson Joseph A. Anderson.1 On appeal, Amy claims that the court abused its discretion in denying that motion. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court. The relevant facts are not in dispute. In 2005, Curtis S. Anderson and Patricia Whitaker Anderson executed a promissory note (note) in favor of Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corporation, a subsidiary of IndyMac Bank, F.S.B., in the principal amount of $210,000. The note was secured by a mortgage deed on real property known as 116 Wilson Street in Hartford (property), which was filed on the Hartford land records in Decem- ber 2005. The note and mortgage deed subsequently were assigned to the plaintiff, Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A., as Trustee for Mortgage Assets Management Series I Trust. Curtis S. Anderson died in 2016 and Patricia Whita- ker Anderson died in 2018. In May 2019, the plaintiff commenced a foreclosure action against the defendants as heirs to the estate of Patricia Whitaker Anderson. In its operative complaint, the plaintiff alleged in relevant part that the note was in default due to the death of the 1 The plaintiff, Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A., as Trustee for Mortgage Assets Management Series I Trust, also named Patricia Whitaker Anderson and Curtis S. Anderson as defendants in its operative complaint, the August 9, 2023 amended complaint. It nevertheless is well established that “[a] dead person is a nonexistent entity and cannot be a party to a suit . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Freese v. Dept. of Social Services, 176 Conn. App. 64, 84, 169 A.3d 237 (2017). Because it is undisputed that Patricia Whitaker Anderson and Curtis S. Anderson died prior to the commencement of this foreclosure action, as the plaintiff specifically alleged in its complaint, they are not proper parties thereto. In addition to Amy L. Anderson and Joseph A. Anderson, the following were also named as defendants: Jeffrey D. Anderson; the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; the State of Connecticut, Department of Revenue Services; and the State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch. The latter three defendants did not appear before the trial court and have not appeared or participated in this appeal. For purposes of clar- ity, we refer to Amy L. Anderson, Joseph A. Anderson, and Jeffrey D. Anderson collectively as the defendants and individually by first name in this opinion.  Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Anderson borrowers and that the defendants had failed to cure that default. Accordingly, the plaintiff elected to accelerate the balance due, to declare the note to be due in full, and to foreclose the mortgage. On June 3, 2019, Amy filed an appearance as a self- represented party; Jeffrey filed a similar appearance on October 20, 2021. On November 12, 2021, Jeffrey filed a petition for permission to request mediation, which the court granted. The case thereafter was assigned to the foreclosure mediation program on November 19, 2021. On May 1, 2023, the foreclosure mediator issued a final report terminating that program and referring the mat- ter “[b]ack to the foreclosure docket . . . .” On October 22, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion for default against Joseph due to his failure to file an appear- ance at any time following the commencement of this action in 2019, which the court granted. On November 15, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure. By order dated December 9, 2024, the court found the debt to be $210,217.79 and the fair market value of the property to be $255,000. The court thus rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale and set a sale date of March 8, 2025.2 On February 28, 2025, Joseph filed an appearance as a self-represented party. That same day, Joseph filed a motion to open the judgment of foreclosure by sale. In that motion, Joseph averred in relevant part: “I . . . am requesting a ninety day postponement of the scheduled . . . sale of the property . . . since (i) I have only recently returned . . . to Connecticut from a thirty-one year res- idence overseas, and have not engaged directly with the [plaintiff], and (ii) my financial circumstances have advanced to the point where I will be able to fully retire the debt owed to the [plaintiff], with business-related 2 A judgment of foreclosure by sale was required because the United States, and its Secretary of Housing and Urban Development specifi- cally, was a party to this foreclosure action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (c) (2024); Stratford v. 500 North Avenue, LLC, 210 Conn. App. 718, 721, 271 A.3d 137 (2022).  Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Anderson income I expect to receive within the next ninety days. [I am] one of three defendants in this matter, all chil- dren of the now deceased owners of the property . . . . My financial circumstances have . . . advanced in a way that will allow me to fully pay off the debt owed to the [plaintiff] in the short term. As the founder of an Asia- Pacific bio-energy business, I will receive income within the next ninety days that will allow me to fully retire the outstanding debt to the [plaintiff], and to reimburse expenses incurred. I therefore request postponement of the scheduled March 8, 2025 foreclosure sale for a ninety day period, within which I will engage directly with the [plaintiff] to fully retire the outstanding debt and provide reimbursement for all expenses.” Joseph did not append any documentary evidence to that motion to support the assertions contained therein. The court held a hearing on Joseph’s motion to open on March 17, 2025.3 At that hearing, Joseph reiterated that he was “expecting income within the next ninety days . . . which would enable [him] to fully pay off the debt” to the plaintiff. Apart from that bald assertion, Joseph did not offer any documentary or testimonial evidence regarding his ability to pay that debt.4 At the hearing, the court asked Joseph if he was aware that this foreclosure action was commenced in 2019 and had been pending for approximately six years; Joseph answered affirmatively. The court then asked him if he 3 Amy and Jeffrey did not appear or participate at that hearing. 