Betts v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AMANDA BETTS, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 21-1861 (CKK-MAU) WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION (September 14, 2026) Amanda Betts (“Betts”) brings this employment discrimination action against her former employer, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”). At this stage in the proceedings, Betts has three remaining claims left: a sex discrimination claim, a race discrimination claim, and a retaliation claim. WMATA moves for summary judgment on Betts’s remaining claims. Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions,1 the relevant legal authority, and the entire record, the Court shall GRANT WMATA’s [23] Motion for Summary Judgment. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background Betts is a Black, biological female who became an employee in WMATA’s Metro Transit Police Department (“MTPD”) in November 2005. Pl.’s Stmt., Dkt. No. 24-1 ¶ 1. While employed with MTPD, Betts filed three Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charges 1 The Court’s consideration has focused on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 23 (“Def.’s Mot.”), and the attachments thereto; Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 24 (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), and the attachments thereto; Defendant’s Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 26 (“Def.’s Reply”); the Report and Recommendation, Dkt. No. 28 (“Rep.”); Defendant’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation, Dkt. No. 29 (“Def.’s Obj.”); Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Objections, Dkt. No. 30 (“Pl.’s Resp.”); and Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Response, Dkt. No. 31 (“Def.’s Reply, Dkt. No. 31”). 1 over a two-year period. These charges form the basis for Betts’s remaining Title VII claims for sex discrimination (Count Three), race discrimination (Count Four), and retaliation (Count Five). Id. ¶¶ 3–5; Mem. Op., Dkt. No. 10 at 36. The Court shall confine its discussion of the facts to those that are relevant to the disposition of WMATA’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 1. Betts’s First EEOC Charge Betts presented her first charge against WMATA to the EEOC on April 29, 2013, by completing and filing EEOC Form 5 (the “First Charge”). See First Charge, Dkt. No. 23-4. The form Betts used to submit her First Charge allowed her to indicate whether she was presenting charges of discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, national origin, retaliation, age, disability, genetic information, or “other” by checking a box next to each form of charged discrimination. Id. Betts indicated that she was charging discrimination based on race, sex, retaliation, disability, and “other,” specifying that “other” referred to a hostile work environment. Id. Betts also checked a box indicating that this charged discrimination was continuing. Id. The form Betts used to submit her First Charge also provided a section for Betts to explain “the particulars” of her charged discrimination. Id. In this narrative section, Betts alleged that, in May 2012, she notified her supervisors that she was pregnant, and that from that date on she had “been harassed and treated differently than males and non-pregnant employees with respect to requests for transfers to administrative and limited duty assignments, surrender of service weapon, and unfair performance evaluations.” Id. Betts also alleged that she had “also been harassed in retaliation for [her] participation as a witness in a prior charge . . . filed with EEOC by another party.” Id. Betts has identified the EEOC charge that she participated in as a charge of harassment brought by a female colleague in May 2012. See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts in Dispute, Dkt. No. 24-2 ¶ 8. Betts explained that WMATA had “given [her] no reasons for the difference in treatment” and claimed, in relevant part, that she had been “discriminated against on the basis of [her] sex, female, 2 and retaliated against because of [her] participation in prior EEO activity.” See First Charge, Dkt. No. 23-4. Betts identifies two performance evaluations as adverse actions relevant to the charges of discrimination and retaliation alleged in her First Charge. The first is a February 2013 performance evaluation that Betts received shortly after returning from maternity leave. 2 See Rep. at 7; Pl.’s Resp. at 5. The second is a March 2013 performance evaluation. See Rep. at 7; Pl.’s Resp. at 5. 