In re Commonwealth

E-FILED CNMI SUPREME COURT E-filed: Nov 02 2026 03:11PM Clerk Review: Nov 02 2026 03:11PM Filing ID: 81225426 Case No.: 2025-SCC-0001-CRM NoraV Borja IN THE Supreme Court OF THE Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS, Plaintiff, v. SHAYNE BLANCO VILLANUEVA, Defendant. JAMES ROBERT KINGMAN, Party of Interest-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. KEITH CHAMBERS, II, Party of Interest-Appellee, Cross-Appellant. SUPREME COURT NO. 2025-SCC-0001-CRM SLIP OPINION Cite as: 2026 MP 11 Decided November 2, 2026 CHIEF JUSTICE ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOHN A. MANGLOÑA JUSTICE PRO TEMPORE F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO Superior Court Criminal Action No. 24-0028-CR Associate Judge Kenneth L. Govendo, Presiding  In re Commonwealth, 2026 MP 11 MANGLOÑA, J.: ¶1 The trial court sanctioned Keith Chambers II (“Chambers”) and James Robert Kingman (“Kingman”) for unprofessional conduct as attorneys, including use of dilatory tactics and improper communications. Chambers and Kingman contend the sanctions violated their due process rights because the trial court neither gave them notice that it was considering sanctions nor afforded them an opportunity to be heard before imposing them. They also argue the trial court failed to find bad faith, a prerequisite to imposing sanctions. The sanctions against Chambers and Kingman are REVERSED, and this matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 The CNMI House of Representatives Special Committee on Federal Assistance and Disaster Related Funding (“the Committee”) was investigating potential misuse of public funds in the Building Optimism, Opportunity, and Stability Together Program, a federally-funded program to assist in economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. One individual under criminal investigation was Shayne Blanco Villanueva (“Villanueva”). During this investigation, Kingman, an attorney for the Commonwealth, called Chambers, Villanueva’s attorney. During the phone call, Kingman informed Chambers of a potential conflict of interest because Chambers represented two people involved in the same criminal investigation. ¶3 That same day, Chambers informed Villanueva of the criminal investigation and advised him to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self- incrimination if asked to testify. Several weeks later, the Committee summoned Villanueva to testify before the legislature. Villanueva invoked the Fifth Amendment in response to nearly every question, and the legislature subsequently charged him with contempt. ¶4 The contempt case was brought before Presiding Judge Roberto C. Naraja, with Chambers representing Villanueva and Kingman representing the Commonwealth. The two attorneys displayed considerable hostility toward one another, with many early filings containing personal attacks rather than legal merit. Presiding Judge Naraja warned both parties to behave professionally or face sanctions. ¶5 Early in the proceedings, Chambers raised the issue of judicial impartiality, though he did not formally pursue recusal until later. At Villanueva’s arraignment, Chambers orally requested that the judge recuse himself because the judge’s nephew was expected to be a key witness. Presiding Judge Naraja twice directed Chambers to file a written motion for recusal. Chambers did not file a written motion, as noted in two subsequent orders. During a pre-trial conference approximately six months after the arraignment, another attorney for Villanueva noted for the record the familial connection to a 2  In re Commonwealth, 2026 MP 11 witness. ¶6 A month later, Presiding Judge Naraja ordered Chambers to file a formal motion for recusal. Judge Govendo heard the motion and found recusal necessary. The case was reassigned to Judge Govendo. ¶7 At a status conference after the case was reassigned, Judge Govendo noted the earlier warning about professionalism and emphasized that the attorneys’ behavior should not continue. Later, Chambers subpoenaed Kingman and moved to disqualify him as the attorney for the Commonwealth. Chambers sought Kingman’s disqualification so that Kingman could testify at the hearing about the phone call to Chambers and show that Villanueva had reason to believe he should invoke his right to remain silent. The Commonwealth moved to quash the subpoena. ¶8 Judge Govendo denied the Commonwealth’s motion to quash and granted Chambers’ motion to disqualify Kingman. In the same order, the judge publicly reprimanded both attorneys and fined each $500. The order stated that Kingman’s conduct had intensified public condemnation of Villanueva by prompting Villanueva