Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 1 of 42 FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-12653 ____________________ U.S. ALL STAR FEDERATION, INC., Plaintiff-Counter Defendant- Appellant, VARSITY SPIRIT, LLC Counter Defendant, versus OPEN CHEER & DANCE CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES, LLC, d.b.a Allstar Worlds Championship/Allstar Worlds, THE OPEN CHEER AND DANCE, LLC, d.b.a. Allstar Worlds Championship/Allstar Worlds, DAVID OWENS, HEIDI WEBER, JEB HARRIS, DAVID HANBERY, Defendants-Counter Claimant-Appellees. USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 2 of 42 2 Opinion of the Court 24-12653 ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 6:21-cv-02135-WWB-DCI ____________________ Before JORDAN and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and JONES, * District Judge. MARCUS, Circuit Judge: This case features a spirited battle of trademarks tied to the sport of competitive international cheerleading. The combatants are two cheerleading organizations, fighting over the validity of a set of contested marks: “THE CHEERLEADING WORLDS” and “WORLDS.” The former mark is published on the Supplemental Register by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”); the lat- ter is an unregistered mark claimed under common law. U.S. All Star Federation, Inc. (“USASF”) launched the first volley, suing Open Cheer & Dance Championship Series, LLC and The Open Cheer and Dance, LLC (the “Open Cheer Entities”), along with their owners and operators (collectively “Open Cheer”), in the Middle District of Florida, claiming that Open Cheer in- fringed on both marks by hosting a competing cheerleading tour- nament, known as the “Allstar World Championship” or “Allstar Worlds.” In the end, however, Open Cheer took the field. The district court rejected all of USASF’s trademark infringement * Honorable Steve C. Jones, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia, sitting by designation. USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 3 of 42 24-12653 Opinion of the Court 3 claims, granting summary judgment for Open Cheer. It concluded that the two cheerleading marks were generic as a matter of law, and therefore insufficiently distinctive to receive any protection un- der state or federal law. We disagree. Although the district court was right to review on the merits whether the marks are distinctive, since that issue was not foreclosed by the earlier dismissal of USASF’s affirmative defenses, a review of the considerable body of evidence presented by USASF on the usage of the two marks has convinced us that there are critical fact questions in dispute -- including whether the marks are descriptive and have acquired secondary meaning -- that cannot be resolved at summary judgment. On the record before us, a reasonable jury could find that USASF’s two marks are suffi- ciently distinctive to warrant trademark protection. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. USASF is a sanctioning organization that governs and organ- izes events for “All Star” cheerleading and dance, a competitive form of coordinated cheerleading where athletes represent private clubs and gyms instead of a given sports team or school. Since 2004, in conjunction with the International All Star Federation (“IASF”) and the International Cheer Union (“ICU”), USASF has conducted an annual, week-long event at Disney World in Or- lando, Florida known as “Championship Week,” which has two component competitions: “The Cheerleading Worlds” and “The USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 4 of 42 4 Opinion of the Court 24-12653 Dance Worlds.” “The Cheerleading Worlds,” or simply “Worlds,” is a season-end championship hosting the highest-level All Star teams from the United States and around the world. During the regular season, teams compete to earn “bids” based on their “level”; USASF’s event features athletes in three distinct levels (5, 6, and 7). USASF claims it holds two valid trademarks in connection with its annual competition: (1) THE CHEERLEADING WORLDS and (2) WORLDS. As for the first of these marks, USASF owns a federal registration on the Supplemental Register (Registration No. 2,999,331). USASF also asserts that due to its “long-standing and substantially exclusive use of the marks,” as well as “the significant goodwill it has built up in these marks over the past 20 years,” it possesses a common law right to both marks. USASF has filed two applications with the PTO for publication on the Principal Register for THE CHEERLEADING WORLDS and THE CHEERLEADING WORLDS (design), which remain pend- ing. David Owens, Heidi Weber, Jeb Harris, and David Hanbery (the “Individual Appellees”), formerly members of USASF, are