2. Betts’s Secon EEOC Charge Betts bypassed her chain of command in appealing the two performance evaluations at issue in her First Charge, and therefore she was investigated and received a written dereliction for violating General Order #240, which prohibits employees from bypassing their chain of command. See Rep. at 3. Betts contested the written dereliction, and on May 16, 2013, Chief Pavlik, the new chief of MTPD, ordered that her written dereliction be removed from her record. Id. Chief Pavlik also ordered that MTPD issue a final performance evaluation to Betts within 90 days, but Betts contends that she did not receive that final evaluation until January 17, 2014. Id. Shortly after that, on January 30, 2014, Betts presented another EEOC Form 5 containing her second charge against WMATA to the EEOC (the “Second Charge”). See Second Charge, Dkt. No. 23-5. Like her First Charge, Betts’s Second Charge checked the boxes indicating that she was presenting charges of continuing discrimination based on retaliation and a hostile work environment—unlike her First Charge, however, Betts’s Second Charge did not check the boxes that would have indicated she was also bringing claims of race discrimination and sex discrimination. Compare id. with First Charge, Dkt. No. 23-4. In describing “the particulars” of Betts’s alleged discrimination, Betts’s Second Charge stated that she was “retaliated against based 2 Betts went on maternity leave around October 2012 and returned to work on February 4, 2013. Dkt. No. 24-1 ¶ 15. 3 on being a witness” in relation to another EEOC charge. Id. Betts’s Second Charge identified a March 14, 2013, performance evaluation in which she was allegedly “given another evaluation with a lower score . . . in response to a previous performance evaluation appeal,” and the written dereliction she received on April 12, 2013, “for going out of [her] chain of command when [she] complained.” Id.; see also Rep. at 3. Betts’s Second Charge stated that “[n]o reason was provided for the above-mentioned treatment” and claimed that Betts was “retaliated against for engaging in a protected activity with respect to discipline in violation of Title VII.” Id. Betts amended her Second Charge on March 18, 2014. Id. Betts’s amendment did not alter the content of her Second Charge as it was first filed. Id. Instead, Betts’s amendment added two instances of alleged adverse action. Id. Specifically, Betts amended her Second Charge to include the fact that she was suspended without pay on February 20, 2014, and discharged on March 6, 2014. Id. Betts’s amendment states that “[t]he reason given for [her] discharge was failure to cooperate with an internal investigation.” Id. The internal investigation in question was an investigation into whether Betts kept case files in her car or at home. See Dkt. No. 24-1 ¶¶ 36– 41. The Court shall describe the details of this investigation later on. See infra Section III.B.2.b. 3. Betts’s Third EEOC Charge Betts appealed her termination and, approximately one year later, received an arbitration award reinstating her to MTPD. Rep. at 3 (citing Dkt. No. 24-1 ¶ 46). This award came at the culmination of a proceeding where three arbitrators considered whether WMATA had “just cause” to terminate Betts. Rep. at 3 (citing Arbitration Opinion, Dkt. No. 7-4 at 3). The arbitrators heard arguments from WMATA claiming that it had cause to terminate Betts because of her “several and repeated failures to cooperate with its investigation” into her practice of keeping case files in her car, and that this refusal to cooperate violated “General Order #231 and her Oath of Office.” Id. at 4 (quoting Arbitration Opinion at 21). And the panel heard Betts’s arguments that WMATA 4 failed to prove it had cause to terminate her and that the “investigation was simply a pretext” to fire her. Id. (quoting Arbitration Opinion at 23). Ultimately, after considering witness testimony, documents, and briefing from the parties, the arbitrators concluded that WMATA “failed to prove that it had just cause to discipline [Betts], let alone terminate her.” Id. (quoting Arbitration Opinion at 1–3, 39). The panel therefore reinstated Betts to MTPD. Betts contends that she was not properly reinstated by MTPD upon her return. Id. (citing Dkt. No. 24-1 ¶¶ 46–68). Betts resigned on May 6, 2015. Id. On May 22, 2015, Betts presented an EEOC Form 5 containing her third charge against WMATA to the EEOC (the “Third Charge”). See Third Charge, Dkt. No. 23-6. Betts’s Third Charge, like her Second Charge, checked the boxes indicating that she was