Full Opinion

FILED OCTOBER 22, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE WADE KING and TERESA KING, ) No. 40472-2-III husband and wife, d/b/a KING RANCH, ) ) Petitioners, ) ) v. ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION HILARY FRANZ, in her official capacity ) as Commissioner of Public Lands, STATE ) OF WASHINGTON, THE ) WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT ) OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ) ) Respondents. ) LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — Wade and Teresa King appeal the Douglas County Superior Court’s order transferring venue of their petition and complaint to Thurston County Superior Court. We reverse the trial court’s transfer order and remand for the court to determine the viability of the Kings’ duty claims. FACTS The Parties At statehood in 1889, the United States granted Washington millions of acres of land that are held in trust to support and fund specified public institutions. Omnibus No. 40472-2-III King v. Dep’t of Nat. Res. Enabling Act of 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676, §§ 11, 13; Conservation Nw. v. Franz, 199 Wn.2d 813, 833, 514 P.3d 174 (2022). The legislature has authorized the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to lease state trust lands for purposes it deems advisable. RCW 79.13.010. As a trust land manager, DNR is obligated to follow the common law duties of a trustee, which include generating revenue, managing trust assets prudently, and using reasonable diligence in pursuing contract claims. County of Skamania v. State, 102 Wn.2d 127, 132-38, 685 P.2d 576 (1984); Conservation Nw., 199 Wn.2d at 829-30. Wade and Teresa King are cattle ranchers who own and operate King Ranch, a generational family ranch in eastern Washington. They are actively engaged in raising and breeding livestock and horses on tens of thousands of acres of private and public land in Grant and Douglas Counties. The Dispute According to the Kings, the crux of the dispute began with the Department of Ecology conducting a “haphazard investigation” leading to “flimsy evidence” and two administrative orders charging the Kings with violating Washington State wetland laws and regulations. Clerks Papers (CP) at 18-19. DNR, initially sympathetic to the Kings, later had a management level meeting with Ecology. Soon after the meeting, DNR ordered the Kings to sign a statement admitting to Ecology’s allegation that it had 2 No. 40472-2-III King v. Dep’t of Nat. Res. damaged 14 alkali ponds with ground disturbing work on the leased land and to promise to cooperate fully with restoration. Their refusal to sign the statement led to DNR terminating their Grant County lease and not renewing their Douglas County lease. Due to the configuration of the Kings’ privately owned and DNR-leased acreages, DNR’s decisions to terminate the Grant County lease and not renew the Douglas County lease will cause them irreparable harm. In the midst of these disputes, Ecology and DNR negotiated and signed an eight- page memorandum of agreement (MOA). The MOA requires DNR to take specific steps so that DNR’s leased lands are managed consistent with Ecology’s views of Washington State wetland protection laws. The Petition/Complaint and the Answer/Counterclaims The Kings filed a petition and complaint for judicial review in Douglas County Superior Court, asking the court to “order DNR to perform its duties and grant [them] relief under the APA[1] and/or other applicable law, including restoration of [their] use and possession of leased ranching lands.” CP at 6. In addition to other claims, the Kings brought two distinct APA claims: (1) one under RCW 34.05.570(2), asserting that DNR violated rulemaking procedures when it entered into the MOA with Ecology, and 1 Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 34.05 RCW. 3 No. 40472-2-III King v. Dep’t of Nat. Res. (2) several under RCW 34.05.570(4), asserting that DNR violated their rights by failing to perform 20 statutory duties it owed them. The petition/complaint also asserted other claims, including unjust enrichment and breach of contract. DNR filed an answer, denied that the MOA constituted a “rule,” and asserted counterclaims. The Motion and the Arguments The same day that DNR filed its answer/counterclaims, it also filed a motion to change venue. DNR, citing RCW 34.05.570(2)(b), argued that the Kings’ rulemaking claim had to be transferred to Thurston County Superior Court. DNR conceded that the Kings’ other claims were properly in Douglas County. The Kings responded that Douglas County was the proper venue for their rulemaking claim because, under RCW 34.05.570(2)(a), a rulemaking claim can be heard in any county if brought in the context of any other review proceeding under this section. The Kings argued that their duty claims were another review proceeding under RCW 34.05.570(4). DNR countered that the Kings’ duty claims were not properly brought under RCW 34.05.370(4). DNR argued that a claim under that subsection must be of an “agency action,” and that the Kings’ duty claims were excluded as “agency action” under RCW 34.05.010(3)(c). 4 No. 40472-2-III King v. Dep’t of Nat. Res. During oral argument, DNR asked that the entire case be transferred to Thurston County in the interest of judicial efficiency. The Kings complained that proceeding in two counties risked inconsistent decisions and “would be a big waste of time, energy, and money for the Courts and the parties.