Day Kimball Healthcare, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health

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The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  Day Kimball Healthcare, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health DAY KIMBALL HEALTHCARE, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH ET AL. (AC 48313) Moll, Suarez and Seeley, Js. Syllabus The plaintiff, which owned and operated an acute care hospital, appealed from the Superior Court’s judgment dismissing its administrative appeal from the decision of the named defendant, the Department of Public Health. The department previously had approved the application of the defendant H Co. for a certificate of need, pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 19a-639 (a)), to establish an ambulatory surgery center in the plaintiff’s primary service area. Prior to the public hearing on H Co.’s application, the plaintiff was granted intervenor status. The plaintiff claimed that the court improperly dismissed its appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of its determination that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate statutory or classical aggrievement as required to maintain its appeal. Held: The plaintiff’s claim that the Superior Court improperly dismissed its administrative appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of its determination that the financial and competitive interests asserted by the plaintiff were not within the zone of interests protected by § 19a-639 (a) was unavailing, as the plaintiff provided no Connecticut authority in support of its contentions that the statutes governing certificates of need afforded the plaintiff a protected property interest, and the plaintiff’s asser- tion that, as a licensed health care provider, it was required to comply with current requirements under the certificate of need statutes did not provide the plaintiff with standing to challenge the approval of a certificate of need for a market competitor. The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s administrative appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the plaintiff did not demonstrate that it was classically aggrieved by the department’s decision approving H Co.’s application for a certificate of need, the plaintiff having failed to demonstrate the existence of a specific, personal and legal interest in the granting of a certificate of need to a market competitor, and, even if it is assumed that the plaintiff had such interest, if failed to demonstrate that any such interest was specially and injuriously affected by that action. Argued April 9—officially released November 10, 2026 Procedural History Appeal by the plaintiff from the decision of the named defendant approving the application of the defendant HHC Plainfield Surgery Center, LLC, for a certificate of need to open an ambulatory surgery center, brought to  Day Kimball Healthcare, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health the Superior Court in the judicial district of Windham and transferred to the judicial district of New Britain, where the court, Cordani, J., denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss; thereafter, the court, Budzik, J., granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss and rendered judgment of dismissal, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed. Patrick J. Monahan II, with whom were Michael McPerson and, on the brief, Sandra L. Smith, for the appellant (plaintiff). Melanie A. Dillon, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for the appellees (named defendant et al.). Jesse A. Langer, with whom, on the brief, was Jeffrey D. Bausch, for the appellee (defendant HHC Plainfield Surgery Center, LLC). Opinion SEELEY, J. The plaintiff, Day Kimball Healthcare, Inc., which owns and operates Day Kimball Hospital, an independent, acute care hospital that is licensed by the defendant Department of Public Health (department), appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dis- missing its administrative appeal from the decision of the department approving, pursuant to General Stat- utes (Rev. to 2019) § 19a-639 (a),1 a certificate of need application of the defendant HHC Plainfield Surgery Center, LLC (HHC), to open an ambulatory surgery cen- ter in Plainfield. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed its administrative appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of its determination that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate aggrievement as required to maintain its administrative 1 General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 19a-639 (a) provides: “In any deliberations involving a certificate of need application filed pursuant to section 19a-638, the [Health Systems Planning Unit] shall take into  Day Kimball Healthcare, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health appeal. