Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE GUNNAR L.G. ROSE; CAROL A. No. 88054-3-I SNYDER, individually and as litigation guardian of minor child E.J.S.; HUDSON H. SNYDER; MAXIMILIAN SNYDER; BRIAN TETREAULT, as litigation guardian of minor children A.N.T. and B.E.A.T.; DONYA C. GRANT, individually and as litigation guardian ad litem for minors K.M.G ., M.A.G., and R.K.G.; HADLEY B. GRANT; and ARICA L. SMITH- SIMMER, individually and as litigation UNPUBLISHED OPINION guardian ad litem for minors K.R.M.S. and N.D.S., Respondents, v. PHARMACIA LLC, a Delaware limited liability corporation, Defendant. BOWMAN, A.C.J. — The attorneys representing defendant Pharmacia LLC appeal from the trial court order issuing personal, punitive, reprimand, and attorney fee sanctions against them under CR 37(b)(2) for the late disclosure of expert witnesses. Because CR 37(b)(2) does not authorize personal punitive sanctions for violation of a discovery order, we reverse and remand for the trial court to vacate those sanctions. We otherwise affirm. No. 88054-3-I/2 FACTS In 2018, Gunnar Rose and several other plaintiffs sued Pharmacia1 for damages from exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). The same year, Donya Grant and several other plaintiffs filed a separate lawsuit against Pharmacia2 on similar grounds. In June 2024, the trial court consolidated the lawsuits. At that time, the discovery deadline to disclose expert witnesses and reports had passed in both cases.3 Pharmacia had previously disclosed that Dr. Laura Jansen and Dr. Jill Kelderman would render medical and causation opinions about the minor plaintiffs in the Rose matter, and it timely provided those reports. It also disclosed that Dr. Matthew Holcomb and Dr. Frederic Braun would render medical and causation opinions about the minor plaintiffs in the Grant case, and it timely provided those reports. The court set a consolidated trial date for October 7, 2024, and the parties began addressing motions in limine in August 2024. On August 16, 2024, plaintiffs’ counsel deposed Dr. Jansen about her opinions in the Rose matter. During her deposition, Dr. Jansen disclosed that she also planned to review records related to the minor plaintiffs in the Grant matter and provide a report with her opinions in that case as well. Plaintiffs’ 1 The plaintiffs listed several other defendants in their complaint. It is unclear from the record the status of those other defendants, so they are not listed in the case caption. In any event, they are not parties on appeal. 2 Again, the plaintiffs listed several other defendants in their complaint, but Pharmacia is the only defendant pertinent to this appeal. 3 The cutoff for expert discovery in the Rose matter was January 31, 2024. And the cutoff for expert discovery in the Grant matter was November 10, 2023. 2 No. 88054-3-I/3 counsel asked what those opinions might be, but Dr. Jansen refused to discuss them at that time. On September 21, 2024, Pharmacia disclosed Dr. Jansen’s new reports pertaining to the minor plaintiffs in Grant. And on September 30, it produced new reports from Dr. Kelderman with her opinions related to those plaintiffs. On October 11, plaintiffs’ counsel moved to strike the new reports as untimely. In response, Pharmacia argued that its late disclosures were intended to reduce duplication and streamline evidence at trial. The trial court held a hearing on October 25, 2024. At the hearing, the court asked Pharmacia why it decided to “change horses this late in the game.” It also told Pharmacia to be prepared to discuss appropriate sanctions. After some discussion, Pharmacia withdrew the late-disclosed opinions and its request to substitute witnesses. Pharmacia’s lead attorney claimed personal responsibility for the late disclosures but said it was a “team decision with input from the client.” Plaintiffs’ counsel then asked the court to impose sanctions for time wasted on preparing briefs and arguing the motions to strike. Counsel reminded the court that this was the “fifth or the sixth motion or event that the defense has created” and then withdrawn. Counsel requested that three hours of trial time be taken from the defense and awarded to the plaintiffs. Pharmacia opposed the time sanction, arguing that it would “dramatically harm [its] ability to defend this case.” The court acknowledged that Pharmacia voluntarily withdrew the late- disclosed reports and its request to substitute witnesses and did not impose a time sanction. But it said that plaintiffs’ counsel had some “very valiant, valid 3 No. 88054-3-I/4 points with respect to the disruption and the pattern of disruption.” It explained that the court and the plaintiffs had already spent “tremendous” amounts of time preparing for hearings that Pharmacia then put aside, including CR 2(a) and Frye4 hearings. And the court noted that this behavior is disruptive and “reflects to some degree a disrespect for the Court and the Court’s time.” The court ordered Pharmacia to pay the plaintiffs’ attorney fees for their time associated with the motions to strike. And it individually sanctioned the Pharmacia attorneys $2,500 each, payable to the King County Bar Foundation. The court explained it was “an appropriate sanction taking into account the surrounding circumstances, which is not just the issues in this motion, but it’s the issues writ large with the way that this case has been conducted over the last couple of months. . . . It’s a start and a stop.” On November 1, 2024, the court issued its written sanctions order. It incorporated its oral findings and ordered that “Defendant shall pay Plaintiffs’ attorney fees and costs for all issues associated with having to address [the] motions [to strike].” And it ordered each of Pharmacia’s eight attorneys to pay $2,500 to the King County Bar Foundation. On November 4, 2024, Pharmacia moved for reconsideration of the personal sanctions against its attorneys. It argued, among other things, that the sanctions were unsupported by the record or any legal standard. And the sanctions violated the attorneys’ due process rights. 4 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Circ. 1923). 4 No. 88054-3-I/5 The court heard oral argument on the motion to reconsider. On March 17, 2025, it issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order on reconsideration. In its order, the court clarified that it issued sanctions solely under CR 37(b)(2), saying: [T]his Court’s sanctions ruling was based on authority conferred to it under CR 37(b)(2), which addresses sanctions in the context of when a court order is not complied with, as was the case here. While other sources of authority, such as this Court’s inherent authority to sanction bad faith litigation conduct also support this Court imposition of sanctions against Attorneys, the Court did not rely on that authority, nor its authority under CR 11 or its contempt powers, when issuing the sanctions at issue. The court reiterated that the attorneys’ decision to knowingly violate the court’s scheduling order was “objectively unreasonable and therefore sanctionable.” It declined to reconsider the personal punitive sanctions but reduced the number of Pharmacia attorneys subject to the $2,500 sanction from eight to four. As to the other four attorneys, it “formally reprimanded” them for “not speaking up and speaking out against their co-counsel’s flagrant violations.” The court also clarified that it imposed the attorney fee sanctions “jointly and severally” against only three of Pharmacia’s attorneys. Pharmacia’s trial counsel appeal.5 ANALYSIS Pharmacia’s attorneys argue that the trial court erred by imposing “punitive, personal, reprimand, and attorneys’ fees sanctions” against them under 5 On September 29, 2025, a commissioner of this court denied Pharmacia’s motion to amend the appellate case caption to add its attorneys as parties and designate them as appellants. The commissioner noted that this court will still “treat[ ] the attorneys as appellants” without changing the case caption and designated Pharmacia as the defendant on appeal and the plaintiffs as respondents. 5 No. 88054-3-I/6 CR 37(b)(2). Respondents ask for attorney fees and costs on appeal. We address each argument in turn. 1. CR 37(b)(2) Sanctions The attorneys argue the court erred by imposing personal punitive sanctions under CR 37(b)(2). We agree.6 The trial court has broad discretion to impose sanctions for a violation of discovery orders. Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 131 Wn.2d 484, 494, 933 P.2d 1036 (1997). We review an order imposing sanctions for abuse of that discretion. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. State v. Thurlby, 184 Wn.2d 618, 624, 359 P.3d 793 (2015). A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law. Wash. Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass’n v. Fisons. Corp., 122 Wn.2d 299, 339, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993). The purposes of sanction orders are to deter, punish, compensate, and educate. Fisons, 122 Wn.2d at 356. The law provides several types of sanctions to address a variety of inappropriate conduct. See, e.g., CR 11, 26, 37. For example, CR 11(a)(4) allows the court to impose sanctions to prevent baseless filings, filings made for improper purposes, and abuse of the judicial system. Biggs v. Vail, 124 Wn.2d 193, 197, 876 P.2d 448 (1994); Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 119 Wn.2d 210, 219, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992). And CR 26(g) is aimed at 6 The attorneys also argue that the sanctions are disproportionate to the discovery violation. Because we conclude that the court issued the personal punitive sanctions in error, we need not address that argument. As to the attorney fees, that sanction is directly proportionate to the time spent bringing the motion to strike, so we reject that argument. See CR 37(b)(2) (allowing attorney fees as a sanction). 6 No. 88054-3-I/7 reducing delaying tactics, procedural harassment, and mounting legal costs due to certain discovery violations. Fisons, 122 Wn.2d at 341-42. Similarly, CR 37(b)(2) authorizes the court to impose sanctions for failure to comply with discovery orders. Finally, the court has the inherent authority to impose sanctions to control conduct in the courtroom if it finds that a party or attorney acted in bad faith. State v. S.H., 102 Wn. App. 468, 475, 8 P.3d 1058 (2000). Sanctions under one rule are not appropriate when a “more specific sanction rule better fits the situation.” Fisons, 122 Wn.2d at 339-40. The attorneys argue that CR 37(b)(2) does not empower the court to issue personal punitive sanctions for violating a discovery order. We agree. We interpret statutes and court rules de novo. N. Coast Elec. Co. v. Signal Elec., Inc., 193 Wn. App. 566, 571, 373 P.3d 296 (2016). And we interpret court rules using the rules of statutory construction. In re Dependency of N.G., 199 Wn.2d 588, 594, 510 P.3d 335 (2022). We look to the statute or rule’s plain language to determine its meaning and the drafter’s intent. Id.; Dan’s Trucking, Inc. v. Kerr Contractors, Inc., 183 Wn. App. 133, 139, 332 P.3d 1154 (2014). We give effect to the plain meaning of the text, reading it as a whole and considering the surrounding context and related provisions. Dan’s Trucking, 183 Wn. App. at 139. We give an undefined term “ ‘its plain and ordinary meaning unless a contrary legislative intent is indicated.’ ” State v. Haggard, 195 Wn.2d 544, 548, 461 P.3d 1159 (2020) (quoting Ravenscroft v. Wash. Water Power Co., 136 Wn.2d 911, 920-21, 969 P.2d 75 (1998)). We “employ traditional rules of grammar in discerning the plain language” of a rule. State v. Bunker, 169 Wn.2d 571, 578, 238 P.3d 487 (2010) (citing In re 7 No. 88054-3-I/8 Forfeiture of One 1970 Chevrolet Chevelle, 166 Wn.2d 834, 838-39, 215 P.3d 166 (2009)). If it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation after this inquiry, it is ambiguous, and we “ ‘may resort to statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law for assistance in discerning legislative intent.’ ” Haggard, 195 Wn.2d at 548 (quoting Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 373, 173 P.3d 228 (2007) (citing Cockle v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 142 Wn.2d 801, 808, 16 P.3d 583 (2001))). Under CR 37(b)(2), if a party fails to obey a discovery order, the court “may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following”: (A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order; (B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting the disobedient party from introducing designated matters in evidence; (C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceedings or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party; (D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order to submit to physical or mental examination; (E) Where a party has failed to comply with an order under rule 35(a) requiring the party to produce another for examination such orders as are listed in sections (A), (B), and (C) of this subsection, unless the party failing to comply shows that the party is unable to produce such person for examination. In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising him or her or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds 8 No. 88054-3-I/9 that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. The rule’s plain language authorizes a court to issue sanctions “as are just” when a party disobeys a discovery order. CR 37(b)(2). But here, the parties disagree about the type of sanction that may be included in that phrase. Because the phrase is undefined and may be susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, we employ canons of statutory construction to discern its meaning. One such canon of statutory construction is “ejusdem generis.” See Silverstreak, Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 159 Wn.2d 868, 882, 154 P.3d 891 (2007). The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that where specific words follow a general term, the specific words “ ‘modify or restrict the application of [the] general terms.’ ” Id.7 (quoting Davis v. Dep’t of Licensing, 137 Wn.2d 957, 970, 977 P.2d 554 (1999)). Courts should construe general words followed by specific terms as encompassing “only similar objects.” Sw. Wash. Ch., Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n v. Pierce County, 100 Wn.2d 109, 116, 667 P.2d 1092 (1983). The ejusdem generis rule applies where lists of both general and specific terms are “clearly associated” in a sentence. Sw. Wash. Ch., 100 Wn.2d at 116-17. Here, the phrase “make such orders in regard to the failure as are just” is a general term. CR 37(b)(2). But that term is then followed by several specific examples in subsections (A) to (E). Id. So, under the canon of ejusdem generis, the general term encompasses sanctions similar to only those specifically listed in subsections (A) to (E). Those subsections include deeming the disputed facts 7 Internal quotation marks omitted. 