Bay Area Unitarian v. Ogg

Case: 23-20165 Document: 271-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/31/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ____________ FILED July 31, 2026 No. 23-20165 ____________ Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Bay Area Unitarian Universalist Church; Drink Houston Better, L.L.C., doing business as Antidote Coffee; Perk You Later, L.L.C., Plaintiffs—Appellants, versus Harris County District Attorney Kim Ogg; County Sheriff Ed Gonzalez; Webster Acting Chief Pete Bacon; Chief of Houston Police Department J. Noe Diaz, Defendants—Appellees. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:20-CV-3081 ______________________________ ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC Before Elrod, Chief Judge, and Jones, Smith, Stewart, Richman, Southwick, Haynes, Graves, Higginson, Willett, Duncan, Engelhardt, Oldham, Wilson, Douglas, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges. * _____________________ * Judge Ho was recused and did not participate in the decision. Case: 23-20165 Document: 271-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/31/2026 No. 23-20165 Edith Hollan Jones, Circuit Judge, joined by Elrod, Chief Judge, and Smith, Stewart, Richman, Southwick, Haynes, Willett, Duncan, Engelhardt, Oldham, Wilson, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges: † The sole issue in this en banc appeal is whether the plaintiff property owners have Article III standing to sue a district attorney, a sheriff, and two police chiefs for the purpose of invalidating, in part, a Texas statute that criminalizes carrying guns onto premises on which the owners prohibit firearms. 3 For several reasons, they have no standing. The district court’s judgment denying relief is AFFIRMED. I. One plaintiff owns a coffee shop in Houston; the other is a Unitarian Universalist church located near Houston in Webster, Texas. The property owners do not want anyone who carries a firearm to enter their premises. Texas lawmakers furthered their goal by enacting laws that criminalize entry on another’s property as trespass even if the gun owner has a handgun license, so long as the property owner has given “effective” notice that entry with a handgun is forbidden. 4 Texas Penal Code Section 30.06 applies to those licensed to carry a concealed handgun, and Section 30.07 covers licensees who openly carry holstered handguns. To plaintiffs, however, the _____________________ † Chief Judge Elrod and Judge Willett concur in the judgment and join in all Parts except for Part III-B. Judge Richman concurs only in the judgment because there is no redressability. Judge Southwick concurs in the judgment and joins in Parts III.A and III.C. Judge Haynes concurs only in the judgment. Judge Ramirez concurs in the judgment and joins all Parts, except Part III.B and III.C. 3 Tex. Penal Code §§ 30.06, 30.07. 4 The plaintiffs do not challenge a separate statute that prescribes criminal trespass if the person is not carrying a license or, if carrying a license, fails to conceal or holster the handgun. Tex. Penal Code § 30.05 (a), (f). 2 Case: 23-20165 Document: 271-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/31/2026 No. 23-20165 rub is in the definition of what constitutes effective notice. In materially identical language, both statutes provide that notice may be given orally or by written communication to the armed individual. In the context of Section 30.06, a “written communication” means: (A) a card or other document on which is written language identical to the following: “Pursuant to Section 30.06, Penal Code (trespass by license holder with a concealed handgun), a person licensed under Subchapter H, Chapter 411, Government Code (handgun licensing law), may not enter this property with a concealed handgun”; or (B) a sign posted on the property that: (i) includes the language described by Paragraph (A) in both English and Spanish; (ii) appears in contrasting colors with block letters at least one inch in height; and (iii) is displayed in a conspicuous manner clearly visible to the public. Tex. Penal Code § 30.06(c)(3). The open carry provision is nearly identical, with “written communication” being defined as: (A) a card or other document on which is written language identical to the following: “Pursuant to Section 30.07, Penal Code (trespass by license holder with an openly carried handgun), a person licensed under Subchapter H, Chapter 411, Government Code (handgun licensing law), may not enter this property with a handgun that is carried openly”; or (B) a sign posted on the property that: (i) includes the language described by Paragraph (A) in both English and Spanish; 3 Case: 23-20165 Document: 271-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/31/2026 No. 23-20165 (ii) appears in contrasting colors with block letters at least one inch in height; and (iii) is displayed in a conspicuous manner clearly visible to the public at each entrance to the property. Tex. Penal Code § 30.07(c)(3). Aside from slight variations in the text of the signs, the only meaningful difference is that Section 30.07(c)(3)(B)(iii) requires the sign to be clearly visible “at each entrance to the property,” while the concealed carry statute does not mention entrances to the property. Although each plaintiff posted one or both prescribed signs to fend off handgun-carrying individuals, they object to the burdensome, “ugly,” and “intimidating” appearance of the required signs. Plaintiffs filed suit in federal court in September 2020. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, based on alleged violations of the First Amendment, against those portions of the statutes that condition criminal trespass on whether a property owner followed the prescribed language and format of signs denying access to gun owners. The remaining defendants 5 are the Harris County District Attorney and Sheriff and the police chiefs of Houston and Webster. Plaintiffs contend that their “desire to be protected by the law compels them to post signs that they otherwise would not. For Plaintiffs, who would prefer to speak their message in a different, less burdensome and less costly format, this compulsion is an injury.” When initial procedural activities were complete, the district court granted the Houston Police Chief’s Rule 12(c) motion to dismiss, Bay Area Unitarian Universalist Church v. Paxton, No. CV H-20-3081, 2022 WL _____________________ 5 Plaintiffs originally joined as defendants, but later dismissed the Texas Attorney General, the head of the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement, and the Harris County Attorney. 4 Case: 23-20165 Document: 271-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/31/2026 No. 23-20165 22869779, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2022), the Harris County Defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion to dismiss, and the Webster Police Chief’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, Bay Area Unitarian Universalist Church v. Paxton, No. CV H-20-3081, 2023 WL 2563998, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2023). The district court concluded that the plaintiffs lack Article III standing to sue. Its reasoning rested primarily on the plaintiffs’ lack of Article III “injury” from the existence of the challenged provisions and secondarily on the lack of “traceability” of their alleged injury to any actions by the defendants. In addition, the court pointed out that “redressability” is lacking because federal courts do not have power to rewrite a state criminal statute as plaintiffs would like it, that is, to rewrite the law to denominate a criminal trespass violation for whatever type of sign they should choose to post. On plaintiffs’ appeal to this court, a divided panel held that plaintiffs enjoy Article III standing and accordingly reversed and remanded for litigation on the merits of their complaint. Bay Area Unitarian Universalist Church v. Ogg, No. 23-20165, 2025 WL 1066187, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 9, 2025) (unpublished). A majority of this court then voted for en banc review, Order Granting Rehearing En Banc, Bay Area Unitarian Universalist Church v. Ogg, No. 23-20165, (Sept. 29, 2025), thus vacating the panel opinion. II. “A Rule 12(c) ‘motion for judgment on the pleadings is [ ] reviewed de novo.’” Hayes v. GStek, Inc., 175 F.4th 603, 607 (5th Cir. 2026) (quoting Wetherbe v. Tex. Tech Univ. Sys., 138 F.4th 296, 300 (5th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1492 (2026) (alteration in original)). “A court will ‘evaluate a motion under Rule 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings using the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.’” Id. (quoting Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 543–44 (5th Cir. 2010)). “Where, as here, ‘the district court rules on jurisdiction without 5 Case: 23-20165 Document: 271-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/31/2026 No. 23-20165 resolving factual disputes . . . we consider the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true and review whether the district court’s application of the law is correct.’” Di Angelo Publications, Inc. v. Kelley, 9 F.4th 256, 260 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Laufer v. Mann Hosp., L.L.C., 996 F.3d 269, 271 (5th Cir. 2021)). Further, a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is reviewed de novo. Id. at 259-60. The court also had before it depositions from the church and the Webster Police Chief to consider in evaluating the dismissal motion. III. Federal courts have Article III jurisdiction to hear “[c]ases and [c]ontroversies” only if plaintiffs claim (1) an “injury in fact,” (2) that is “fairly traceable” to the defendants’ challenged conduct, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As this court recently recited, standing doctrine should not be too complex. United States v. Texas, 173 F.4th 659, 662 (5th Cir. 2026) (en banc). A modicum of analysis demonstrates that none of these preconditions are fulfilled. These plaintiffs have only rank and counter-factual speculation about their “injury,” their injury is not caused by or traceable to the defendants, and federal courts may not redress their alleged injury. Before cataloguing the ways in