Full Opinion

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-2014 JOHN DOE, Appellant v. THE TRUSTEES OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY ________________ Appeal from U.S. District Court, D.N.J. Judge Zahid N. Quraishi, No. 3:24-cv-07125 Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and MASCOTT, Circuit Judges Argued Mar. 11, 2026; Decided: July 21, 2026 ________________ OPINION OF THE COURT KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. Disciplinary proceedings in the context of higher education are not a zero-sum game. Both sides—students reporting misconduct and students accused of misconduct—have legitimate interests that can coexist when universities employ fair disciplinary procedures to seek truth and accountability. There is a wide range of permissible procedural safeguards that universities can implement to accommodate both the vital protection of victims’ rights and the essential fairness owed to respondents. Yet in their worthy quest to erase the scourge of assault, particularly sexual assault, from their campuses, many universities have struggled to find the proper balance between these countervailing interests. Princeton University is among them. We have had occasion to consider concerns about Princeton’s disciplinary procedures in the past, see Doe v. Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2022) (Princeton III), and Princeton has taken remedial steps in the interim to address some of those issues. But the appeal before us suggests others linger. In the underlying complaint filed by John Doe, a student accused of misconduct by two female students, John alleges that Princeton found him responsible and suspended him for two years as a result of disciplinary proceedings rife with hostility to John, disparate treatment of witnesses, and unsupported credibility assessments.1 The District Court dismissed the complaint, concluding those allegations were insufficient to support John’s state-law contract claims or his sex discrimination claim under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Because we view the allegations as sufficient, we will reverse and remand as to the dismissal of all claims included in this appeal. 1 We use the term “proceedings” to refer to the entire disciplinary process, including Princeton’s investigation and live hearing. 2 I. BACKGROUND A few weeks after classes began for the fall 2023 semester, John Doe, a sophomore at Princeton, received an unexpected message: A university investigator wanted to interview him as soon as possible regarding unspecified allegations that he had engaged in misconduct. When John met with the investigator a few days later, he learned that two former friends, both female students, had accused him of choking them in separate incidents during the previous semester. He was interviewed for the first and only time about those accusations and denied them. Princeton proceeded to investigate the alleged assaults as violations of its Personal Safety Policy by interviewing student witnesses and compiling an evidence packet that was eventually turned over to the decision-maker: Princeton’s Committee on Discipline. After reviewing the evidence packet and within hours of concluding a late-night disciplinary hearing, the Committee found John responsible for the alleged assaults and suspended him for two years. We will describe the circumstances of each alleged assault, Princeton’s investigation of those allegations, and its decision to punish John for the charged misconduct. At this stage of the proceedings, there has been no discovery or development of an evidentiary record. We are simply reviewing the District Court’s decision to dismiss John’s complaint for failure to state a claim, so we must accept as true, and recount below, the factual allegations as described in that complaint. See Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 340. The following narrative, in other 3 words, “is one-sided because the posture of the case requires it to be,” Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2019), and “[d]iscovery might not bear out [John]’s account,” Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 340. Our task at this stage is merely to determine whether, assuming everything John alleges is true, he has stated a claim for relief. A. The Incident Between John Doe and Sarah Smith The first alleged assault took place at an on-campus party on the night of March 3, 2023, against Sarah Smith, a female student enrolled at Princeton. There, John “spoke closely and loudly with Sarah, in part out of anger” that she had not upheld her promise to keep a close eye on their mutual friend (Student 3) who had recently been harassed at a different party. App. 56. During that heated conversation, three female bystanders asked Sarah if she was okay, but the nearby security guard did not intervene. John denied making any physical contact with Sarah, and although Sarah “almost immediately complained to her roommates about how John had angrily yelled at her,” those roommates later testified that Sarah did not say “the incident ha[d] a physical component.” App. 56. Sarah likewise did not mention anything about choking when she confronted John the following day. Indeed, it was not until four weeks later, after another friend, Jane Roe, claimed to have been choked by John, that Sarah accused John of doing the same to her. 4 B. The Incident Between John Doe and Jane Roe The