to plead the fifth; his attempt to avoid giving the defendant necessary information violated the spirit of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct; and his hostility towards Villanueva and Chambers lacked purpose and wasted judicial resources. It further found that Chambers had deliberately filed untimely recusal motions concerning Presiding Judge Naraja and Kingman to gain strategic advantage and that Chambers had also caused increased public scrutiny of Villanueva by improperly communicating Kingman’s statements. ¶9 Kingman and Chambers moved for reconsideration or, alternatively, to vacate or stay the sanctions. The trial court denied the motions. Kingman and Chambers then appealed, arguing that the sanctions violated their due process rights because they were imposed without adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. They further contend that the court failed to make the required finding of bad faith, and that the record does not support the grounds on which the sanctions were based. II. JURISDICTION ¶ 10 We have appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of the Commonwealth Superior Court, including findings of misconduct. NMI C ONST. art. IV, § 3; Commonwealth v. Aguon, 2019 MP 1 ¶ 10. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶ 11 Whether or not a court provided sufficient due process in issuing sanctions is reviewed de novo. Matsunaga v. Matsunaga, 2001 MP 11 ¶ 3. ¶ 12 We review the propriety of sanctions for abuse of discretion: the trial court must have made an error of law or a clear error of fact. Commonwealth v. Weintraub, 2018 MP 16 ¶¶ 9, 11. 3  In re Commonwealth, 2026 MP 11 IV. DISCUSSION ¶ 13 We begin our analysis with whether Kingman and Chambers received sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard in accordance with due process before addressing the bad faith requirement for sanctions on conduct that occurs during the normal course of litigation.1 A. Due Process Requirements Were Not Met 1. The Parties Lacked Notice ¶ 14 Before a court may sanction an attorney, it must provide fair notice and an opportunity to be heard. In re Oducayen Nisperos, 2007 MP 33 ¶ 8; Lucky Dev. Co. v. Tokai, U.S.A., Inc., 3 NMI 343, 362–63 (1992); In re Roy, 2007 MP 28 ¶ 5. When the opposing party seeks sanctions, fair notice requires a written motion. J.C. Tenorio Enters. v. Pedro, 2006 MP 22 ¶ 20. We have yet to declare what fair notice requires when the court itself initiates sanctions, as in this case. ¶ 15 Notice exists to ensure that a person potentially subject to sanctions can prepare for their hearing. City of W. Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 240 (1999) (“A primary purpose of the notice required by the Due Process Clause is to ensure that the opportunity for a hearing is meaningful”); Sec. Nat’l Bank v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936, 944 (8th Cir. 2015) (“Any opportunity to be heard would be of little value without notice of the nature of a potential sanction, for only with that information can a party respond in a cogent way”). ¶ 16 Courts have fashioned standards of notice to effectuate this purpose. The Supreme Court has noted that “[n]otice of the issues to be resolved by the adversary process is a fundamental characteristic of fair procedure.” Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 126 (1991). This notice requirement does not lose importance in the context of attorney sanctions. See, e.g., In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968) (finding that an attorney is entitled to fair notice of the charge against them in a proceeding for disbarment); In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Actions, 278 F.3d 175, 191 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that notice should be particularized and state “the precise sanctioning tool that the court intends to employ”). ¶ 17 In the case In re DeVille, the Ninth Circuit held that notice of potential attorney sanctions requires information about the alleged misconduct and the disciplinary authority under which the court intended to proceed. 361 F.3d 539, 548–49 (9th Cir. 2004). However, these requirements were not stringent and circumstances could change how they were applied. Id. In particular, the disciplinary authority could be misstated, so long as the notice of the conduct to 1 In his reply brief, Kingman argues that Chambers’ brief should be excluded for being untimely, as it was due on Sunday, August 3, and Chambers submitted his brief on Monday, August 4. However, our rules clearly provide that when a brief is due on a Sunday, the deadline will roll over onto the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday. NMI SUP. CT. R. 26(a)(3). Chambers’ brief was therefore timely. 