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. The following factual and procedural history, as dem- onstrated by the record and set forth by the court in its memorandum of decision, is relevant to this appeal. “On consideration and make written findings concerning each of the follow- ing guidelines and principles: “(1) Whether the proposed project is consistent with any applicable policies and standards adopted in regulations by the Office of Health Strategy; “(2) The relationship of the proposed project to the state-wide health care facilities and services plan; “(3) Whether there is a clear public need for the health care facility or services proposed by the applicant; “(4) Whether the applicant has satisfactorily demonstrated how the proposal will impact the financial strength of the health care system in the state or that the proposal is financially feasible for the applicant; “(5) Whether the applicant has satisfactorily demonstrated how the proposal will improve quality, accessibility and cost effectiveness of health care delivery in the region, including, but not limited to, provi- sion of or any change in the access to services for Medicaid recipients and indigent persons; “(6) The applicant’s past and proposed provision of health care services to relevant patient populations and payer mix, including, but not lim- ited to, access to services by Medicaid recipients and indigent persons; “(7) Whether the applicant has satisfactorily identified the population to be served by the proposed project and satisfactorily demonstrated that the identified population has a need for the proposed services; “(8) The utilization of existing health care facilities and health care services in the service area of the applicant; “(9) Whether the applicant has satisfactorily demonstrated that the proposed project shall not result in an unnecessary duplication of exist- ing or approved health care services or facilities; “(10) Whether an applicant, who has failed to provide or reduced access to services by Medicaid recipients or indigent persons, has demonstrated good cause for doing so, which shall not be demonstrated solely on the basis of differences in reimbursement rates between Medicaid and other health care payers; “(11) Whether the applicant has satisfactorily demonstrated that the proposal will not negatively impact the diversity of health care provid- ers and patient choice in the geographic region; and “(12) Whether the applicant has satisfactorily demonstrated that any consolidation resulting from the proposal will not adversely affect health care costs or accessibility to care.” Our references in this opinion to § 19a-639 (a) are to the 2019 revision of the statute unless otherwise indicated.  Day Kimball Healthcare, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health July 22, 2019, HHC filed an application for a [certificate of need] with the Health Systems Planning Unit . . . of [the defendant Office of Health Strategy]2 to open a new [ambulatory surgery center] at 584 Norwich Road in Plainfield . . . . HHC is an affiliate of Hartford Health- Care Corporation. . . . Opening an [ambulatory surgery center] requires a [certificate of need] from the [Health Systems Planning Unit]. See General Statutes § 19a-638 (a) (6). By law, the ‘Commissioner of Health Strategy shall oversee the Health Systems Planning Unit and shall exercise independent decision-making authority over all certificate of need decisions.’ General Statutes [Rev. to 2019] § 19a-612d. “HHC’s proposed [ambulatory surgery center] will have two operating rooms and two additional rooms for future use. . . . The [ambulatory surgery center] will initially focus on orthopedics, pain management, urology, and gastroenterology. . . . The [ambulatory surgery center’s] primary service area is intended to be all the towns within a twenty mile radius of Plainfield. . . . “[The plaintiff] is a not-for-profit corporation with its principal office at 320 Pomfret Street in Putnam . . . . [The plaintiff] owns and operates Day Kimball Hospi- tal. . . . Day Kimball Hospital provides the full range of health care services typical of a general acute care hospital, including outpatient surgery.” (Citations omit- ted; footnote added; footnote omitted.) “Day Kimball Hospital serves many of the general health care needs of the residents of northeastern Connecticut, including at General Statutes § 19a-638 (a) sets forth the circumstances under which the issuance of a certificate of need is required, and subsection (b) sets forth those in which a certificate of need is not required. Under subsection (a) (6), a certificate of need must be obtained for “[t]he establishment of an outpatient surgical facility . . . .” General Statutes § 19a-638 (a) (6). 2 The Health Systems Planning Unit “administer[s] the certificate of need application process for health care facilities” and operates as a unit within the department. High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health, 352 Conn. 697, 700 n.2, 339 A.3d 619 (2025); see also General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 19a-612d.  Day Kimball Healthcare, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health least some of the towns within the primary service area proposed for the [ambulatory surgery center].” “On January 27, 2020, [the plaintiff] submitted a request for [a] hearing on HHC’s [certificate of need] application. . . . On March 13, 2020, [the plaintiff] was granted intervenor status.3 . . . From August 12 through 28, 2020, [the Office of Health Strategy] held a virtual public hearing on the application.”4 (Citations omitted; footnote in original.) At the virtual public hearing, “Paul Beaudoin, chief financial officer and interim chief execu- tive officer of [the plaintiff], testified as follows: ‘Clearly, the proposed [ambulatory surgery center] service area overlaps with [the plaintiff’s] service area. More than 50 percent of our outpatient surgery volume is generated by the towns in the proposed [ambulatory surgery center] service area. Further, two