which plaintiffs’ claims are deficient for standing purposes, a few facts need to be pointed out. The challenged criminal statutes were designed to accommodate property owners’ constitutional right to refuse access to gun toters while protecting the rights of licensed gun owners to carry open or concealed firearms. Criminal trespass thus occurs if the licensed gun owner, despite being warned not to enter a property either orally or in writing with a card or according to the 6 Case: 23-20165 Document: 271-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/31/2026 No. 23-20165 prescribed signage, enters and refuses to leave. This means, as the testimony showed, that police may arrest and charge as a trespasser under these provisions a person who was told to leave or was warned by the prescribed sign. A property owner is not, however, compelled by the criminal statutes to post required signage, and may post whatever warning he or she desires, or no printed warning. In these situations, if a licensed gun toter enters the premises, the property owner may orally advise the person to leave, and if he refuses, the police may arrest the trespasser pursuant to the provisions challenged here. To be precise, the licensed gun carrier has a statutory defense to the trespass statute if he has not been advised by the owner’s oral or prescribed written communication that guns are forbidden on the property. But even then, the owner is not without recourse to the deterrent effect of criminal law: on summoning law enforcement, the owner may have the police provide the statutory oral warning or may eject the intruder. In each instance, the intruder may be prosecuted for violating the challenged statute or the officer’s command. Confirming what is obvious from the statutes’ face, the church administrator stated that when the church has called the Webster police on various occasions, they have always responded to the calls. The Webster Police Chief affirmed that his department responds to trespass and other calls regardless whether the property owner elected to use the statutes’ prescribed signage. As to the City of Houston and Harris County defendants, plaintiffs failed to allege any facts that police officers cannot or will not respond to calls about gun-toting trespassers, or that they cannot or will not eject and charge gun-toting trespassers irrespective of compliance with the challenged statutes. 7 Case: 23-20165 Document: 271-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 07/31/2026 No. 23-20165 Although the parties’ briefing has focused on the injury component of Article III standing, the criterion of “traceability” between the defendant law enforcement officials’ conduct and the plaintiffs’ claimed injuries presents an initial, insuperable obstacle to standing. The lack of “redressability” of plaintiffs’ injuries by a federal court’s judgment is another plain impediment. Therefore, although each of plaintiffs’ theories of injury is dubious, we initially assume arguendo that sufficiently cognizable legal injury exists. See, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 1925 (1976); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Senate, 432 F.3d 359, 360 (D.C. Cir. 2005). A. Traceability For standing analysis, traceability means that a plaintiff must connect the defendants’ conduct to claimed constitutional violations. Traceability means, at a minimum, causation in fact. See, e.g., Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 768, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2566 (2019). This concept does not require but-for causation, Khodara Env’t, Inc. v. Blakey, 376 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2004) (Alito, J.), but traceability is not demonstrated if the violations arise from another cause or the act of third parties, Simon, 426 U.S. at 41–42, 96 S. Ct. at 1926. And allegations and proof of traceability must reveal more than speculation or conjecture that the defendants’ actions will violate plaintiffs’ rights. Plaintiffs’ briefs acknowledge their basic problem: all of the defendants are mandated to enforce Texas criminal laws as written! Sections 30.06 and 30.07 do not allow charging or prosecuting persons who, as licensed gun owners, enter property of others where no oral warning against their entry has been given nor prescribed signs posted. That does not mean plaintiffs are bereft of protection. Law enforcement may otherwise protect the property owner—just not by means of these statutes—against intruding licensed gun carriers. It is not officers of the law who “cause” the injuries of 8 Case: 23-20165 Document: 271-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 07/31/2026 No. 23-20165 which plaintiffs complain, but the terms of the law itself and actors who decide to intrude against the plaintiffs’ wishes. See California v. Texas, 593 U.S. 659, 675, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2117 (2021) (“[T]he States also have failed to show how this injury is directly traceable to any actual or possible unlawful Government conduct. . . .” (emphasis added)). Plaintiffs’ real complaint is about the underinclusiveness of these