the sole owners of the Open Cheer Entities. Starting in 2020, Open Cheer began promoting a different season-end All Star cheerlead- ing competition, known as the “Allstar World Championship” or “Allstar Worlds.” The competition caters to “younger athletes in levels 1 through 5 but not level[s] 6 or 7.” Allstar Worlds is con- ducted around the same time as USASF’s Championship Week, USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 5 of 42 24-12653 Opinion of the Court 5 and is held nearby, at the Orange County Convention Center in Orlando, Florida. USASF claims that since its launch, Allstar Worlds has “resulted in significant confusion in the marketplace,” because athletes, parents, reporters, and other competition-goers have confused Allstar Worlds with The Cheerleading Worlds. On December 21, 2021, USASF fired a shot across the bow, commencing this lawsuit against Open Cheer in the Middle District of Florida. USASF sought to enjoin the alleged infringement of its marks, recover damages, disgorge unlawfully obtained profits, and procure treble and punitive damages. In defense of its marks, USASF brought five claims: (1) infringement of USASF’s federal trademark, THE CHEERLEADING WORLDS, under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a); (2) infringement of USASF’s common law trademarks, WORLDS and THE CHEERLEADING WORLDS, under the Lanham Act, id. § 1125(a); (3) infringement of USASF’s common law trademarks, WORLDS and THE CHEERLEADING WORLDS, under Florida common law; (4) un- fair competition under Florida common law; and (5) civil conspir- acy under Florida common law. Open Cheer returned fire on April 4, 2022, denying the fac- tual predicates of USASF’s claim -- and in particular, that USASF’s marks “are well-known and have acquired distinctiveness among its membership and among the All Star cheer and dance commu- nity more broadly.” Open Cheer’s Answer also asserted affirma- tive defenses against the marks’ distinctiveness, including one that stated: “Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 6 of 42 6 Opinion of the Court 24-12653 Plaintiff’s alleged marks are merely descriptive, lack secondary meaning, and/or are generic.” USASF moved to strike several of Open Cheer’s affirmative defenses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). Of note, the motion challenged the affirmative defense on the distinctiveness of USASF’s marks, claiming it was conclusory and legally insufficient. On August 29, 2023, the parties jointly moved to dismiss the affirm- ative defenses identified in the motion to strike, including the one claiming USASF’s marks were generic. The district court granted the motion, dismissing the defenses with prejudice. Thereafter, Open Cheer moved for summary judgment. It claimed that (1) USASF did not have a valid and protectable trade- mark, because the two marks were generic, or were descriptive without secondary meaning; (2) the assignment agreement which gave USASF initial ownership of the two marks was unenforceable; (3) USASF could not show its marks were unlawfully used; and (4) there was no likelihood of confusion between USASF’s marks and Open Cheer’s marks. In response, USASF argued, among other things, that Open Cheer was barred from raising the matter of dis- tinctiveness at summary judgment, since the earlier order dismiss- ing Open Cheer’s affirmative defenses was entered with prejudice, precluding all further litigation of the issue. The district court granted summary judgment on all counts in favor of Open Cheer. First, the court held that the assignment of the marks to USASF was valid and granted USASF standing to sue, a holding which neither side now challenges. The court then USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 7 of 42 24-12653 Opinion of the Court 7 reached the pivotal question of distinctiveness, explaining that Open Cheer was not precluded from raising the matter on sum- mary judgment, because “distinctiveness, or non-genericness, is an essential element of Plaintiff’s case on which Plaintiff bears the bur- den of proof,” meaning “Defendants were not required to raise ge- nericness as an affirmative defense in this case.” On the merits, the court found that the two marks were not sufficiently distinctive to merit any legal protection. The court ex- amined many dictionary definitions of “cheerleading” and “world” and concluded that the marks, which were comprised of these words, were not suggestive. It went on to find that the marks were generic, since they described the “basic nature of the service” USASF offers. Critically, the court determined that although “Plaintiff does point to some evidence showing non-generic use of the Cheerleading Marks,” this evidence “f[ell] short of creating