second alleged choking incident transpired on the night of April 1, 2023, when John’s friend from high school, Jane Roe, was visiting him at Princeton. The night began with a group of friends—including John, Jane, Sarah, Student 3, and Student 4—having drinks in John’s dorm room before they ventured to an on-campus party, leaving John’s roommate (Student 5) behind. The walk to the party was quickly derailed by the fallout from a series of romantic interactions. First, John kissed Jane, upsetting Student 3, who had romantic feelings for John, and causing Student 3 and Student 4 to break off from the group to process Student 3’s hurt feelings. Next, Jane kissed Sarah, upsetting John, who had romantic feelings for Jane. John and Jane then got into an argument about the second kiss, while Sarah lay on the ground “in [a] drunken state.” App. 58. In the middle of that argument, as Student 3 and Student 4 were walking back towards the group, Jane—who was also “highly intoxicated”—abruptly fell backwards into John then dropped to the ground “screaming and crying loudly.” App. 58. Among Jane’s cries were “words to the effect of, ‘Z choked me,’ and, ‘He choked me,’” referencing an ex-boyfriend who had choked Jane when they were dating. App. 58. After the group consoled Jane for one-to-two hours, they made their way back to Sarah’s dorm, where they all agreed Jane would sleep that night. But before parting ways, Jane asked to speak to John alone in a common room and kissed him for the second time that night. Despite the turbulent evening, 5 Jane stayed on Princeton’s campus for several more nights and spent two of those nights in John’s dorm room. In a text message to John on the day after the incident, Jane acknowledged that Sarah had not seen the alleged choking. Nonetheless, in the days and months following the incident, Jane attempted to get John to admit that he had choked her. John consistently denied any memory of doing so. The closest Jane got to an admission was a text from John on the night after the incident, delicately declining to accept her recollection of the evening by stating, “it’s probably that it hasn’t fully soaked in yet cause I haven’t processed what I must have done last night,” App. 60, and a recording of a phone call, which Jane allegedly coerced John to make and send to her—“under threat of reporting him to the University” if he would not comply— in which he told his parents that “on the night in question he was ‘trying to pull [Jane] in to talk to her and, like, damaged her windpipe ever so slightly,’” App. 61 (emphasis omitted). Notwithstanding Jane’s accusations and John’s denials, Jane and Sarah continued to spend time with John after the alleged assaults, even vacationing with him at John’s family home for several nights in late August 2023. A few weeks after that trip, however, Jane learned that John had told another male friend that he was “a little scared of her.” App. 62. As alleged in the complaint, Jane then retaliated by making a complaint to Princeton that John had choked her five months earlier. 6 C. Princeton’s Investigation Princeton dutifully responded to Jane’s allegation by appointing an internal investigator to obtain Jane’s full account. In their initial interview, Jane told the investigator— despite her previously texting John to the contrary—that Sarah witnessed the alleged choking. She also provided a detailed account of the alleged assault, reporting that John “grabbed her by her throat, and lifted her off the ground” for “5-6 seconds,” so she was “straining on her tip toes to get the pressure off of her neck,” App. 70-71, and “having flashbacks and . . . PTSD from her prior rape when she had been choked,” App. 58. But that account changed when Jane was interviewed again later in the investigation. On that occasion, Jane reported that John had not “squeezed her neck at all, but rather just pressed from the front as they talked.” App. 30 (citation modified). In addition to interviewing Jane, the investigator contacted some of the other students with relevant information about the alleged assault, including Sarah, who said at that point that John likewise had choked her on March 3, 2023. Now responding to a second report of choking, Princeton decided to conduct a joint investigation into the two incidents, eventually culminating in a disciplinary hearing. As with Jane, Sarah’s narrative evolved over the course of the joint investigation. She initially told the investigator that John put his hand on her throat and used that hand to hold her in place, but in parallel fashion to Jane, later asserted that John had not actually “meant to choke her” and that he did not 7 actually “grasp” or “squeeze” her neck, but “was more pushing.” App. 75-76 (citation modified). Compounding the inconsistencies in the complainants’ accounts was the investigator’s inconsistent manner of seeking out evidence. She interviewed Jane and Sarah three times each, giving them opportunities to respond to John’s statements. She also, with assistance from Princeton’s Deputy Dean of Undergraduate Students Joyce Chen, interviewed every female and supportive witness identified by the complainants at least once. As it turned out, however, those witnesses provided little by way of corroboration. Sarah’s roommates stated that Sarah did not mention any physical component to her interaction with John on the night she was allegedly choked; Student 3, who had been walking back towards the