challenged statutes. Contrary to the usual case in which traceability exists, the law here does not coerce plaintiffs’ conduct. Nothing prohibited by these criminal statutes can be enforced by the defendants against the plaintiffs. Cf. id. at 670, 141 S. Ct. at 2114 (Article III standing cases “have consistently spoken of the need to assert an injury that is the result of a statute’s actual or threatened enforcement, whether today or in the future.” (emphasis in original; citing cases)). If plaintiffs choose to promote enforcement of these criminal trespass provisions by purchasing and displaying the prescribed signage or by giving oral notice, that is their choice, wholly unaffected by law enforcement’s conduct. But if the property owners decline to adopt the law’s requirements, those choices do not “cause” law enforcement to “violate” plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Law enforcement officers instead protect the property owners by answering their call, ordering the gun carrier to leave, and charging and prosecuting any violations that may ensue from those procedures. In such situations, the actions of third parties, not law enforcement, may “cause” a violation of plaintiffs’ rights to exclude. That chain of causation cannot “be traced to the . . . defendant[s].” Simon, 426 U.S. at 41, 96 S. Ct. at 1926. Plaintiffs’ theory of traceability thus depends on the effect of the law or the conduct of others and is wholly speculative. Plaintiffs state that their alleged injuries “flow from the challenged statutes’ immunization of license holders from criminal trespass liability (unless Plaintiffs post the prescribed signs).” It is false to suggest that gun carriers are “immunized” from 9 Case: 23-20165 Document: 271-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 07/31/2026 No. 23-20165 liability, it is speculative to imply that law enforcement will decline to protect these property owners, and it is speculative to “predict[]” that if the owners do not post the designated signs, some licensed gun carriers will enter their property. Like other property owners in Texas, the plaintiffs may eject any unwanted visitor from their property. As previously noted, there is no support in the record, in evidence or factual allegations, for the proposition that law enforcement, including any of the named defendants, will fail to aid these plaintiffs when they seek official assistance to remove gun carriers. Regarding their fears that licensed gun owners will deliberately enter their property in the absence of the required signs, they even concede, “[t]o be sure, some license holders might trespass on Plaintiffs’ property no matter what the statutory language.” So, what is more “predictable”? To acknowledge the alternative possibilities is to show that plaintiffs are engaged in conjecture. Traceability for standing purposes must be based on more than speculation about the defendants’ conduct or that of third parties. Simon, 426 U.S. at 41–45, 96 S. Ct. at 1926–27. In any event, it has long been understood that “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619, 93 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1973). And the Supreme Court has added that the same concerns denying individuals the right to coerce law enforcement also prevent their “effort to compel the State to enact a code in accord with [their] interests.” Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65, 106 S. Ct. 1697, 1705 (1986). It isn’t just what the defendants allegedly don’t do here that annoys the plaintiffs, but what the law doesn’t do. Either way, their claims fail. The lack of “traceability” may be illustrated by simple analogies. A property owner may believe that the 30 mph speed limit on his quiet residential street creates hazardous driving conditions that may result in collisions on his property or physical danger. But law enforcement does not 10 Case: 23-20165 Document: 271-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 07/31/2026 No. 23-20165 “cause” a “violation” of the property owner’s rights by not ticketing drivers going 28 mph. Nor does law enforcement “cause” an illegal nuisance to arise if one landowner’s nocturnal lighting brightly illuminates the neighbor’s backyard but remains below the local code’s maximum prescribed lumens. Likewise in this case, the defendants’ actions or inaction are in no way traceable to the plaintiffs’ alleged First Amendment harms. B. Redressability Even if there were plausible injuries to the plaintiffs, and even if the injuries were somehow traceable to the defendants’ conduct, still, as the district court explained, it is beyond the power of federal courts to redress the injuries. Redressability requires that it be “‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S. Ct. at 2136 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43, 96 S. Ct. at 1924, 1926). First, because the statutes do not coerce the plaintiffs into engaging in the complained-of conduct, the defendants cannot be compelled to do or forgo anything in relation to the plaintiffs. Nor, because citizens have no cognizable legal interest in the arrest or prosecution of another, can the defendants be compelled to prosecute trespassers. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 619, 93 S. Ct. at 1149. Injunctions run against defendants, not statutes. As a result, the plaintiffs’ failure to explain what an injunction could possibly order the defendants to do is fatal to their case. The court cannot order the defendants to re-write the statute. Furthermore, the court cannot order the defendants to arrest and prosecute people carrying guns in a manner permitted by the plain text of the statute. Second, elementary principles of federalism and the separation of powers forbid rewriting statutes. “[T]he discretion to delimit the categories of crimes justifying detention, like the discretion to define criminal offenses and prescribe punishments, resides wholly with the state legislatures.” 11 Case: 23-20165 Document: 271-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 07/31/2026 No. 23-20165 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 n.18, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2412 (1984). Federal courts are not super legislatures. Nor may courts revise a statute because judges “deem its effects susceptible of improvement.” Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 398, 104 S. Ct. 756, 764 (1984). Indeed, as the district court recognized, “[t]he law of Article III standing . . . serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146–47 (2013) (citing cases). A final practical caution renders plaintiffs’ idea of redressability— enjoining enforcement of the heightened notice requirements—practically unwise. Even if a court were to do so, these criminal trespass provisions would be left with an undefined, ambiguous reference to “written communication.” Tex. Penal Code §§ 30.06(b), 30.07(b). Licensed gun owners, if charged under the mangled provisions, would have a field day defending against the vagueness of this term, and property owners would have less security about their rights to exclude. C. Injury Multiple theories of “injury” are posited by the plaintiffs to advance their First Amendment claim that the statutorily designed posters communicating “effective notice” to licensed gun carriers are too big, too bold, and too unwelcoming. Plaintiffs want these criminal trespass provisions to apply to whatever posters they choose; they disdain giving oral notice or cards provided by the statutes; and they claim that the First Amendment secures this “right.” Up to now, we have assumed arguendo that at least one claimed form of “injury” exists. All the theories, however, are at least doubtful. To fulfill the “injury” prong of Article III standing, a plaintiff must plead and eventually prove that he “suffered ‘an invasion of a legally 12 Case: 23-20165 Document: 271-1 Page: 13 Date Filed: 07/31/2026 No. 23-20165 protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S. Ct. at 2136). The district court rejected each of plaintiffs’ theories. The following summaries paraphrase or add briefly to the district court’s reasoning. Bay Area Unitarian Universalist Church, 2022 WL 22869779, at *2–5; Bay Area Unitarian Universalist Church, 2023 WL 2563998, at *3–7. First, plaintiffs claim an “asymmetrical injury” from being “compelled” to erect prescribed signs while property owners seeking to thwart other types of trespass need not post the same types of signs. Plaintiffs’ reliance on Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008), is wholly misplaced. The plaintiff in that case suffered potential liability for FEC violations if he failed to comply with regulations that his electoral opponent did not have to satisfy. Id. at 728–31, 128 S. Ct. at 2765– 67. These plaintiffs are under no such threat, and their comparison with other trespass laws draws a false analogy to entirely different circumstances. Second, plaintiffs use the rubric of “unconstitutional conditions” to assert that unless they provide the unconstitutionally prescribed signage, they will be denied enforcement of criminal trespass laws against licensed gun carriers. Setting aside the nuances of this theory, 6 their conclusion has already been shown to be unfounded and conjectural. And to repeat, _____________________ 6 “Under the well-settled doctrine of ‘unconstitutional conditions,’ the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right . . . in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to [the right].” Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317 (1994). This court has observed that the doctrine has not been treated “as an absolute prohibition.” See Dep’t of Tex., Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S. v. Tex. Lottery Comm’n, 760 F.3d 427, 437 n.4 (5th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 13 Case: 23-20165 Document: 271-1 Page: 14 Date Filed: 07/31/2026 No. 23-20165 plaintiffs in any event lack a cognizable legal interest in the prosecution of others. See Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 619, 93 S. Ct. at 1149. Moreover, their claimed First Amendment injuries falter under scrutiny. There is no “compelled” speech, 7 because they are not compelled to post the prescribed signs in order to eject licensed gun carriers from their premises. They may invoke the challenged provisions by cards or oral notice, or they may summon the police to provide notice and enforce the trespassers’ removal. Their claim of monetary “injury” arising from printing the prescribed signage is dubious, because after all, they’d rather invest in some other signs that would presumably cost money to print. 