4  In re Commonwealth, 2026 MP 11 be sanctioned and the accusation of bad faith were plain. Id. When analyzing the question of notice in the context of executive action, the Ninth Circuit has noted that “the opportunity to guess at the factual and legal bases for a government action does not substitute for actual notice of the government's intentions.” Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. United States, 686 F.3d 965, 986–87 (9th Cir. 2012). The same holds true in the judicial context—without notice of why a court is planning sanctions, attorneys can only guess at the relevant factual and legal basis for the court’s actions, and such guesses are no substitute at all for proper notice. ¶ 18 We hold that, at a minimum, due process requires that an attorney facing sanctions be given advance notice that sanctions are being contemplated and be informed of the factual allegations and the legal basis supporting them. This notice allows the attorney to respond and present a meaningful defense. ¶ 19 Neither Kingman nor Chambers received such notice. While they received warnings to reform their conduct, at no point did the court give the impression that sanctions were imminent. Furthermore, the court’s warnings only loosely corresponded with the conduct it ultimately sanctioned. The court warned the parties against such unprofessional behavior as personal attacks in filings, while the sanctions only briefly mentioned Kingman’s animosity towards Villanueva and Chambers. Instead, the trial court focused its reasoning on the timeliness of Chambers’ motions to recuse and the propriety of Kingman telling Chambers about a potential conflict of interest and his opposition to the motion to recuse. Neither attorney had reason to believe that they would need to prepare a defense, let alone what they needed to defend themselves against. 2. Opportunity to be Heard ¶ 20 The due process protection of the opportunity to be heard requires a chance to make one’s case before sanctions are imposed. In re Roy, 2007 MP 28 ¶ 5. A hearing is mandatory when one would assist the court in deciding whether to impose sanctions, such as when the sanctioned conduct occurred outside of court. Lucky Dev. Co., 3 NMI at 363. However, even when a hearing is not required, the opportunity to be heard remains. Id. If a court deems a hearing is unnecessary, it may simply ask the parties to file briefs on the issue to satisfy their due process right to be heard. Roy, 2007 MP 28 ¶ 6. ¶ 21 This approach accords with interpretations of due process throughout the United States. Across the federal circuits, courts recognize that the right to be heard does not mandate a specific form and can be satisfied though oral or written arguments, with or without evidentiary hearings. Pacific Harbor Capital, Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 210 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000); Wilson-Simmons v. Lake County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 207 F.3d 818, 822–23 (6th Cir. 2000); G.J.B. & Assocs. v. Singleton, 913 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1990); Merriman v. Security Ins. Co., 100 F. 3d 1187, 1192 (5th Cir. 1996). Likewise, state courts frequently acknowledge an attorney’s right to be heard before the imposition of sanctions 5  In re Commonwealth, 2026 MP 11 without mandating the full panoplies of an evidentiary, adversarial hearing. Bruenger v. Miller, 706 S.W.3d 247, 258 (Ky. 2024); see also Watness v. City of Seattle, 457 P.3d 1177, 1185 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019) (counting both the briefing and the hearings as ‘opportunities to be heard’ under due process); Stone v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 28 N. W. 3d 211, 227 n.14 (Wis. Ct. App. 2025) (due process requires an opportunity to be heard for a complaint sanctioned for a frivolous appeal, although complainant was not necessarily entitled to an evidentiary hearing). ¶ 22 Here, neither Kingman nor Chambers had an opportunity to be heard. They did not have an opportunity to present their case in person or in writing before they were sanctioned, violating both of their due process rights. For these reasons alone, this case would warrant reversal.2 However, we also take this opportunity to clarify the standard for bad faith, as there seem to be misunderstandings about when a finding of bad faith is required and what bad faith entails. B. Bad Faith 1. Whether or Not Bad Faith is Required ¶ 23 A court must make a finding of bad faith before it uses its inherent authority to sanction an attorney for conduct that falls within