78D TEAM, LLC v. U.S. BANK N.A., Etc.
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledApril 1, 2020
Docket3D19-1708
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed April 1, 2020.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D19-1708
Lower Tribunal No. 18-8338
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78D Team, LLC,
Appellant,
vs.
U.S. Bank, N.A., etc.,
Appellee.
An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, Martin Zilber, Judge.
Jacobs Legal, PLLC, and Bruce Jacobs, for appellant.
Burr & Forman LLP, and Nicholas S. Agnello and Matt Mitchell (Fort
Lauderdale), for appellee.
Before EMAS, C.J., and GORDO and LOBREE, JJ.
LOBREE, J.
78D Team, LLC (the “Subsequent Purchaser”) appeals from a payment order
entered pursuant to section 702.10(2), Florida Statutes (2018), in foreclosure
proceedings in favor of U.S. Bank (the “Mortgagee”). The Subsequent Purchaser
challenges the lower court’s purported retroactive and unconstitutional application
of section 702.10(2) to proceedings involving a 2004 mortgage, as well as the
sufficiency of the lost-note affidavit and allegedly fraudulent assignment. We affirm.
The Subsequent Purchaser concedes—and the record makes irrefutable—that
it has never been in privity with any of the parties. Therefore, it lacks standing to
challenge the allegedly unconstitutional impairment of the rights of parties to a
mortgage with regard to which it was neither a party nor beneficiary. See Green
Emerald Homes, LLC v. 21st Mortg. Corp., No. 2D17-2192, 2019 WL 2398015, at
*4-5 (Fla. 2d DCA June 7, 2019) (affirming the “extension to the mortgage
foreclosure context of the hornbook contract law rule that a person who is neither a
party to nor an intended third-party beneficiary of a contract has no rights under the
contract to enforce”); Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So. 2d 68, 76 (Fla. 2000)
(“[C]onstitutional rights are personal in nature and generally may not be asserted
vicariously.”).
We find the lost-note affidavit, in conjunction with the other evidence
accompanying it, sufficient to show that the Mortgagee was a lawful holder of the
note. See Aquasol Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n, No. 3D17-
2
352, 2018 WL 5733627, at *4 (Fla. 3d DCA Oct. 31, 2018) (“We conclude, as this
court and our sister courts have previously held, that HSBC had standing to foreclose
if at the time of filing the action it was the holder or owner of the note.”). 1
We also deem the attack on the assignment to be, alternatively, precluded for
lack of standing, unsupported by the record, or irrelevant to the Mortgagee’s
standing as a holder of the note. See Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Rutledge, 230
So. 3d 550, 552 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (subsequent purchaser lacked standing to argue
that borrower’s signature on note and mortgage was forged); HSBC Bank USA,
Nat’l Ass’n v. Buset, 241 So. 3d 882, 889, 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (rejecting
unclean hands challenge, as subsequent purchaser had notice of purportedly
fraudulent assignment, which was public record valid on its face, and alternatively
holding that “even if this assignment were void or voidable, which it is not, the Bank,
as holder of the note, would have the authority to foreclosure the mortgage”).
1
As in Aquasol, 2018 WL 5733627, at *4 (footnote omitted), we again note that:
[T]his issue was recently addressed by this court in HSBC
Bank USA, N.A. v. Buset, 241 So. 3d 882 (Fla. 3d DCA
2018). In its briefs, however, Aquasol has failed even to
acknowledge, much less address, the Buset opinion. This
is all the more curious given the fact that counsel for
Aquasol was also counsel of record for Buset in that
appeal, so it is difficult to fathom how this failure could be
attributed to mere oversight. We take this opportunity to
remind Aquasol’s counsel that the Rules of Professional
Conduct mandate candor toward the tribunal.
3
Affirmed.
4