a genuine dispute of material fact,” since USASF’s event was suppos- edly the only season-ending cheerleading championship in All Star cheerleading at the time, thereby explaining away any public asso- ciation between the contested marks and USASF’s event. This timely appeal followed. USASF challenges the district court’s ruling on three grounds: first, that Open Cheer ought to have been barred from addressing the marks’ distinctiveness at summary judgment, because the dismissal with prejudice of Open Cheer’s affirmative defense effectively operated as a judgment on the merits of the issue; second, that the court erred in weighing evidence on the factual question of distinctiveness, and employed USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 8 of 42 8 Opinion of the Court 24-12653 the wrong genericness standard; and, finally, that the court’s con- clusion that USASF’s two marks were generic was in error, since the record evidence is sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of fact as to the distinctiveness of the disputed marks, either because the marks are suggestive, or because they are descriptive and have taken on secondary meaning. II. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, “apply- ing the same legal standards used by the district court.” Yarbrough v. Decatur Hous. Auth., 941 F.3d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Galvez v. Bruce, 552 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2008)). Summary judgment is granted where the proffered evidence “show[s] that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Cohen v. United Am. Bank of Cent. Fla., 83 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). If “the evidence is merely colorable” or “is not significantly probative,” so that no reasonable jury could find in fa- vor of the non-movant, summary judgment is appropriate. Ander- son v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986). “When re- viewing a grant of summary judgment, the court of appeals may affirm if there exists any adequate ground for doing so, regardless of whether it is the one on which the district court relied.” Fitzpat- rick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1117 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing, inter alia, Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 525 F.2d 1204, 1207 (5th Cir. 1976)). USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 9 of 42 24-12653 Opinion of the Court 9 What’s more, we have explained that “[s]ummary judgment is a lethal weapon, and courts must be mindful of its aims and tar- gets and beware of overkill in its use.” Edmondson v. Velvet Lifestyles, LLC, 43 F.4th 1153, 1159 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Vineberg, 370 F.2d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 1967)). Most significantly, at summary judgment, “the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence . . . but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. A genuine issue of material fact would exist “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248. In making this determination, a reviewing court must exam- ine the evidence “in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (per curiam) (cita- tion modified). Further, “the district court should resolve all rea- sonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant, and draw all justifiable inferences in his favor.” United States v. Four Par- cels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (ci- tation modified). “If the record presents factual issues, the Court must not decide them; it must deny the motion [for summary judg- ment] and proceed to trial.” Herzog v. Castle Rock Ent., 193 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (citation modified). III. A. As a preliminary matter, USASF contends that the question of distinctiveness was not properly before the district court, since the matter was decided on the merits when Open Cheer agreed to USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 10 of 42 10 Opinion of the Court 24-12653 dismiss the following affirmative defense with prejudice: “Plain- tiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because Plaintiff’s al- leged marks are merely descriptive, lack secondary meaning, and/or are generic.” Because the phrase “with prejudice” is synon- ymous with “on the merits,” Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 904 F.2d 1498, 1501 (11th Cir. 1990), USASF reasons that the dis- missal of this affirmative defense with prejudice operates as an ad- judication of the marks’ distinctiveness on the merits. USASF is mistaken. Our Court has never given preclusive effect to the dismissal of an affirmative defense, so that no further defense could be