the normal course of litigation. Commonwealth v. Borja, 3 NMI 156, 172 (1992); Aguon, 2019 MP 1 ¶ 20. One way to determine whether conduct falls within the normal course of litigation is to look to whom the responsibility is owed. The Second Circuit has distinguished between acts undertaken in the normal course of litigation from those that are not by whether the attorney is in the role of acting as an advocate or as an officer of the court. Rossbach v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 81 F.4th 124, 143 (2d Cir. 2023); Matsunaga, 2001 MP 11 ¶ 21. If the attorney violated a duty owed to the court, such as complying with local rules, then no finding of bad faith is necessary. Rossbach, 81 F.4th at 143. If the attorney violated a duty owed to the client, then the court must find bad faith before imposing sanctions. ¶ 24 We have found activities that fall within the normal course of litigation to include dilatory tactics, lack of preparedness for trial, transferring funds to a federal agency with a request to initiate forfeiture proceedings, and missing deadlines. Weintraub, 2018 MP 16 ¶¶ 12, 17; Matsunaga, 2001 MP 11 ¶ 21. On the other hand, lying to the court and violating one’s responsibilities to their client do not relate to the ordinary course of litigation, as such behaviors are “unrelated to an attorney’s legitimate efforts at zealous advocacy for the client.” Matsunaga, 2001 MP 11 ¶ 21. ¶ 25 The trial court stated that neither Kingman nor Chambers’ actions were part of the normal course of litigation and so it did not need to make a finding of 2 For this reason, we do not reach the arguments of either Kingman or Chambers that relate to the trial court’s application of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the constitutive grounds for the sanctions. 6  In re Commonwealth, 2026 MP 11 bad faith. In particular, it argued that because Chambers’ client did not benefit from his actions, but suffered an impairment to his right to a speedy trial when the trial was delayed to change the judge and prosecutor, Chambers had not acted within the normal course of litigation. Similarly, it argued that Kingman calling Chambers about a potential conflict of interest was an action outside the normal course of litigation. ¶ 26 This incorrectly reads the caselaw. We have held that insufficient trial preparation and missed deadlines constitute normal actions within the course of litigation. Under the trial court’s standard, these must be outside the normal course of litigation as they cannot benefit the attorney’s client. Yet, we have found them to be within the normal course of litigation. The key concern is not the timing or quality of the act, but the nature of it. These were potential violations of duties to the client, not the court. Issues such as quality or timing of an act are more properly addressed by examining whether the act was taken in bad faith rather than whether it was a normal part of litigation. ¶ 27 A motion for recusal of a judge or prosecutor is a normal part of litigation. That Chambers failed to file with sufficient speed does not render the motion outside the normal course of litigation. A last-minute motion to recuse is surely a more normal part of litigation than missing a deadline entirely. Cf. Weintraub, 2018 MP 16 ¶ 17 (finding that missing a deadline is part of the normal course of litigation). ¶ 28 Kingman’s actions likewise comprise the normal course of litigation. Notifying an opposing party of a potential conflict of interest and filing a motion to quash are normal acts within the role of an attorney. These actions served to strengthen the Commonwealth’s position or to fulfill professional responsibilities as an officer of the court. ¶ 29 Because both parties’ actions were part of the normal course of litigation, the trial court needed to find bad faith before it could sanction them. 2. Whether the Court Found Bad Faith ¶ 30 We have found that the question of bad faith is essentially a question of motive. To determine whether a person acted in bad faith, we ask whether a person intentionally committed an unprofessional or unethical act. Weintraub, 2018 MP 16 ¶¶ 14, 18. ¶ 31 Commonwealth v. Weintraub has been our most comprehensive opinion to date on the requirements of bad faith. Id. In Weintraub, we held that willfully disobeying a court order, committing fraud upon the court, delaying litigation, and presenting frivolous or meritless arguments are acts of bad faith. Id. ¶ 14. ¶ 32 A finding of bad faith can be implicit. See Matsunaga, 2001 MP 11 ¶ 24 n.17 (inferring bad faith from the record); Aguon, 2019 MP 1 ¶ 20 (determining bad faith based on attorney performing act previously