9 No. 88054-3-I/10 as established, striking claims or defenses, refusing the admission of evidence, striking pleadings, holding a party in contempt, or compelling a witness to appear. Id. But none of the listed examples in CR 37(b)(2) include an imposition of monetary punitive sanctions. And none of them include the imposition of personal sanctions or reprimands against attorneys. As a result, here, the court’s imposition of personal punitive sanctions goes beyond the type of sanction contemplated for failure to obey a discovery order under CR 37(b)(2). The respondents point to the last paragraph of CR 37(b)(2) that allows a court to impose attorney fee sanctions against both a party and their attorney to argue that under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, a personal punitive sanction against an attorney would be a “just” order contemplated by the rule. But that section of CR 37(b)(2) is not one of the enumerated specific examples following the general language authorizing orders “as are just.” So, it is not clearly associated with the general term, and the doctrine of ejusdem generis does not encompass that language. See Sw. Wash. Ch., 100 Wn.2d at 116-17 (”The ejusdem generis rule is generally applied to general and specific words clearly associated in the same sentence in a pattern such as ‘[specific], [specific], or [general]’ or ‘[general], including [specific] and [specific].’ Where the general and specific words are not so connected, the reasoning underlying the ejusdem generis rules loses its force.”).8 Indeed, the plain language in the last paragraph of CR 37(b)(2) explains that it applies “in lieu of” or “in addition” to “the foregoing orders” listed in subsections (A) to (E). 8 Alterations in original, citations omitted. 10 No. 88054-3-I/11 Finally, the court’s use of CR 37(b)(2) runs afoul of the rule that it must impose a sanction using the authority that most specifically addresses the conduct. See Fisons, 122 Wn.2d at 339-40. The trial court imposed the personal punitive sanctions based in part on the attorneys’ conduct throughout the case, not just on the discovery violations. The court found that sanctions were appropriate because of “not just the issues in this motion, but it’s the issues writ large with the way that this case has been conducted over the last couple of months. . . . It’s a start and a stop.” CR 11(a)(4) addresses sanctions for attorneys who abuse the judicial system, and a trial court may use its inherent powers to otherwise control bad faith conduct of lawyers in the courtroom. Biggs, 124 Wn.2d at 197. And here, while the trial court recognized that it could have imposed sanctions under CR 11, it made no finding of bad faith as necessary to support those sanctions and explained that it was issuing sanctions solely under CR 37(b)(2). We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing personal punitive sanctions against Pharmacia’s attorneys under CR 37(b)(2).9 9 Pharmacia’s attorneys also argue that the court erred by failing to conduct a Burnet analysis before personally sanctioning them and violated their due process rights by failing to give them adequate notice that they may be subject to personal sanctions. But they cite no persuasive authority that a Burnet analysis is required before issuing monetary sanctions, so we do not address their argument. See RAP 10.3(a)(6). And their due process argument fails because the record shows that the attorneys received both notice and an opportunity to be heard. In any event, because we conclude that the court improperly imposed the personal punitive sanctions, we need not address these issues. Pharmacia’s attorneys also argue that the trial court violated their due process rights by belatedly imposing joint and several attorney fees. But again, the record shows that the attorneys had notice and an opportunity to be heard before the court imposed those sanctions. And CR 37(b)(2) permits imposition of attorney fees against attorneys as sanctions. 11 No. 88054-3-I/12 2. Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal The respondents ask for attorney fees and costs under RAP 18.1 and CR 37. RAP 18.1(a) permits an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal if they are recoverable under applicable law. And CR 37(b)(2) authorizes attorney fees and costs to compensate a party for expenses caused by the other party’s failure to obey a court order. But because we conclude that the trial court erred by imposing personal punitive sanctions against Pharmacia’s attorneys, we decline to award the respondents attorney fees or costs on appeal. Because CR 37(b)(2) does not authorize the court to impose personal punitive sanctions for violation of a discovery order, we reverse and remand for the trial court to vacate its order imposing those sanctions. We otherwise affirm. WE CONCUR: 12