of the three physician letters of support included in the application are from orthope- dic surgeons with privileges at Day Kimball [Hospital], leading us to reasonably conclude that our medical staff physicians are targets for prospective investor posi- tions in the proposed [ambulatory surgery center]. . . . The unfortunate reality is that once licensed, absent any extraordinary government mandated restriction, an [ambulatory surgery center] can offer any surgical specialty, regardless of what the [certificate of need] application presently says the applicant intends to offer. “ ‘Another reality is that compliance minded physician investors who take heed of federal safe harbor regulations have a regulatory incentive to move substantial patient volume from [hospital outpatient department surgery] to the [ambulatory surgery center]. There is also a built- in economic incentive for physician investors to steer 3 “Intervenor status, by itself, does not establish aggrievement. See New England Rehabilitation Hospital of Hartford, Inc. v. Commis- sion on Hospitals & Health Care, 226 Conn. 105, 132, 627 A.2d 1257 (1993) . . . .” 4 “As the basis for its claimed aggrievement, [the plaintiff] contend[ed] that granting a [certificate of need] to HHC for an [ambulatory surgery center] [would] harm [the plaintiff’s] financial health and its ability to compete for patient business.”  Day Kimball Healthcare, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health higher paying commercial patients to the [ambulatory surgery center] and direct Medicaid patients to [hospital outpatient department surgery]. Outpatient surgery contributes positively to [Day Kimball Hospital’s] bottom line. We are an independent hospital, without the inher- ent financial flexibility and support that the hospitals of the large and sprawling health systems in Connecticut enjoy. As an independent community hospital, our board of directors insists on maintaining our commitment to access—every member of our community has equal access to all services that we provide regardless of ability to pay. Day Kimball [Hospital] is the sole hospital in the so-called “quiet corner” of Connecticut. We rely upon our service lines that produce a positive contribution margin to underwrite our Medicaid intensive services such as obstetrics, behavioral health, and the emergency depart- ment. Our Medicaid burden for these services [is] 38.3 percent for the emergency department, 48.1 percent for inpatient behavioral health, and 55.7 percent for obstet- rics. In [fiscal year] 2018, as noted in the most recent annual report [of the Office of Health Services] on the financial status of Connecticut’s short-term acute care hospitals, Medicaid reimbursed [the plaintiff] sixty-seven cents for every dollar of cost. Granting this proposal will have a direct negative impact on [the plaintiff’s] ability to provide services to Medicaid recipients. It should be noted that every town in our service area is a designated health services professional shortage area for behavioral health. . . . Day Kimball [Hospital] is the sole Connecticut hospital and/or Connecticut hospital affiliated provider of behavioral health in our service area. A loss of profit- able outpatient surgical cases will impede our ability to continue to provide our services at the current level.’ ” “By a settlement agreement and order dated Janu- ary 25, 2021, [the department, via the Office of Health Strategy] approved HHC’s application for a [certificate of need] to open an [ambulatory surgery center].” The plaintiff subsequently filed an administrative appeal with the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes  Day Kimball Healthcare, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health (Rev. to 2019) § 19a-6415 and General Statutes § 4-183 (a).6 In its administrative appeal, the plaintiff alleged that HHC “failed to satisfy its burden with respect to all or some of the principles and guidelines set forth in [§] 19a-639 (a) (1) [through] (12)”; see footnote 1 of this opinion; and that it was prejudiced and aggrieved by the department’s final decision approving HHC’s application for a certificate of need. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that its substantial rights as a licensed acute care hospital were prejudiced by the final decision approving HHC’s application for a certificate of need because, inter alia, that decision and the findings and conclusions therein violated constitutional or statu- tory provisions, were in excess of statutory authority and were made upon unlawful procedure, in that HHC did not satisfy its burden under § 19-639 (a) (1) through (12), thereby rendering its application legally deficient. The plaintiff further alleged that it had been granted intervenor status, which included the right to “be copied on all pleadings, correspondence and filings submitted from this point forward by [HHC] until the issuance of a final decision” and that, as an intervenor, it was granted express rights to fundamental fairness and due process of law, which were violated when the department, via the Office of Health Strategy, “issued its final decision 5 General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 19a-641 provides in relevant part: “Any health care facility or institution and any state health care facil- ity or institution aggrieved by any final decision of said unit under the provisions of sections 19a-630 to 19a-639e, inclusive, may appeal from such decision in accordance with the provisions of section 4-183, except venue shall be in the judicial district in which it is located. . . .” Our references in this opinion to § 19a-641 are to the 2019 revision of the statute. Pursuant to General Statutes § 19a-630 (10), a “ ‘[h]ealth care facility’ means (A) hospitals licensed by the Department of Public Health under chapter 368v . . . . ‘Health care facility’ includes any parent company, subsidiary, affiliate or joint venture, or any combination thereof, of any such facility.” 