established to be in bad 7  In re Commonwealth, 2026 MP 11 faith); Ibezim v. The GEO Grp., Inc., 786 Fed. Appx. 975, 977 (11th Cir. 2019) (finding bad faith without precise “magic words” being used). ¶ 33 The trial court made no findings on bad faith for Kingman. It never addressed Kingman’s motives or the purpose for which he acted. Additionally, Kingman’s motives are not apparent from the record. Kingman was sanctioned without an explicit or implicit finding of bad faith, and his sanctions would warrant remand on those grounds alone. ¶ 34 Regarding Chambers, the trial court made contradictory findings in different orders. When it sanctioned Chambers, the court stated that “Chambers intentionally delayed weakening the opposing counsel at an inopportune time” and “was purposefully untimely in filing recusal motions.” Commonwealth v. Villanueva, No. 24–00028 (NMI Super. Ct. Dec. 4, 2024) (Order Denying Mot. to Quash at 15, 18) (emphasis added). We have already found that dilatory tactics constitute bad faith, so this finding could have been sufficient to satisfy the requirement for a finding of bad faith before sanctions can be imposed. Aguon, 2019 MP 1 ¶ 20. However, in its subsequent Order Denying the Motion to Reconsider, the trial court stated, “[l]ike the Attorney Mitchell in Saipan Lau Lau Dev, Chamber’s dilatory actions were not done in bad faith to benefit his client’s legal case.” Commonwealth v. Villanueva, No. 24–00028 (NMI Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 2024) (Order Denying Mot. to Reconsider at 1). This demonstrates confusion about what bad faith entails and how Saipan Lau Lau Development informs it. ¶ 35 In Saipan Lau Lau Development, we found the attorney had acted with the intention to disrupt the proceedings and sanctioned him. Saipan Lau Lau Dev. v. Superior Court, 2001 MP 2 ¶ 70. As described above, the core of a bad faith determination is finding an improper motive, and this finding does not need to be explicitly labeled as a finding of bad faith. See Weintraub, 2018 MP 16 ¶¶ 14, 18; Matsunaga, 2001 MP 11 ¶ 24 n.17. Wanting to disrupt judicial proceedings certainly qualifies as an improper motive. Saipan Lau Lau Development was therefore not an instance of sanctions without a finding of bad faith, but of sanctions with an implied finding of bad faith. ¶ 36 After hearing and considering the parties’ explanations and arguments, the trial court may make factual findings different from those underlying the sanctions order. When it draws legal conclusions from those findings, the court should apply the bad faith standard set forth in this opinion. V. CONCLUSION ¶ 37 Because the trial court erred as a matter of law when it analyzed the bad faith standard for sanctions, and because neither party received the necessary due process protections, we REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 8  In re Commonwealth, 2026 MP 11 SO ORDERED this 2nd day of November, 2026. /s/ ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO Chief Justice /s/ JOHN A. MANGLONA Associate Justice /s/ F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO Justice Pro Tempore COUNSEL J. Robert Glass, Jr., Saipan, MP, for Party of Interest-Appellant, Cross-Appellee. Joaquin DLG. Torres, Saipan, MP, for Party of Interest-Appellee, Cross-Appellant. NOTICE This slip opinion has not been certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court for publication If any discrepancies arise between this slip opinion and the opinion ultimately certified for publication, the certified opinion will control. Readers are requested to bring any errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Supreme Court at P.O. Box 502165 Saipan, MP 96950; telephone (670) 236–9715; or e-mail Supreme.Court@NMIJudiciary.gov. 9  E-FILED CNMI SUPREME COURT E-filed: Nov 02 2026 03:11PM Clerk Review: Nov 02 2026 03:11PM Filing ID: 81225426 Case No.: 2025-SCC-0001-CRM NoraV Borja IN THE Supreme Court OF THE Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS, Plaintiff, v. SHAYNE BLANCO VILLANUEVA, Defendant. JAMES ROBERT KINGMAN, Party of Interest-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. KEITH CHAMBERS, II, Party of Interest-Appellee, Cross-Appellant. Supreme Court No. 2025-SCC-0001-CRM Criminal Case No. 24-0028-CR JUDGMENT Party of Interest-Appellant James Robert Kingman and Party of Interest-Appellee Keith Chambers, II, sought review of sanctions imposed by the trial court. For the reasons discussed in the accompanying opinion, the Court REVERSES the sanctions against both Kingman and Chambers and REMANDS for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 2026. /s/ NORA V. BORJA Deputy Clerk of the Supreme Court