presenting charges of discrimination based on retaliation and a hostile work environment. Id. In describing the particulars of her Third Charge, Betts alleged that WMATA (1) intentionally delayed her reinstatement until March 12, 2015; (2) failed to provide proper employee identification, keys to access the bathroom, and a radio to report suspicious activity upon her return; (3) failed to notify a District One official of her new duty assignment; (4) required Betts to use personal funds to complete the recertification process; (5) required Betts to complete the police recertification process, including a full background investigation; and (6) caused Betts to resign on May 6, 2015, effecting a constructive discharge. Rep. at 4 (citing Third Charge). B. Procedural Background Betts filed a five-count Complaint against WMATA in July 2021. See Compl., Dkt. No. 1. Betts’s Complaint included claims of (1) hostile work environment based on sex, disability (based on her pregnancy), race, and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act; (2) discrimination based on disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act; (3) discrimination based on sex in violation of Title VII; (4) discrimination based on race in violation of Title VII; and (5) retaliation against protected activity in violation of Title VII. Rep. at 4 (citing Compl.). 5  WMATA filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment, arguing (1) that Betts failed to exhaust her Title VII claims; (2) that Betts’s claims were time-barred; and (3) that Betts failed to state a plausible claim for relief as to each count. Id. (citing Dkt. No. 5). This Court granted WMATA’s Motion in part and denied it in part. See Order, Dkt. No. 9; Mem. Op., Dkt. No. 10. In a nutshell, the Court’s ruling dismissed any claims brought by Betts outside of her (1) sex discrimination claim in Count Three, (2) race discrimination claim in Count Four, and (3) retaliation claim in Count Five, and only insofar as these three claims relied on (a) her February 2013, March 2013, and January 2014 performance evaluations, (b) her February 2014 suspension and March 2014 termination, and (c) the allegations raised in her Third Charge. Id. (citing Mem. Op., Dkt. No. 10). WMATA then moved for summary judgment on Betts’s three remaining counts. See Def.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 23. Betts opposed WMATA’s motion, Dkt. No. 24, and WMATA replied, Dkt. No. 26. The Court then submitted WMATA’s motion for a report and recommendation, see Order, Dkt. No. 27, and it was randomly referred to Magistrate Judge Upadhyaya, who recommended denying WMATA’s motion for summary judgment. See Rep., Dkt. No. 28. WMATA filed objections to the Report, see Dkt. No. 29, and those objections are now ripe. C. The Report’s Findings As indicated above, the Report recommends denying WMATA’s Motion for Summary Judgment. See Rep. at 1. The Report made the following three determinations in coming to this conclusion: (1) the Report determined that Betts’s First and Second Charges contained claims of race and sex discrimination, while her First, Second, and Third charges contained claims of retaliation; (2) the Report determined that Betts’s 2014 suspension and termination were the only adverse actions related to her remaining claims; and (3) the Report determined that Betts had offered sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that WMATA’s asserted non- 6 discriminatory reason for suspending and terminating Betts was pretextual. The Court shall briefly elaborate on these findings below and address WMATA’s objections in Section III. 1. The Report determined that Betts’s First and Second Charges contained claims of race and sex discrimination, while her First, Second, and Third charges contained claims of retaliation. The first threshold disagreement resolved by the Report concerned which of Betts’s three charges—the First Charge, Second Charge, and Third Charge detailed above—made claims of sex and race discrimination. 