4 As this court recently noted, “the court’s judgment ordering a foreclo- sure by sale does not extinguish the heirs’ claimed right of redemption, and thus the heirs still may exercise their claimed right to redeem as the sole living heirs of the decedent despite the denial of their motion to open that judgment.” Reverse Mortgage Solutions, Inc. v. Widow(er), Heir(s) and/or Creditors of the Estate of Beryl E. Rowland, 231 Conn. App. 761, 778 n.10, 334 A.3d 1054 (2025); see also Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 227 Conn. App. 806, 819–20, 324 A.3d 167 (2024) (explaining that foreclosure sale does not become complete until “con- firmed and ratified by the court” and that “[t]he court’s approval of a sale extinguishes the rights of redemption of other parties” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 351 Conn. 905, 330 A.3d 133 (2025). The record in the present case indicates that the trial court has  Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Anderson had notice of this action and Joseph confirmed that he had “been aware of the litigation . . . .” The court also asked Joseph if he had been aware “that the property was being foreclosed,” to which Joseph responded, “Yes. Yes, Your Honor.” At the conclusion of that hearing, the court denied Joseph’s motion to open. In doing so, the court empha- sized that Joseph had “been aware of this [foreclosure action] for many years” and stated that “[b]eing [out of] the country is not an excuse for not participating, either by yourself or having a lawyer look out for your inter- ests here in this country.” The court further noted that the foreclosure sale had “already occurred.” The court memorialized its ruling on Joseph’s motion to open in an order issued on March 17, 2025.5 From that judgment, Amy now appeals. At the outset, we note certain legal precepts that gov- ern our review. “[D]ue consideration of the finality of judgments is important and . . . judgments should only be . . . opened for a strong and compelling reason.” Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, 180 Conn. App. 818, 828, 184 A.3d 1254 (2018). “The standard of review of [a denial of a motion to open] a judgment of foreclosure by sale . . . is whether the trial court abused its discretion. . . . A foreclosure action is an equitable proceeding. . . . The determination of what equity requires is a matter for the discretion of the trial court. . . . In determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, we must make every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action. . . . Our review of a trial court’s exercise of the legal discretion vested in it is limited to the questions yet to approve the March 8, 2025 sale of the property. Accordingly, the defendants retain their right of redemption. In the brief that it filed with this court on December 29, 2025, the plaintiff averred that, although Joseph represented in his February 28, 2025 motion to open that he would have sufficient funds to fully pay off the debt to the plaintiff within ninety days, “we are now ten months past the filing of the motion to open and the loan remains in default and not paid off.” In her appellate reply brief, Amy does not dispute that averment. 5 That order stated simply: “DENIED per oral record.”  Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Anderson of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have reached the conclusion that it did.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reverse Mortgage Solutions, Inc. v. Widow(er), Heir(s) and/or Creditors of the Estate of Beryl E. Rowland, 231 Conn. App. 761, 772–73, 334 A.3d 1054 (2025). On appeal, Amy claims that the court, in acting on Joseph’s motion to open the judgment of foreclosure by sale, failed to properly apply General Statutes § 49-15. She overlooks the fact that § 49-15, by its plain lan- guage, applies “only to judgments of strict foreclosure”; Norwich v. GHT Trust, 232 Conn. App. 781, 789, 339 A.3d 632 (2025); and does not apply to judgments of foreclosure by sale. See First Connecticut Capital, LLC v. Homes of Westport, LLC, 112 Conn. App. 750, 752 n.3, 966 A.2d 239 (2009) (§ 49-15 “pertains only to motions to open a judgment of strict foreclosure”); D. Caron & G. Milne, Connecticut Foreclosures (4th Ed. 2004) § 9.01B, p. 203 (“§ 49-15, by its very terms, is applicable only to judgments of strict foreclosure, and thus can have no effect on a judgment of foreclosure by sale”). Amy also argues that the court abused its discretion by failing to “solicit testimony, affidavits, or documen- tary proof” from Joseph before ruling on his motion to open the judgment of foreclosure by sale.6 We do not 6 Amy further argues that the court abused its discretion by failing to articulate specific factual findings in ruling on Joseph’s motion to open. She nevertheless has not requested an articulation