group with Student 4 on the night Jane was allegedly choked, confirmed that she did not see what happened between John and Jane; and another female witness asserted that Jane’s reaction on the night of her alleged assault was likely due to Jane feeling triggered when John brought up Jane’s ex-boyfriend during their argument. In addition, the investigator asked several female witnesses—but no male witnesses—who had seen Jane in the days following the alleged assault about whether Jane had bruising on her neck and received conflicting answers. On the other hand, John’s initial interview with the investigator, before he had notice of the allegations or formal charges against him, was his only interview that preceded the 8 formal disciplinary hearing. John’s supportive witnesses, all of whom were male, likewise went largely unheard. According to the complaint, the investigator’s treatment of those witnesses did not match the importance of the evidence they had to offer. The investigator did not seek out statements from two individuals with potentially relevant information. The first was John’s roommate, Student 5, who, according to the complaint, could have offered relevant information about whether Jane slept in his and John’s shared dorm room during the week after the alleged assault. The second was Student X, a male student at another university who allegedly could have provided evidence showing that Jane had also recently made false choking allegations against him. The investigator did conduct one interview with the sole eyewitness to Jane’s alleged assault, Student 4. Student 4 advised that John did not touch Jane during the interaction, and that, on the night after the alleged assault, Jane told him that “John did not choke her, but he put his hand on her neck and it brought back the memory of her prior assault.” App. 75 (citation modified). After several weeks of investigation, Dean Chen scheduled a disciplinary hearing and formally charged John with violating Princeton’s Personal Safety Policy, which prohibits “[a]ny physical assault committed . . . on the premises of the University or in the local vicinity, especially when unprovoked 9 and/or when injury results.”2 App. 36. A Committee on Discipline was then convened to adjudicate the charges through a live hearing. D. The Disciplinary Hearing In advance of the hearing, John requested that Student 4 and Student X be called as witnesses. Denying that request as to Student X, Dean Chen explained that the hearing “would focus only on the incidents at hand,” App. 81, and because Student X “was not interviewed,” App. 66, “did not have firsthand knowledge of the incident,” and “only knew about the character of Jane,” App. 81, he would be an impermissible character witness. John then availed himself of alternate avenues to defend against the misconduct allegations. He submitted multiple written statements responding to initial drafts of the evidence packet and detailing Jane’s false allegations against Student X, as well as text messages and photographic evidence contradicting Jane and Sarah’s statements about when they cut off contact with John, where Jane slept for the rest of her time on Princeton’s campus, and whether Jane had bruising on her neck following the alleged assault. Among the text messages was an exchange between John and Jane, in which Jane said she would lie under oath 2 John was also charged with violating Princeton’s Alcohol Policy by serving alcohol to individuals who were underage on the evening of April 1, 2023, but John does not challenge Princeton’s resolution of that charge in this appeal. 10 about her false choking allegations against Student X, and that she could get Sarah to lie for her, too. John’s disciplinary hearing began at 7:27 p.m. on November 6, but one critical party was conspicuously missing—Jane. Dean Chen had informed John the day prior that Jane had declined to attend the hearing and that the proceeding would go forward in any event. At the outset of the hearing, as alleged in the complaint, the Committee questioned John for over ninety minutes. That questioning was “one-sided” and “demanding,” indicating that the Committee members were “hostile to [John’s] account,” App. 77-78, and notwithstanding Dean Chen’s prior representation that the hearing “would focus only on the incidents at hand,” much of it “solely focused on whether or not [John] had good character,” App. 81. Student 4, whose testimony supported John and who was the only eyewitness, was likewise questioned “in an incredibly hostile manner” for forty minutes. App. 33. The Committee homed in on a portion of the evidentiary packet, which suggested Student 4 had said: “Perhaps it happened if she is saying it and it triggered a memory in [Jane’s] head. I don’t think it’s that bad. I don’t think [John] choked her really really hard. I think it is being portrayed a lot worse than it was.” App. 83. According to the complaint, the investigator verified that the quoted statement matched her interview notes. Student 4, however, testified “unequivocally” that he did not make that 11 statement, and a Committee member cut him off as he was trying to explain how he had been misquoted. App. 83. In contrast, Sarah and the complainant-supportive witnesses were allegedly treated “with kid gloves” and questioned for less than thirty minutes each. App. 77. According to the complaint, one Committee member, Professor Elizabeth Harman, “did not ask Sarah