3 The Report noted that Betts’s Complaint and subsequent filings allege “that her suspension and termination, both captured in her Second Charge, constitute race and sex discrimination.” Id. (citing Compl. ¶¶ 47, 54). WMATA, however, argues that Betts “has no claim for sex and race discrimination in her . . . Second Charge,” because Betts only “checked the Charge’s boxes for retaliation and ‘other’ for hostile work environment.” Id. (quoting Def.’s Reply, Dkt. No. 26 at 14, and citing Def.’s Mem., Dkt. No. 23-1 at 3 (arguing that “[t]he Court limited Plaintiff’s factual allegations in her Amended Second Charge to her February 2014 suspension and her March 2014 termination, as the basis for her remaining claim of retaliation”). The Report determined that Betts’s Second Charge did make claims of sex and race discrimination, despite WMATA’s arguments to the contrary. The Report explained that Betts’s Second Charge made claims of race and sex discrimination despite Betts’s failure to check the corresponding boxes for those claims because the circumstances made it “reasonable to infer that Betts intended that her Second Charge would build upon her First Charge, in which Betts did allege race and sex discrimination.” Rep. at 9. The Report, however, rejected Betts’s argument that her Third Charge presented claims of discrimination. The Report explained that “Betts did not include any narrative about alleged 3 The Report concluded, without much argument to the contrary, that each of Betts’s three charges made claims of retaliation. See Rep. at 11. 7 discrimination in her Third Charge nor [did] she check the box for discrimination or a ‘continuing action.’” Rep. at 10. Moreover, the Report highlighted that the race and sex discrimination counts in Betts’s Complaint contain “no allegations from her Third Charge.” Id. “Nor [did Betts’s] December 15, 2021, letter to the EEOC regarding her Third Charge clearly allege race and sex discrimination.” Id. Accordingly, the Report concludes that Betts’s Third Charge set forth only retaliation claims. Id. at 11. 2. The Report determined that Betts’s 2014 suspension and termination were the only adverse actions related to her remaining claims. The Report concluded that “Betts’s Second Charge clearly identifies two adverse actions: her suspension and termination.” Rep. at 11–12 (citing Baird v. Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). As to the remaining actions alleged in Betts’s First, Second, and Third Charges, the Report concluded that Betts had failed to show that they constituted adverse employment actions. See id. at 11–16. The Report determined that Betts’s performance evaluations do not constitute adverse employment actions because Betts “fails to raise a genuine issue that her evaluations caused her any financial or other concrete harm.” Id. at 13. Similarly, the Report determined that the actions alleged in Betts’s Third Charge do not constitute adverse actions because they “are more akin to the ‘trivial harms’ the Supreme Court considers ‘petty slights or minor annoyances’ that all employees experience, regardless of whether that employee has reported prohibited behavior.” Id. at 15 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)). Accordingly, the Report concluded that “only Betts’s suspension and termination in her Second Charge can sustain her remaining claims.” Id. at 15–16. 8  3. The Report determined that Betts had offered sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that WMATA’s asserted non-discriminatory reason for suspending and terminating Betts was pretextual. Following its conclusions on the threshold issues discussed above, the Report “turn[ed] to the central question: with respect to her suspension and termination, has Betts produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that WMATA’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was pretext for intentional discrimination or retaliation based on Betts’s membership in a protected class?” Rep. at 16. WMATA’s asserted non-discriminatory reason for suspending and terminating Betts is that “[s]he is the only officer ever known to have refused to submit to and cooperate with an investigation by MTPD’s Office of Professional Responsibility and Inspections (‘OPRI’).” Def.’s Mem. at 13 (citing Pavlik Decl., Dkt. No. 23-14 ¶ 25); see also Rep. at 17. The investigation in question concerned MTPD’s discovery that Betts was “keeping approximately 30 sensitive police investigation files in the trunk of her car.” Id.; see also Undisputed Facts, Dkt. No. 24-1 ¶ 38. WMATA argues that Betts was suspended in February 2014 because she “refus[ed] to answer questions asked of her” by the internal investigators. Id. (citing Arbitration Hearing Tr. (Sept. 23, 2014), Dkt. No. 23-28 at 58:13–72:12). Betts was then terminated, according to WMATA, because MTPD’s investigation “sustained several charges against [her] warranting termination,” Def.’s Reply at 15, including two charges of violating General Order #231, which subjects employees to termination if they “withhold information from, are untruthful, or fail to cooperate with an internal investigation,” and one