8 Their claim of “reputational harm,” based on a few adverse customer reviews, utterly fails to bear a “‘close relationship’ to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts—namely, the reputational harm associated with the tort of defamation.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 432, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2208 (2021) (quoting Spokeo, 578 U. S. at 341, 136 S. Ct. at 1549). _____________________ 7 What makes this claim of compulsion additionally legally suspect is that plaintiffs agree with the statutes’ purpose; they just disagree with the aesthetics of the prescribed signage. The usual compelled speech claim deals with the speaker’s unwillingness to further the message, not the medium. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 1187 (1943). 8 See also United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 676, 143 S. Ct. 1964, 1970 (2023) (“[m]onetary costs are of course an injury,” but “the alleged injury must be legally and judicially cognizable” (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2317 (1997))). More important, the statutes regulate licensed gun carriers, not the plaintiffs. Thus, “for standing purposes, the absence of coercive power over the plaintiff makes a difference: When ‘a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed’ to establish standing.” Id. at 678, 143 S. Ct. at 1971 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562, 112 S. Ct. at 2137). 14 Case: 23-20165 Document: 271-1 Page: 15 Date Filed: 07/31/2026 No. 23-20165 Plaintiffs’, and the dissents’, final redoubt is their inherent right as property owners to exclude unwanted persons from their property. They allege a deprivation of this right through the loss of the “deterrent value” of these criminal trespass statutes. But they are free to exclude at their will. The statutes do not mandate their acceptance of licensed gun carriers, and prescribed signage is no precondition to their giving out cards or oral notice or calling the police. The facts here are completely distinguishable from the cases cited by the Plaintiffs regarding government regulations that forced a property owner to allow access to the property. 9 As for the dissent, the Supreme Court recently reiterated that “opening up private property to the general public implies a ‘license to all persons to enter,’ meaning that ‘no person is a trespasser by merely entering therein’ unless the property owner has given ‘due notice’ that such a person is banned.” Wolford v. Lopez, 225 L. Ed. 2d 494, 508 (2026) (quoting Commonwealth v. Power, 48 Mass. 596, 602 (1844)). Texas’s legislature opted to provide “due notice” of the criminal trespass law to prevent the law from becoming a trap for constitutionally protected licensed gun carriers. Nothing about ensuring that law abiding citizens have notice before being subject to criminal sanctions threatens property rights. IV. Because these plaintiffs failed to sustain their burden of proving constitutional standing, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. _____________________ 9 Compare Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 162, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2080 (2021) (a regulation requiring union organizing activity on private property violated the Takings Clause); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82–85, 100 S. Ct. 2035, 2041–43 (1980) (upholding a California constitutional provision allowing handbill solicitors on private shopping center property). 15 Case: 23-20165 Document: 271-1 Page: 16 Date Filed: 07/31/2026 No. 23-20165 Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge, joined by Elrod, Chief Judge, concurring in part and in the judgment: Article III standing requires three things: injury in fact, causation, and redressability. 1 I agree that all three are lacking. I part ways with the majority’s redressability analysis, however. The majority rejects redressability because relief should not issue. But that is not the question: redressability asks whether the requested relief, if granted, would remedy the plaintiffs’ injury; it does not ask whether relief should be granted. 2 I would find redressability lacking for a different reason. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin enforcement of the written-notice requirements. Injunctions, however, run against parties, not statutes. 3 Plaintiffs have not explained what an injunction would require Defendants to do, and they disclaim the one thing—arresting and prosecuting trespasses even where written notice is lacking—that could remedy their alleged injuries. Plaintiffs also seek a declaration that the written-notice requirements are unconstitutional. But they have shown neither that “future litigation is likely to happen” nor “that the declaration’s preclusive effect will likely help [them] in that litigation.” 