Full Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE JULIO ARMANDO MANCILLAS GUTIERREZ, et al., Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants/Appellees, v. AIDA PARRA, Defendant/Counterclaimant/Appellant. No. 1 CA-CV 26-0094 FILED 11-18-2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CV2022-010946 The Honorable Timothy J. Ryan, Judge REVERSED AND REMANDED COUNSEL Andersen, PLLC, Scottsdale By Mark E. Andersen, Samantha Garber Stirling, Mark W. Hawkins Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants/Appellees Fraud Fighters Law Firm, PLLC, Phoenix By Samuel J. Doncaster Counsel for Defendant/Counterclaimant/Appellant GUTIERREZ, et al. v. PARRA Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined. W E I N Z W E I G, Vice Chief Judge: ¶1 Aida Parra appeals the superior court’s grant of summary judgment to Julio Mancillas Gutierrez. A court cannot resolve a swearing contest on summary judgment. Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 311 (1990). Parra swore she and Gutierrez formed an oral partnership to pool their earnings and share what they built. Gutierrez swore they did not. The superior court granted summary judgment to Gutierrez anyway. We reverse and remand. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 Parra and Gutierrez were an unmarried couple who lived together for about 20 years. Gutierrez owned Julioberto’s Mexican Food, LLC and Mancillas Enterprises, LLC. He also owned about 32 properties, some of which generated rental income. Those properties were titled in either Gutierrez or Mancillas Enterprises’ name. Throughout their relationship, Parra raised the children, cleaned the home and cooked the meals so “[Gutierrez] could focus on working outside the home.” Parra also worked at the businesses—without pay until 2019 and for a salary after that. ¶3 In 2021, the couple broke up. In August 2022, Gutierrez sued Parra to quiet title to the condominium where Parra lived.1 Parra counterclaimed, alleging she and Gutierrez had formed an oral partnership, and Gutierrez breached it by keeping the profits for himself, and denying her access to partnership property. Parra alleged she agreed to provide domestic services and unpaid labor because she and Gutierrez had agreed to “pool their earnings” and share in their joint accumulations. 1 In 2024, Gutierrez moved to dismiss his complaint. The court later granted dismissal of the first amended complaint with prejudice as to counts 1-4. 2 GUTIERREZ, et al. v. PARRA Decision of the Court ¶4 Gutierrez moved for summary judgment on Parra’s counterclaims. He swore, under penalty of perjury, he had no express or implied partnership agreement with Parra. He also argued he had compensated Parra for her work when he quitclaimed the condominium to her. He insisted Parra was merely his live-in girlfriend. ¶5 Parra answered with her own declaration, also under penalty of perjury. She swore she and Gutierrez had agreed to be equal owners and share the profits they created together. And she swore she worked without pay because of that agreement. ¶6 In his reply, Gutierrez argued for the first time that the statute of limitations barred Parra’s partnership claim. The superior court ordered more briefing. ¶7 The court granted summary judgment to Gutierrez “for each and every reason[] set forth in [his] motion and reply,” concluding “[t]here is no partnership interest implied or otherwise.” But it rejected Gutierrez’s statute-of-limitations argument. Parra timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 12-2101(A)(1), -120.21(A)(1). DISCUSSION ¶8 Parra argues she presented enough evidence of a partnership agreement to earn a trial. We agree. ¶9 We review de novo the entry of summary judgment. Jackson v. Eagle KMC L.L.C., 245 Ariz. 544, 545, ¶ 7 (2019). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to Parra. See Andrews v. Blake, 205 Ariz. 236, 240, ¶ 12 (2003). Summary judgment is appropriate only if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Gutierrez has not made that showing. ¶10 Parra also challenges what she reads as a ruling that her partnership claims were time-barred. The court made no such ruling. It rejected Gutierrez’s statute-of-limitations argument, and Gutierrez has neither cross-appealed nor asked us to affirm on that ground. We do not address it. 3 GUTIERREZ, et al. v. PARRA Decision of the Court I. Mancillas Enterprises’ status as a limited liability company does not defeat Parra’s claim. ¶11 Gutierrez argues Parra’s claim fails as a matter of Arizona law because Mancillas Enterprises is a limited liability company and therefore cannot enter a partnership agreement. Not so. ¶12 A limited liability company can enter a partnership agreement with individuals or other entities. See A.R.S. § 29-1001(15) (defining a “[p]erson” to include an individual, corporation, partnership or any other legal entity). ¶13 Nor does A.R.S. § 29-1012(B) help Gutierrez as he asserts. It provides that an association formed under another statute, such as a limited liability company, is not a partnership. A.R.S. § 29-1012(B). But Parra does not argue Mancillas Enterprises is a partnership, and she does not claim to be a member of it. Neither statute entitles Gutierrez to judgment as a matter of law. And even if one did, it could not support judgment on the properties titled to Gutierrez personally. II. The dueling sworn statements created a genuine issue of material fact. ¶14 To survive summary judgment, Parra had to offer enough evidence to create a genuine issue for trial. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(e). She did. ¶15 Gutierrez swore he had no partnership agreement with Parra. Parra swore she did, described its terms and explained she worked without pay because of it. That is a swearing contest. Deciding whom to believe is the job of the factfinder at trial, and the superior court should have denied Gutierrez’s motion. See Orme Sch., 166 Ariz. at 311 (summary judgment is inappropriate if the trial judge must choose between competing inferences). 4 GUTIERREZ, et al. v. PARRA Decision of the Court CONCLUSION ¶16 We reverse the judgment on counts 1 through 4 of Parra’s counterclaim and remand for proceedings consistent with this decision. Gutierrez seeks attorney fees and costs on appeal. He did not prevail, so we deny his request. Parra may recover costs on appeal as the prevailing party upon compliance with ARCAP 21. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 5