charge of violating the Metro Transit Police Oath of Office, which requires employees to swear that they will “obey [their] superiors in all lawful matters of duty performance,” OPRI Investigation, Dkt. No. 23-27 at WMATA000349–51. WMATA also argues that Betts has not shown causation because the relevant decisionmaker—Chief Ronald 9 Pavlik, who terminated Betts—first learned of Betts’s Second Charge a month after he terminated Betts. Def.’s Mem. at 14; Rep. at 17. Betts argues that WMATA’s asserted non-discriminatory reason—her failure to cooperate in the investigation—is pretext for discrimination and retaliation. Betts alleges that “she and another female detective, who also had a history of EEO activity, were singled out for taking case files home, even though white, male detectives with no EEO activity routinely took files home.” Rep. at 17 (citing Pl.’s Opp’n at 19). The Report identified that “Betts asserts that Sergeant Boehm, who is a white man with no prior EEO activity, had a large stack of case files in his car.” Id. (citing Betts Decl., Dkt. No. 7-3 ¶ 34 4). The Report also noted that Betts argues that “WMATA attempted to elicit incriminating, written responses from her after she disclosed that she took case files home.” Id. at 17–18 (citing Arb. Decision, Dkt. No. 7-4 at 11–14). Finally, “Betts asserts that her repeated complaints about her chain of command accumulated in continued retaliatory actions, such as the evaluations she appealed, the charges she filed, and, ultimately, her termination.” Id. at 18 (citing Pl.’s Opp’n at 19; Arb. Decision, Dkt. No. 7-4 at 36–37). While noting that “it is a close call,” the Report concluded that Betts has produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that WMATA’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was pretext for intentional discrimination or retaliation. Rep. at 16. The Report concluded that Betts sufficiently supported her arguments “by citing her own affidavit, letters, deposition testimony, and an Arbitration Opinion and Award . . . in which an arbitration panel found that WMATA did not have just cause to terminate Betts.” Id. at 18. The Court shall discuss Betts’s arguments and evidence in more detail below. 4 Where Betts attests that, “in April 2014, [she] was informed by Det. Beau Perrizo that when Stephen Boehm (white, male, no EEO activity) was promoted from Detective to Sergeant, he passed a stack of open cases to Det. Perrizo and there was a large stack of case files in Sgt. Boehm’s car.” 10  II. LEGAL STANDARD A. Objections to a Report and Recommendation “In considering objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, district courts generally apply a de novo standard of review.” Mohammad Hilmi Nassif & Partners v. Republic of Iraq, 759 F. Supp. 3d 30, 38 (D.D.C. 2024), aff’d sub nom. Nassif v. Republic of Iraq, 166 F.4th 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2026) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); LCvR 72.3(c)). However, where a party “makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates [its] original arguments,” district courts review the report and recommendation “only for clear error.” Bynum v. D.C., 424 F. Supp. 3d 122, 127 (D.D.C. 2020) (EGS) (quoting Houlahan v. Brown, 979 F. Supp. 2d 86, 88 (D.D.C. 2013) (FJS)); see also Shurtleff v. EPA, 991 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2013) (EGS); LCvR 72.3(b). Furthermore, a district court may adopt portions of a report and recommendation to which no party files an objection and treat arguments not raised through a timely objection as waived. See Mohammad Hilmi Nassif & Partners, 759 F. Supp. 3d at 38 (citing Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 152 (1985); LCvR 72.3(b); Taylor v. District of Columbia, 325 F. Supp. 3d 144, 144 n.3 (D.D.C. 2018) (DLF)). After reviewing a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and any objections, a district judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); LCvR 72.3(c). B. Summary Judgment A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.”). In making this determination, the court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to [the nonmoving party] and draw all reasonable inferences in [their] favor.” Holcomb 11 v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)). “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986) (emphasis in original). A fact is “material” if a dispute over it “might affect the outcome of a suit under governing law; factual disputes that are ‘irrelevant or unnecessary’ do not affect the summary judgment determination.” Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). An issue is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The moving party bears the initial burden of “identifying those portions” of the record that “demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party carries this initial burden, “the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to show that sufficient evidence exists for a reasonable jury to find in the nonmoving party’s favor with respect to the ‘element[s] essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” Bajaj v. Turner, 778 F. Supp. 3d 151, 176 (D.D.C. 2025) (RDM) (quoting Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). The nonmoving party must provide “more than mere allegations or denials; instead, it must be supported by affidavits, declarations, or other competent evidence, setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). “If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (internal citations omitted). 12  C. Title VII Exhaustion Requirement Before initiating an action in federal court under Title VII, “an aggrieved party must exhaust [their] administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.” Oviedo v. WMATA, 948 F.3d 386, 393 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Washington v. WMATA, 160 F.3d 750, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). “Properly exhausted claims encompass those that the EEOC charge and its accompanying documents detail with ‘sufficient information to put the agency on notice of the claim and to enable the agency to investigate it.’” Holmes v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 723 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2024) (JEB) (quoting Crawford v. Duke, 867 F.3d 103, 109 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). “Allowing a complaint to encompass allegations outside the ambit of the predicate EEOC charge would circumvent the EEOC's investigatory and conciliatory role, as well as deprive the charged party of notice of the charge, as surely as would an initial failure to file a timely EEOC charge.” Marshall v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (cleaned up). “Defendants have the burden to prove a failure to exhaust.” Holmes, 723 F. Supp. 3d at 13 (citing Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). III. ANALYSIS The parties object to some, but not all, of the Report’s findings. At the outset, the Court shall ADOPT the Report IN PART with respect to its findings that the parties do not object to. See Mohammad Hilmi Nassif & Partners, 759 F. Supp. 3d at 38. Accordingly, the Court finds that Betts’s First Charge sets forth race and sex discrimination claims, and her First, Second, and Third Charges set forth retaliation claims. The Court also finds that that the only cognizable adverse employment actions alleged by Betts are her 2014 suspension and termination. The Court shall now consider the remaining issues raised by WMATA’s Motion for Summary Judgment, of which there are two. The first is whether WMATA is entitled to summary judgment on Betts’s race and sex discrimination claims on the grounds that Betts’s failed to 13 exhaust these claims with respect to her 2014 suspension and termination. The Court answers this question in the affirmative. The second is whether WMATA is entitled to summary judgment on Betts’s remaining retaliation claim because she has failed to sufficiently rebut WMATA’s asserted legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for suspending and terminating Betts in 2014. Again, the Court answers this question in the affirmative. Accordingly, the Court shall GRANT WMATA’s Motion for Summary Judgment. A. The Court shall enter summary judgment for WMATA on Betts’s race and sex discrimination claims because Betts failed to exhaust these claims with respect to her 2014 suspension and termination, which are the only actionable adverse actions remaining. “[T]he theories of discrimination in a plaintiff’s lawsuit are limited to the theories contained in the EEOC Charge [they] filed.” Ferguson v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 630 F. Supp. 3d 96, 111 (D.D.C. 2022) (CKK), aff’d, No. 22-7142, 2024 WL 2052016 (D.C. Cir. May 8, 2024) (cleaned up and citation omitted). While the administrative charge requirement “should not be construed to place a heavy technical burden” on the plaintiff, it is “not a mere technicality” and the Court “cannot allow liberal interpretation of an administrative charge to permit a litigant to bypass the . . . administrative process.” Stewart