from the trial court at any time. See Practice Book §§ 60-5 and 61-10 (a). Moreover, she has provided this court with no authority to support her contention that the trial court, in ruling on a motion to open a judgment of foreclosure by sale, is obligated in every instance to articulate specific factual findings in the absence of such a request by any party. We therefore decline to further consider that inadequately briefed claim. See C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 630, 273 A.3d 271 (2022) (“We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim . . . receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discus- sion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court to judiciously and efficiently . . . consider claims of  Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Anderson agree. The burden rested solely on Joseph, as the party moving to open the judgment of foreclosure by sale, to proffer evidence in support of his bald assertion that he was “expecting income within the next ninety days [that] would enable [him] to fully pay off the debt” to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Simmons v. Weiss, 176 Conn. App. 94, 100, 168 A.3d 617 (2017) (burden of proof in motion to open is on moving party); State v. Leandry, 161 Conn. App. 379, 403 n.10, 127 A.3d 1115 (rejecting claim “that the trial court has a sua sponte responsibil- ity to solicit an offer of proof” from party), cert. denied, 320 Conn. 912, 128 A.3d 955 (2015). The record reflects that Joseph did not do so. In addition, Amy claims that the court violated Joseph’s right to due process, as memorialized in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972).7 In Haines, the trial court granted a motion to dismiss a complaint filed by a self-represented petitioner against prison officials and state officers on the ground of failure to state a claim. Id., 520. The trial court in that case did not hold a hearing on the motion to dismiss or afford the petitioner an opportunity to offer proof in support of his allegations. Id. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court first noted that “[t]he only issue now before us is [the] petitioner’s contention that the [trial court] erred in dismissing his pro se complaint without allowing him to present evidence on his claims.” Id. The court then explained that “allegations such as those asserted by [the] petitioner, however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer supporting evidence. We cannot say with assur- ance that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears beyond doubt error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). 7 “Whether a party was deprived of his due process rights is a question of law to which appellate courts grant plenary review.” McFarline v. Mickens, 177 Conn. App. 83, 100, 173 A.3d 417 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 997, 176 A.3d 557 (2018).  Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Anderson that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. . . . Accord- ingly, although we intimate no view whatever on the merits of petitioner’s allegations, we conclude that he is entitled to an opportunity to offer proof.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 520‒21. Unlike Haines, the trial court in the present case held a hearing on Joseph’s motion and afforded him an oppor- tunity to present evidence in support of his claims. For that reason, Amy’s due process claim is without merit. Amy also contends that the court abused its discretion by denying Joseph’s motion to open the judgment of foreclosure as untimely. We recognize that, at the conclu- sion of the March 17, 2025 hearing, the court observed that “the sale [of the property] has already occurred.” As the court expressly stated, that was just one “factor” that it considered in ruling on Joseph’s motion to open. Significantly, Joseph confirmed in his testimony at that hearing that he had been aware (1) that the property was being foreclosed, (2) that the plaintiff commenced the foreclosure action in 2019, and (3) that the foreclosure action had been pending for approximately six years. Joseph also testified that he had “been aware of the liti- gation” in this foreclosure action despite living abroad. In denying his motion to open, the court emphasized that “[Joseph] and his family have been aware of this [foreclosure action] for many years” and that “[b]eing [out of] the country is not an excuse for not participat- ing, either by yourself or having a lawyer look out for your interests here in this country.” It is well established that “the determination of whether to grant a motion to open a judgment rests in the trial court’s sound discretion.” Citibank, N.A. v. Lindland, 310 Conn. 147, 166, 75 A.3d 651 (2013). This court does “not undertake a plenary review of the merits of a decision of the trial court to grant or to deny a motion to open a judgment. . . . In an appeal from a denial of a motion to open a judgment, our review is limited to the issue of whether the trial court has acted unreasonably  Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Anderson and in clear abuse of its discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McGovern v. McGovern, 217 Conn. App. 636, 646, 289 A.3d 1255, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 1018, 295 A.3d 111 (2023). On our review of the record in the present case, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion or act unreasonably in denying Joseph’s motion to open. The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred.