GUTIERREZ v. PARRA
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket1 CA-CV 26-0094
JudgeDavid D. Weinzweig
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
JULIO ARMANDO MANCILLAS GUTIERREZ, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants/Appellees,
v.
AIDA PARRA, Defendant/Counterclaimant/Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CV 26-0094
FILED 11-18-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2022-010946
The Honorable Timothy J. Ryan, Judge
REVERSED AND REMANDED
COUNSEL
Andersen, PLLC, Scottsdale
By Mark E. Andersen, Samantha Garber Stirling, Mark W. Hawkins
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants/Appellees
Fraud Fighters Law Firm, PLLC, Phoenix
By Samuel J. Doncaster
Counsel for Defendant/Counterclaimant/Appellant
GUTIERREZ, et al. v. PARRA
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Anni Hill Foster
joined.
W E I N Z W E I G, Vice Chief Judge:
¶1 Aida Parra appeals the superior court’s grant of summary
judgment to Julio Mancillas Gutierrez. A court cannot resolve a swearing
contest on summary judgment. Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 311
(1990). Parra swore she and Gutierrez formed an oral partnership to pool
their earnings and share what they built. Gutierrez swore they did not.
The superior court granted summary judgment to Gutierrez anyway. We
reverse and remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Parra and Gutierrez were an unmarried couple who lived
together for about 20 years. Gutierrez owned Julioberto’s Mexican Food,
LLC and Mancillas Enterprises, LLC. He also owned about 32 properties,
some of which generated rental income. Those properties were titled in
either Gutierrez or Mancillas Enterprises’ name. Throughout their
relationship, Parra raised the children, cleaned the home and cooked the
meals so “[Gutierrez] could focus on working outside the home.” Parra
also worked at the businesses—without pay until 2019 and for a salary after
that.
¶3 In 2021, the couple broke up. In August 2022, Gutierrez sued
Parra to quiet title to the condominium where Parra lived.1 Parra
counterclaimed, alleging she and Gutierrez had formed an oral partnership,
and Gutierrez breached it by keeping the profits for himself, and denying
her access to partnership property. Parra alleged she agreed to provide
domestic services and unpaid labor because she and Gutierrez had agreed
to “pool their earnings” and share in their joint accumulations.
1 In 2024, Gutierrez moved to dismiss his complaint. The court later
granted dismissal of the first amended complaint with prejudice as to
counts 1-4.
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GUTIERREZ, et al. v. PARRA
Decision of the Court
¶4 Gutierrez moved for summary judgment on Parra’s
counterclaims. He swore, under penalty of perjury, he had no express or
implied partnership agreement with Parra. He also argued he had
compensated Parra for her work when he quitclaimed the condominium to
her. He insisted Parra was merely his live-in girlfriend.
¶5 Parra answered with her own declaration, also under penalty
of perjury. She swore she and Gutierrez had agreed to be equal owners and
share the profits they created together. And she swore she worked without
pay because of that agreement.
¶6 In his reply, Gutierrez argued for the first time that the statute
of limitations barred Parra’s partnership claim. The superior court ordered
more briefing.
¶7 The court granted summary judgment to Gutierrez “for each
and every reason[] set forth in [his] motion and reply,” concluding “[t]here
is no partnership interest implied or otherwise.” But it rejected Gutierrez’s
statute-of-limitations argument. Parra timely appealed. We have
jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 12-2101(A)(1), -120.21(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶8 Parra argues she presented enough evidence of a partnership
agreement to earn a trial. We agree.
¶9 We review de novo the entry of summary judgment. Jackson
v. Eagle KMC L.L.C., 245 Ariz. 544, 545, ¶ 7 (2019). We view the evidence in
the light most favorable to Parra. See Andrews v. Blake, 205 Ariz. 236, 240, ¶
12 (2003). Summary judgment is appropriate only if no genuine issue of
material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Gutierrez has not made that showing.
¶10 Parra also challenges what she reads as a ruling that her
partnership claims were time-barred. The court made no such ruling. It
rejected Gutierrez’s statute-of-limitations argument, and Gutierrez has
neither cross-appealed nor asked us to affirm on that ground. We do not
address it.
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GUTIERREZ, et al. v. PARRA
Decision of the Court
I. Mancillas Enterprises’ status as a limited liability company does
not defeat Parra’s claim.
¶11 Gutierrez argues Parra’s claim fails as a matter of Arizona law
because Mancillas Enterprises is a limited liability company and therefore
cannot enter a partnership agreement. Not so.
¶12 A limited liability company can enter a partnership
agreement with individuals or other entities. See A.R.S. § 29-1001(15)
(defining a “[p]erson” to include an individual, corporation, partnership or
any other legal entity).
¶13 Nor does A.R.S. § 29-1012(B) help Gutierrez as he asserts. It
provides that an association formed under another statute, such as a limited
liability company, is not a partnership. A.R.S. § 29-1012(B). But Parra does
not argue Mancillas Enterprises is a partnership, and she does not claim to
be a member of it. Neither statute entitles Gutierrez to judgment as a matter
of law. And even if one did, it could not support judgment on the
properties titled to Gutierrez personally.
II. The dueling sworn statements created a genuine issue of material
fact.
¶14 To survive summary judgment, Parra had to offer enough
evidence to create a genuine issue for trial. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(e). She
did.
¶15 Gutierrez swore he had no partnership agreement with Parra.
Parra swore she did, described its terms and explained she worked without
pay because of it. That is a swearing contest. Deciding whom to believe is
the job of the factfinder at trial, and the superior court should have denied
Gutierrez’s motion. See Orme Sch., 166 Ariz. at 311 (summary judgment is
inappropriate if the trial judge must choose between competing inferences).
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GUTIERREZ, et al. v. PARRA
Decision of the Court
CONCLUSION
¶16 We reverse the judgment on counts 1 through 4 of Parra’s
counterclaim and remand for proceedings consistent with this decision.
Gutierrez seeks attorney fees and costs on appeal. He did not prevail, so
we deny his request. Parra may recover costs on appeal as the prevailing
party upon compliance with ARCAP 21.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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