6 General Statutes § 4-183 (a) provides: “A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the Superior Court as pro- vided in this section. The filing of a petition for reconsideration is not a prerequisite to the filing of such an appeal.”  Day Kimball Healthcare, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health after ex parte communications [with HHC] in complete disregard of the rights granted to [the plaintiff as an] intervenor . . . [and] denied [the plaintiff] notice or [an] opportunity to be heard or to otherwise provide input in the apparent ex parte process that led to a final deci- sion.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) According to the allegations, the plaintiff had presented “substantial evidence demonstrating material deficiencies in the application and the many reasons why [HHC] had failed to meet its burden,” but its evidence was “wholly disregarded . . . .” The plain- tiff alleged further that the department failed to give proper weight to its evidence demonstrating that “the application, if granted, would negatively impact health care delivery in northeastern Connecticut,” and, in par- ticular, the plaintiff, because (1) “more than 50 percent of [the plaintiff’s] outpatient surgery volume, which contributes positively to [the plaintiff’s] bottom line, is generated by the towns in the applicant’s proposed . . . service area,” (2) the plaintiff “relies on outpatient surgery volume to underwrite its Medicaid intensive services such as obstetrics, behavioral health and the emergency department,” (3) “the proposed [ambulatory surgery center] would have a direct negative impact on [the plaintiff’s] ability to provide services to Medicaid recipients,” and (4) “a 30 to 40 percent reduction in [the plaintiff’s] outpatient surgery and endoscopy cases as a result of the proposed [ambulatory surgery center] would result in a 2.5 to 3.5 million dollar reduction in [the plaintiff’s] operating results . . . .” Thereafter, HHC filed a motion to dismiss the plain- tiff’s administrative appeal, alleging that the plaintiff lacked statutory and classical aggrievement to maintain its appeal. The department and the Office of Health Strategy filed a motion to dismiss on similar grounds. The court, Cordani, J., denied both motions, finding that the plaintiff sufficiently had alleged aggrievement. The parties subsequently filed briefs in support of their respective positions concerning the plaintiff’s appeal, and the court, Budzik, J., heard argument on August 13,  Day Kimball Healthcare, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health 2024. In its brief, the plaintiff repeated its allegations that “the [certificate of need] application, if granted, would negatively impact the health care delivery system in northeastern Connecticut, specifically Day Kimball [Hospital], because more than 50 percent of Day [Kimball Hospital’s] outpatient surgery volume, which contributes positively to [the plaintiff’s] bottom line, is generated by the towns in the applicant’s proposed [ambulatory surgery center] service area. . . . Day Kimball [Hospital] relies on its outpatient surgery volume to underwrite its Medicaid intensive services such as obstetrics, behavioral health, and the emergency department . . . . [A] 30 to 40 percent reduction in Day Kimball [Hospital’s] outpatient surgery and endoscopy cases as a result of the proposed Plainfield [ambulatory surgery center] would result in a 2.5 to 3.5 million dollar reduction in [the plaintiff’s] operating results . . . .” In their briefs, the defendants argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s appeal because the plaintiff was not aggrieved by the final decision approving HHC’s application for a certificate of need.7 In a memorandum of decision filed December 10, 2024, Judge Budzik dismissed the plaintiff’s admin- istrative appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiff could not prove statutory aggrievement because the financial and competitive interests asserted by the plaintiff in its appeal were not within the zone of interests protected by § 19a-639 (a). The court also concluded that, “[t]o the extent [that the plaintiff] argue[d] that it ha[d] proven classical aggrieve- ment . . . the financial and competitive harms alleged by [the plaintiff] . . . do not prove classical aggrievement.” 7 In their trial briefs, the defendants also asserted that, under the law of the case doctrine, Judge Budzik was not bound by Judge Cordani’s prior decisions denying the motions to dismiss and, thus, was not precluded from concluding that the plaintiff was not aggrieved. Although, on appeal, the plaintiff contends that Judge Cordani’s decision and legal analysis regarding the issue of aggrievement were correct, it recognizes that Judge Budzik “was not bound as a matter of law to adopt Judge Cordani’s legal analysis on aggrievement . . . .”  