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 12. Nevertheless, they asked the court to transfer only their rulemaking claim if it decided to grant DNR’s motion. The Ruling The trial court requested and received supplemental briefing. Six weeks after the hearing, the court issued its letter decision. The trial court agreed with DNR that the Kings’ duty claims were excluded from the definition of “agency action” under RCW 34.05.010(3)(c). In so concluding, the court reasoned: “[The Kings’ duty claims,] while varied, all . . . relate either directly to decisions over when, how, and to whom land may be leased, or proprietary decisions over how to manage land owned by the State.” CP at 230. The court concluded that those claims could not be brought under RCW 34.05.370(4) but instead must be brought under RCW 79.02.030.2 Because of this, 2 This conclusion caused some confusion to the Kings, who perceived that the trial court had dismissed their duty claims. We agree with DNR, the trial court’s conclusion did not dismiss those claims. We note that the Kings expressly brought their claims under both the APA and RCW 79.02.030. 5 No. 40472-2-III King v. Dep’t of Nat. Res. the court concluded that the Kings’ rulemaking claim was not brought “in the context of” any other review proceeding under section .570 and was required by RCW 34.05.570(2)(b) to be brought in Thurston County. However, the trial court mistakenly believed that the parties had stipulated during oral argument that if the rulemaking claim was transferred, that the entire case should be transferred. For this reason, the court transferred the entire case to Thurston County. The Kings sought discretionary review of the trial court’s transfer order, and we granted review. Comm’r’s Ruling (Dec. 30, 2024). ANALYSIS A. THE BROAD TRANSFER ORDER The Kings argue the trial court erred by transferring the entire case to Thurston County based on a “stipulation” during oral argument that did not exist. DNR does not assert that a stipulation existed. Rather, it argues the trial court had discretion under RCW 4.12.030(3) to transfer all claims to Thurston County. RCW 4.12.030(3) permits a trial court to transfer a case to a different county when “the ends of justice would be forwarded by the change.” “Judicial economy is an appropriate consideration under RCW 4.12.030.” In re Det. of Lewis, 134 Wn. App. 896, 902, 143 P.3d 833 (2006), aff’d, 163 Wn.2d 188, 177 P.3d 708 (2008). 6 No. 40472-2-III King v. Dep’t of Nat. Res. Here, the trial court did not transfer the entire case to Thurston County because of judicial economy. It transferred it based on a “stipulation” that did not exist. We infer that DNR might be asking us to affirm the trial court’s transfer decision on a different basis, namely RCW 4.12.030. We decline this request. Discretionary transfer decisions should be made by a trial court, not an appellate court. B. THE NARROW TRANSFER OF THE KINGS’ RULEMAKING CLAIM The Kings argue they are entitled to have their rulemaking claim heard in Douglas County if that claim is brought “in the context of any other review proceeding under this section.” RCW 34.05.570(2)(a). They contend that their duty claims are properly brought under .570(4)—the “other review proceeding under this section.” The Kings argue the trial court erred by concluding that their duty claims were not properly brought under .570(4). We conclude the record is insufficiently developed for us to decide this issue. 1. Standard of review Our review of a superior court’s order changing venue turns on the reason for the transfer. If the trial court changed venue because the action was filed in an improper county, the decision is not discretionary, and we review the decision de novo. Ralph v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 187 Wn.2d 326, 338, 386 P.3d 721 (2016). If the claim properly 7 No. 40472-2-III King v. Dep’t of Nat. Res. exists in a county, but the trial court changed the venue for witness convenience, the ends of justice, or judicial disqualification, we review the decision for abuse of discretion. Moore v. Flateau, 154 Wn. App. 210, 214, 225 P.3d 361 (2010). Because proper venue under RCW 34.05.570(2)(a)-(b) turns on whether the duty claims qualify as “other review proceeding[s]” within RCW 34.05.570(4), the issue is one of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo. 2. Whether the Kings’ rulemaking claim can be transferred to Thurston County depends on the viability of their duty claims RCW 34.05.570(2)(b)(i) generally requires a party to bring an action in Thurston County if the party seeks to have an agency rule declared invalid. As an exception, RCW 34.05.570(2)(a) permits a rulemaking challenge to be brought in any county if it is brought “in the context of any other review proceeding under this section.” The Kings contend that the “other review proceeding” is their duty claims brought under RCW 34.05.570(4). The parties disagree on whether the Kings’ duty claims are properly brought under RCW 34.05.570(4). RCW 34.05.570(4) is titled, “Review of other agency action.” Subpart (4)(a) provides, “[a]ll agency action not reviewable under subsection (2) or (3) of this section shall be reviewed under this subsection.” 