v. White, 61 F. Supp. 3d 118, 129 (D.D.C. 2014) (CKK) (quoting Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). A plaintiff is “limited to pursuing those ‘claims that are like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such allegations;’” although “every detail of the eventual complaint need not be presaged in the EEOC filing, the substance of the claims must fall within the scope of ‘the administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to follow the charge of discrimination.’” Id. (quoting Park, 71 F.3d at 907). As detailed above, Betts’s suit involves three EEOC charges that she filed between April 29, 2013, and May 22, 2015. See supra Section I.A. The Court has concluded that Betts’s First 14 Charge contained claims of race and sex discrimination, and that her First, Second, and Third Charges included claims of retaliation. The question is whether Betts’s Second Charge also contained claims of race and sex discrimination. This is relevant because Betts’s Second Charge contains the only adverse employment actions remaining in this case—her 2014 suspension and termination. Accordingly, Betts will be unable to survive summary judgment if the scope of her race and sex discrimination claims does not extend to her Second Charge, as doing so requires that she connect her claims to an adverse employment action. See Ramsey v. Moniz, 75 F. Supp. 3d 29, 49 (D.D.C. 2014) (BAH) (“. . . for the plaintiff’s discrete discrimination claim to survive, the plaintiff must have alleged an adverse employment action in her EEO complaint.”). WMATA argues that Betts cannot rely on the allegations in her Second Charge to support her race and sex discrimination claims because the Second Charge makes “no references to discrimination.” 5 Def.’s Obj. at 4 (capitalization modified). Betts filed her Second Charge on January 30, 2014, and amended it on March 18, 2014. See supra Section I.A.2. WMATA argues that Betts’s Second Charge did not set forth any discrimination claims because (1) Betts did not check the boxes for “sex” or “race” discrimination (but did check the boxes for “retaliation,” “other (hostile work environment),” and “continuing action”), and (2) Betts did “not mention anything pertaining to race or sex discrimination” in the narrative section (although “she twice use[d] the word ‘retaliation’”). Def.’s Obj. at 3. The narrative section of Betts’s Second Charge reads, in full: 5 According to Betts, WMATA must demonstrate that the Report’s finding on this issue was based on “clear error” because WMATA “already raised this argument, at least in part, during its Motion briefing.” Pl.’s Resp. at 8. The Court, however, determines that de novo review is appropriate. From the record, it appears that WMATA first addressed the issue at hand in its Reply in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. See Def.’s Mem. at 3 (assuming without argument that Betts’s Second Charge concerned only “her remaining claim of retaliation”); id. at 12–14 (same). And its argument here does more than “simply reiterate[]” the argument it presented in its Reply. Bynum, 424 F.Supp.3d at 127. Accordingly, the Court determines that the de novo standard of review that “district courts generally apply” is appropriate here. Mohammad Hilmi Nassif & Partners, 759 F. Supp. 3d at 38. 15  I. I began my employment with the above-mentioned Respondent in November 28, 2005, in the position of Police Officer. I currently hold the position of Police Detective under Sergeant Charles Page. I believe I was retaliated against based on being a witness to EEOC Charge [number crossed out]. On March 14, 2013, in response to a previous performance evaluation appeal, l was given another evaluation with a lower score. Furthermore on April 12, 2013, I was disciplined for going out of my chain of command when I complained. II. No reason was provided for the above-mentioned treatment. III. I believe I was retaliated against for engaging in a protected activity with respect to discipline in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. IV. On February 20, 2014, I was placed on an suspension without pay and on March 6, 2014 I was discharged. The reason given for my discharge was failure to cooperate with an internal investigation. Id. at 3. As WMATA points out, Betts “did not take the opportunity to check the boxes for race discrimination or sex discrimination when she amended, nor did she provide any additional narrative beyond a brief description stating that she was suspended on February 20, 2014, and terminated on March 16, 2014.” Def.’s Obj. at 4. In