Day Kimball Healthcare, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health (Citation omitted.) From the judgment rendered thereon, the plaintiff appealed. Before we address the plaintiff’s claims on appeal, we set forth the legal principles that govern this admin- istrative appeal, as recently set forth by our Supreme Court in High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health, 352 Conn. 697, 703–704, 339 A.3d 619 (2025) (High Watch): “ ‘It is fundamental that appellate jurisdiction in administrative appeals is created only by statute and can be acquired and exercised only in the manner prescribed by statute. . . . An appeal from an administrative decision of the department is governed by . . . the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act; General Statutes [§ 4-166 et seq.].’ . . . United Cable Television Services Corp. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 235 Conn. 334, 341, 663 A.2d 1011 (1995). ‘Pleading and proof of aggrievement are prerequisites to a trial court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of an administrative appeal. . . . It is [therefore] fundamental that, in order to have standing to bring an administrative appeal, a person must be aggrieved.’ . . . Id., 342. ‘Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and statutory. . . . Classical aggrievement requires a two part showing. First, a party must demonstrate a spe- cific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as opposed to a general interest that all members of the community share. . . . Second, the party must also show that the agency’s decision has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest. . . . Aggrievement does not demand certainty, only the possibility of an adverse effect on a legally pro- tected interest. . . . Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation.’ . . . Lewis v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 275 Conn. 383, 391, 880 A.2d 865 (2005).”  Day Kimball Healthcare, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health I We first address the plaintiff’s claims concerning the court’s determination that it did not demonstrate statu- tory aggrievement. At the outset, we set forth the legal principles gov- erning statutory aggrievement. “Regarding statutory aggrievement, [our Supreme Court] has long held that a party’s legal interest must fall within the ‘zone of interests’ of the statute at issue for that ‘interest [to be] protected by that legislation.’ . . . Id. ‘It has been [noted] that the zone of interests test bears a family resemblance to the scope of the risk doctrine in the law of torts. . . . In tort law, it is not enough that the defendant’s violation of the law caused injury to a plaintiff. The defendant must also owe that plaintiff a duty. Similarly, with respect to the law of [statutory] standing, it is not enough that a party is injured by an act or omission of another party. The defendant must also have violated some duty owed to the plaintiff.’ . . . McWeeny v. Hartford, 287 Conn. 56, 65, 946 A.2d 862 (2008); see, e.g., United Cable Televi- sion Services Corp. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, supra, 235 Conn. 344–45 (‘in considering whether a plaintiff’s interest has been injuriously affected by the granting of a certificate of public convenience and neces- sity, we have looked to whether the injury he complains of (his aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon him) falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for [the] complaint’ . . .). [Appellate courts] exercise plenary review over [a] plaintiff’s claim that it is . . . statutorily . . . aggrieved because subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. See, e.g., Wheelabrator Lisbon, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 283 Conn. 672, 685, 931 A.2d 159 (2007).” (Emphasis in original.) High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health, supra, 352 Conn. 704–705. “It is [also] well established that, ‘[a]s a general rule, allegations that a governmental action will result in com- petition harmful to the complainant’s business would not  Day Kimball Healthcare, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health be sufficient to qualify the complainant as an aggrieved person.’ . . . West Farms Mall, LLC v. West Hartford, 279 Conn. 1, 26 n.14, 901 A.2d 649 (2006). This is true as a matter of administrative law as well as common law. See, e.g., State Medical Society v. Connecticut Board of Examiners in Podiatry, 203 Conn. 295, 302, 524 A.2d 636 (1987) (‘[i]t is a principle of common law that [o]ne who causes loss of business or occupation to another merely by engaging in a business or occupation in good faith is not liable to the other for the loss so caused, though he knows that the loss will result’ . . .). However . . . the legislature has, at times, conferred standing on market competitors by statute, creating a limited exception to this general common-law rule. See Light Rigging Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 219 Conn. 168, 176–77, 592 A.2d 386 (1991).” (Emphasis added.) High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health, supra, 352 Conn. 705–706. Next, we recount the basis for the trial court’s determi- nation that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate statutory aggrievement, as set forth in its comprehensive and well reasoned memorandum of decision filed on December 10, 2024. Specifically, the court stated: “[T]he court con- cludes from the record . . . that [the plaintiff] is asserting financial and competitive interests to support its claim of aggrievement. Both [the plaintiff’s] pleadings and the testimony of . . . Beaudion before the [Office of Health Strategy] make it clear that [the plaintiff] is primarily concerned that granting a [certificate of need] to a com- peting [ambulatory surgery center] will allow HHC to siphon off surgical patients from [the plaintiff]. Because [the plaintiff] uses the fees earned from surgical patients to offset other unprofitable areas of care and to balance [the plaintiff’s] finances more generally, [the plaintiff] is concerned that the operation of the [ambulatory surgery center by HHC] will harm [the plaintiff’s] long-term financial health. Thus, [the plaintiff] is plainly seeking to vindicate its own financial and competitive interests. . . .  Day Kimball Healthcare, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health “[I]n evaluating similar claims of competitive harm, our . . . Supreme Court has made clear that there is only a ‘limited exception’ to the general rule that harm to competitive interests does not establish aggrievement and that this limited exception applies only where the legislature explicitly provides for the protection of competitors in the text of the statute itself. See United Cable [Television Services Corp. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control], supra, 235 Conn. 356; [see also] New England Cable [Television Assn., Inc. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 247 Conn. 95, 108, 717 A.2d 1276 (1998)]. Here, the court concludes that [the plaintiff] cannot clear that hurdle.” In reaching that conclusion, the court first distinguished Light Rigging Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, supra, 219 Conn. 176, which involved a statute governing the licensing of motor carriers that “explicitly required the [Department of Public Utility Control] to consider how the granting of a new license to a competitor would impact already existing licensees.” (Emphasis added.) The court also examined the legisla- tive history of § 19a-639 (a) and found that it did “not support the idea that the statute was intended to protect the interests of competitors.” Moreover, the court, after noting that only subdivi- sions (8) and (9) of § 19a-639 (a) refer to “existing” health care facilities such as Day Kimball Hospital, concluded that, “to the extent that [the plaintiff] assert[ed] that it ha[d] standing or [could] otherwise assert aggrievement under . . . § 19a-639 (a) (1) through (7) or (10) through (12) . . . [the plaintiff] ha[d] no specific personal and legal interest in the interests protected by those statutory [subdivisions] because those [subdivisions] relate to the overall Connecticut health care system and/or the fitness of HHC to open an [ambulatory surgery center]. . . . [The plaintiff] may not appoint itself as, in effect, the repre- sentative of the public health system in northeastern Con- necticut. . . . Additionally, the court conclude[d] that [the reference in § 19a-639 (a) (11)] to ‘[w]hether the applicant has satisfactorily demonstrated that the proposal will not negatively impact the diversity of health care providers  Day Kimball Healthcare, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health and patient choice in the geographic region’ reflect[ed] the legislature’s concern regarding vertical integration of health care providers, not a desire to protect business competitors.” (Citations omitted.) Consequently, the court concluded that, considering the text of § 19a-639 (a), its relationship to other directly related statutes, as well as its legislative history, “§ 19a-639 (a), includ- ing [subdivisions] (8) and (9), is intended to protect the interests of the health care consuming public at large, not potential competitors to those seeking a [certificate of need].” With this background in mind, we turn to the plain- tiff’s statutory aggrievement claims on appeal. A The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly dismissed its administrative appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of its determination that the financial and competitive interests asserted by the plaintiff were not within the zone of interests protected by § 19a-639 (a). The plaintiff contends that the “court’s decision is based on the faulty premise that the relevant statutory guidelines are completely divorced from the competitive implications of an applicant’s application for a [certificate of need] on an existing provider,” and that the “[Health Systems Planning Unit] cannot lawfully analyze the economic issues in the health care market- place as required by . . . § 19a-639 (a) without recognizing and considering inevitable and concurrent competitive effects on existing providers who have already been approved by Connecticut licensure and [the] [certificate of need] process.” In support of its claim, the plaintiff relies on Light Rigging Co. and asserts that “[t]here is no distinction between analyzing ‘existing motor trans- portation facilities and the effect upon them’ [as was done pursuant to the statute] in Light Rigging [Co.], and the required analysis [under subdivision] (11) [of § 19a-639 (a) concerning] existing [providers] in the region to determine whether they will suffer a negative impact.” According to the plaintiff, this factor “plainly  Day Kimball Healthcare, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health gives [it] standing as one of the very providers to be impacted under the language of [subdivision] (11) of . . . § 19a-639 (a).” The plaintiff further maintains that “[e]conomic analysis is pervasive in the state’s [certificate of need] statutory framework,” as evidenced by, for example, subdivision (2) of § 19a-639 (a), which mandates the Health Systems Planning Unit “to consider and make written findings concerning ‘[t]he relationship of the proposed project to the state-wide health care facilities and services plan,’ and [subdivision] (12) . . . [which] requires consideration of ‘[w]hether the applicant has sat- isfactorily demonstrated that any consolidation result- ing from the proposal will not adversely affect health care costs or accessibility to care.’ ” For the reasons that follow, we conclude that our Supreme Court’s recent decision in High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health, supra, 352 Conn. 697, is dispositive of the plaintiff’s claim.8 We first provide an overview of High Watch. The sole issue on appeal before our Supreme Court in High Watch 8 We note that, on April 15, 2025, the plaintiff’s appellate counsel filed a motion with this court seeking an extension of time in which to file its appellate brief. In its motion, the plaintiff explained that it had been contacted by counsel for the department and the Office of Health Strategy and informed that counsel for those defendants intended to file a motion to transfer this appeal to our Supreme Court so that it could be heard with High Watch, which involved a similar issue. The plaintiff’s counsel sought the extension to be able to confer with the plaintiff regarding the impending motion to transfer the appeal. This court granted an extension to April 25, 2025, for the plaintiff to file its brief. On April 24, 2025, the department and the Office of Health Strategy filed a motion seeking the transfer of this appeal to our Supreme Court, and the plaintiff filed its appellate brief that same day, without seeking an extension of time to file its brief until after the release of the decision in High Watch. After our Supreme Court denied the motion to transfer, the department, the Office of Health Strategy, and HHC sought and were granted extensions to file their briefs after the release of the decision in High Watch. On August 5, 2025, our Supreme Court issued its decision in High Watch; see High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health, supra, 352 Conn. 697; and, on October 14, 2025, the department, the Office of Health Strategy, and HHC filed their appellate briefs in which they similarly asserted that the High  Day Kimball Healthcare, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health was “whether the plaintiff, High Watch Recovery Cen- ter, Inc. [(High Watch Recovery), a nonprofit substance abuse treatment facility, was] aggrieved by, and there- fore ha[d] standing to contest, on appeal to the Superior Court, the administrative decision of the [department] . . . approving, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 19a-639 (a), the certificate of need application of the plaintiff’s competitor, the defendant, Birch Hill Recovery Center, LLC (Birch Hill).”9 (Footnote omitted.) Id., 699. In High Watch, the Superior Court, Budzik, J., had determined that High Watch Recovery was not aggrieved by the department’s decision to approve Birch Hill’s application for a certificate of need. Id., 702–703. On appeal, High Watch Recovery asserted “that, as an existing addiction services facility, it ha[d] standing to contest the department’s decision approving Birch Hill’s application to establish a competing substance abuse treatment facility.” Id., 703; see also In re Ava W., 336 Conn. 545, 554, 248 A.3d 675 (2020) (“[a]ggrieve- ment, in essence, is appellate standing” (internal quota- tion marks omitted)). Although High Watch Recovery acknowledged the general rule that “allegations that a governmental action will result in competition harmful to the complainant’s business would not be sufficient to qualify the complainant as an aggrieved person”; (inter- nal quotation marks omitted) High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health, supra, 352 Conn. Watch decision is dispositive of the plaintiff’s appeal. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for permission to file a supplemental brief addressing the decision in High Watch and its impact on the present case. The department, the Office of Health Strategy, and HHC filed objections to the plaintiff’s motion, asserting that the plaintiff could address the High Watch decision in its appellate reply brief. This court denied the plaintiff’s motion for supplemental briefing on November 3, 2025, after which the plaintiff filed its reply brief in which it addressed the applicability of the High Watch decision. 9 We note that the 2017 revision of § 19a-639 (a), which was at issue in High Watch, does not differ in any meaningful way from the 2019 revision of § 19a-639 (a) at issue in the present case. See Public Acts 2018, No. 18-91, § 26 (making minor changes to subsection (a), includ- ing replacing “Department of Public Health” with “Office of Health Strategy”).  Day Kimball Healthcare, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health 705; it contended that the legislature established a statu- tory exception to that rule in General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 19a-639 (a), which, it asserted, “ ‘creates a zone of interests that includes existing certifi[ed] health service providers, [given t