mounted on a prima facie element later in the same case. USASF identifies no such holding, instead only offering the unremarkable observation that a dismissal “with prejudice” functions as an adjudication on the merits where preclusion is oth- erwise proper. Indeed, in nearly all of the cases USASF cites, pre- clusion applied because the claim or issue was raised in prior litiga- tion, not in an earlier part of the same proceeding. See, e.g., Hart v. Yamaha-Parts Distribs., Inc., 787 F.2d 1468, 1470 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that dismissal with prejudice of a prior negligent design action barred claim for breach of warranty); Citibank, 904 F.2d at 1500–02 (same for preclusion following a prior settlement agree- ment). Only one case in USASF’s briefing breaks this pattern. How- ever, USASF’s spotlight of Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Loudermilk, 930 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2019) further undermines its position. In Loudermilk, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 11 of 42 24-12653 Opinion of the Court 11 on one of the defendants’ affirmative defenses, prompting that de- fense to be withdrawn. Id. at 1294. At trial, when the defendants sought to introduce evidence related to the defense on the merits, the plaintiff moved to exclude such evidence. Id. Although we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiff’s motion, our reasoning was clear: the district court did so because of an earlier evidentiary ruling that the defendants had not challenged. Id. at 1295. The panel in Loudermilk never con- doned, directly or indirectly, the preclusion of evidence or argu- ment on a prima facie element simply because an affirmative de- fense on the subject had been dismissed earlier. To bar the review of a plaintiff’s prima facie case on these facts would unduly stretch the boundaries of our precedent on pre- clusion, reaching even improperly pled affirmative defenses. Af- firmative defenses “raise[ ] matters extraneous to the plaintiff’s prima facie case; as such, they are derived from the common law plea of ‘confession and avoidance.’” In re Rawson Food Serv., Inc., 846 F.2d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1270 (1st ed. 1969)). So, “[a]n affirmative defense is one that, ‘if established, requires judgment for the defendant even if the plain- tiff can prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence.’” Grippa v. Rubin, 133 F.4th 1186, 1196 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1303 (11th Cir. 1999)). “A defense which points out a defect in the plaintiff’s prima facie case is not an affirmative defense.” In re Rawson, 846 F.2d at USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 12 of 42 12 Opinion of the Court 24-12653 1349. Our Court has long recognized a clear distinction between affirmative defenses of the kind enumerated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) 1 and defenses to the merits of a prima facie case. See, e.g., id.; Myers v. Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc., 592 F.3d 1201, 1224 (11th Cir. 2010). The distinction can have real consequences in lit- igation, since “[f]ailure to plead an affirmative defense generally re- sults in a waiver” of that claim. Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1239 (11th Cir. 2010). Defenses pled in this manner are evaluated independently from the merits of a party’s prima facie showing. Thus, for example, outside of the defenses enumerated in Federal Rule 8(c), “[m]any kinds of immunity are routinely pleaded as affirmative defenses.” Grippa, 133 F.4th at 1196 (citing Moore v. Morgan, 922 F.2d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1991)). The defense at issue here is plainly not an affirmative de- fense. Open Cheer attempted to deny that USASF had established the distinctiveness of its claimed marks. This denial is not a “mat- ter[ ] extraneous to the plaintiff’s prima facie case,” In re Rawson, 846 F.2d at 1349, nor would it “require[ ] judgment for the 1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) reads in pertinent part: In General: In responding to a pleading, a party must affirma- tively state any avoidance or affirmative defense, including: ac- cord and satisfaction; arbitration and award; assumption of risk; contributory negligence; duress; estoppel; failure of con- sideration; fraud; illegality; injury by fellow servant; laches; li- cense; payment; release; res judicata; statute of frauds; statute of limitations; and waiver. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (citation modified). USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 13 of 42 24-12653 Opinion of the Court 13 defendant even if [USASF] can prove [its] case,” Grippa, 133 F.4th at 1196 (citation modified). Instead, it bears directly on the first element that USASF must prove to obtain relief for a trademark infringement claim. That the defense was dismissed with preju- dice, then, should be unsurprising. It was never a proper affirma- tive defense to begin with, and no amendment by Open Cheer would have cured it of that defect. See generally Crawford’s Auto Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 945 F.3d 1150, 1162–63 (11th Cir. 2019). We have previously condemned a “kitchen-sink approach to pleading and affirmative defenses,” where a party asserts numerous “affirmative defenses” that are functionally denials in disguise. Loudermilk, 930 F.3d at 1295. This approach produces defenses that are duplicative of an answer’s general denials and blurs the line be- tween the litigants’ respective burdens of proof. But Open Cheer, in apparent recognition of its error, agreed to the dismissal of the offending defense. Open Cheer’s Answer also included a proper, general denial of the distinctiveness of USASF’s marks. It reads this way: “Defendants deny that Plaintiff’s alleged ‘WORLDS Trade- marks’ are well-known and have acquired distinctiveness among its membership and among the All Star cheer and dance commu- nity more broadly.” Thus, the issue remained very much alive even after the affirmative defense had been dismissed. “This Court has excused technical noncompliance with pleading requirements where the substance of the pleading is suffi- cient.” Myers, 592 F.3d at 1225 (citation modified). Although Open USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 14 of 42 14 Opinion of the Court 24-12653 Cheer’s affirmative defense was brought in error, the upshot of dis- missing that defense does not vitiate the general denial Open Cheer properly asserted elsewhere in its Answer, nor does the dismissal function as a binding determination on the distinctiveness of the marks. The dismissal was a correction of a technical mishap, bring- ing Open Cheer’s Answer in line with the appropriate pleading standards for denials and affirmative defenses. The district court did not err, therefore, in rejecting USASF’s estoppel argument, and in allowing Open Cheer to present evidence on the issue of distinc- tiveness at summary judgment. On the parties’ agreement, the court corrected the pleadings, and held USASF to the burden of proving distinctiveness that had never left USASF’s shoulders. B. We turn to the merits. A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof [used] to identify and distinguish [one’s] goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods.” Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127). In Section 32 of the Lanham Act, Congress created a cause of action for infringement of a mark registered on either the Prin- cipal or Supplemental Registers. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). Section 43, moreover, supplies a cause of action for common law marks that are used in interstate commerce. Id. § 1125(a). In either case, a claimed mark must meet certain threshold showings. Thus, “[a] plaintiff seeking to prevail on a trademark in- fringement claim must show 1) that he had a valid trademark and USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 15 of 42 24-12653 Opinion of the Court 15 2) that the defendant had adopted an identical or similar mark such that consumers were likely to confuse the two.” Gift of Learning Found., Inc. v. TGC, Inc., 329 F.3d 792, 797 (11th Cir. 2003) (per cu- riam) (citing, inter alia, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)). A valid trademark is “distinctive,” meaning it “identif[ies] the source of the goods or ser- vices,” not the goods or services themselves. Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509 F.3d 1351, 1357 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Colt Def. LLC v. Bushmaster Firearms, Inc., 486 F.3d 701, 705 (1st Cir. 2007)). “[A] mark can be ‘distinctive’ in one of two ways: It can be ‘inherently’ distinctive, or it can ‘acquire’ distinctiveness over time.” Royal Palm Props., LLC v. Pink Palm Props., LLC, 950 F.3d 776, 782 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Welding Servs., 509 F.3d at 1357). Inher- ently distinctive marks facially “identify the source of a particular product or service[.]” Id. (citing Knights Armament Co. v. Optical Sys. Tech., Inc., 654 F.3d 1179, 1188 (11th Cir. 2011)). Conversely, a mark that has acquired distinctiveness “might initially have been understood to describe a broad class of potential products or ser- vices, but over time it has taken on a ‘secondary meaning’ that links it to a particular source.” Id. at 783 (citing Coach House Rest., Inc. v. Coach & Six Rests., Inc., 934 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991)). “Be- cause a valid mark need only have either inherent or acquired dis- tinctiveness,” we would be required to reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment if a genuine dispute exists over whether either of the marks, THE CHEERLEADING WORLDS or WORLDS, are “distinctive in either respect.” Engineered Tax Servs., Inc. v. Scarpello Consulting, Inc., 958 F.3d 1323, 1327 (11th Cir. 2020). USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 16 of 42 16 Opinion of the Court 24-12653 Our law is clear that “the four categories of distinctiveness in trademark law, listed in descending order of strength, are: (1) fanciful or arbitrary; (2) suggestive; (3) descriptive; and (4) ge- neric.” Knights Armament, 654 F.3d at 1188 (citing, inter alia, Weld- ing Servs., 509 F.3d at 1357; Custom Mfg. & Eng’g Inc. v. Midway Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 648 n.8 (11th Cir. 2007)). Although “[t]he demarcation between each category is more blurred than it is defi- nite,” over the years we have attempted to shade in the contours of each category. Coach House Rest., 934 F.2d at 1559. “[F]anciful marks (think ‘Verizon’ telecommunications -- the name is a made-up word), arbitrary marks (think ‘Apple’ comput- ers -- the name is a real word that has nothing to do with the prod- uct) and suggestive marks (think ‘Igloo’ coolers -- the name is a real word that bears only an oblique relationship to the product)” are all inherently distinctive. Royal Palm Props., 950 F.3d at 783. Be- cause marks belonging to these categories are inherently distinc- tive, “no proof of secondary meaning is required for [them] to be protectable.” Knights Armament, 654 F.3d at 1188 (quoting Coach House Rest., 934 F.2d at 1560). In contrast, “[a] ‘descriptive’ mark identifies a characteristic or quality of the product,” id. (citing Welding Servs., 509 F.3d at 1358), and can “become protectible only if [it] ‘acquire[s]’ distinc- tiveness by obtaining a ‘secondary meaning’” as an identifier of a product’s source in the minds of the consuming public. Royal Palm Props., 950 F.3d at 783 (citation modified). Finally, at the bottom of USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 17 of 42 24-12653 Opinion of the Court 17 the distinctiveness hierarchy, “generic marks . . . can never become protectible.” Id. (citing Knights Armament, 654 F.3d at 1188). A mark’s distinctiveness category is a question of fact. Weld- ing Servs., 509 F.3d at 1357 (citing, inter alia, Investacorp, Inc. v. Ara- bian Inv. Banking Corp. (Investcorp) E.C., 931 F.2d 1519, 1523 (11th Cir. 1991)). At summary judgment, USASF bears the burden to make a prima facie showing that it possesses a valid, distinct trade- mark, since neither mark is registered on the PTO’s Principal Reg- ister. All agree that USASF’s marks are neither arbitrary nor fanci- ful. The marks would only be protectible, then, if they are sugges- tive, or are descriptive with secondary meaning. We conclude that, at this preliminary stage, there is no genuine dispute of mate- rial fact over whether the marks are suggestive, but there remain genuine disputes over whether the two marks are descriptive and have obtained secondary meaning. i. First, WORLDS and THE CHEERLEADING WORLDS are not suggestive. As noted, USASF bears the burden of producing evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that its two marks are suggestive. It has not done so. Suggestive marks bear only an “oblique relationship to the product” they reference. Royal Palm Props., 950 F.3d at 783. We have traditionally employed two tests to determine whether a mark is suggestive. The first is the so-called “imagination” test, which asks whether a mark “requires a leap of the imagination to get from the mark to the product.” Knights Armament, 654 F.3d at USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 18 of 42 18 Opinion of the Court 24-12653 1188; see also Engineered Tax Servs., 958 F.3d at 1329. The second is the third-party use test, which we have also called a test of third- party “need.” Engineered Tax Servs., 958 F.3d at 1331. It asks “whether competitors would be likely to need the terms used in the trademark in describing their products.” Id. (quoting Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 116 (5th Cir. 1979)). The two tests “work in tandem to distinguish suggestive from descriptive marks.” Id. at 1329. In concluding that the two marks were not suggestive, the district court relied primarily on the imagination test, reasoning that no imaginative leap is required to cross from WORLDS or THE CHEERLEADING WORLDS to an international cheerlead- ing competition, since “[i]n combination, these