even a single question” and even fell asleep during her testimony. App. 85. The late hour of the hearing and the Committee’s preference to conclude that evening contributed to the brevity of the questioning. For example, the Committee instructed Sarah to “keep her answers as concise as possible” because the hearing was taking longer than expected, and it did not press Sarah on the inconsistencies in her statements. App. 85 (citation modified). As with John, however, the Committee did elicit testimony from her about John’s character. E. The Committee’s Decision Although the hearing did not conclude until around 11:30 p.m., the Committee communicated the results of its “extremely limited” deliberations to Dean Chen by 10 a.m. the following morning. App. 87. Dean Chen verbally informed John that the Committee had found him responsible for the charges against him, and the Committee then issued a formal decision letter. That letter included a statement that the Committee “had considered all of the information obtained in the investigation 12 and presented at the hearing,” but it discussed only two pieces of evidence: (1) what it described as “the women’s continued and consistent descriptions of the incidents in communications and conversations with others”; and (2) so-called “admissions and acknowledgements [John] made in text messages.” App. 88 (citation modified). The Committee also wrote that it was not persuaded by John’s assertions that he was blackmailed by Jane into making the purported admissions, though it did not explain why it found John not credible in the absence of any testimony, let alone contradictory testimony, from Jane. Finally, the letter announced the Committee’s decision to suspend John for two years—an unprecedented sanction at Princeton for the charges at issue. That significant penalty was supposedly justified by John’s ostensible pattern of misconduct in these two incidents and a prior disciplinary infraction that the Committee characterized—allegedly in error—as an assault.3 Nowhere in the letter did the Committee acknowledge Jane or Sarah’s inconsistent descriptions of the alleged assaults or specify which of those descriptions it believed were supported 3 According to the complaint, John’s prior disciplinary incident occurred in March 2023, when John and Student 3—frequent Muay Thai partners—were roughhousing. Although Student 3 told the investigating official that “everything that happened between her and John in that incident was done with [her] informed and continuous consent,” John was found responsible for “endangering a student.” App. 90 (citation modified). 13 by the evidence. Nor did the Committee identify which text messages it deemed to contain John’s admissions. At some point following the hearing, John was informed by “a source involved in the [Committee’s] deliberative process” that “most of the [Committee] members had decided John was guilty before the hearing even started,” and Professor Harman, the Committee member who fell asleep during Sarah’s testimony, “even gave an impassioned speech arguing not just that John was guilty, but that it would be a ‘moral failing’ to vote for anything other than expulsion.” App. 33 (emphasis omitted). F. John Doe’s Appeal John subsequently filed an internal appeal of the Committee’s decision on the grounds that the disciplinary procedures were not “fair and reasonable” and the “imposed penalty d[id] not fall within the range of penalties imposed for similar misconduct.” App. 37. He raised various arguments, including that Princeton’s investigator treated male and female witnesses differently, that he was not provided the same follow-up interview opportunities as Jane and Sarah, that Princeton failed to obtain testimony from the witnesses he identified, and that the hearing was improperly rushed. Princeton’s appeal panel emailed John a set of questions probing his critiques and, after reviewing John’s answers, denied the appeal. Although the appeal panel did not comment on several of John’s arguments, it addressed his core objection by concluding that “no procedural irregularity existed in 14 [John’s] hearing” and that John received adequate opportunities to “submit[] supplemental written materials” relevant to the charges at issue. App. 92-93. G. The Federal Complaint John then filed the complaint underlying this appeal, claiming sex discrimination in a federally funded education program, in violation of Title IX,4 as well as breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and gross negligence under state law. The District Court dismissed the complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim, and John filed this timely appeal, challenging all but the dismissal of his gross negligence claim. II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW The District Court had jurisdiction over John’s Title IX claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and over his state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. See Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 341. In conducting that review, “we accept all [the plaintiff’s] 4 Title IX states that “[n]o person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 15 allegations as true and draw all inferences in [his] favor, and we will not dismiss a complaint merely because it appears unlikely that the plaintiff[] can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on the merits.” Stringer v. County of Bucks, 141 F.4th 76, 84 (3d Cir. 2025) (citation modified). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which requires “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,” to state a plausible claim—i.e., to “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). III. DISCUSSION As we consider John’s Title IX and state-law contract claims, we do not write on a blank slate. The legal standards we apply are rooted in two of our prior decisions addressing the sufficiency of a student’s complaints that his university conducted biased and unfair disciplinary proceedings. See Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 343; Doe v. Univ. of Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2020) (USciences). We discuss those decisions below, distilling their legal precepts before applying those precepts to John’s complaint. A. The Framework Established by USciences and Princeton III In both USciences and Princeton III, we concluded that the complaint of the male undergraduate challenging the 16 university’s decision to discipline him for alleged sexual misconduct against a female undergraduate was sufficient to state a claim for violation of Title IX, breach of contract, and, in Princeton III, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Our discussions of the factual allegations in those cases are instructive. 1. Violation of Title IX In support of their Title IX claims, both plaintiffs alleged (1) that the university had “yielded to external pressure when implementing and enforcing” its disciplinary policy, and (2) that “sex was a motivating factor in [the university’s] investigation and decision to impose discipline.” USciences, 961 F.3d at 209; Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 343. Specifically, they pointed to the “more rigorous approach to campus sexual misconduct allegations” ushered in by the United States Department of Education’s 2011 Dear Colleague Letter (2011 DCL) and universities’ “alleged . . . overreaction” to that 17 federal pressure.5 USciences, 961 F.3d at 209-10; see Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 345. We acknowledged the potential relevance of such historical context and concluded that, even though external pressure “cannot alone support a plausible claim of Title IX sex discrimination,” USciences, 961 F.3d at 5 Princeton III, USciences, and most of our sister circuits’ Title IX decisions in the university-discipline context involved complaints of sexual misconduct addressed under the university’s Title IX policy. Here, Princeton instead charged John with violations of its Personal Safety Policy. But our Title IX framework still applies and we analogize to sexual misconduct cases because John’s complaint is fairly read to allege discriminatory discipline in response to complaints of male-against-female violence with romantic overtones. See Doe v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 67 F.4th 702, 705-06, 709 (5th Cir. 2023) (analogizing to sexual misconduct cases in a Title IX challenge to disciplinary proceedings addressing complaints of “mental or bodily harm” to the plaintiff’s former romantic partner); Sheppard v. Visitors of Va. State Univ., 993 F.3d 230, 232-33, 235 (4th Cir. 2021) (same for proceedings resolving complaints of physical assault against the plaintiff’s former girlfriend). For the same reason, John’s allegations that Princeton was under pressure to address complaints of sexual misconduct provide background indicia of sex discrimination that plausibly affected Princeton’s resolution of the nominally non-sexual assault complaints against John. Universities cannot insulate themselves from Title IX liability by recharacterizing disciplinary complaints that, on their face, indicate the alleged misconduct is of a sexual nature and adjudicating those charges under disciplinary policies with lower procedural protections for respondents. 18 210, it did “factor[] into the total mix of information supporting a plausible Title IX claim,” Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 345. Based on that total mix, we held that the alleged external pressure, when combined with the plaintiffs’ allegations of selective enforcement in their individual proceedings, stated a plausible claim for relief. These cases teach that, in the absence of direct evidence, a Title IX plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss by alleging both background indicia of sex discrimination (such as external or internal pressure on the university for its handling of complaints of male-against-female violence), and what is sometimes called a “particularized ‘something more,’” Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chi., 933 F.3d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 2019), namely, “other circumstantial evidence of bias in [his] specific proceeding,” Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018). Although the circumstantial evidence of bias in both USciences and Princeton III involved assertions that the university asymmetrically enforced its disciplinary policies against male and female students, we also emphasized that plaintiffs are “free to characterize their claims however they wish” and are not limited to alleging a particular factual scenario. USciences, 961 F.3d at 209. Instead, we look at the “total mix of information” supporting a plaintiff’s claim, Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 345, which may include, among other things, allegations that a similarly situated female was treated more favorably by the university or, as here, allegations of procedural irregularities in the university’s disciplinary 19 proceedings, see Doe v. Stonehill Coll., Inc., 55 F.4th 302, 334 (1st Cir. 2022) (collecting cases). 