8 No. 40472-2-III King v. Dep’t of Nat. Res. We review statutory interpretation de novo. A Better Richland v. Chilton, 5 Wn.3d 931, 935, 583 P.3d 1 (2026). In interpreting a statute, our fundamental objective is to discover and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Preston v. SB&C, Ltd., 6 Wn.3d 502, 515, 588 P.3d 371 (2026). If the statute’s meaning is plain, we must apply it as written. Id. “We read statutes as a whole and ‘should not interpret [them] in a way that would render any language ‘meaningless or superfluous.’” A Better Richland, 5 Wn.3d at 935 (quoting Wash. State Ass’n of Counties v. State, 199 Wn.2d 1, 12-13, 502 P.3d 825 (2022)). A claim under RCW 34.05.570(4) must challenge “agency action.” The subsection title as well as subpart (4)(a) makes this clear. The central question on appeal is whether the Kings’ duty claims fall within the definition of “agency action.” RCW 34.05.010(3) defines “agency action” as “the implementation or enforcement of a statute, the adoption or application of an agency rule or order, the imposition of sanctions, or the granting or withholding of benefits.” Here, the crux of the dispute involves DNR attempting to enforce wetland statutes and rules against the Kings, who denied that their ranch activities were illegal. Broadly speaking, the Kings allege that had DNR complied with its statutory duties, it would have worked cooperatively with them and concluded they had not violated the law. On the current pleadings and 9 No. 40472-2-III King v. Dep’t of Nat. Res. without resolving the RCW 34.05.010(3)(c) exclusion, the Kings plausibly allege “agency action” as defined in RCW 34.05.010(3); whether any claim is excluded as a proprietary decision requires development and determination below. RCW 34.05.010(3) then defines what “agency action” does not include. Under RCW 34.05.010(3)(c), “agency action” does not include “any sale, lease, contract, or other proprietary decision in the management of public lands or real property interests.” Washington has articulated several tests across different contexts to determine whether a state agency’s actions are governmental or proprietary in nature. Lakehaven Water & Sewer Dist. v. City of Federal Way, 195 Wn.2d 742, 765, 466 P.3d 213 (2020). In State Owned Forests v. Sutherland, 124 Wn. App. 400, 410-13, 101 P.3d 880 (2004), we concluded that RCW 34.05.010(3)(c)’s phrase, “or other proprietary decision,” reflected legislative intent to exclude the full range of business-like trust land management decisions from APA review. Most of the Kings’ arguments regarding this issue are conclusory. The only specific argument the Kings advance is that DNR’s compliance with various statutory duties, such as the ecosystem standards set forth in RCW 79.13.600-.620, are not business-like proprietary decisions. This argument is unhelpful. In an undeveloped 10 No. 40472-2-III King v. Dep’t of Nat. Res. record such as this, we have no intention of examining each of the Kings’ 20 duty claims to determine which involve mostly proprietary rather than nonproprietary decisions. DNR argues the trial court made a finding, unchallenged by the Kings, that their duty claims “relate either directly to decisions over when, how, and to whom land may be leased, or proprietary decisions over how to manage land owned by the State.” CP at 230. We disagree that a trial court’s construction of a party’s pleading amounts to a finding that needs to be challenged on appeal. Neither party’s arguments are helpful in resolving this last issue. We will therefore provide only general guidance to the parties and the trial court. At this point, the Kings’ duty claims have not been challenged. The viability of those claims should be decided by the trial court. If DNR owes a duty to the Kings under the statutes cited, the Kings’ duty claims fit within the type of claims that are properly brought under RCW 34.05.570(4)(b).3 If, however, DNR does not owe a duty to the Kings under the statutes cited, the Kings’ duty claims are not proper claims brought under that subsection. We decline to further 3 RCW 34.05.570(4)(b) provides in relevant part: “A person whose rights are violated by an agency’s failure to perform a duty that is required by law to be performed may file a petition for review pursuant to RCW 34.05.514, seeking an order pursuant to this subsection requiring performance.” 11 No. 40472-2-III King v. Dep’t of Nat. Res. expound, given our “role as a neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.” Dalton M, LLC v. N. Cascade Tr. Servs. Inc., 2 Wn.3d 36, 50, 534 P.3d 339 (2023). CONCLUSION We reverse the trial court’s order transferring venue. The resolution of the Kings’ “in the context of” argument depends on the viability of their duty claims. If those claims are viable, the rulemaking claim may be heard in Douglas County under RCW 34.05.570(2)(a). If those claims are not viable, then the rulemaking claim must be transferred to Thurston County, and the remaining claims would be subject to transfer within the discretion of the Douglas County Superior Court under RCW 4.12.030. A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040. _________________________________ Lawrence-Berrey, J. WE CONCUR: ______________________________ _________________________________ Cooney, A.C.J. Murphy, J. 12