words describe a competition where [an] international group of athletes or teams compete in cheerleading.” We agree. Beginning with the simpler of the two marks, WORLDS requires no leap of the imagination to connect its mean- ing to USASF’s product: an international competition. As defined, “Worlds” is a well-worn stand-in for competition labels like “World Competition” or “World Championship,” serving as short- hand for a global tournament. See world, n., Oxford English Dic- tionary, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/world_n (last visited May 29, 2026) (defining “Worlds” as “[a] world championship or competition”).2 The term is akin to other words that describe a 2 USASF takes issue with the use of dictionaries to discern a mark’s distinctive- ness. It asserts that Open Cheer’s supplied dictionary definitions “were merely USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 19 of 42 24-12653 Opinion of the Court 19 geographic competition, such as “Regionals” or “Nationals,” which in common parlance are readily evocative of a high-level event in the relevant sport. See regional, adj. & n., Oxford English Diction- ary, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/regional_adj (last visited May 29, 2026) (defining “Regionals” as a “regional contest or com- petition”); national, adj. & n., Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/national_adj (last visited May 29, 2026) (same for “Nationals”). Although USASF argues that “Worlds” is not defined to mean “a world championship” in the dictionaries cited by the district court, the fact that some dictionar- ies omit the relevant definition is not dispositive. See Sec. Ctr., Ltd. v. First Nat’l Sec. Ctrs., 750 F.2d 1295, 1298 n.4 (5th Cir. 1985). And in any event, authoritative dictionaries do define “Worlds” to mean “[a] world championship or competition,” referring to its capital- ized, plural form. World, n., Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/world_n (last visited May 29, 2026). quoted in an incomplete fashion in their Motion for Summary Judgment” and “no request was made for the Court to take judicial notice of these definitions, and they are not part of the record.” We are unpersuaded. “The dictionary definition of [a] word is an appropriate and relevant indication ‘of the ordinary significance and meaning of words’ to the public,” and may be used by a court in the course of assessing a mark’s distinctiveness. Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 11 n.5 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds, B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138 (2015); see also Investacorp, 931 F.2d at 1523–24 (“Also probative of the descriptiveness of a mark is the idea that is conveyed to the observer by the plain dictionary defi- nition of the formatives comprising the mark.”). USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 20 of 42 20 Opinion of the Court 24-12653 THE CHEERLEADING WORLDS fares no better. It is true that in assessing the validity of a mark, “the whole can indeed be greater than the sum of its parts.” Engineered Tax Servs., 958 F.3d at 1329 (citing Vision Ctr., 596 F.2d at 116). We have said that a court must “analyze [a] mark holistically,” looking to the specific inter- play between the words comprising the mark to discern whether it is suggestive. Id.; see also USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 591 U.S. 549, 556 (2020) (“[F]or a compound term, the distinctiveness inquiry trains on the term’s meaning as a whole, not its parts in isolation.”). That one part of the mark, “Worlds,” is not suggestive therefore does not doom the joint phrase “The Cheerleading Worlds” to mere descriptiveness. Nevertheless, here the phrase “The Cheerleading Worlds,” which adds “Cheerleading” as a modifier of “Worlds,” does little to add to the imaginative labor required to connect the mark to USASF’s product. USASF argues again that the phrase “The Cheer- leading Worlds” is not listed in any dictionary, and thus does not obviously mean “international cheerleading tournament.” But how else would a consumer interpret the phrase? Although “Worlds” does not precede “Cheerleading,” as one might expect for an adjectival descriptor of a competition (e.g., “World Cheer- leading Championship” or “World Cheerleading Competition”), a hyper-literal interpretation of “Cheerleading Worlds” describes a nonsensical product: multiple realms within which cheerleading occurs or where cheerleaders otherwise reside, such as in “parallel worlds.” See world, n., Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/world_n (last visited May 29, USCA11 Case: 24-12653 Document: 73-1 Date Filed: 06/24/2026 Page: 21 of 42 24-12653 Opinion of the Court 21