2. Contract Claims As for their state contract claims, the USciences and Princeton III plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to state plausible claims that the universities breached promises in their disciplinary policies to provide fair and unbiased conduct proceedings. See 30 F.4th at 347; 961 F.3d at 211-12. In Princeton III, as here, we applied New Jersey law to the plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Because New Jersey law required that a university “follow its own established procedures . . . and that those procedures be fundamentally fair,” we held that the plaintiff stated a plausible breach-of-contract claim by alleging facts showing the university failed to follow its own requirements that policy violations be established “by a preponderance of the evidence,” and that its decision-makers be “impartial and unbiased.” Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 346-47 (citation modified). And though the plaintiff’s breach-of-implied-covenant claim “share[d] facts with” his breach-of-contract claim, those claims did not arise from an alleged contravention of the same code provisions. Id. at 348 & n.16. Thus, the “factual overlap [was] not fatal” and the plaintiff’s allegations of improper performance and bad faith sufficed to state a claim. Id. at 348. With those precedents in mind, we now consider the allegations in John’s complaint. 20 B. Title IX John contends that the investigation and resolution of Jane and Sarah’s disciplinary complaints against him violated Title IX by subjecting him to “the imposition of university discipline when sex [was] a motivating factor in the decision to discipline.” Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 343. We apply a “straightforward pleading standard” to Title IX claims: “The alleged facts, if true, must support a plausible inference that a federally-funded college or university discriminated against a person on the basis of sex.”6 USciences, 961 F.3d at 209 (citation modified). Here, the parties do not dispute that Princeton is a federally funded university and that John’s suspension excluded him from participation in its educational programs and activities, so the only question is whether John plausibly alleged that sex motivated Princeton’s decision to suspend him for two years. We address below the sufficiency of John’s allegations as to 6 By adopting that standard, we diverge from some of our sister circuits that apply specific doctrinal tests, such as erroneous outcome, selective enforcement, or deliberate indifference, to analyze Title IX claims. See Doe v. Univ. of Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2020) (USciences); see also, e.g., Doe v. Stonehill Coll., Inc., 55 F.4th 302, 332 (1st Cir. 2022) (erroneous outcome and selective enforcement); Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 590 (6th Cir. 2018) (deliberate indifference). Nonetheless, plaintiffs remain “free to characterize their claims however they wish.” USciences, 961 F.3d at 209. 21 (1) background indicia of sex discrimination, consisting in this case of internal and external pressure on Princeton to rigorously pursue allegations of male-against-female assault, and (2) circumstantial evidence of bias, including procedural irregularities, in his disciplinary proceedings.7 1. Background Indicia of Sex Discrimination John argues that the 2011 DCL and related Office for Civil Rights (OCR) investigations into Princeton’s handling of sexual assault complaints formed a “backdrop of gender-based pressure” on Princeton “to favor claims of assault brought by women against men.” Opening Br. 47 (citation modified). But the 2011 DCL was rescinded in 2017—years before John’s disciplinary proceedings. Thus, standing alone, that allegation 7 While implicit in our prior decisions, we make clear today that we reject the Second Circuit’s approach of applying a lower pleading standard—requiring only “facts supporting a minimal plausible inference of discriminatory intent,” Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 2016) (emphasis added)—to Title IX claims. As today’s decision reflects, “Rule 8(a)’s liberal pleading standard is lenient enough to allow meritorious discrimination claims to proceed while preserving the gatekeeping function of pleading standards.” Austin v. Univ. of Or., 925 F.3d 1133, 1137 n.4 (9th Cir. 2019); see Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 589. That is not to say that Title IX cases from the Second Circuit have no persuasive value, but we take into account the lower standard against which that court assessed the pleadings. 