4 On the contrary, because the defendants in future (hypothetical) trespass prosecutions are not parties to this case, any declaration in this case would _____________________ 1 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 2 See 15 Moore’s Federal Practice § 101.42 (3d ed. 2026) (“Redressability does not require that the plaintiff actually be entitled to the relief sought; it is enough that the requested relief, if granted, would redress the plaintiff’s injury.”). 3 See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2495 (2021) (mem.). 4 Wells v. Johnson, 150 F.4th 289, 302 (4th Cir. 2025). 16 Case: 23-20165 Document: 271-1 Page: 17 Date Filed: 07/31/2026 No. 23-20165 have no preclusive effect in those ones—and thus would be “little more than an advisory opinion.” 5 _____________________ 5 Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255, 293 (2023). 17 Case: 23-20165 Document: 271-1 Page: 18 Date Filed: 07/31/2026 No. 23-20165 Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge, dissenting: As Justice Cardozo artfully expressed, the law requires us to reconcile opposites: “[C]ompeting values each have merit yet still oppose each other, and must somehow be brought together so that as much as possible of the good in each can be protected and preserved.” Appellate Judicial Opinions 235 (Robert A. Leflar ed., 1974). This case asked us to harmonize conflicting fundamental rights—liberty and property—to the best of our ability. Instead, the majority chose justiciability. As a result, Texas, accommodated by our court, has, once again, passed a law sheltered from review that merits litigation may have proven unconstitutional. Cf. Whole Women’s Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 59 (2021) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). And, once again, I dissent. * * * The majority relegates injury to the end of its standing analysis and the right to exclude to the end of that discussion. But the tension between property owners’ rights and gun owners’ rights should be front and center in this case, as it was in the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Wolford v. Lopez. See 146 S. Ct. 2032 (2026). There, the Court considered the inverse of the Texas statutes at issue in this case. The Court held that a Hawaii law requiring a property owner’s express consent for someone to lawfully carry a firearm on their premises violated the Second Amendment. Id. at 2040–41. Valid consent entailed only “clear and conspicuous signage” at a building’s entrance or elsewhere “on the premises,” without any specific language or size demands. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 134-9.5 (2023). Even with that minimal requirement—akin to 18 Case: 23-20165 Document: 271-1 Page: 19 Date Filed: 07/31/2026 No. 23-20165 Texas’s general trespass law in § 30.05 1 and much more flexible than §§ 30.06 and 30.07 2—Justice Alito, writing for the Court, acknowledged the burden that notice put on a property owner: Some proprietors who do not themselves object to entry by carry-permit holders may be reluctant to post a sign welcoming such individuals for fear of alienating other customers. So under Hawaii’s new default rule, a proprietor in this category may only be willing to consent discreetly to the entry of permit holders who make the effort to inquire. Wolford, 146 S. Ct. at 2047. _____________________ 1 Tex. Penal Code § 30.05(b)(2)(C) (“‘Notice’ means . . . a sign or signs posted on the property or at the entrance to the building, reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders, indicating that entry is forbidden.”). 2 A Texas proprietor seeking to keep out all firearms must post three distinct, large signs. Two for licensed handguns, prescribed by §§ 30.06 and 30.07, and another for other firearms under § 30.05(c). See Tex. Penal Code § 30.06(c)(3)(B) (“‘Written communication’ means . . . a sign posted on the property that: (i) includes the language[, ‘Pursuant to Section 30.06, Penal Code (trespass by license holder with a concealed handgun), a person licensed under Subchapter H, Chapter 411, Government Code (handgun licensing law), may not enter this property with a concealed handgun,’] in both English and Spanish; (ii) appears in contrasting colors with block letters at least one inch in height; and (iii) is displayed in a conspicuous manner clearly visible to the public.”); id. § 30.07(c)(3)(B) (“‘Written communication’ means . . . a sign posted on the property that: (i) includes the language[, ‘Pursuant to Section 30.07, Penal Code (trespass by license holder with an openly carried handgun), a person licensed under Subchapter H, Chapter 411, Government Code (handgun licensing law), may not enter this property with a handgun that is carried openly,’] in both English and Spanish; (ii) appears in contrasting colors with block letters at least one inch in height; and (iii) is displayed in a conspicuous manner clearly visible to the public at each entrance to the property.”); id. § 30.05(c) (“A person may provide notice that firea