isolation, Betts’s Second Charge cannot reasonably be read to include claims of discrimination. In the section of the Second Charge that asked Betts to indicate the basis for her allegations of discrimination, she declined to check the boxes for “race” and “sex” and instead checked only the boxes for “retaliation” and “other (hostile work environment).” Second Charge, Dkt. No. 23-5 at 2. More importantly, in the narrative section of her Second Charge, Betts “wrote nothing whatsoever” about race or sex. Holmes, 723 F. Supp. 3d at 14. Instead, Betts described her belief that she “was retaliated against for engaging in a protected activity with respect to discipline.” Second Charge at 2. “There can be little doubt, therefore, that the charge [itself] lacked ‘sufficient information’ to put EEOC on notice of [Betts’s] claims of discrimination—as distinct from her claims of retaliation and a hostile work environment—or to enable EEOC to 16 investigate those claims.” Holmes, 723 F. Supp. 3d at 14 (quoting Crawford, 867 F.3d at 109 and citing Robinson-Reeder v. Am. Council on Educ., 532 F. Supp. 2d 6, 13 (D.D.C. 2008)); see also Dunn v. Collins, No. 21-cv-02845 (CJN), 2026 WL 32782, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2026) (finding that plaintiff failed to exhaust her claims of race discrimination where her EEO charge raised claims of sex discrimination but “did not raise any claims at all based on race”). Betts cannot overcome this reading of her Second Charge by pointing to the fact that she checked the “continuing action” box on the charge and mentioned her March 14, 2013, performance evaluation in the narrative section. See Rep. at 9. First, whatever the interpretation of the phrase “continuing action,” it is not clear why a claim of continuing retaliation would provide any more notice of a discrimination claim than a claim of past retaliation. Furthermore, the term “continuing action,” as it is used in the part of the form where claimants indicate the “date(s) discrimination took place,” is most logically read to indicate that the alleged unlawful conduct is still occurring at the time of filing, not that the alleged unlawful conduct is part of a continuing pattern alleged in a prior, separate charge. Indeed, Betts used the same section of her Second Charge to indicate that the earliest date the alleged unlawful conduct took place was March 14, 2013. See Second Charge at 2. This leads us to Betts’s argument that her inclusion of the March 2013 performance evaluation in the narrative section of her Second Charge establishes that her Second Charge included claims of discrimination. At the outset, the Court has already ruled that Betts’s claim regarding her March 2013 performance evaluation is time-barred from her Second Charge. See Mem. Op., Dkt. No. 10 at 20 (finding that Betts’s “Second EEOC Charge was untimely with respect to the March 2013 performance evaluation and the April 12, 2013 dereliction reprimand”); see also Rep. at 7 n. 2 (stating that “[a]lthough Betts only references her March 2013 evaluation 17 in her Second Charge, it is actually Betts’s January 2014 performance evaluation that is at issue”). “Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice,’” and a claimant “can only file a charge to cover discrete acts that ‘occurred’ within the appropriate time period.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114. But putting that aside, Betts has not shown why her mention of the March 2013 performance evaluation connects her Second Charge to her prior claims of discrimination. Betts alleged in her Second Charge that the “lower score” she received on her March 2013 evaluation came “in response to a previous performance evaluation appeal” that she had made. Second Charge at 2. In other words, Betts alleged that her March 2013 evaluation was the product of impermissible retaliation, not discrimination based on race or sex. Nor can Betts’s September 18, 2014, letter to the EEOC provide the information needed to read Betts’s Second Charge to include claims of discrimination. See Rep. at 9–10 (citing Pl.’s Second EEOC Letter, Dkt. No. 7-19). In this letter, Betts alleges that she had been “subjected to constant discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment by [her] supervisors” since May 2012. Pl.’s Second EEOC Letter at 1. It is true that an attachment to an EEOC complaint “can independently identify claims for resolution regardless of whether the attachment is also referenced in the body of the complaint itself.” Crawford, 867 F.3d at 107. But Betts’s September 18 letter wa