22 carries little weight. See Doe v. Samford Univ., 29 F.4th 675, 692 (11th Cir. 2022) (stating that allegations about the 2011 DCL, “a government policy that has been rescinded and replaced,” do not assist a Title IX plaintiff “in crossing the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief” (citation modified)). As our sister circuits have observed (and even John’s counsel recognized at oral argument), a plaintiff must allege facts sufficiently close in time to the challenged disciplinary proceedings to show that the pressure on the university to favor certain complainants or respondents based on their gender was active and ongoing.8 John’s complaint meets that threshold by alleging specific incidents suggesting the pressure on Princeton, precipitated by the 2011 DCL, continued into the fall of 2023. Upon rescission of the 2011 DCL, for example, “[a]dministrators immediately stated that Princeton would not change its policies and 8 See, e.g., Stonehill Coll., Inc., 55 F.4th at 336-37 & n.48 (recognizing the 2011 DCL’s rescission, rejecting evidence of a two-year-old OCR inquiry as “too weak to create a plausible inference [of] sex bias,” and noting that the plaintiff cited “no contemporaneous attention to the issue”); Doe v. Univ. of Ark.-Fayetteville, 974 F.3d 858, 863-66, 868 n.1 (8th Cir. 2020) (recognizing the 2011 DCL’s rescission but determining that ongoing OCR and state legislative investigations into the university’s handling of Title IX complaints, as well as a “highly-publicized” lawsuit, supported a plausible claim of sex discrimination); Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018) (noting that consistent “public attention and [an] ongoing investigation” provided a backdrop of gender bias). 23 procedures, insisting that its DCL-era procedures were ‘working well’ and were ‘fair.’” App. 43. Princeton also allegedly submitted comments in 2019 to the United States Department of Education opposing proposed regulations that would increase procedural protections for students accused of sexual misconduct. Then, when those regulations became law in 2020, Princeton announced that “it would nonetheless strive to adhere as closely as possible to its current system in implementing that final rule,” App. 46 (citation modified), labeling the new regulations “problematic in a number of ways,” App. 47 (citation modified). The complaint describes pressure that was internal, too, including a slew of critical, student-authored articles in the campus newspaper, a protest outside the University president’s building by Princeton Students for Title IX Reform that lasted more than two hundred hours, and objections to on-campus speakers who had made controversial statements about the treatment of campus sexual assault. The newspaper articles specifically criticized Princeton’s investigations and hearings in disciplinary proceedings involving male-against-female assault. In 2022, for instance, a female student authored an op-ed detailing her experience of being “choked and strangled by a Princeton graduate student” and criticizing the subsequent disciplinary process because Princeton officials had asked difficult questions that “made her fe[el] shamed” and took testimony from witnesses who accused her of lying. App. 50. Another article, published six months before John’s investigation, lamented that Princeton’s Title IX investigators 24 “often asked questions that were ‘difficult and personal,’ and that complainants’ character were often questioned during the process.” App. 52. Together, these factual allegations suffice to plausibly allege that Princeton was under pressure to crack down on male respondents when enforcing its disciplinary policies against John. See Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 345; USciences, 961 F.3d at 209. But because “allegations about pressure . . . cannot alone support a plausible claim of Title IX sex discrimination,” USciences, 961 F.3d at 210, we will next consider whether John’s complaint adequately alleged “facts particular to his case” that indicate bias in Princeton’s disciplinary process, Columbia Coll. Chi., 933 F.3d at 855. 2. Circumstantial Evidence of Biased Disciplinary Proceedings To establish the “particularized ‘something more’” needed to state a plausible Title IX claim, Columbia Coll. Chi., 933 F.3d at 856, John points to certain procedural irregularities in his specific processes. Although procedural irregularities can “provide strong support for [a] claim of bias,” Doe v. Oberlin Coll., 963 F.3d 580, 587 (6th Cir. 2020), and satisfy the “other circumstantial evidence of bias in [his] specific proceeding,” Baum, 903 F.3d at 586, they “are not inevitably a sign of sex bias,” Stonehill Coll., Inc., 55 F.4th at 334 (emphasis added); see Roe v. St. John’s Univ., 91 F.4th 643, 654 (2d Cir. 2024). The ultimate test is whether the “total mix of information,” including background indicia of sex discrimination, plausibly 25 supports the Title IX claim. Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 345. Those background indicia can provide the necessary “causal connection” between the alleged procedural irregularities and the university’s sex-motivated disciplinary outcome. Baum, 903 F.3d at 585 (citation modified).9 Such is the case here. John’s complaint details several procedural irregularities and statements by decision-makers that—in the context of internal and external pressure on Princeton to favor female complainants over male respondents—state a plausible Title IX claim. 9 John urges us to adopt a sliding-scale approach whereby “[t]he clearer and more significant that any one of these ‘procedural irregularities’ is in a plaintiff’s disciplinary process, the less external support it needs to plausibly suggest gender bias.” Opening Br. 41 (quoting Menaker v. Hofstra Univ., 935 F.3d 20, 33 (2d Cir. 2019)). And he argues that the procedural irregularities in this case “are egregious enough, standing alone, to plausibly support an inference of gender bias.” Op